Le Haut-Karabakh : deux poids, deux mesures…

Le Haut-Karabakh : deux poids, deux mesures…
by Anne-Marie Mouradian

Dec 03, 2009 04:48 PM

The principle is that the EU grants its development aid to populations
in need regardless of political considerations. But the truth is
difference. An article in French about the EU’s attitude to Nagorno
Karabakh. This article was published on by
Anne-Marie Mouradian.

L’Union européenne accorde en principe son aide humanitaire en
fonction des besoins des populations locales et non de considérations
politiques. La réalité est moins lisse. En témoigne la différence de
traitement envers deux républiques sud-caucasiennes autoproclamées et
au statut comparable : l’Abkhazie qui a fait sécession de la Géorgie
en 1992, d’une part, le Haut – Karabakh, enclave arménienne offerte à
l’Azerbaïdjan par Staline, qui a voté son indépendance en 1991, de
l’autre.

Deux « conflits gelés » à la suite de guerres d’indépendance
meurtières. La dernière crise russo-géorgienne et la signature, en
octobre, des protocoles arméno-turcs les ont rappelés au bon souvenir
de la communauté internationale.

Nonobstant le fait qu’elle ne la reconnaisse pas comme Etat, l’Union
européenne a des relations de facto avec l’Abkhazie. Elle lui fournit
une aide humanitaire, finance des projets visant à améliorer les
conditions de vie des habitants et des programmes de réhabilitation
économique. A travers ce modus vivendi, l’Europe a été en 2008 un
important donateur avec des projets « apolitiques » dont la mise en
`uvre n’était pas conditionnée à l’avancement des négociations ou à un
règlement du conflit.

L’UE refuse en revanche toute assistance au Haut-Karabakh et le
service d’aide humanitaire de la Commission européenne, ECHO, est
absent de l’enclave. Peter Senneby, l’envoyé spécial de l’Union
européenne pour le Caucase du Sud, s’est rendudepuis son entrée en
fonction, il y a trois ans, en Ossétie du Sud et en Abkhazie, mais il
n’est jamais allé au Haut-Karabakh. Deux poids, deux mesures pour ne
pas fcher Bakou. «Nous ne voulons pas », explique une source à la
Commission de Bruxelles, «créer de problèmes avec Bakou, avec le
gouvernement azerbaïdjanais qui considère toute aide à la population
du Haut-Karabakh comme une atteinte à sa souveraineté. Peter Senneby a
eu l’intention, à plusieurs reprises, d’aller à Stepanakert, la
capitale de l’enclave, mais a dû à chaque fois renoncer, voire
rebrousser chemin, sous la pression de Bakou».

Les Etats-Unis octroient, pour leur part, une assistance humanitaire
directe au Haut-Karabakh, fixée pour 2009 à 8 millions de dollars.
L’USAID y finance des projets de santé, d’approvisionnement en eau
potable, agriculture de subsistance, reconstruction des écoles et
habitations, programmes de micro-crédits…Pour tenter des combler les
lacunes humanitaires, quelques ONG internationales sont également
présentes, dont le Comité International de la Croix Rouge ou l’ONG
britannique « Halo Trust » spécialisée dans le nettoyage des mines
anti personnelles qui, quinze ans après le cessez le feu, continuent
de tuer et mutiler. Mais les besoins sont considérables.

Exsangue et détruite à 80% à l’issue de la guerre avec l’Azerbaïdjan,
le Haut-Karabakh, un « Etat qui n’existe pas mais qui est bien là »,
s’est attelé à sa reconstruction avec l’aide, principalement, de la
république d’Arménie elle-même isolée économiquement par le double
blocus turco-azéri, et d’organisations humanitaires arméniennes des
Etats-Unis et d’Europe, puisqu’à défaut d’un accès à la mer comme la
Géorgie ou de pétrole comme l’Azerbaïdjan, les Arméniens possèdent une
diaspora.

Absente sur le plan humanitaire et du développement, l’UE ne participe
pas non plus directement aux négociations sur le Haut-Karabakh entre
l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan menées sous l’égide du groupe de Minsk de
l’OSCE. Elle n’est pas pour autant inactive et compte financer des «
mesures de confiance » entre les sociètés civiles des parties en
conflit, indique-t-on à Bruxelles. Mais ces programmes de contacts et
de rencontres restent limités aux populations de l’Arménie et de
l’Azerbaïdjan, en excluant les habitants du Haut-Karabakh qui semblent
considérés par la communauté internationale plus comme un enjeu que
comme des acteurs. Comment `uvrer pour la paix en ignorant la
dynamique locale ? Le Parlement européen a invité l’UE à sortir de ce
paradoxe en élargissant les contacts aux principaux intéréssés et en
facilitant des contacts entre les populations du Haut-Karabakh et
d’Azerbaïdjan.

Fragiles protocoles arméno-turcs
La problématique a été relancée avec la signature le 10 octobre, sous
énorme pression américaine, des protocoles entre l’Arménie et la
Turquie, sur fond de nouveau grand jeu géopolitique au Sud-Caucase.
L’ouverture de la frontière fermée par la Turquie depuis 1993 et le
rétablissement de relations diplomatiques devraient contribuer, en
principe, à stabiliser la région et permettre à l’Occident de
sécuriser son approvisionnement énergétique depuis le bassin de la
Caspienne.

Jusqu’ici, la Turquie avait mis trois conditions à l’ouverture de sa
frontière avec l’Arménie : que Erevan renonce à revendiquer la
reconnaissance du génocide arménien par les Turcs ottomans qu’Ankara
s’obstine à nier depuis 94 ans ; que le conflit du Haut-Karabakh soit
résolu de manière satisfaisante pour l’Azerbaïdjan, que Erevan
reconnaisse les frontières actuelles comme légales, renonçant à
d’éventuelles revendications territoriales et réparations.

Côté arménien, les autorités ont répété qu’elles ne demandaient aucun
préalable tout en précisant qu’il ne peut être question de remplacer
un embargo matériel par un embargo sur la mémoire. Des opposants aux
protocoles en Arménie comme dans la diaspora, jugent quant à eux toute
normalisation impossible tant que l’Etat turc, par son négationnisme
et son refus de tout acte de contrition, gardera toujours béante la
plaie du génocide arménien.

Concernant le Karabakh, il ne peut, estime Erevan, servir de
marchandage à une normalisation arméno-turque. La république de facto
qui n’a pas oublié les pogroms antiarméniens en Azerbaïdjan, rejette
catégoriquement toute idée de retour sous l’autorité de Bakou. Le
compromis global proposé par les médiateurs du groupe de Minsk porte
sur la définition du statut final de l’enclave dans le cadre d’un
referendum d’autodétermination, la question des réfugiés et personnes
déplacées, le retour sous contrôle azerbaïdjanais des zones tampon
entourant le Haut-Karabakh et un corridor reliant l’enclave à
l’Arménie. Pour Erevan, il s’agit d’un paquet à négocier dans son
ensemble. Bakou s’oppose au referendum d’autdétermination.

Face aux menaces de guerre régulièrement agitées par le président
Aliyev, un retrait des forces arméniennes de la ceinture de sécurité
qu’elles occupent autour du Haut-Karabakh rendrait l’enclave
vulnérable, sinon indéfendable en cas d’attaque ; elles n’envisagent
de s’en retirer que si elles sont remplacées par une force
internationale. Les médiateurs ont proposé le déploiement d’une
mission de paix mais aucun Etat, à part la Russie, n’est prêt à
envoyer de troupes. « Nous n’avons reçu aucun signal dans ce sens de
la part de nos responsables politiques » constate un expert du Comité
militaire de l’UE.

« En cette période de crise financière et de réduction des budgets,
l’UE envisage moins que jamais de déployer une mission de paix autour
du Karabakh» confirme-t-on à la Commission européenne. Comme le relève
Bruno Coppieters, professeur de sciences politiques à la Vrije
Universiteit Brussel, « Le problème des Etats non reconnus
internationalement, c’est qu’on peut difficilement garantir leur
sécurité et empêcher l’usage de la force à leur encontre. C’est ce qui
s’est passé dans le cas de l’Akhazie, en août 2008. Il faut que la
communauté internationale trouve le moyen de prévenir les menaces
d’agression dans ce genre de situation ».

Officiellement, les protocoles arméno-turcs ne prévoient rien d’autre
que l’ouverture de la frontière et la normalisation sans préalables
des relations bilatérales entre la Turquie et l’Arménie, après
ratification par leurs parlements.

L’accord à peine signé, le Premier ministre Erdogan subordonnait
pourtant leur mise en `uvre à une solution du conflit du Karabakh. Le
parlement turc ne ratifiera pas les protocoles tant qu’il n’aura pas
obtenu satisfaction sur cette question, en comptant sur la fragilité
d’une Arménie rendue économiquement vulnérable par le blocus. Un
calcul qui balaierait les engagements des « parrains » occidentaux et
équivaudrait à torpiller le processus de normalisation. Reconnaître
qu’il a été « piégé» et accepter une formule mettant en danger le
statut et la sécurité du Haut-Karabakh contraindrait le Président
arménien Serge Sarkissian à la démission. Avant lui, l’ancien
président Levon Ter-Petrossian en a fait l’expérience dans des
circonstances comparables.

Nul ne sait à ce stade ce qui sortira des protocoles arméno-turcs. Le
chemin est encore long à parcourir et laisse prévoir de complexes et
obscures man`uvres diplomatiques. Leur mise en `uvre inconditionnelle
permettrait un début de rapprochement, premier pas d’un long et
difficile processus, sachant que normalisation et réconciliation sont
deux notions différentes. La première relève d’une décision d’Etat à
Etat. La seconde nécessite l’assentiment et l’adhésion des peuples,
clé d’une véritable stabilisation.

*Anne-Marie Mouradian est journaliste, correspondante de plusieurs
médias internationaux (Bruxelles).

http://www.grotius.fr/
http://www.grotius.fr/

ISTANBUL: 12,000 Armenian citizens working illegally in Turkey

Today’s Zaman, Turkey
Dec 5 2009

Report: 12,000 Armenian citizens working illegally in Turkey

Photo: Researcher Alin Ozinian, a Turkish Armenian, interviewed
Armenians living in Turkey for the study.

There are between 12,000 and 13,000 Armenian citizens working
illegally in Turkey, the results of a study by the Eurasia Partnership
Foundation have revealed.

According to the study, 94 percent of the Armenians working in Turkey
are women, with very few Armenian men accompanying their spouses to
Turkey or working here. Armenian women tend to work as childcare
providers, servants, janitors and saleswomen. Most of the Armenian men
who accompany their wives here choose not to work at all, while those
who do tend to work in the jewelry business.

The foundation — based in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia — recently
sponsored a detailed study on the work patterns of Armenians in
Turkey. Head researcher Alin Ozinian, an ?Ä?°stanbul native of Armenian
descent, worked for two years on the project, which culminated in a
150-page report to be released to the public next month in ?Ä?°stanbul.
The report makes important claims as to the number of Armenians living
in Turkey. According to official numbers, 6,000 Armenians did not
return home after traveling to Turkey between 2000 and 2008. Ozinian
adds figures from the 1990s to this number and says the number of
Armenians illegally living in Turkey is not 70,000 to 100,000 as has
previously been asserted, but is actually 12,000 to 13,000.

In November, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?Ä?an said during the
course of a speech in Malatya that there were nearly 100,000 Armenians
living illegally in Turkey and that the government overlooked this. In
the past, Turkish foreign ministers and diplomats have also spoken of
Armenians living in Turkey numbering around 70,000. Turkey has
deported very few Armenians working illegally here in recent years,
the report says, asserting that Armenians are only deported if they
have committed a crime outside of working illegally; the crime rate
amongst immigrant Armenians is very low. Ozinian believes that the
Turkish authorities knowingly ignore illegal Armenian workers in
Turkey.

For those Armenians with the will, it is a simple matter to immigrate
to Turkey. An $80 bus ticket secures travel through Georgia to the
Turkish border, where another $15 buys an entry visa. Ninety-five
percent of Armenian immigrants choose to live in ?Ä?°stanbul.

An interesting finding of the study is that those migrating from
Armenia prefer to work and live with Turks in ?Ä?°stanbul, as opposed to
Armenians who are natives of the city. Immigrant Armenians say the
`moral values’ of Turks and Armenians are very close. Amongst the
survey questions asked as part of the study was, `Is there a
difference between the idea of a Turk you had in your head before
coming here and the ideas you have now?’ Most of the answers expressed
a fear of Turks before coming and a love of them after living and
working with them.

Armenian immigrant children often do not continue their education
after coming to Turkey, and infants born here have no official birth
certificates. As there is no Armenian consulate or embassy in Turkey,
they are children without identities or nationality.

05 December 2009, Saturday
S?Ã`LEYMAN KURT ANKARA

672-100-report-12000-armenian-citizens-working-ill egally-in-turkey.html

http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-194

U.S. To Support Armenia-Turkey Reconciliation: Obama

U.S. TO SUPPORT ARMENIA-TURKEY RECONCILIATION: OBAMA

news.am
Dec 4 2009
Armenia

13:09 / 12/04/2009U.S. President stated he would continue to press
unconditional Armenia-Turkey rapprochement, RFE/RL reads. NEWS.am
posts the full text of the article of RFE/RL website.

"Obama hailed the U.S.-backed dialogue between the two nations as
"historic," in a letter to Hirair Hovnanian, chairman of the Armenian
Assembly of America,that was publicized by the influential advocacy
group late on Thursday.

"I agree that normalization between Armenia and Turkey should move
forward without preconditions and within a reasonable timeframe,"
he said, echoing statements by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
and other U.S. officials.

"We will continue to vigorously support the normalization effort in
the months ahead," added Obama.

The letter dated November 20 came in response to a September
9 joint appeal to Obama from Hovnanian and the leaders of the
Armenian General Benevolent Union and two U.S dioceses of the
Armenian Apostolic Church. The signatories voiced support for the
fence-mending Turkish-Armenian agreements and said Washington should
get Ankara to stop linking their implementation with a resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict favored by Azerbaijan.

The Armenian-American leaders also urged Obama to honor his campaign
pledges to recognize the 1915 massacres of Armenians in the Ottoman
Empire as genocide once in office. "If this normalization process
is used as a smokescreen for not reaffirming the Armenian Genocide
and the U.S. record, it will be a blow to the rapprochement process
and the expectations of people of goodwill everywhere," they said,
highlighting concerns among many Armenians in the United States and
elsewhere in the world.

In his reply, Obama again stopped short using the word ‘genocide’
with respect to "one of the great atrocities of the 20th century,"
even if he made clear that he stands by his past pronouncements on the
subject. "My interest remains the achievement of a full, frank and just
acknowledgement of the facts," he wrote. "I believe that the best way
to advance that goal is for the Armenian and Turkish people to address
the facts of the past as part of their efforts to move forward."

How The West Lost Turkey

HOW THE WEST LOST TURKEY
NICK DANFORTH

Greek American News Agency
/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id =6634&Itemid=83
Dec 1 2009

Lately, some on the right in Washington have fretted that Turkey’s
religiously oriented Justice and Development Party, the AKP, will
distance the country from its Western allies, eroding secularism as it
seeks tighter bonds within the Middle East. After all, Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pushed some very sensitive Western buttons:
He has dismissed concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, for instance,
and canceled a military exercise with Israel, holding one with Syria
instead.

These moves leave plenty to worry about — including the possibility
that the United States will make things worse by worrying about all
the wrong things. But Erdogan’s decisions do not augur the rise of
an Islamist foreign policy in Turkey. The more troubling reality
is that they are the inevitable outcome of long-brewing domestic
trends. In limiting cooperation with Israel and improving relations
with neighbors like Iran and Syria, Erdogan is playing to Turkish
leftists and rightists, secularists and Islamists. He’s pandering to
voters who already dislike the United States and Israel while cleverly,
if cynically, pursuing Turkey’s national interests. A good politician
from any other party would do the same.

Understanding Erdogan’s political calculus starts with understanding
that in Turkey anger at the West is near universal. Where Islamists
see a global crusade against their faith, secular leftists see global
capitalism and U.S. imperialism. Many Islamists think Israel and
the United States are secretly working with the Turkish military to
overthrow the democratically elected Islamist government. Conversely,
many secularists think Israel and the United States are using the AKP
to weaken Turkey by undermining its secular identity. According to a
recent poll, 72 percent of people in Turkey believe foreign powers
are working to break apart their country. It’s little comfort that
they disagree on how.

Turks themselves were never enthusiastic about their country’s
relationship with Israel. The military was, though, and for much of
Turkey’s recent history it controlled the country’s foreign policy.

Now, in an increasingly democratic Turkey with more power centers
when it comes to foreign affairs, the temptation for politicians to
pander to anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and anti-Washington sentiment
is hard to resist — as seen in Erdogan’s recent statements.

The more impatient Washington gets with this dynamic, the worse it
will be. Suggesting, for instance, that it wouldn’t be so bad if the
Turkish army were still running the show just plays into the hands of
millions of anti-American conspiracy theorists — who are surprisingly
attentive to statements from think tanks and Capitol Hill. It also
feeds the illusion that the Turkish military will remain reliably
pro-American. Older, higher-ranking officers continue to work closely
with their U.S. counterparts. But younger officers who grew up viewing
the United States as their enemy are rising through the ranks.

Fortunately, Erdogan’s friendship with Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad enjoys less popular support. And though moderates decry
the friendship, fringe rightists and leftists applaud it. Last June,
both moderate Islamists and moderate secularists embraced the Iranian
protesters as kindred spirits. To secularists, many of whom view
Erdogan as little more than a Turkish Ahmadinejad, the protesters
were fighting against theocracy. To Islamists, the protesters were
fighting for democracy, with the ayatollahs cast in the authoritarian
role of the Turkish military. After President Abdullah Gul and Erdogan
rushed to congratulate Ahmadinejad on his victory, several columnists
in the reliably pro-government Zaman newspaper broke with the party
line to condemn the brutality on the streets of Tehran.

Meanwhile, more partisan voices on both extremes denounced the
protesters as American or Zionist puppets. A secular columnist, for
instance, described Neda Agha-Soltan — the protesting young woman
whose death was seen around the world on YouTube — as a militant in
George Soros’s army who had removed the cross from her neck to pose
as a protester. An Islamist paper claimed she was still wearing the
cross when she was shot.

In time, democratization will help discredit the radicals on both
sides. Until then, Washington’s best partners remain those moderates
who, whatever they think of the United States, at the very least
share a mutually comprehensible view of the world.

There are also powerful economic and strategic interests driving
Turkey’s foreign policy of which watchers in Washington should take
better notice. In recent years, a vibrantly capitalist Turkey has
bolstered its regional trade to great effect, looking for markets
not just in the Middle East but also in old enemies such as Armenia.

Lifting visa requirements with Syria in September, for instance, has
already been a boon to businessmen in southern Turkey. Russia is now
the country’s largest trading partner, and the Wall Street Journal
reports that Turkey’s trade with Sudan has tripled since 2006. Iran,
meanwhile, is a major source of cheap natural gas, keeping Turkey’s
economy growing. How shocked can the United States be if that makes
Ahmadinejad look a little less despotic in Ankara?

Turkey is acutely aware that economic success is crucial to securing
European Union membership. Indeed, Ankara has promoted its EU candidacy
by claiming that it will help expand Europe’s influence in the Middle
East; the AKP has offered Turkey’s services as a mediator between Syria
and Israel as well as between Iran and the United States. Turkish
politicians and intellectuals are quick to point out that they will
be more useful to their allies if they are also on good terms with
their allies’ enemies. Being a bridge between East and West, they say,
requires having a footing in the East as well.

Yet in trying to turn its dual identity into a strategic asset,
Turkey runs the perpetual risk of finding itself rejected by both
sides — too Muslim and Middle Eastern for the Europeans, and too
secular and pro-American for the Middle Easterners. Europeans might
be more tolerant than Americans when it comes to entreaties to Iran
and Iran’s criticism of Israel, but only up to a point. Recently,
the AKP seems to have realized it went too far for EU tastes in
preparing to welcome Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir to
Istanbul. Meanwhile, Turkey’s relations with the Arab world have
always been worse than many people realize. The Ottoman Empire, for
one, is not fondly remembered by many of its former subjects. Turkey
opposed Algerian independence in 1955 and almost attacked Syria in
1998. With the Cold War over and a resolution to Turkey’s perennial
Kurdish problem in sight, the general consensus in Ankara is that
it’s high time Turkey patched things up with the East as well.

The hostility Turks feel toward their allies is alarming. Their
desire for peace and prosperity in the region is not. Ultimately,
the challenge for Washington is to keep this distinction in mind when
deciding how worried to get over developments in Turkey. Erdogan’s
challenge is even harder. He has to get what he can from Turkey’s
new friends in the East while also keeping — and, if necessary,
publicly defending — Turkey’s friends in the West.

http://www.greekamericannewsagency.com/gana

To Influence Baku Armenia Should Withdraw From Kars Agreement And Ra

TO INFLUENCE BAKU ARMENIA SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM KARS AGREEMENT AND RAISE NAKHICHEVAN ISSUE

/PanARMENIAN.Net/
02.12.2009 20:04 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Turkey and Azerbaijan are trying to link
Armenia-Turkey relations to NKR conflict, RPA parliamentary group
member Gagik Melikyan said.

"It’s natural, but they won’t be allowed to do so," he stressed at the
joint news conference with former NKR Foreign Minister Arman Melikyan.

Yet, the latter disagreed, noting that though there’s no formal link
between Armenia-Turkey protocols and NKR conflict settlement, still
there is a procedural one.

"Armenia-Turkey border is unlikely to be opened until the spring 2010.

All the while, Turkey will be convincing the international community
of the impossibility to open the border without some progress in
Karabakh conflict settlement," Arman Melikyan emphasized.

"To influence Baku, Armenia should withdraw from Kars agreement and
raise Nakhichevan issue," Arman Melikyan noted adding that withdrawal
from agreement and Protocols’ ratification will allow Armenia to turn
over a new leaf in relations with Turkey.

The FMs Of RA And Estonia Touched Upon The NKR Issue

THE FMS OF RA AND ESTONIA TOUCHED UPON THE NKR ISSUE

Aysor
Dec 2 2009
Armenia

The agenda of the Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian who
was in Athens for participating in the 17th sitting of the OSCE
Ministerial Council was full also with bilateral meetings.

The Armenian and Estonian ministers Nalbandian and Urmas Paet expressed
their gratitude for the periodic contact and have noticed that they
are giving a nice opportunity for controlling the implementation
of the achieved agreements and to highlight the new steps for the
development of the relations.

As the Press and information service of the Armenian Foreign Ministry
informs Urmas Paet has reconfirmed the invitation for Tigran Sargsyan
to Estonia made by the Prime Minister Andrus Ansip.

The Armenian FM has presented to his Estonian counterpart the latest
developments concerning the NKR issue taken place in Munich on November
22 during the meeting of the two presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Ministers have discussed also issues concerning the cooperation
in the sphere of retraining of diplomatic staff.

Interview With Rev. Stan Lucyk

INTERVIEW WITH REV. STAN LUCYK
By Noelle Boughton

United Church Observer
tan_lucyk/
Nov 30 2009

A retired United Church minister who has led pilgrimages to the
Holy Land for 30 years explains why Canadian Christians should make
the journey

Q Why do you think Christians should visit Israel and Palestine?

A Is there a Palestine? There’s a Palestinian Authority. But I
don’t think there’s a UN-recognized state of Palestine. It’s called
the Occupied Territories. It’s occupied land under dispute. [The
Palestinians are] allowed to sit at the UN, but the state has not
been put in place by the United Nations. The State of Israel is the
state recognized by the United Nations.

Q Okay, why do you think Christians should visit Israel and the
Occupied Territories?

A Because our boss was a Jew. Because Israel was the Christians’
homeland. Christianity is a historic religion that comes out of
Judaism. As [Old Testament scholar] George Ernest Wright said,
God is the God who acts — historical acts in historical places
and in historical times. To pick up those acts within the place in
which that history occurred is to underline the historicity of what
underlies Christianity.

Q How has seeing the land influenced your understanding of the Bible?

A Most of the United Church theology I had was mediated through
Scotland. Most of my teachers had their PhDs out of Edinburgh. When
you go and experience the land, it’s quite different in that you see
interpretive links. For example, if you think "Jew" in the Bible,
think Bedouin. So much of the folk stuff of biblical times was part
of Bedouin culture, which is still there, among Arabs and Palestinians.

Take Psalm 23: "Thou preparest a table before me in the presence of
mine enemies." You don’t understand that until you realize the outside
ropes of the Bedouin tent were a refuge for anyone pursuing a person
for blood vengeance. The whole perspective on biblical interpretation
is changed when you experience that world.

Q What do Canadian Christians learn on these trips?

A If they learn anything, they should learn that beneath the surface
are countless subsurface stories. It’s always the first-time visitor
who has the solution for the Israeli-Arab issue, but the more you
visit, the more you learn about the complexity of the Middle East. It
should make us cautious about damning one side or the other. Sure,
the fence is a dirty, nasty thing. But, in 2002, there were 400
homicides in Israel. That’s counting terrorism. In 2008, after the
fence was put up, there were four. I haven’t heard any Jew who hasn’t
said that fence is terrible, but it has proven necessary. Another
thing Canadians learn is that 98 percent of the Christians in that
world are Palestinians. Our brothers and sisters in Christ in that
land are Palestinian Arabs.

Q How do you choose what people see on your tours?

A Normally the tour builds to Jerusalem. That’s the goal of the
pilgrimage. Then, one has to do basic homeland stuff for the Christian:
Nazareth, Galilee, around the Sea of Galilee. There’s also the question
of experiencing the vast range of that tiny country. So I take them
to Mount Hermon, the Dead Sea, and out in the wilderness, from which
the prophets came. It’s also a question of going to places associated
with the biblical story. We go to the sea coast, so they understand
that Pilate usually lived on the coast. He came into Jerusalem only
at Passover to make sure the Freedom Festival didn’t get these guys
thinking about freedom. And our guy from the Galilee, who talks about
a kingdom of God, ends up crucified.

I think part of our tour is also to break down "social distance." I
have a couple like Nadja and Issam Habash, Coptic Palestinian
Christians, come in. They allow us to understand something of their
world, like having to get up in the morning to get their kids through
that security fence. I often hire someone from [the Jewish non-profit
organization] Melitz, and on Saturday morning, we go to four synagogues
to experience the Yemenite, the Italian and the Reform [services].

I also want them to experience the totally different mosaic of
Christianity in Israel. Who’s a Melkite? Who’s a Maronite? Who are
the Armenians? Part of this is to open them to what author Philip
Jenkins calls "the lost history of Christianity."

Q What do they learn about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

A That depends on whom they talk to and what they read. Take the
Gaza conflict. War is dirty. Neither side was right. Hamas with their
rockets, and Israel with its attack. But, as a sovereign state, are
you allowed to protect yourself? When the State of Israel was formed,
the only one who made sense to me was theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. He
said that under a great historical necessity — namely the Holocaust,
but also the fact that countries like Canada were unwilling to help
refugees — one could justify the establishment of the State of
Israel, but there would never be a clean solution to this. At most —
in settling land claims and removing Palestinians from their land —
we will "approximate justice."

Q What opportunities are you able to build into the tour to help
participants assess the current conflict?

A We meet with Palestinians. We also go back and forth between
the Palestinian Authority and Israel. We know there are different
standards for different people. We whisk through without our passports
even being looked at most of the time because we have a trustee who
takes us across. The other thing I usually do is have a group meet
with the Palestinian Lutheran bishop of Jordan and Israel, Munib
Younan. He spends about an hour with us talking about the dilemma of
his people. Often, when we go to Bethlehem, I have the guide in the
Authority tell us what life is like. We see the shabbiness of the
Palestinians’ clothing, cars and buses when we go into Jericho.

Q The United Church has 19 partners in Israel and the Occupied
Territories. Do you include visits with any of them?

A I don’t know who the partners are. I am aware of the Middle
East Council of Churches, but I choose the partners I know. Bishop
Younan is a Palestinian. In Jordan and Syria, we meet with a Melkite
archbishop. It brings back some of that lost history of Christianity.

Q Most of your tours focus on Israel with only a few stops at
historical West Bank sites. How do you respond to critics who say
this does not provide an adequate representation of the struggles of
Palestinians today?

A Most sites germane to the biblical story are on the Israeli side:
the Galilee, Nazareth, Jerusalem, the wilderness. Bethlehem and
Jericho are in the Palestinian Authority, and we go there. Qumran is
in Palestinian territory, even though it’s under the Israelis. So we
visit Palestinian territories that relate to the biblical story. If
you want to tour only what goes on in the Palestinian-Israeli fight,
fine, do it, but it’s the biblical story that I’m after.

The sacramental nature of geography — the linking of word to place
to bring the past into the present — is the theological rationale for
why I do tours. I don’t make money. I’m not in it as a tour person. I’m
not in it to push the Israeli side. I’m in religious education.

Noelle Boughton is a Toronto writer and editor.

http://www.ucobserver.org/faith/2009/12/s

An Open Letter To Peter Semneby

AN OPEN LETTER TO PETER SEMNEBY

armradio.am
01.12.2009 11:59

"Yerkir" Union of NGOs for Repatriation and Settlement addressed
an open letter to EU Special Representative of the South Caucasus,
where it denounces the European uNion for shutting eyes to the
discriminatory policy of the Georgian authorities towards ethnic
minorities. The letter reads, in part:

"Dear Mr. Semneby,

In the interview published in the Russian daily newspaper "Vremya
Novostey" on November 2, 2009 you, among other issues, touched upon
the problems of ethnic minorities of Georgia and, in that context, the
problems of the Javakheti Armenians, making the following observation:
"The issues of national minorities in Georgia are important. We must
pay more attention to them, than we – on our part, and the Georgian
authorities – on theirs used to. This is a difficult issue. … The
problems there are largely social; those are problems of economic
development."

The very fact of your statement can be considered as positive,
even if it is only viewed from the standpoint of public recognition
of the existing problem by such a high-ranking official of the
European Union. However, to what extent does it reflect the real
situation, reducing the problems of Javakheti Armenians to only their
socio-economic component?

Of course, the socio-economic component is present in the complex of
the problems of the Javakheti Armenians, but it does not occupy the
central and decisive position. The Armenian population of Georgia,
and the part, compactly inhabiting the south-western regions of the
country in particular, suffers from violation of their political,
civil, cultural, educational and religious rights, the rights that
are guaranteed by numerous international obligations undertaken by
Georgia and aimed at protection of ethnic minorities.

The main problems facing the Georgian and the Javakheti Armenians
can be summed up as follows:

The Armenian population is disproportionately represented in the
administrative and governing bodies of the regions of their compact
residence;

The Georgian authorities impose mandatory legislative and
administrative measures to compel the minorities in the places of their
compact residence to use exclusively the Georgian language in all
spheres of public life, although the vast majority of the Javakheti
Armenians by objective circumstances do not speak the language of
the titular nation;

The Armenian Apostolic Church in Georgia has no legal status, and
the Georgian authorities refuse to return to it the Armenian temples,
confiscated during the Soviet era.

The very fact that you avoided mentioning in your interview
the existence of these issues, which are far from being only
socio-economic, becomes even more bizarre, considering the fact that
numerous reputable international organizations have addressed the
issue of discriminatory policy implemented by the Georgian authorities
towards the ethnic minorities in Georgia.

Thus, for example, the UN Human Rights Committee in its recommendations
adopted on October 16, 2007, proposes that the Georgian authorities
take steps to ensure freedom and equality of religion. The Committee
recommends that the Georgian authorities solve the problem of
restitution of the property, confiscated during the Soviet era to the
religious minorities. The Committee, expressing concern about the low
level of political representation of minorities, suggests that the
Georgian authorities implement measures to eliminate discrimination on
the basis of language. To this end, the Committee proposes to consider
the possibility of allowing minorities to use their own language
at the level of local government and administration and to take all
appropriate measures to ensure adequate political representation and
political participation of ethnic minorities.

Serious shortcomings regarding the compliance of Georgia with
the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities were reflected in the report submitted in spring 2009
by the Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe. The Advisory
Committee recommends that the Georgian authorities make sure that the
policy of promoting the Georgian language is not detrimental to the
right of using the minority languages, mentioning that this requires
more resolute measures reflected both in law and in practice. The
experts of the Council of Europe, noting that national minorities
are underrepresented in the country’s political, cultural, social and
economic life, recommend that the Georgian authorities take vigorous
measures to remove legislative and practical obstacles the national
minorities come across, so that they can participate in the elected
bodies and in the executive, and work in the public service.

In addition to the above, authoritative international organizations
in 2005-2009, the Public Defender of Georgia, a number of Western
countries and international organizations in their respective reports
and statements touched upon the various manifestations of the policy
of violation of the rights of the Armenian minority of Georgia,
expressing their concern about these facts.

The President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan in his speech on September
1, 2009 also addressed the issues of concern of the Georgian and
Javakheti Armenians stating in particular that the logic of the
policy towards Javakhk should rest on the premise of "integration
without assimilation", and that the recognition of the Armenian as a
regional language, the registration of the Armenian Apostolic Church,
the steps undertaken to protect the Armenian monuments in Georgia
will only strengthen the Armenian-Georgian friendship and enhance
the atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding.

However, the Georgian authorities ignore the recommendations of the
international community and continue implementing a discriminatory
policy towards the Javakheti Armenians. Moreover, in recent years this
policy has achieved the level of repressions against the Javakheti
political activists through law enforcement agencies and judicial
authorities. During the period of 2007-2009 as a result of direct
and indirect pressure from the power structures of Georgia dozens
of political activists emigrated from Javakheti, many were tried for
fabricated criminal charges, some of them "bought" their freedom at
the cost of admission of guilt in their alleged "crimes", others were
tried in absentia and sentenced to various prison terms.

On July 21, 2008 the Georgian Special Forces stormed the house and the
office of the prominent Javakheti political activist Vahagn Chakhalyan,
"found" weapons there and on this basis immediately arrested him
as well as his father and his under-age brother. Later on Vahagn
Chakhalyan was charged with "organizing and active participation in
activities that disrupt public order" and "hooliganism"- charges
solely based on his political activities in 2005-2006, when the
Armenian population through demonstrations and protests put forth
their legitimate claims to honor their linguistic and educational,
socio-cultural and religious rights.

On April 7, 2009, as a result of proceedings accompanied by flagrant
violations, the Javakheti political activist was sentenced to 10
years’ imprisonment in the Court of First Instance. On October 30,
2009 the Court of Appeals upheld the verdict intact.

This retaliatory act by the Georgian authorities against Vahagn
Chakhalyan has caused wide public resonance in Armenia and in the
Diaspora. A number of Armenian non-governmental organizations,
international human rights institutions, European parliamentarians
have adopted statements and taken other steps aimed at protection
of the rights of the Javakheti Armenian activist. On April 14, 2009
the Coordination Council of Armenian Organizations of France held a
protest demonstration before the Georgian Embassy in Paris against
this unjust sentence; two days after this action Vahagn Chakhalyan
was severely beaten in prison.

Meanwhile, Georgia is a member of the "The European Neighborhood
Policy" and "Eastern Partnership" EU programs and through them the
country receives substantial financial assistance. At the same time
Georgia openly violates the basic human rights and the rights of ethnic
minorities. Under the circumstances, by ignoring the existing problems
the EU actually authorizes the Georgian authorities to continue their
discriminatory policy towards their ethnic minorities, authorizes new
manifestations of police repressions in the Armenian-populated areas,
and authorizes new irresponsible acts that deepen day by day the
mood of fear, frustration and alienation in the Armenian-populated
regions of Georgia. Thus, the European Union involuntarily assumes
the role of an accomplice of the Georgian authorities, sharing the
responsibility for a possible aggravation of the situation.

Dear Mr. Semneby,

Based on abovementioned facts, we call upon You to take more
decisive and effective stance in this issue in order to "explain"
to the Georgian authorities that the communication with the Armenian
citizens of their country from the position of rude force, police
repression and deprivation of rights leads to a deadlock, and only
through recognition, effective protection and enjoyment of fundamental
rights and freedoms of individuals and minorities, as well as the
actual planting of democratic procedures is it possible to create
stable guarantees for the development of the country.

We firmly believe, that only by exercising principled position with
respect to these issues is it possible to help the Georgian authorities
in creating a functioning democratic system, which will be the real
guarantee of stability for the country and the entire South Caucasus
region as a whole."

RA PM Tigran Sargsyan Received A Delegation Led By Republic Of Polan

REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA PRIME MINISTER TIGRAN SARGSYAN RECEIVED A DELEGATION LED BY REPUBLIC OF POLAND NATIONAL DEFENSE MINISTER BOGDAN KLICH

gov.am
Nov 30 2009
Armenia

Greeting the delegation, the Prime Minister said to be hopeful that
"the visit will help strengthen bilateral relations, especially in the
strategic field of military cooperation." Tigran Sargsyan expressed
his appreciation of the Polish Seim’s passing a resolution on Armenian
Genocide recognition.

Bogdan Klich conveyed warm greetings on behalf of Polish Prime Minister
Donald Tusc who is scheduled to visit Armenia shortly.

Getting down regional problems, the head of the Armenian government
outlined the Karabakh peace process and the latest developments in
Armenia-Turkey relationship. The Polish Defense Minister said his
country is a partisan of peaceful settlement of disputes in South
Caucasus: "We highly value the process of signing the protocols."

The parties also spoke about the Partnership for Peace program
as implemented in NATO frameworks. The Republic of Poland was
said assuming EU chairmanship next year and concerned with the
implementation of the Poland-Sweden-initiated Eastern Partnership
Program.

Summing up the meeting, Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan extended warm
greetings to his Polish counterpart and expressed hope that Mr. Tusc’s
upcoming visit will give a boost to economic ties: "Poland may well
be represented on a higher level in our region, and we are interested
in it."

BAKU: Zurab Noghaideli: The Regional Security Architecture Should Be

ZURAB NOGHAIDELI: THE REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE SHOULD BE REESTABLISHED IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS – EXCLUSIVE

APA
Nov 26 2009
Azerbaijan

Moscow. Roman Agayev – APA. APA’s exclusive interview with former
Prime Minister of Georgia, leader of opposition party, "Movement for
Fair Georgia" Zurab Noghaideli

-Traditionally, there has been friendship, peaceful neighborhood
between Azerbaijan and Georgia, and these relations are continuing.

How do you assess the present state of the relations between the
two countries?

-No doubt, Azerbaijan-Georgia relations will improve and strengthen.

Unfortunately, there are a number of problems in these relations,
though at first sight they seem to be positive. Tomorrow there will
be real strategic relations between our countries. Speaking of the
problems in Azerbaijan-Georgia relations, I mean Mikhail Saakashvili
led Georgia to war and destroyed the regional security architecture.

This architecture should be reestablished.

-Do the problems in the relations between the two countries also
include the problems of the Azerbaijanis living in Georgia?

-Like other nations, the Azerbaijanis living in Georgia also share out
problems and achievements. Speaking about the problems I mean that
the August happenings destroyed the regional security, it should be
reestablished. Georgia-Azerbaijan relations should always be on good
level. These relations will be on high level when we come to power.

-The regional security architecture was destroyed not only by last
year’s war, but much earlier – it was destroyed as a result of
Armenia’s aggression against Azerbaijan that is still going on…

– Certainly. I agree with you. Speaking of the security architecture
of the Caucasus I did not mean that at present it is ideal. Of course,
security architecture was destroyed because of a number of reasons,
including Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. There are a number of unsolved
problems in the South Caucasus. I think we should strengthen our
efforts to solve these problems. It is impossible to establish
transparent, stable security architecture in the Caucasus unless
these problems are solved fully. I am glad that Armenia and Azerbaijan
continue negotiations on the settlement of Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

Unfortunately, the process of settlement is going slowly, but it
should be noted that there are promising signs in this process.