MOSCOW TO BID FAREWELL TO FAMED SINGER FLORA MARTIROSYAN
December 10, 2012 – 15:00 AMT
PanARMENIAN.Net – Moscow will bid farewell to famed Armenian singer
Flora Martirosyan.
As the Union of Armenians of Russia told PanARMENIAN.Net on Tuesday,
December 11, Surb Harutyun Armenian church in Moscow will host a
public prayer in commemoration of the singer.
PRESS RELEASE
Catholicosate of Cilicia
Communication and Information Department
Tel: (04) 410001, 410003
Fax: (04) 419724
E- mail: [email protected]
Web:
PO Box 70 317
Antelias-Lebanon
CATHOLICOS ARAM I CONGRATULATED THE MARONITE PATRIARCH BESHARA RAI
ON BEING NAMED A CARDINAL BY POPE BENEDICT XVIth
On Friday 5 December 2012, His Holiness Aram I met with Patriarch Rai at the
Maronite Patriarchate in Bkerke. Catholicos Aram I congratulated the new
Cardinal, and then they held a private meeting whereby they discussed the
situation in the region and particularly in Syria; the new electoral law and
the formation of a new government in Lebanon. At the end the Catholicos and
the Patriarch discussed the possibility of holding a meeting of the Heads of
all Churcches in the Middle East.
##
Photo:
Oil, Iran, and stability in the Gulf: Why the Gulf states want to keep
Iran in a box
By Stephen M. Walt
December 08, 2012 “Information Clearing House” – We are often told
that Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are deeply worried about
Iran, and eager for the United States to take care of the problem.
This is usually framed as a reflection of the Sunni-Shiite divide, and
linked to concerns about Iranian subversion, the role of Hezbollah,
and of course the omnipresent fretting about Iran’s nuclear energy
program.
I have heard senior Saudi officials voice such worries on more than
one occasion, and I don’t doubt that their fears are sincere. But
there may be another motive at work here, and Americans would do well
to keep that possibility in mind.
That motive is the Gulf states’ interest in keeping oil prices high
enough to balance their own budgets, in a period where heightened
social spending and other measures are being used to insulate these
regimes from the impact of the Arab Spring. According to the IMF,
these states need crude prices to remain upwards of $80 a barrel in
order to keep their fiscal house in order.
Which in turn means that Saudi Arabia et al also have an interest in
keeping Iran in the doghouse, so that Iran can’t attract foreign
companies to refurbish and expand its oil and gas fields and so that
it has even more trouble marketing its petroleum on global markets. If
UN and other sanctions were lifted and energy companies could operate
freely in Iran, its oil and gas production would boom, overall
supplies would increase, and the global price would drop.
Not only might this new wealth make Iran a more formidable power in
the Gulf region–as it was under the Shah — but lower oil and gas
prices would make it much harder for Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
states to stave off demands for political reform through social
spending. Saudi Arabia could cut production to try to keep prices up,
but that would still mean lower overall revenues and a budget
shortfall.
So when you hear people telling you how worried the Gulf states are
about Iran, and how they support our efforts to keep tightening the
screws, remember that it’s not just about geopolitics, or the
historical divide between Sunnis and Shiites or between Arabs and
Persians. It’s also about enabling certain ruling families to keep
writing checks. Keep that in mind the next time you fill your gas tank
or pay your home heating bill, or the next time somebody tells you the
United States ought to think seriously about a preemptive war.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of
international relations at Harvard University.
This article was originally posted at Foreign Policy
UK Ambassador: We are two sets of energy thinking about Armenia
news.am
December 09, 2012 | 18:37
Armenian News-NEWS.am launches a series of interviews with foreign
diplomats working in Armenia. Ambassadors will reveal the secrets of
their diplomatic work and speak about the difficulties they are faced
withб while moving to a new country. In our first interview UK
Ambassador to Armenia Katherine Leach speaks about her work and
experience as a diplomat.
About diplomacy
What do you think is the most difficult thing about being a diplomat?
I was going to say people might imagine the most difficult thing is
moving around, constantly having to start everything from scratch in a
new country, but that is the part I enjoy the most. The hardest thing
is to think imaginatively about what you can really achieve in a
country because often governments and diplomats are quite unwilling to
take risks. I think the most difficult thing is to look with fresh
eyes at the situation and try to give more challenging advice in your
government and try to change policy of your government.
Have you ever made a bold move?
There was one occasion that sticks in my mind when I was working in
Japan, through my help we managed to encourage development of a
business network who wanted to lobby the government for more ambitious
actions on green energy, environmentally friendly energy. It was
important as Japanese business is often quite cautious and
conservative and for businesses to come together and say: `we must
much more dynamic and aggressive in lobbying the government on the
issue’ was surprising. I felt I made a contribution to it.
Do you think there are any words the diplomat must never say?
I think we try not to be rude, we try to be polite. I definitely say
`yes’ more often.
What would you do if you were not a diplomat?
The sensible option is to be a lawyer. A fantasy option was to work
for a charity which buys land and old houses and then opens them for
public. It is a way of preserving England’s countryside.
I used to work for environmental charity. It had million members and
raised money to buy wild places to protect them. I did that before
joining the foreign office.
Different countries
Do you think you must set a certain goal coming to a new country?
I think it is always good to try to set goals. When we arrived in
Armenia we had a clear goal to improve the relationship between our
two countries, particularly on the commercial side, to promote
business links between the two countries.
You have worked in different countries. What do you think can your way
of thinking change while moving to a new country? Do you take
something form a new culture?
The core of you stays the same. But, in each country you live in, you
appreciate different things which you do not see in your own country
or which perhaps your country has lost. I see in Armenia tremendous
hospitality and generosity towards strangers which in some ways we
have lost in UK. In Japan what I valued was enormous politeness
towards people and culture of respect. The similarity for example
between Japan and Armenia is an importance of family, parents,
grandparents. We have lost that in the UK.
About Armenia
Do you remember the first impression about Armenia?
What struck me was how warm and funny the people were, the sense of
humor. The landscape, if you are from south of rural England, a place
with many farms, you feel like you are up in the mountains.
Do you know any words in Armenian?
I always try to learn the language. My Armenian is not as good as it
should be because I speak Russian and it is easy to communicate in
Russian. My plan for the next year is to focus on Armenian. The phrase
I know is: `Shutov aveli lav klini'(It would be better soon).
What things do you really miss being out of UK?
I miss some television programs and the sausages. I miss my friends
and family. We have beautiful countryside and old houses looked after
by charity and are open to general public. Old houses with large
gardens, I love a British garden.
Two Ambassadors ` advantages and disadvantages
You are appointed as two ambassadors. What advantages and
disadvantages does your job have?
The huge advantage is you have two brains, two sets of energy thinking
about Armenia and the embassy. Being an Ambassador is actually quite a
lonely job. I am having someone else with a slightly different point
of view who you can discuss things with. It generates more ideas. The
main disadvantage it is quite unusual, people are a little bit
surprised. But I hope once they meet both of us, they will understand
it is no like having half an ambassador, it is like having two.
Congressional Documents and Publications
December 5, 2012
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia Hearing
“Iranian Influence in the South Caucasus and the Surrounding Region.”;
Testimony by Alex Vatanka, Adjunct Scholar, Middle East Institute
Chairman Burton, members of the committee and ladies and gentlemen.
Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today.
My focus this afternoon is on Iran’s policies toward the South
Caucasus. I will provide a brief assessment of Iran’s foreign policy
behavior in this region of the world and how it impacts the interests
of the US and her allies and partners.
First, let me set the regional scene. Iran has deep roots in this
region. Much of the South Caucasus region was historically part of or
heavily influenced by the Persian Empire. In some aspects,
cross-border ties remain significant. Today, there are over twice as
many ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran (estimated at around 20 million
people) than in the Republic of Azerbaijan. One of the largest
Armenian Diaspora communities is also found in Iran (estimated at
around 80,000 people).
Iran’s reach and influence
The close historical, ethnic and religious ties (particularly the
shared Shia Islam with Azerbaijan) should on paper make this region
fertile ground for Iranian influence. Nonetheless, Tehran’s record in
this region is at best mixed.
The record is mixed for one key reason: The three countries of the
region – Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – view their large southern
neighbor through very different lenses. Accordingly, relations range
from intimate (Armenia) to cordial (Georgia) to complicated and often
outright hostile (Azerbaijan).
Before assessing Tehran’s relations with these three states, let me
say something about a fundamental factor that shapes Iran’s posture
toward the South Caucasus. That pertains to Iran’s relations with
Russia. In my view, the regime in Tehran appears to be extremely
deferential toward Russian interests in the South Caucasus, a region
that Moscow still considers to be part of it “Near Abroad.”
Why is this reality the case? Given Iran’s international isolation,
the ruling clerical-military elite in Tehran appear to prioritize
Russia as the periodic – albeit unreliable – supporter of Iran and
have therefore opted not to challenge Moscow’s policies in the South
Caucasus and in Central Asia.
This is of course to the detriment of long-term Iranian national
interests. But the Islamist regime in Tehran is above all driven by
its own narrow set of political goals which are overwhelmingly rooted
in a desire to ensure the regime’s survival at the cost of undermining
Iran’s national interest. I believe this is the most plausible
explanation behind Tehran’s inclination to accommodate Russia above
and beyond, and a conclusion which is commonly accepted by independent
observers in Tehran.
In fact, across the wider Caucasus region, Iran’s posture has either
been mute toward Russian assertiveness or Tehran actively complements
Moscow’s pursuit of its strategic objectives. For example, the Iranian
regime – a self-declared guardian of Muslim peoples – remained
conspicuously silent during Russian military campaigns in the Muslim
republic of Chechnya.
More recently, Tehran barely reacted after Russia invaded Georgia in
August of 2008. Elsewhere, Iranian policies have actively complemented
Russian objectives. The best example of this is Tehran’s close ties
with Armenia, a close ally of Russia, at the expense of
Iranian-Azerbaijani relations.
In other words, if Russian interests are at stake, Iran prefers to
either align its policies with those of Moscow (as is the case with
Armenia) or stay out Russia’s path (as is the case with Georgia).
Iran-Azerbaijan standoff
Among the three South Caucasian states, Azerbaijan has been the one
where immediate Russian interests are least sensitive. This reality,
combined with the fact that Azerbaijan is closest to Iran on ethnic
and religious terms, has turned Baku into Tehran’s primary target. For
that reason, Iran-Azerbaijan relations are presently the most
turbulent in the region.
When Azerbaijan first emerged as an independent state in 1991, Tehran
was hopeful that this new Shia-majority country would be open to
Iranian overtures and Tehran’s Islamist and anti-Western political
model.
This was not the case then in 1991 and the appeal of the Iranian
Islamist model has only weakened in the meantime, a feature which has
been a constant irritant in Iranian-Azerbaijani relations over the
course of the last 21 years.
In fact, Baku early on chose a pro-Turkish and Western-oriented
position. This continues to frustrate Tehran as one of Baku’s
strategic goals is to become a close regional partner of the United
States.
Meanwhile, as Azerbaijan has matured politically and become wealthier
thanks to oil and gas export revenues, it has clearly also become
bolder in pursuing its foreign and national security interests. This
is best exemplified by Baku’s decision to forge close ties with Israel
and knowing full well that this would anger and further complicate
relations with Tehran.
Azerbaijan has been steadfast and argues that Iran has no basis to
criticize its ties with the Jewish state given that Tehran has long
ignored Baku’s pleas to shun Armenia or otherwise accommodate
Azerbaijani security interests.
Azerbaijan-Israel relations, however, are more than merely a knee-jerk
response to Iranian policies. The Azerbaijanis argue that they too
need allies they can turn to meet their diplomatic, economic and
military needs, and Israel is judged as both a resourceful and
reliable partner.
Despite repeated vocal Iranian objections, Azerbaijani-Israeli
relations remain solid. In February 2012, Azerbaijan signed a $1.6
billion defense deal with Israel that included air defense systems,
intelligence equipment and unmanned aerial vehicles.
In my discussions with an array of political figures in Azerbaijan –
from government officials to key opposition figures – I found very
little disagreement on the issue of Baku’s close ties with Israel. At
the heart of the matter is an Azerbaijani desire across the political
spectrum for the development of the country’s capabilities and
specifically in regards to finding a settlement to the frozen
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
As Iran’s “Big Brother” approach and pressure toward Baku has failed
to deliver, Tehran is now instead seeking to incentivize Baku with a
new wave of promises of cooperation. This latest approach has been
very noticeable in the last few months, most likely indicating that
Tehran is hoping to prevent further fallout with its immediate
neighbors.
The latest overtures toward Baku need to be seen in the context of
Iran’s already isolated position due to its nuclear program and UN
resolutions and sanctions. Nonetheless, despite such Iranian offers,
deep suspicion in relations is highly unlikely to go away in the
foreseeable future.
Perhaps more important than any other factor, Baku shows no sign of
wanting to abandon its pro-US position or its ties with Israel and
certainly shows no sign of wanting to adopt policies that would
appease the ruling elite in Tehran.
The impact of Iranian behavior on US interests and its partners
Throughout the 1990s, one of Tehran’s key objectives across the
Caucasus and Central Asia was to prevent an increase of US influence.
This is still an objective, but Tehran’s resources are limited and it
is now far more likely to out-source to Russia and China and regional
collective organizations – such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization – to realize this objective. This shift is also a
reflection of the undoubted failure of the Iranian Islamist message,
even in countries such as Azerbaijan, with a Muslim and Shia majority.
However, this equilibrium could shift if the Iranian nuclear standoff
continues and if radical entities within the Iranian regime opt to
increase anti-US activities in the South Caucasus as a way to
challenge or confront the US and its allies. There have been some
recent signs to justify such concerns.
Earlier in the year, Azerbaijani officials reported the arrest of
individuals charged with planning to attack US and Israeli and Jewish
targets. As recently as 9 October 2012, Azerbaijan sentenced 22 people
charged with spying for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
(IRGC) and plotting to carry out attacks against American and Israeli
targets in Azerbaijan. These realities point to Azerbaijan as a
potential battle-ground in Iran’s stand-off with the US and her
allies.
On the question of Iranian influence and activities in the South
Caucasus, Armenia and Georgia pose different challenges for US policy
makers.
Given that its borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan have been closed
since 1993, Armenia has become reliant on Iran and Georgia as its sole
avenues to world markets. Iran is also a principal trading partner for
Armenia and Yerevan’s economic interests are already harmed by the
sanctions imposed on Iran. It would appear that both Armenia and Iran
would have an incentive to circumvent international sanctions imposed
on Iran, although this is strongly denied by the Armenian authorities.
In the case of Georgia, it is again about whether Iran can use the
country to circumvent international sanctions. Since 2010,
Iran-Georgia relations have warmed and a visa-free regime has been
established between the two countries, increasing the flow of Iranian
tourists and investment to Georgia. The bulk of this traffic can be
expected to be legitimate as Iranian investors and tourists look for
new and affordable destinations and particularly since traditional
destinations such as those in Europe and in the United Arab Emirates
have become less accessible. At the same time, the greater Iranian
access to Georgia is highly likely to be exploited by Iran’s
intelligence services for operational purposes although there is very
little concrete material in this regard in open sources.
In conclusion, let me say that Iran’s influence in the South Caucasus
does not match its proximity or historical ties to the region. Tehran
insistence on building relations on an ideological and anti-Western
platform is a failed policy. This is best symbolized by the poor state
of relations between Iran and Azerbaijan. And it goes beyond bilateral
ties. Thanks to its ideological intransigence, Tehran has removed
itself as a contender in Caspian Basin energy bonanza. When Tehran has
been able to make inroads in the region – specifically in Armenia and
less so in Georgia – it has done so overwhelmingly because those
states lack alternatives and not because of a convincing Iranian
message.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the Committee, thank you
again for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Read this original document at:
Armenian organization calls for revising Law on Sects
tert.am
20:03 – 08.12.12
An Armenian alliance of NGOs has called for joint efforts towards
combating harmful sects.
At a news conference on Saturday, President of the One Nation Alliance
Gor Tamazyan, urged the government to reconsider its approaches to
non-political sects, otherwise predicting a slimming of the budget due
to Jehovah’s Witnesses winning cases against Armenia at the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
`That organization is a totalitarian sect and contains anti-national
elements,’ he said, noting that a foreign-funded organization can
never serve national interests.
Commenting on the recent ECtHR lawsuit that saw Jehovah’s Witnesses
evading the military win a case against the Republic of Armenia,
Tamazyan said that deserters’ success in the European Court sets a bad
precedent to others.
70 Armenian trucks stuck in Upper Lars, paper says
December 8, 2012 – 19:54 AMT
PanARMENIAN.Net – Over 70 Armenian trucks are stuck in Upper Lars
checkpoint at the Russian-Georgian border due to the heavy snow,
Zhoghovurd daily reported.
`This may cause upsurge in the prices of imported goods, experts say.
The cars have been instructed to change the direction to Ukraine,
given the current situation,’ the paper says.
Number of “victims” of Turkish and Azerbaijani hacker attacks grows in Armenia
arminfo
Saturday, December 8, 15:21
If in 2011 1100 Armenian web sites were broken because of the attacks
of Turkish and Azerbaijani hackers, in 2012 this number have grown up
to 1250, chairman of the public organization “Internet Society” (ISOC
AM), Igor Mkrtumyan, said at the opening ceremony of the III
conference of Web-technologies “ArmNet 2012” in Yerevan, 8 December.
He also added that the above-mentioned indices are evidence of the
necessity of raising safety level of web-sites.
ISOC AM, Orange Armenia and Maeutica branding agency initiated the
conference. Director of the agency, Haykui Taksildaryan, told Arminfo
correspondent earlier that in some sense the Internet realized itself
in Armenia like an information resource, but it has not been well
developed like a branch of economy and a business-instrument. “Few
people in the country managed to monetize Internet and build business
on it”, – she said and added that it requires special knowledge.
The winners of the III contest of Internet sites “ArmNet Awards 2012”
in 9 nominations will be awarded within the frames of the conference.
Orange Armenia is going to complete the year 2012 with a zero balance
and operate at a profit in 2013
arminfo
Saturday, December 8, 11:20
Orange Armenia is going to complete the year 2012 with a zero balance
of operating income and expenditure and to operate at a profit in
2013, Chief Executive Officer of Orange Armenia Francis Gelibter says
in his interview with ArmInfo. By late 2013 the company will cover the
investments in formation and development of the network. When
characterizing the company’s development, he pointed out that in Q3
2012 versus Q3 2011 consumption grew by approximately 7% in the
Armenian markets of mobile communication and wireless broadband
internet, and the growth among the Orange subscribers made up 41%. In
2012 Orange Armeni invested about 12 mln EUR, and over its three-year
activity in Armenia the company invested about 30 mln EUR to acquire
the relevant equipment.
Francis Gelibter said that the leadership of France Telecom highly
estimated the company’s achievements: during the October meeting of
the France Telecom Group representatives in Romania, Orange Armeni
was awarded a prize as the best company in terms of efficiency and
development dynamics. To recall, Francis Gelibter took his office
precisely 100 days ago, and over this period of time he has come to
the conclusion that the Armenian telecoms market is very competitive
and the subscribers have an opportunity of choice. He said that under
these conditions the company can prove that it has an advantage over
others not due to the lack of competition, but due to the fact that it
is the best in the competitive fight.
Gelibter thinks that the year 2013 will be significant in terms of
development of the product range, as the company will start preparing
for transition to the Mobile Number Portability (MNP). To introduce
this system in 2013, the company will continue working with the
Armenian Public Services Regulatory Commission and with the other two
telecommunication mega-operators of Armenia.
Orange Armeni has also outlined other innovations for 2013. Gelibter
says that the company’s ideology in its work with subscribers is the
same: provision of high-quality services both via the call center and
the sales offices. The company will keep on being an innovative
operators and being the first to offer new services and offers to the
market, as well as to keep lead in offering its customers the best
price for the best service.
To note, the subscriber base of Orange Armenia as of Q2 2012 numbered
644.7 thsd (6.3% y-o-y growth). The number of broadband internet
users totaled 77.6 thsd (18.7% y-o-y growth).
According to the analytical bulletin “Financial Analysis of the
Largest Manufacturing Enterprises of Armenia” by the Agency of Rating
Marketing Information (ArmInfo), in 2011 the assets of Orange Armenia
amounted to 43.9 bln AMD (over $107.8 mln), inventory holdings – about
613.1 mln AMD, bank loans – 72.9 bln AMD. In 2011 the company’s
proceeds totaled about 14 bln AMD (75.7% y-o-y growth). The
accumulated loss totaled 62.3 bln AMD.
To note, France Telecom operates in 33 countries. The company entered
the Armenian market in Nov 2009.
Armenian inmate denied anti-drug treatment
TERT.AM
16:14 – 08.12.12
An Armenian inmate serving time at the Nubarashen penitentiary
complains that his continuous request for an anti-drug treatment meet
the prison authorities’ rejection.
In a phone conversation with Tert.am, the convict, Arthur Smbatyan,
said it is already 6-7 months he has been asking the prison
administration to enroll him in a Metadon treatment program.
`It isn’t as though the program had been approved by the National
Assembly. There’s nothing illegal about my request,’ he said, adding
that doctors consider him a registered patient since 2008.
A patient enrolled in the Methadone replacement therapy is obliged,
throughout the treatment, to avoid using a narcotic or psychotropic
drug without the doctor’s prescription.
Smbatyan says he has been in prison since October 28, 2008. Initially
sentenced for two years and six month, he was later convicted four
times over drug addiction charges.
`First they imposed an administrative fine and then prolonged my
sentence for six months. The third time they recalled my sentence and
convicted again. The fourth time I was caught here over a drug case,’
he said.
Arthur’s family gave him up after the last sentence. The inmate, who
has sewn his mouth shut after declaring a hunger-strike, says his wife
won’t event answer his calls. He is now confined in a lock-up but will
be transferred to a hunger-strike cell on Sunday.
Arthur says he made two suicide attempts, first by hanging himself and
the second time – by piercing his belly with a broken piece of glass.
`They are torturing me to death; I am forced to do that,’ he told our
correspondent.
Speaking to Tert.am, a spokesperson for the Penitentiary Department,
Gor Ghlechyan, said the prisons have nothing to do with the Metadon
program.
`That’s a commission which decides whether or not to enroll a person,
regardless of being a convict,’ he said, ruling out any intervention
by prison administrations.
`[The convict] writes the request which we send to the commission,’ he
explained.
Ghlechyan promised to make additional comments on Monday.