TURKEY-US RELATIONS: EMBEDDED DISPUTES – ANALYSIS
Eurasia Review
Feb 4 2015
February 4, 2015
By Mehmet Yegin
A year ago, I discussed in my Analist Magazine column how Turkey’s
relations with the U.S. changed dramatically in 2013 as an abrupt
political divergence between the two countries made itself visibly
apparent especially after the May of that year. Today, at the end of
2014, we see a picture in which divergences are embedded, and mistrust
has become profound. It may be expected that this image will endure
in 2015 unless a dramatic change occurs.
Turkey’s damaged image in the U.S.
Political polarization in Turkey created a negative image of the
country in the eyes of the U.S. While those familiar with Turkish
politics were fairly disappointed, those who do not know much about the
country came to adopt a negative perspective based on the reflections
of mainstream media. The roots of this negative image can be traced
back to 2013 when Turkey banned access to popular social media
networks, therewith unfortunately causing some to associate Turkey
with countries like North Korea and China. In addition, Turkey’s
attitude towards journalists in the country and ISIS precipitated
the deepening of this negative perception.
Articles and editorials published by prominent U.S. newspapers such as
the New York Times and the Washington Post shaped the perceptions of
those who are not familiar with the dynamics of Turkey. Additionally,
Armenian lobbies active in the U.S. are fueling the fire by inflating
recent developments. Amidst the Kobani crisis, the Kurdish lobbies
endeavored to depict Turkey as supportive of ISIS militants. Within
this context, it has become more and more challenging to speak out
in favor of Turkey.
Enduring divergences on Syria and ISIS
The gap between Turkish and U.S. positions on Syria was not closed
in 2014. The U.S.’s policy toward Syria has revolved around the fight
against ISIS and the anti-ISIS coalition. Turkey, on the other hand,
built its policy on defeating Bashar al-Assad and, to this end,
has sought the establishment of a no-fly zone, buffer zone or a
safe corridor. Based on these approaches, the two parties strove
to convince one another of their cases to no true avail, with the
exception of a slight consensus on the coalition issue.
The NATO Wales Summit from September 4-5 was a crucial step for the
establishment of the anti-ISIS coalition. While Turkey was included
as one of the core states joining the coalition, it nonetheless
did not put its signature on the Declaration in Jeddah. In the end,
Turkey agreed to increase measures that would strengthen its border
security and agreed to train moderate Syrian opposition forces, yet
it did not become an active member of the coalition and it did not
grant access to Incirlik airbase for the coalition forces. It can be
said that Turkey deliberately adopted this ambiguous attitude. This
policy seems to be working in terms of preventing a major crisis. On
the one hand, Turkey has been able to avoid becoming a target of ISIS,
which is likely to maintain its presence along the Turkish border
for some time, and on the other hand, it has more or less reassured
its place within the Western alliance.
However, the process has not gone very smoothly. Particularly, the
U.S.’s provision of direct assistance to the PYD despite Turkey’s
opposition, which was explicitly articulated by President Erdogan,
and its sending of arms to fighters in Kobani created a rift between
the two countries. The U.S.’s cooperation with the PYD, whatever
the motives may be, has generated deep mistrust on the Turkish side
because of its profound sensitivity to the Kurdish dimension of the
conflict. Prior to the U.S.’s engagement with the PKK/PYD, Washington
had already developed a unique relationship with Iraqi Kurds subsequent
to 2003. And in general these developments have heightened Turkey’s
anxieties as to its own territorial unity and the fidelity of the
Americans as a trustworthy ally.
Turkey wants the ISIS and Assad issues to be considered as one but
the U.S. has not conceded to these demands. Although Washington stated
that Turkey’s insistence on pointed actions such as the implementation
of a no-fly zone would be evaluated, each of its following statements
have hinted at its rejection thereof. When Vice President Joe Biden
visited Ankara, we expected the issue to be decisively addressed,
nonetheless, the parties could not agree on a no-fly zone. In fact,
even though Biden’s visit was thought to be crucial for determining
the future trajectory of the anti-ISIS coalition, the only substantial
outcome of talks was the agreement on training the Syrian opposition.
Both the Turkish and the American parties put forward their best
efforts to convince the other of their case, but in the end neither
showed any sign of budging.
The impact of mid-term elections and expectations for 2015
A very dramatic shift occurred in the balance of power in Washington
with the mid-term elections of November 2014. The Republicans
reassured their dominance in the House of Representatives and gained
a majority in the Senate. Thus, the Republicans now have control of
the legislative branch. The effect of this change in Washington on
Turkey-US relations is twofold. The two countries can open a bright
new page if they can meet a joint decision regarding Syria. In
the opposite scenario, however, the Republicans might adopt a more
critical and pushy attitude towards Turkey. Additionally, the fact
that Turkey will be undergoing its own elections in the near future
might even complicate things further.
One of the hottest topics on the agenda between Turkey and the U.S. is
the 100th anniversary of the 1915 events in the Ottoman Empire and the
Armenian claims with reference thereto. The Republican Party do not
ideologically favor the Armenian claims. Furthermore, the Republican
Party’s grassroots does not contain a considerable Armenian population,
which therefore limits Armenian influence on the issue.
Speaker of the House John Boehner, during his visit to Turkey last
April, stated that the Armenian claims should be investigated
by historians. This indicates that the Republicans could play a
conciliatory role in preempting a potential crisis in Turkey-U.S.
relations.
Nevertheless, if a consensus on the Syrian issue remains absent and
Turkey’s poor democracy rankings persist, the Republicans might
attempt to punish Turkey by passing bills in both chambers. The
election atmosphere in Turkey might also complicate these matters. The
‘exceptional’ case of anti-Americanism in Turkey, which has been
adopted by a surprisingly large portion of the Turkish society,
rests on solid foundations. If the Armenian claims receive support
from the U.S. government, both the ruling and opposition parties
in Turkey might strive to augment their electoral gains by taking
advantage of these tensions.
Finally, a new topic has emerged recently in Turkey-U.S. relations with
the December 14th investigation. Here, debates on freedom of press,
on the one hand, and the extradition of Fethullah Gulen on the other
will continue to be a major topic for the two countries in 2015.
In particular, Turkey’s request that Gulen be extradited might create
new tensions in the two countries’ bilateral relations in the long run.
To conclude, 2014 ended with tensions that borrowed from the preceding
year. We can expect that these divergences will endure in 2015 unless
a major breakthrough changes the course of events.
http://www.eurasiareview.com/04022015-turkey-us-relations-embedded-disputes-analysis/