Author: Kanayan Tamar

BRONZE AGE BONES OFFER EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL DIVINATION

Cornell Chronicle, Cornell University
March 12 2015

By H. Roger Segelken

Adam T. Smith, right, and his Armenian colleague, Dr. Ruben Badalyan,
excavate the Gegharot site.

Artifacts uncovered at one of the Gegharot citadel shines are evidence
of political divination, archaeologist say.

Trying to divine the future of a precarious administration, “House
of Cards” President Frank Underwood enters the inner sanctum with a
trusted adviser. “It’s really a crapshoot,” the adviser says, and the
president nods. The bourbon is drained, cigars are snuffed, and the
political leader emerges with a more confident sense of what’s to come.

‘Twas ever thus.

“It really was a crapshoot, with very high stakes for sovereign rulers
in a turbulent time,” says Cornell archaeologist Adam T. Smith,
interpreting evidence from 3,300-year-old Bronze Age shrines,
ensconced within a hilltop fortress on the Tsaghkahovit Plain of
central Armenia. Smith, a professor of anthropology in the College
of Arts and Sciences, studies the role that the material world –
everyday objects, representational media, natural and built landscapes
– plays in the political lives of ancient and modern-day people.

Dice-like knucklebones used for osteomancy and colored stones used for
lithomancy (divination with bones and stones, respectively) were found
deep within the ruins of the fallen citadel of Gegharot. Aleuromancy
(divination with freshly ground flour) is a likely explanation for
implements found in one of three shrines, Smith and Cornell Ph.D.

candidate Jeffrey F. Leon report in their October 2014 American Journal
of Archaeology article, “Divination and Sovereignty: The Late Bronze
Age Shrines at Gegharot, Armenia.”

Excavations conducted at Gegharot since 2002 have turned up a variety
of ceremonial, iconic and fortune-telling objects:

censers and basins for burning aromatic plant materials that could
induce a trance state; covered storage containers made of clay where
pollen analysis found evidence of wheat; drinking vessels, probably
for long-gone wine; sculpted clay idols “with vaguely anthropomorphic
features and hornlike protrusions” and stele (standing blocks) the
archaeologists say “likely served as focal point for ritual attention”;
grain-grinding implements and stamp seals to make impressions in
flour dough; dozens of knucklebones (also called astragali) of cattle,
sheep and goats with certain sides blackened like the markings on dice;
and polished stones in colors ranging from black and dark grey to red,
green and white.

The Tsaghkahovit Plain was sparsely populated until around 1500 B.C.

when a nameless people (they left no written record of what they called
themselves) began to build strongholds and new institutions of rule
there. “It was a time of radical inequality and centralized practices
of economic redistribution,” Smith says, “and the political leaders
were scrambling to hold on to their power. Knowing what the future
held was critically important.” The diviner, Smith says, was a kind of
primordial actuary, assessing risks and advising on pathways forward.

“We call them ‘shrines’ because of two distinctive qualities of
the spaces: They were quite intimate in scale, with not much room
for public spectacle,” Smith explains, “yet they appear to have been
religiously charged places, designed and built to host esoteric rituals
with consecrated objects – secretive rites focused on managing risks
by diagnosing present conditions and prognosticating futures.”

The Bronze Age people who tried to predict futures there had a
quarter-millennium run, until about 1150 B.C. Their divination
paraphernalia, meticulously unearthed by the archaeologists, looks
as if it had been abandoned in place, moments before the inhabitants
fled some cataclysm.

Without Bronze Age mystics to interpret the bones and stones, it’s
hard to know whether the citadel’s demise was presciently foreseen. As
the fictional President Underwood said: “It’s not the beginning of
the story I fear; it’s not knowing how it will end.”

Support for the study came, in part, from the National Science
Foundation and other organizations. The study was conducted under the
auspices of Project ArAGATS, the joint Armenian-American Project for
the Archaeology and Geography of Ancient Transcaucasian Societies.

The U.S.-Turkey Partnership: One Step Forward, Three Steps Back
By Michael Werz and Max Hoffman
March 12, 2015

President Barack Obama made a large political investment in Turkey in
2009 for a series of compelling reasons, which he laid out in a speech
to the Turkish parliament during his first overseas trip as president.
His administration recognized that Turkey’s role would be essential to
tackling a series of challenges important to the United States,
including stabilizing Iraq, solidifying a sanctions regime to pressure
Iran to negotiate on its nuclear ambitions, and combating terrorism.

Through this investment, President Obama sought to strengthen the
three pillars of the U.S.-Turkey partnership that were referenced in
his Ankara speech: Turkey’s status as a “strong, vibrant, secular
democracy” and its commitment to the rule of law; Turkey’s important
role in the NATO alliance and its push for membership in the European
Union, both of which bind it firmly to the West; and Turkey’s
potential to serve as an interlocutor and a model to the Middle East
and the broader Muslim world as part of President Obama’s efforts to
patch up America’s image in the Muslim world.

But this investment has not been reciprocated. The ruling Justice and
Development Party, or AKP, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
have handled domestic and regional developments in a way that has
raised doubts about each of these pillars. Few observers would count
Turkey as a vibrant democracy. Turkey’s bid for EU membership has
stalled, and its role as a reliable NATO ally has been questioned.
Moreover, the country’s appeal as a model for the region has eroded
significantly, and its ability to influence regional dynamics has
decreased as Syria and Iraq have spun out of control.

There are many reasons for the deterioration on each of these
fronts–including domestic political pressures on the AKP, the
ideological positions of its leadership and the political
constituencies on which it relies, and remarkable regional
upheaval–but the end result is that Turkey has distanced itself from
the West and from Western values.

The bottom line is that the United States’ investment in Erdogan and
the AKP has not worked, and the United States should try a new
approach. The Turkish government seems determined to crack down on
dissent. It has signed energy and defense accords with Russia and
China that undermine NATO positions, and it routinely bargains with
the United States over what should be basic transactions between
allies in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or
ISIS. Additionally, the AKP leadership has repeatedly resorted to
rhetorical attacks on the United States, the European Union, and
Israel, which only increase latent anti-Americanism in Turkish
society. It is time for the United States to try a new policy and to
bring its considerable leverage to bear. The United States should let
the AKP enjoy what pro-government voices have called the country’s
“precious loneliness.”

Early optimism for a new partnership

According to a famous Kemalist mantra, “Turkey is a country surrounded
by seas on three sides, and by enemies on four sides.” This perception
informed generations of Turkish students and policymakers, reflecting
the limits placed on Turkish political vision by the Cold War era.
More than any other country in the Western alliance, Turkey was frozen
into a geopolitical box by a bipolar world. For much of the 20th
century, the country was surrounded by members of the Soviet-allied
Warsaw Pact, authoritarian regimes of Baathist or Islamist
orientation, or nations with which it had deep historical animosities,
such as Greece.

This siege mentality began to soften in the 1990s and underwent a more
thorough change with the electoral victory of the conservative AKP in
2002. Then-Prime Minister Erdogan declared in September 2008 that this
“Turkish complex ¦ is behind us” after President Abdullah Gul
concluded a historic visit to long-estranged Armenia. These
shifts–both real and rhetorical–were part of an important attempt to
overcome the widespread Turkish misconception that other nations were
trying to hold the country down. Later, in 2009 and 2010, Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s “zero problems with our neighbors” policy
built upon this premise, aiming to turn old enemies into friends and
becoming the catchphrase of Turkish diplomacy. Davutoglu’s approach,
outlined during the years he spent in an advisory role before assuming
the position of foreign minister, sought to reinvigorate Turkey’s bid
for EU membership, normalize relations with Syria and Armenia, take
steps to resolve the Cyprus dispute, and boost trade ties with the
Middle East and Africa. While this approach was perhaps
deterministic–relying on Turkey’s geography as something of a crutch
to ensure and explain its relevance–it was an important step forward.

This new outlook prompted great optimism among Western observers and
friends of Turkey, who hoped that it would render obsolete the
stubborn Turkish conspiracy theories that saw Western imperialism
behind every regional dynamic. The new approach seemed to offer a
modern, rational position–albeit one defined within a conservative
perspective and with universalist ingredients–that sought engagement
with the Levant alongside a push for membership in the European Union.

The “Kurdish opening” in 2009 was the domestic counterpart to this
policy. It was a genuine attempt to demilitarize Turkish politics and
society and to end a conflict that had left tens of thousands of
people dead over the previous three decades, most of them Kurdish
citizens of Turkey. Implicitly, the outreach and rhetorical shift
around the opening began to reverse the vague and archaic preamble of
the Turkish Constitution, which categorically prohibits “activity
contrary to ¦ [the] historical and moral values of Turkishness.” For
example, state-run television and radio stations began to broadcast
extended Kurdish-language programming–something that was unthinkable
for years in Turkey. Explicitly, the opening was an acknowledgment of
the country’s diversity and a shift away from its ethnic definition of
citizenship.

Based on these advances and as part of his effort to recast U.S.
relations with the region in the wake of the Bush administration, as
mentioned above, President Obama visited Ankara during his first
overseas trip in 2009–a presidential first and a demonstration of the
importance he placed on the relationship. In his speech before the
Grand National Assembly of Turkey, President Obama emphasized,
“Turkey’s democracy is your own achievement. It was not forced upon
you by any outside power.” He also stressed the need for cooperation
between the United States and Turkey.

The Ankara speech inaugurated five years of serious investment of
political capital in Turkey by the Obama administration. This
investment continued despite increasingly discordant signals from the
Turkish side, where Prime Minister–now President–Erdogan often
succumbed to the temptation to use the United States as a populist
punching bag in his domestic politics. But the investment was the
right move at the time. The United States sought to elevate its
relationship with Turkey above the countless day-to-day transactions
between the two governments. By doing this, it hoped to create a
durable partnership that would increase Turkish domestic legitimacy
through democratic reforms; contribute to regional stability through
Turkish economic and political engagement with the Levant; and help
shape increasingly turbulent regional transformations in a democratic,
pluralistic way.

However, the past two years have made it painfully obvious that these
expectations are unrealistic. Perhaps the U.S.-Turkey partnership is
yet another victim of the unprecedented upheaval sweeping the region,
but it is clear that the relationship has reached and passed an
important turning point. Far from moving beyond the transactional,
U.S.-Turkish interactions are now testy, hard-bargaining affairs. The
U.S. policy of political investment has not paid off with Turkey–or
at least not with its current government. Now–as Omer Taspinar, an
expert on Turkey and a professor at the National War College, has
suggested–is the time to try a policy of “benign neglect” and let the
government in Ankara decide if it is prepared to engage in
reciprocity.

Moments of transformation

Three moments capture the trajectory of this transformation in the
U.S.-Turkey relationship and define the limits of Turkish capability
and influence. These moments are tied to three famous sites in three
troubled countries: Gezi Park in Turkey; Mosul in Iraq; and Kobani in
Syria.

Gezi Park

In May 2013, a small protest movement to save a city park in Istanbul
became an illustration of Turkish society’s transformation and the
Turkish government’s inability to respond with political flexibility.
The park was seized upon as a symbol by Turkey’s diverse, urban middle
class, which was chafing under the assertion of political and cultural
dominance by the previously marginalized Islamist working class–a
current that took political form in the AKP. The protests also showed
the world a detached, vindictive government that mismanaged a
legitimate protest and escalated the confrontation into a month-long
street fight that left five people dead, more than 8,000 people
injured, and substantially deepened polarization within Turkish
society.

>From a U.S. perspective, the lack of political responsiveness and
restraint from the AKP crystallized long-term concerns about the
deterioration of press freedom, soft and hard censorship, government
suppression of social media, new surveillance laws, and frequent
interference in the judicial process through the reassignment of
police and prosecutors. Over the course of the events at Gezi and
around the country, and in their aftermath, the Turkish government
pivoted decisively away from efforts to establish greater legitimacy
through democratic reforms, thus weakening an important pillar of the
U.S.-Turkish partnership.

Mosul

On June 11, 2014, one year after the protests in Gezi Park, ISIS
militants overran the Iraqi city of Mosul, taking Turkish Consul
General Ozturk Yilmaz and 49 other Turks hostage. This disaster was
the result of a chain of events that underlined Turkey’s lack of
strategic foresight and limited tactical capabilities, shaking the
second pillar of Turkey’s cooperation with the United States: positive
regional engagement.

On June 6, when it became clear that ISIS was about to take over the
city, Mosul Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi began making emergency calls to
regional political leaders to warn of the impending dangers. Despite
these calls, then-Foreign Minister Davutoglu declared on June 10 that
there was no threat to Turkey’s consul general or his staff. One day
later, contrary to Davutoglu’s statements, ISIS took Yilmaz and his
colleagues hostage.

However, it was the Turkish government’s reaction to the kidnapping
that was most telling. Instead of reviewing what went wrong to ensure
that it would not occur again–as the United States did after
Benghazi–on June 15, then-Prime Minister Erdogan asked the Turkish
media not to report on the incident. The next day, Deputy Prime
Minister Bulent Arinc echoed Erdogan’s call, and a court in Ankara
“issued ¦ a gag order ruling that `all kinds of print, visual and
Internet media are banned from writing and commenting on the
situation'” in Mosul. On June 17, the Supreme Board of Radio and
Television, or RTUK, delivered the decision of the 9th Heavy Penal
Courtto all media executives, giving the ban legal effect. Meanwhile,
the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted that those taken by
ISIS were “not hostages” but rather “Turkish citizens taken to an
unknown location.”

The Turkish government had become so focused on overthrowing Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad that they were unable to anticipate the
malignant spread of ISIS or to comprehend that the group might target
Turkish citizens. This is not the sort of regional engagement the
United States sought when it invested anew in the Turkish partnership
in 2009.

Kobani

The most telling turning point in the U.S.-Turkish relationship was
the disagreement over Kobani, a Kurdish enclave in northern Syria
along the Turkish border. Beginning in summer 2014 under the eyes of
the international media, control of the town became a major goal for
both ISIS and the coalition arrayed against it. This political
importance led to a desperate struggle between the Kurdish People’s
Protection Units, or YPG, that were defending the city and waves of
better-equipped ISIS fighters. Kobani–despite the efforts of Turkish
officials to downplay the town’s importance–become a symbol of
resistance against ISIS and a test case for whether the U.S.-led
coalition’s aerial strategy in support of indigenous ground forces
could hold off a concerted ISIS attack.

However, the Turkish government was deeply reluctant to help secure
this important military and propaganda victory for the anti-ISIS
coalition. Indeed, Turkey seemed more concerned with undermining
Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria than with confronting the threat
from ISIS. When the United States pressured Turkey to help the Kurds,
President Erdogan used the negotiations to try to extract concessions
from the United States on other aspects of Syria policy–primarily the
targeting of the Assad regime. Of course, the Turkish government did
accept and care for the tens of thousands of refugees who fled Kobani
in the wake of the ISIS attack and deserves credit for its
hospitality. But these people likely would not have had to flee Kobani
if the Turkish government had allowed supplies to reach the Kurdish
defenders instead of blocking resupply in the early stages of the ISIS
attack, effectively completing the ISIS siege.

While few serious observers expected or wanted Turkey to intervene
militarily in Syria without international backing, the Turkish role in
completing the siege of Kobani–along with anti-Kurdish rhetoric from
Turkish leaders–led to the perception that the AKP was more
interested in the destruction of a quasi-autonomous Kurdish region
along Turkey’s southern border than in preventing a humanitarian
catastrophe or cooperating with its NATO partners and the
international coalition in the fight against ISIS.

This policy of blocking supplies to Kobani led to widespread Kurdish
protests in major Turkish cities on October 6 and 7 that left up to 37
citizens dead, mostly in clashes between Kurdish sympathizers and
Islamist factions. The intense reaction elicited by the fighting in
Kobani demonstrated that the peace process between Ankara and the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK–a militant armed group that has
waged an intermittent war against the Turkish state–is now driven as
much by regional events as by the situation inside Turkey, which is an
important development. However, Ankara has been slow to recognize the
reality of a new, more interconnected, regional Kurdish body politic.
It is another indication of the Turkish government’s inability to
anticipate or react to shifting regional dynamics.

The AKP seeks to keep the Kurdish question a domestic issue, refusing
to acknowledge the development of a public sphere and political
discourse shared by Kurds inside and outside Turkey. The AKP’s
reluctant and belated support for the transit of a small detachment of
Kurdish Peshmerga–the military forces of Iraqi Kurdistan–from
northern Iraq to Kobani was its first concession to the reality that
the borders between northern Iraq, Turkey, and Syria have become less
relevant. It is unlikely to be the last such policy adjustment forced
on Turkey.

While Deputy Prime Minister Yalcin Akdogan recently contended that
“Syrian Kurds are our natural ally,” many in his party disagree. This
leaves the AKP pursuing contradictory policy goals: seeking to
undermine Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria while trying to keep the
domestic peace negotiations with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan on track.
This ambiguity has damaged the peace process in Turkey and has made it
impossible for the government to function as a regional mediator–the
role the United States would favor for its ally–in the near future.

In addition, the AKP’s handling of Kobani raises questions about the
current government’s ability to adequately assess regional
transformations and devise reliable policy responses. The U.S.
decision to airdrop ammunition and humanitarian aid into Kobani on
October 19 was a remarkable departure from past U.S. deference to
Turkish wishes on Kurdish issues. The White House ordered a major
shift in the U.S. approach to events along the Turkish border against
Turkey’s wishes and only informed President Erdogan one day in
advance, after the decision had been made. This action was not taken
lightly and was the culmination of months of growing frustration about
Turkey’s incessant bargaining over its participation in the anti-ISIS
coalition. American policymakers were well aware of Turkey’s concerns
about the objectives and character of the Democratic Union Party, or
PYD–a Syrian Kurdish political party. They were equally cognizant of
the AKP’s desire to broaden the international campaign against ISIS to
include the targeting of Syrian President Assad. However, for a NATO
ally to tie cooperation of almost any kind to fulfillment of all ofits
demands–demands that would have resulted in U.S. ownership of another
war in the Middle East–seemed unreasonable to American policymakers.
White House frustration about Turkey’s approach and President
Erdogan’s constant public sniping and populist demagoguery provide
some context for the military and strategic decision to save Kobani.

The future of the U.S.-Turkey partnership

After years of U.S. political investment in the Turkish partnership,
the two nations’ differences have become impossible to ignore. Close
cooperation with the United States has helped bolster Erdogan in his
roles as prime minister and president, but the United States has not
gotten much in return. In fact, this investment has often been met
with insults or conspiracy theories–for example, Erdogan’s absurd
statement implying that U.S. Ambassador Francis Ricciardone was
“engaging in some provocative actions” in Turkey or AKP member and
Ankara Mayor Melih Gokcek’s comment, referring to the United States,
that “These barons and neocons have decided to redesign Turkey to
govern it.” The rhetoric from Turkey’s leaders has gone back to the
bad old days but is now accompanied by strategic dissonance and
impotence rather than cooperation.

This is not to say that Turkey must blindly follow America’s lead on
Syria or anything else. But differences in approach do not excuse
cynical bargaining for advantage–at least not between allies. Just as
importantly, the United States is not responsible for Turkey’s
problems, and many in the U.S. administration seem tired of being
blamed for them. Turkey is an advanced country and should give up
hiding behind the trope of American imperialist meddling.

Finally, the AKP has demonstrated a vindictive, authoritarian streak
and a lack of political acumen that combine to make it a
less-than-valuable partner. For a relationship of marginal value, the
United States is sure putting up with a lot. Behlul Ozkan, an
assistant professor at Marmara University and the author of From the
Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of a National Homeland
in Turkey, described the AKP’s reluctance to accept criticism as a
structural problem within the party: “More worrying than Davutoglu’s
failures as a policymaker,” he wrote in 2014, “is the fact that he
does not see his critics as legitimate. Both he and his supporters
believe him to be infallible.”*

The same is true for President Erdogan, who has jettisoned his earlier
efforts at reform and broader political inclusion to focus on divisive
identity politics and a fifty-percent-plus-one approach to consolidate
control. He made this trend clear in the nomination speech that opened
his presidential campaign in July. The speech was saturated with
religious metaphors and half-baked claims to both Islamic and
anti-colonial traditions. “For 200 years,” Erdogan said, “they tried
to tear us away from our history and from our ancestors. They tried to
get us to disown our claim.” He seemed to suggest that his presidency
would restore a vague, glorious Turkish state–but one predicated
against Western meddling. In Erdogan’s telling, then, Turkey is once
again threatened by enemies from outside and within–a far cry from
the hopes of the early AKP years. But beyond their dubious historical
legitimacy, such ideological delusions are causing significant damage
to Turkey’s foreign policy interests and its relations with the United
States.

Today, due in part to the AKP’s authoritarian and anti-Western shift,
Turkey is more isolated and less able to shape regional policy than at
any time since the end of the Cold War. Offers of cooperation from the
United States and the European Union are now more often dismissed than
accepted. One of the important lessons from the turning points that
have shaped the past two years is that Turkey’s geography is both an
asset and a liability. Geography can ensure relevance, but genuine
influence should be built upon reliable capabilities, a strong
understanding of regional shifts, and policies driven by national
interest and democratic convictions rather than religious paradigms.

Michael Werz is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress.
Max Hoffman is a Policy Analyst at the Center.

* Correction, March 12, 2015: This brief incorrectly identified Behlul
Ozkan. He is an assistant professor at Marmara University and the
author of From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of
a National Homeland in Turkey.

DE-DOLLARIZATION WITHIN EEU IMPORTANT TO ARMENIA BECAUSE OF TIES WITH IRAN – EXPERT

YEREVAN, March 12. /ARKA/. Russian president Vladimir’s Putin
instruction to the central bank and the cabinet to consider the
issue of currency integration within the EEU implies that opinions
of Minsk, Astana and Yerevan shall be considered, political analyst
Sergey Shakaryants told RIA Novosti on Wednesday.

It guarantees well enough that no rush decisions will be made,
Shakaryants said, as cited by Novosti-Armenia referring to RIA Novosti.

According to the analyst, Russian leaders make a decision based on
the fact that the Russian Federation and China, as well as China and
Kazakhstan have already decided to abandon dollar in their bilateral
payments. In February, Iran decided to trade with other countries in
any currency other than US dollar.

Russia and Kazakhstan have already taken the first steps to
de-dollarize their foreign trade, with their leading trade partners
outside the EEU in particular, Shakaryants said.

The new terms of trade and mutual payments will be soon even more
important to Yerevan than to some other EEU member states, due to
close trade and economic ties with Iran, the analyst said.

Yet, it is premature to say to what extent the four EEU member
countries are prepared for transition to a single currency, the expert
said. -0–

PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN: DISCUSSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM UNDERWAY

POLITICS | 12.03.15 | 10:51

Photolure

President Serzh Sargsyan holding his right hand on the Republic of
Armenia Constitution and a Bible during his inauguration for the
second term on April 9, 2013.

RELATED NEWS

Changing Basic Law: Armenian leadership reaffirms plans for
constitutional reform

Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan continues to have meetings with
representatives of the country’s political forces regarding the
planned constitutional reform, his spokesman told Tert.am on Wednesday.

“A new series of active discussions around the constitutional reform
will begin tomorrow [March 12],” said Arman Saghatelyan. “Information
regarding these discussions will be provided additionally.”

The constitutional reform concept calling for turning Armenia into
a parliamentary republic with a powerful prime minister and largely
ceremonial president was first unveiled in 2014. The Council of
Europe’s Venice Commission gave a generally positive assessment, saying
that the proposed changes would “strengthen democratic principles and
establish the necessary conditions for ensuring the rule of law and
respect for human rights.” At the same time, the commission noted that
the transition to a parliamentary republic requires “broad consensus
within society.”

Most opposition forces in Armenia, including the Prosperous Armenia
Party (PAP) led by tycoon Gagik Tsarukyan, questioned the need
for reforming the Basic Law, alleging that by the changes Sargsyan,
whose second and final presidential term ends in 2018, and his ruling
Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) are seeking to “perpetuate” their
power. The current head of state, however, has repeatedly pledged not
to seek a top government post after the end of his term in office if
the reform is carried out.

Amid protests staged by three opposition parties, including the PAP,
that raised more issues than just the constitutional reform President
Sargsyan late last year said he would take the final decision on the
constitutional reform concept in February-March 2015. RPA spokesman
Eduard Sharmazanov confirmed last week that the decision would be
presented to the public by the end of March.

The planned constitutional reform appeared to be the catalyst for
the dramatic showdown in February in which President Sargsyan and his
ruling RPA forced Tsarukyan to resign as PAP leader and quit politics.

It is yet unclear whether the PAP, many of whose members have been
renouncing their membership after Tsarukyan’s departure, will continue
to strongly oppose the current administration on the constitutional
reform issue.

At least one parliamentary minority party, the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation, has, in principle, backed the idea of turning Armenia into
a parliamentary republic through the change of the Constitution. The
other three minority factions in the Armenian parliament, including
the Armenian National Congress, Heritage and Orinats Yerkir, are
known to oppose the reform at least at this stage.

Parliament Speaker Galust Sahakyan, a senior member of the RPA, said
earlier this month that draft amendments to the Armenian Constitution
are likely to be put on a referendum as soon as next fall or in
early 2016.

AMERICANA AT BRAND ISSUES APOLOGY TO ARMENIAN CART VENDORS

Wednesday, March 11th, 2015 | Posted by Contributor

The Americana at Brand

GLENDALE–The Americana at Brand issued an apology to Armenian cart
vendors after the shopping center’s management chose to bar them from
selling their merchandise saying that it was inappropriate.

“We would like to apologize to our cart tenants, Tina Chuldzhyan,
Alex Kodagolian and Armin Hariri, for the regrettable misunderstanding
regarding their cart’s merchandise,” the Americana at Brand posted
on the company’s Facebook page. “The cart tenant is more than welcome
to have its product in question displayed on the cart.”

On Monday, Asbarez published an article by Harut Saassounian, in his
regular “My Turn” column, in which the he reported on Americana’s
decision to ban the sale of Armenian Genocide-themed t-shirts.

“Three young Armenian entrepreneurs rented a cart last month at the
Americana — a large shopping-restaurant-theater complex in Glendale —
to sell T-shirts, hats, and other clothing items advertised on their
shop1915.com website.

After Americana’s leasing staff approved their merchandise, Tina
Chuldzhyan, Alex Kodagolian, and Armin Hariri (a rapper known as
‘R-Mean’) began selling their merchandise.

On February 12, the opening day of their business, the three Armenians
were unexpectedly told by Americana’s management to keep their cart
family-friendly and remove all pictures of protests. Even though there
were no pictures of any protests on the cart — just posters of people
wearing the T-shirts on sale — Chuldzhyan told The California Courier
that she immediately took down the posters to avoid any conflict
with Americana.

On Feb. 25, Americana issued an ultimatum telling Tina and her
two partners that within 24 hours they had to change the kind of
merchandise they were selling, claiming that there had been public
complaints about the ‘genocide’ clothing. Otherwise, they would have
three days to vacate the premises.

Fearing that they were on the verge of eviction, the three
entrepreneurs agreed not to display the Armenian T-shirts, and
sell them only if requested by a customer. Later that afternoon,
an Americana official reiterated that all clothing items with the
‘genocide’ theme had to be completely removed from the cart,” wrote
Sassounian.

“ARMENIA IS NOT INVITED TO ASTANA NOT TO BARGAIN.” POLITICAL ANALYST

March 11 2015

Serzh Sargsyan’s attendance at the forthcoming meeting on March 12
and 13 in Astana with the presidents of the three founding members
of the Eurasian Union – Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as political
analyst Stepan Safaryan is sure, was not beneficial to the founding
member countries of the Union. “Obviously, Belarus and Kazakhstan
would like to discuss the impact of the new sanctions provided for
against Moscow on their new economy. They will discuss the losses
caused to their economy that they suffer being Russia’s ally and
would try to gain benefit from Russia. In this respect, neither
Russia nor Belarus and Kazakhstan benefits from the attendance of
Armenia because one more bargainer will be added. It is beneficial
to everyone that these problems are discussed without Armenia,”
said Stepan Safaryan. In his words, as Armenia does not have much
weight in the EaEU project, they have left it out of their meetings
and show that it is a meeting that has nothing to do with the EaEU,
although the EaEU-related issues will be discussed. “It is not that
Armenia does not suffer for being dependent on Russia, but, as there
is no one to invite Armenia, these issues will be discussed by those,
who are able to put claims to each other.” Recall that Armenia’s deputy
FM Shavarsh Kocharyan explained the non-attendance of the Armenian side
by the fact of having no disagreements with the EaEU member states.

Arpine SIMONYAN

Read more at:

GERMAN HISTORIAN SAYS THERE IS PROOF POPE BENEDICT XV TRIED TO STOP ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

09:48, 11 Mar 2015
Siranush Ghazanchyan

Just before the world commemorates the 100th anniversary of the
Armenian Genocide, well-known German historian Michael Hesemann
announced the discovery of 2000 pages of hitherto unpublished documents
on, what he calls “the greatest persecution of Christians in history”
in the Vatican Secret Archives.

In this in-depth analysis with ZENIT, the historian discusses his
findings, what’s often not realized about the Armenian genocide,
and its victims, items which he discusses in his new book.

He also speaks about the Holy Father’s recent visit to Turkey, why
he didn’t speak on the subject, and what people should realize about
the tragedy which happened then, and what’s happening now.

ZENIT: What compelled you to start going through the documents? What
did you feel you had uncovered?

Hesemann: Actually, I was fascinated by the Armenian genocide after
reading a letter written by the Cologne Archbishop–and I am from the
Archdiocese of Cologne-, Cardinal von Hartmann, who in 1913 wrote a
letter to the German Chancellor of the Reich requesting German support
to prevent a new Armenian Genocide after the withdrawal of the Russian
troops from Northeastern Turkey. And his words were very impressive.

He confirmed the Armenian genocide of 1915/1916 and compared it with
the early persecutions of Christians like the Diocletian persecution
of early 4th century.

He said because Germany was such a close ally to Turkey it would also
cause shame on the German name for future generations if it wouldn’t
do anything to stop it. I immediately realized how right he was and
that he was a voice of justice in the middle of this horrible World
War I. And then I asked myself: What did Germany do after World War
I and even today to tell the world what it knew about these horrible
events, just to prevent that history repeats itself – nothing indeed!

Then in 1939, Adolf Hitler met with his leading generals in his
“Berghof” near Berchtesgaden, his headquarters in the mountains, and
announced his plans for Poland: the completely recklessly slaughter
of the Polish elite and all the other atrocities. He ordered to
proceed with the utmost, merciless brutality, since “history is
always written by the victors’ and, anyway, “Who is talking about
the Armenian Genocide today?” So obviously the denial or the cover
up of the Armenian Genocide made Hitler’s brutality in Poland and
eventually the Holocaust possible? It seems so. If you do not tell
the story, history will always repeat itself. So I thought it was my
responsibility as a historian who has access to the Vatican Secret
Archives since 2008 to look for more documents. I became curious
and in some way fascinated by the subject. I wanted to know what
really happened.

So I found documents and documents and documents, more than 2000
pages, most of them never before published, researched, or evaluated
by any historian. Of course, I educated myself on any aspect of the
Genocide, read the works of all the leading contemporary historians
in this field like Kevorkian, Dadrian and others and just realized
that I am entering a brand new territory, adding a new aspect to
their important work. The sources we have on the Armenian Genocide
are, of course, the German documents, both coming from the officers
and diplomats stationed in the Ottoman Empire, which we find in the
Archives of the German foreign office. Another important stock were the
American diplomat’s reports and, of course, the brilliant report by the
American Ambassador in Constantinople, Henry Morgenthau. Of course we
also have intelligence reports from both the British and the French
and the reports of the Italian diplomats in Turkey. But the Vatican
documents are an excellent, first class new source of information.

ZENIT: Why did these massacres happen?

Hesemann: Well, the massacres happened after the Turks searched the
Armenian’s homes for weapons and used any weapon they found as an
“evidence” for a conspiracy or planned revolt, which, of course, was
nonsense – people on the countryside needed to have their guns for
self-defense. Then all men were arrested, tortured, lead outside the
towns or villages and were massacred. Well, how can you resettle the
people if you kill all the men? This is the end of future generations.

Without men, you can’t have families.

Then all the women, the elderly and the children were sent on foot
to the new destination, hundreds of miles through the mountainous
highlands of Anatolia, often enough with no food and water at all.

Sometimes they were not even allowed to drink from the rivers they
passed. They were raped and robbed, by mountain tribes, released
prisoners and their own police guards, and of the few which survived
those death marches – often enough only 5 percent – many were left
completely nude, dirty and ashamed, under the hot Turkish sun and in
the cold of the nights.

Still some 350,000 who arrived in the Syrian Desert were put into
concentrations camps, with no food and very little water and deadly
epidemics going around. And those who survived for another half a year
were sent on new death marches deeper into the desert or were just
massacred.So at the end, maybe a couple tens of thousands survived.

Many of them orphans. Benedict XV later donated two orphanages to
give at least some of them shelter.

If you read the eyewitness testimony, this is really heartbreaking.

You read even of nuns who were raped and all their clothes were
stolen. Many of them went mad afterward because they couldn’t handle
all these terrible experiences. Mothers threw their children into
gorges, into rivers, to kill them, so they wouldn’t have to suffer
as much as they suffered. Suicides were in the daily order.

For a couple of months, the populations of Mosul and other cities
were warned by the government, the Muslim population of course,
not to drink any water from the river because it was polluted by the
thousands of corpses which were drafting down the Euphrates and the
Tigris rivers. All of this is very well documented. But it is still
officially denied by the Turkish government.

ZENIT: Can you elaborate on this?

Hesemann: For example, if you read a book by the department of Tourism
of the Republic of Turkey “2,000 years of Turkish history”- a strange
title since Turkey has more than 5000 years of documented history – you
read the following quote: “The Ottoman government decided to immigrate
the Armenians who were involved in the uprising to a safer place,
namely Syria and Lebanon … The immigration process was carried out
in a successful way as most of the Armenians were safely transferred
to Syria”, you can only call this a cynical lie!

And as passionately, the Turkish government tries to do everything
to suppress the treatment of the Armenian genocide in the schoolbooks
of the free world, or to prevent recognition of the Armenian genocide
as genocide.

Of course, the term genocide can be discussed, but according to
the definition by the United Nations any mass killing of a group or
population, also if it is a religious group, is termed “genocide”.

Because in the end, Armenians weren’t killed because they were
Armenian, but because they were Christians. Armenian women were even
offered to be spared if they convert to Islam. They were then married
into Turkish households or sold on slave markets or taken as sex
slaves into brothels for Turkish soldiers, but at least they survived.

A whole group of Islamized Crypto-Armenians was created by this offer
to embrace Islam. But at least it shows that the Armenians were not
killed because they were Armenians, but because they were Christians,
and for the same reason the Syrian Christians were killed too.

ZENIT: So based on the statistics, how should it be considered?

Hesemann: It was both: A genocide by definition of the United Nations
and, at the same time, the greatest persecution of Christians in
history, when altogether 2.5 million were killed – 1.5 million
Armenians and about one million Syrian and Greek Christians.

ZENIT: What is your view on Pope Francis’ visit to Turkey and on how
he addressed the Armenian subject?

Hesemann: He was not the first Pope in history to speak about the
Armenian genocide because Benedict XV and John Paul II did so, too.

But I am very grateful that Pope Francis even before he became Pope,
in his book with Rabbi Skorka, for example, mentioned the Armenian
genocide. Even in the first months of his pontificate, in May 2013,
when he received one of the Armenian Patriarchs, he called the
events of 1915-1916 a genocide, which caused a lot of unrest and a
very unfriendly reaction from the Turkish side, as did John Paul
II’s remarks on the Armenian genocide did. So I am very grateful
that he continued the long row of Popes who openly spoke about the
Armenian genocide.

I was a little bit disappointed that he didn’t bring it up when he
met Erdogan because his visit took place on the eve of this year
commemorating the 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide. Then
again, he was a guest and he didn’t want to provoke an even more
hostile situation for the Christians, […] the still persecuted
Christian minority in Turkey. So from a diplomatic point of view,
he did the right thing.

ZENIT: Is the Holy Father doing anything in April to commemorate
the anniversary?

Hesemann: Yes, indeed. Pope Francis announced that on April 12 he will
celebrate Holy Mass in the Armenian rite in commemoration of what
happened 100 years ago. I hope that he will find clear words in his
homily on that occasion. And I hope that he will follow the invitation
of the Armenian president and the Armenian Patriarch Catholikos
Karekin II to come to Armenia. Even if he won’t come to Armenia on
the 24th of April, he might come later this year. Sometimes, truth
and solidarity with the martyrs are more important than diplomacy.

Everyone who reads the Vatican documents on the events of 1915/6
gets a very clear idea about what happened. Even Pope Benedict XV,
who was a very careful diplomat, stressing neutrality, wherever he
could, could not remain silent and protested three times, two times
in personal letters to the Sultan and one time in his speech during
a consistory. Indeed, his attempt to stop the Armenian genocide by
public protests is one of the most impressive examples in history
how the Vatican’s diplomacy tried everything humanly possible to
stand up for those persecuted brothers and sisters and save innocent
victims of one of the biggest crimes in history. At the same time,
it’s also a very frustrating example that Vatican diplomacy cannot
change the minds of fanatic ideologists who just demonstrated that
“conscience”and “compassion” are foreign words for them.

ZENIT: As we are now approaching the 100-year anniversary, is there
anything you think people should realize or take away in a way they
have not already?

Hesemann: One thing should be learned: Nobody should ever turn around
and look away if he hears about atrocities in any part of the world.

If you are ignorant today, you will bear the consequences tomorrow. So
it’s better to act and react now.

Hitler believed he was on the safe side, but he wasn’t. So I hope that
the atrocities of 100 years ago wake up Christians and responsible
people from the world of politics, of art, science, and moral [realms],
of all fields of life to look what is happening to Christians in the
same area today.

When I saw reports and videos of what is going on the ISIS controlled
areas, I had a deja vu. I have to admit that when I studied these
files, pictures, and everything from the Armenian genocide, I wondered
sometimes if some of my sources were not just exaggerating. It
sounded so unreal, all those atrocities, this violence, these
reports about crucifixions and mountains of skulls of decapitated
men and so on. And then all this happens in front of my eyes in the
news. So history repeats itself: If you don’t learn from history,
if you aren’t aware of what happened in the past, we allow people
to commit the crimes again. That is why every crime has to be
[prosecuted]. So that people learn that crimes don’t pay off. In
1915, the German chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg knew everything about
the Armenian genocide, since he received all those careful reports
from his diplomats. But he was not willing to stop the slaughter,
but, instead, declared: “We have to keep Turkey as an ally on our side
until the war is over, even if the Armenians perish over it.” Because
of this, Germany is guilty, too, of what it allowed to happen. Today,
we shall not follow Germany’s example and ignore what is happening
in order to not jeopardize diplomatic or trade relations. We should
stop ISIS and end the slaughter of Christians right now!

And finally: As a Catholic, I believe that everyone can be forgiven
if you confess your sins. But that is the first condition. I
don’t want any revenge or punishment for Turkey. Not at all. I want
reconciliation. Reconciliation between the Armenian and Turkish people,
but the condition for this, for forgiveness, is the truth. If I go
to confession and deny my sins, it is worthless and I won’t find
forgiveness. Forgiveness I will only find if I honestly confess what
truly happened. Only the truth can set us free!

The historical facts are so crystal clear. They are as clear as those
of the Holocaust, or any other event that you’d find in any history
book…so many documents, sources, clear statistics, clear evidence
that 1.5 million Armenians and another 1 million Syrian and Greek
Christians were murdered. You cannot deny it. You cannot excuse it.

You can only, and that it’s overdue, admit it. This is the first
step for reconciliation. Any historians looking at all the evidence
would come to the same conclusion of what happened, unless they were
being paid or put under pressure. But facing the evidence we have,
there’s no other conclusion possible. It was genocide. It was the
biggest persecution of Christians in history. If you still deny it,
you protect the perpetrators, you side up with murderers. And you
allow that it will happen again.

GAGIK TSARUKYAN IS CREATING POLITICAL PARTY

Haikazn Ghahriyan, Editor-in-Chief
Comments – 11 March 2015, 19:49

After leaving politics and the PAP Gagik Tsarukyan demands back the
property of the offices and is persuading his fellow party members to
leave PAP. Entire regional units and party “authorities” are leaving
the party upon his call. The press even stated that those loyal to
Tsarukyan are leaving PAP and those who remain are “betrayers”.

Rumors came that in his meeting with Serzh Sargsyan Tsarukyan promised
him to close PAP. According to other rumors, however, the new president
of the party Naira Zohrabyan also met with Serzh Sargsyan and told
him that PAP will be opposition, and Serzh Sargsyan approved and said
PAP will be “under” Hovik Abrahamyan.

Here is an interesting situation. PAP is the apple of discord between
in-laws Hovik Abrahamyan and Tsarukyan. Tsarukyan is trying to close
it while Abrahamyan is trying to “keep” it. Apparently, they are
adjusting shares, as well as in their joint companies.

By the way, in this context there is no need to forget about the third
“shareholder”. Those are the ones who left PAP but retained their
parliamentary mandates who had apparently bought the mandates. This
is not a surprise. PAP was a CJSC.

In fact, PAP is undergoing an inventory and adjustment of shares.

Tsarukyan is extracting his resource, promising them to continue
the sponsorship.

In fact, having led PAP for 9 years, he is making his first independent
“step” – deconstructs the apolitical joint-stock company which was a
hindrance to the development of the political field and is creating
his real “party” free from defectors and other shareholders.

This “party” will be needed later. After all, the economic and
political system of Armenia appreciates the ones who can bring in
“an x number of votes” in return for quotas and privileges.

CONFERENCE ON GENOCIDES AND MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISM TO BE HELD IN PRAGUE

16:34, 11 March, 2015

YEREVAN, MARCH 11, ARMENPRESS. Another conference in Prague’s Goethe
Institute on Wednesday will also discuss the genocide and the current
Islamic fundamentalism. It will be held under the aegis of the Armenian
embassy and the Italian Culture Institute in Prague. As reports
“Armenpress” citing Prague Daily Monitor, the major guests will be
Armenian ambassador to the Czech Republic Tigran Seyrajnyan and the
former Czech foreign ministers, Cyril Svoboda and Karel Schwarzenberg.

Previously it was reported that on March 9 the delegation led by the
Vice President of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia
Eduard Sharmazanovtook part in the official opening of the exhibition
entitled “Armenian Genocide: Front Page Coverage in the World Press ”
held under the auspice of the Committee on Petitions of the Chamber
of Deputies of the Czech Republic in the Czech Museum of Music. The
Information and Public Relations Department of the National Assembly
of the Republic of Armenia informed “Armenpress” about this.

The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of
Armenia to the Czech Republic Tigran Seyranyan, the Spiritual Leader
of the Armenian Communities of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary
Barsegh Archimandrite Pilavchyan, the Spiritual Leader, the Archbishop
of Prague Cardinal Dominik Duka, the Vice President of the Chamber
of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic Jan Bartosek,
the Chair of the Committee of Petitions of the Chamber of Deputies
Zuzka Bebarova-Rujbrova and the Head of the Czech Republic-Armenia
Parliamentary Friendship Group Robin Bohnisch attended the opening
of the exhibition.

The NA Vice President Eduard Sharmazanov, t he RA Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Czech Republic Tigran
Seyranyan, as well as the representatives of the Czech side delivered
speeches.

The NA Vice President Eduard Sharmazanov awarded the Medal of
Honour of the RA National Assembly the spiritual leader of the
Czech Republic, Archbishop of Prague Cardinal Dominik Duka for
the strengthening of the friendly relations between the Armenian
and Czech peoples, the Chair of the Committee of Petitions of the
Czech Chamber of Deputies Zuzka Bebarova-Rujbrova for the significant
contribution to the reinforcement, development of the Armenian-Czech
inter-parliamentary ties and protection of human rights and the Head
of the Czech Republic-Armenia Parliamentary Friendship Group Robin
Bohnisch for the significant contribution to the strengthening and
development of the Armenian-Czech inter-parliamentary ties.

Let us note that t he deputy of the ARF Faction Artsvik Minasyan
and the Chief of Staff, General Secretary Hrayr Tovmasyan are in the
NA delegation.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEUROMARKETING IN ARMENIA

Lragir.am
Business – 11 March 2015, 11:30

According to the economic models of decision making decision makers
choose between alternative courses of action by assessing the
desirability and likelihood of their consequences, and integrating
this information through some type of expectation-based calculus. Any
influence of incidental or intentionally encoded visual or sensitive
emotions would suggest that decisions are affected by factors unrelated
to the utility of their consequences, which can be beneficial or
destructive in the business world.

It is no longer a secret that far too much of what happens in the
process of communications occurs on the emotional level. No doubt in
today’s globalized and digitalized world people very often have the
ultimate need to control the outward expression of their uniquely felt
emotions in public because of professional reasons which may affect
both the corporate working environment and customer service – consumer
relations. Indeed, according to Arlie Hochschild (1983) there exist
certain professions, economics included, in which the main actors
at hand have to manage their emotions to sound proficient. Here,
the concept of Neuromarketing comes to the fore which indicates
that two important processes, marketing and emotions on the “neuro”
level are closely intertwined and that the needs and desires of the
customers are completely matched.

Dr. Anna Rostomyan, Osnabruck University, Fribourg University and
Yerevan State University graduate, holding a degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Philology, whose dissertation is mainly devoted to
the linguo-cognitive analysis of verbal and non-verbal displays of
emotions and their management techniques, suggests in her studies on
Neuroeconomics and Neuromarketing that Emotional Marketing has started
to be greatly applicable in Armenia as well, by some of the leading
corporations and banks, especially “ARMECONOMBANK” OJSC. E.g. by
means of using the colour “blue” in their logo and other marketing
activities, the shade of ocean and cloudless sky, the marketing
specialists denote tranquility and peace of mind, and the colour
“green”, the symbol of grass, to ensure prosperity, the colour “white”
supposedly suggests purity and transparency which corresponds to the
needs of the customers. This strategy of a neurocolour logo edifice
and the overall neuromarketing strategy of the aforementioned bank
truly correspond to the high European standards.

Anna Rostomyan in her scientific article which will be published
in July 2015 in the United States of America in the internationally
peer-reviewed “Business and Economics” Journal factually asserts that
emotional branding or emotional marketing is not a negative concept,
but rather a positive one, which entails diverse meanings and suggests
to the decoding societal public how certain pieces of information
should be properly decoded; it mainly suggests what a specific brand
or product is like in reality.

In summary, we can state that business environment increasingly
grows rapidly developing where human capital and customers become the
mostly important factor for each and every organization. Hence, the
role of human emotions and their corresponding management techniques
gain paramount significance both in business and everyday personal
communication.