STRENGTHS AND CONSTRAINTS OF TURKISH POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
June 19 2014
by Bayram Balci
ABSTRACT
Just after the end of the Soviet Union and the emergence of three
independent states in the South Caucasus Turkey started to manifest
a real interest for this region. Energy issue, which is the key issue
in this Turkish policy since the beginning, is expected to remain the
key priority for Turkey because of its growing economy. Ankara tries
to have a balanced relations with the three South Caucasian countries,
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, but for multiple reasons, Turkey’s
policy in the South Caucasus is still determined by its relations
with Azerbaijan who is the best ally and economic partner for Ankara.
Turkey, despite being an immediate neighbor of the South Caucasus or
Caucasian countries and having a shared history because of the Ottoman
domination of this region, has only recently expressed an interest and
developed a foreign policy towards the three South Caucasus republics.
Since their accession to independence in 1991, Ankara has established
unique ties with these nations. However, Turkey is not the only
regional power to be looking into its neighborhood. Two other
neighbors, which have also historically dominated this region, are
manifesting a likewise legitimate interest: Russia and Iran.
In fact, with the end of the Soviet Union, the new geographical
configuration in the area fed the expectation that a new struggle for
influence in this region would soon be revived amongst the old empires:
the Russians, the Safavids, and the Ottomans and their heirs, Russia,
Iran, and Turkey. But this confrontation has not taken place.
To date, political pragmatism and economic cooperation have prevailed.
In particular, Turkey and Russia have succeeded in avoiding all
direct conflict in the affairs of the Southern Caucasus. Still,
they can be considered the sources of polarization in conflicts,
such as the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh or the secessionist
movement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia.
A General Perspective of Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Southern
Caucasus
The end of the bipolar world was a watershed moment in the history of
Turkey’s foreign policy. No longer having to serve the role of the
buffer zone between East and West, Turkey aspires to become a major
political actor and to impose itself on the regional scene in the
post-Soviet era. The Turkic republics of the area are of particular
importance to Turkey. In the heart of the Caucasus stands Azerbaijan,
culturally and politically the closest to Turkey. Fearful that this
new region would fall under the influence of countries hostile to
the West, like Iran or Saudi Arabia, or to avoid a return of Russia,
Turkey’s western allies strongly encouraged Ankara to present itself
as a model of secular development. However, for a multitude of reasons,
including a lack of sufficient resources, the reticence of these newly
formed republics to relinquish their sovereignty in exchange for
an outside model, and their apprehension of Russia’s return to its
“old neighborhood,” Ankara has revisited its far sighted ambitions
and returned to a more realistic approach.1
When the AK Party acceded to power in 2002, it put into place a more
assertive foreign policy largely due to the economic miracle of the
“Anatolian Tigers.” At the same time, Turkey was cautious not to
be overly ambitious in the Caucasus to avoid stirring up trouble and
rubbing Russia the wrong way. As it turned out, the results were mixed,
and even disappointing politically, however there was success in the
economic and cultural spheres. Turkey’s priority was in the area of
energy and its participation in the realization of the “project of
the century,” the construction of the Baku, Tbilisi, Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline. Following long and intense negotiations and political
maneuvering, in 2005, the BTC turned Turkey into a key country
for the transit of hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea to European
markets.2 The BTC was extended by the Baku, Tbilisi, and Erzurum
pipeline for the transport of natural gas. This very pipeline is in
the process of being further extended by the construction of two new
pipelines that are underway: TAP and TANAP, respectively the Trans
Adriatic Pipeline and the Trans Anatolian Pipeline. Once completed,
they will allow for an improved transit of gas from the Caspian Sea
to the Markets of Europe – passing though Georgia, Turkey, Albania,
Greece, and Italy. By reducing European dependence on Russian natural
gas, these pipelines will turn Turkey into an energy hub and a major
actor for exchanges between Europe and the Caspian basin.3
Politically and geo-strategically, Turkey is still not the major
actor its foreign policy architects dreamt of being at the end of the
Soviet era. Two events illustrate this current failure in Turkey’s
foreign policy ambitions and have forced it to be more modest. First,
as a close ally to Azerbaijan, Turkey did little to help resolve
the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh. The Minsk group, which did not
include Turkey and had the mission to promote the advancement of the
peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, produced little
in accomplishing any significant improvement in a conflict that has
been frozen for over twenty years. Second, the short war in the summer
of 2008 between Russian and Georgia also revealed Turkey’s political
effacement in the Southern Caucasus. Having normally good relations
with both Russia and Georgia, Turkey attempted to play a mediation
role in the conflict but rapidly became aware that it was ineffective.
Confronted by Russia’s growing ambitions, Turkey has little leverage,
especially in the Southern Caucasus. Thus, Ankara launched the
“Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform,” which brought together
the three Caucasus Republics, Turkey, and Russia. Unfortunately, these
efforts only revealed Turkey’s position of inferiority in relation to
Russia in this region. 4Most recently, in March 2014, Ankara has felt
its impotency in the region following Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
Turkey’s diplomats were forced to curtail their criticism of this
act to avoid all direct confrontation with a major economic partner:
Russia.5
However, when it comes to “soft power,” Turkey has considerable
influence in the Southern Caucasus. Turkey’s television broadcasts of
shows and programs are exceptionally popular in Azerbaijan. Reciprocal
tourism is flourishing between Turkey and the Caucasus. Turkish
religious influence is notable, not only in Azerbaijan but also in the
Muslim regions of Georgia (in the region of Adjara and the border areas
of Azerbaijan). Indirectly linked to this soft power are the cultural
and educational activities of the Gulenist movement, which reaches
both Azerbaijan and Georgia where five schools and one university
have been established. However, since an open political rift has
erupted in Turkey between Prime Minister Erdogan and Fethullah Gulen
(the spiritual leader of the Gulenist movement), serious repercussions
could emerge in the region, especially in Azerbaijan where the Gulen
movement affiliated activities have already been severely scrutinized
by local authorities. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that a generation
of political elites has been formed because of these educational
establishments created by the Gulenist movement. Still, despite the
State University of Yerevan opening of a Department of Turkish Studies
with more than 200 students studying Turkish language and civilization,
soft power in Armenia remains weak.
There are evident disparities in the bilateral relations between
Turkey and each of these Republics of the Southern Caucasus. Each
of these three countries has striking differences. More importantly,
they each represent diverse interests for Tukey. Thus, they each have
taken on a unique place in Ankara’s foreign policy.
Turkey-Azerbaijan, a Quasi-perfect Convergence of Viewpoints and
Interests in the Southern Caucasus
Azerbaijan holds a unique place in Turkey’s foreign policy, not only
in the Caucasus and in the general Turkic speaking region but also
beyond. This closeness is not only due to the shared cultural and
linguistic affinities but also to the strong political and strategic
interests that exist between these two countries. Their bilateral
relations are often characterized as “two states, one nation.” With
the end of the Soviet Empire, Turkey sought to recreate a solidarity
based on “Turkishness,” connecting all Turkish speaking nations.
Azerbaijan was the most enthusiastic in heeding this call. Good
bilateral relations are not limited to official government
interactions, as the two societies are very close and intertwined
culturally. Many Turks are of Azerbaijani origin, and since the end
of the Soviet era, there is an increasing number of marriages between
Turks and Azeris. Ethnically, these two people are almost identical.
This is true to the extent that religious differences are erased, as
Turkey is a Sunni majority country and Azerbaijan is 65% Shiite. All
these factors explain the generally good relations between Turkey
and Azerbaijan; however, they do not mask certain emerging tensions.
At the beginning of Azerbaijan’s independence, relations were warm
between the two countries. The first President of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz
Elchibey, was known for his Pan-Turkism and his strong attachment to
Turkey. However, in 1993, he was overthrown by a coup d’état and
was replaced by Heydar Aliyev, who put in place a more pragmatic
foreign policy that was less tied to Turkey. Still, he maintained
good relations with Ankara. Since 2003, his son Ilham has followed
a similar political line and has been able to manage Azerbaijan’s
neighbors. Concretely, Turkey has actively supported Azerbaijan’s
position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as other regional
security issues; for example, when tensions emerged between Azerbaijan
and Iran.6 In exchange, Azerbaijan supports Turkey’s initiatives,
like the Turcophone Summits, even if these summits are not met with
much enthusiasm in Central Asia. In sum, Turkey and Azerbaijan share
similar positions on the Armenian question of genocide, conflict in
the Nagorno-Karabakh, and regional security issues.
In terms of economics, the two countries are linked through a
multiplicity of accords, which permit exchanges in all sectors,
however the energy section is by far the most dynamic. A number of
Turkish companies are investing in Azerbaijan, but the BTC, the BTE
and the other pipelines that are under construction, like the TAP
and the TANAP, represent the keys to relations between these two
counties, and even their future. Moreover, petrol revenues have
permitted Azerbaijan to massively invest in the Turkish economy.7
In the area of ideas, relations are even more developed and have
history. The Turkish Republic was ideologically founded by the
intellectuals who were in same cases originated from Azerbaijan. The
Soviet “parenthetical” was not an obstacle to renewing the cultural
and religious relations between the two countries when the Soviet
Union collapsed. Turkish television networks are avidly followed in
Azerbaijan, and the similarity of the language is apparent in the
streets of Baku. In the religious domain, Azerbaijani Shiism and
Turkish Sunnism do not hinder cooperation between the two countries.
The Turkish Religious Affairs Administration, “Diyanet,” cooperates
with the Spiritual Leader of Baku, and a number of Turkish Islamic
movements are implanted in Azerbaijan, like the disciples of Suleyman
Hilmi Tunahan, or those of the mystic Nakshibendi Osman Nuri Topbas.
Finally, in the area of education, there is the strong presence of
the educational institutions set up by Fethullah Gulen. A number of
his followers have set up universities as well as dozens of schools
and exam preparatory schools.8
Thus, relations between the two countries are excellent at all levels.
They are grounded but it does not mean that certain tensions do not
exist. In particular, when Ankara moves towards normalizing its
relations with Armenia, it meets with strong resistance from its
Azerbaijani ally. The next section will demonstrate how Turkey’s
foreign policy towards Armenia is decided, really, in Baku rather
than in Ankara.
Turkey-Armenia, an Impossible Reconciliation?
Relations between Turkey and Armenia remain, to say the least,
very delicate and complex, as history and the frozen conflict in the
Nagorno-Karabakh weigh heavily on the present. Turkey did recognize
Armenia’s independence at the end of the Soviet era and considered
establishing diplomatic relations with Yerevan. However, these
relations were short lived. In 1993, in solidarity with Azerbaijan,
Turkey closed its borders with Armenia to protest against the
occupation of Karabakh and certain other Azerbaijani towns by
the Armenian forces. Ever since, this cold conflict has been an
insurmountable obstacle in the normalization of relations between
the two countries and has had an impact on Turkey’s foreign policy
in the Caucasus.
The other thorny issue is the question of the Armenian genocide.
Armenia qualifies the massacre of the Armenian populations in 1915
under the Ottoman Empire as genocide and actively advocates in the
international community to have it recognized as such.9 Turkey does
not deny the massacres, but it contests the extent of the tragedy,
which it argues took place in the context of the Russian-Turkish wars
and these tragic events had an impact on all parties involved.
Also, but none the less not a marginal issue, the exact demarcation
of the border between the two countries is a subject of controversy.
Turkey fully recognizes its actual borders, but Ankara still considers
that Yerevan is ambiguous on this issue and has invited it to clarify
its position on the official border.10
Having been stuck in an impasse throughout the 1990s, relations with
Armenia have improved since the AK Party came to power and introduced
its foreign policy of “zero problems with neighbors.” Turkey has
tried to improve its relations with all of its neighbors. The first
steps were made in 2008, within the framework of “football diplomacy.”
Taking advantage of soccer matches between Turkey and Armenia in
2008 to qualify for the Euro Cup, President Abdullah Gul and his
counterpart, Serzh Sargsyan, held mutual visits. These visits,
undoubtedly, opened the door for dialogue and other bolder
initiatives. Secret negotiations led to the preparation of the
“Negotiation of the Protocols” to normalize relations between Turkey
and Armenia.”11 However, these efforts, no matter how sincere they
may have been, fell to the weigh side under the reaction and pressure
coming from Azerbaijan, who accused Turkey of treason and trying to
marginalize Baku from the negotiations, especially excluding the
Nagorno-Karabakh from the equation. In retaliation, Azerbaijan
threatened to increase the price of oil and other derivative
products exported to Turkey. Azerbaijan even threatened to use
Russia as a transport route for oil and gas instead of Turkey.12
Thus, Azerbaijan’s leverage over Turkey compromised the successful
resolution of these Protocols and the revelations to the public of
these secret talks forced the two parties to retract themselves from
previous positions, holding a much less conciliatory stance. In fact,
the Protocols failed to obtain the approval of the two parliaments
without which any normalization is impossible.
However, this failure to achieve normalization cannot be viewed as a
total failure. The process allowed Turkish and Armenian negotiators
to meet. It also encouraged civil society on both sides of the border
to start a serious discussion and to reflect upon these painful topics.
Initiated before these political discussions took place – the
dialogue between historians, intellectuals, and academics now is a new
development and opens the door to many other initiatives. True, next
year’s commemoration in 2015 of the hundred year old tragedy of 1915
risks polarizing the two camps but the first efforts of negotiations
gives us hope that dialogue is possible. Indeed, in April 2014, the
Turkish Prime Minister’s official expression of condolences for the
descendants of the Armenian died in 1915 under Ottomans was a step
forward in the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia.13
Turkey and Georgia, the Bridge Between the Caspian and Europe
Turks and Georgians have a long common history marked by conflicts of
bordering countries. The Ottoman Empire dominated for a longtime part
of the current Georgian territory, notably the province of Ajaria,
which was islamicized as of the 16thcentury. Despite this tumultuous
past, the advent of an independent Georgia from the Soviet Union
in 1991 allowed a development of good relations between Ankara and
Tbilisi, which Turkey privileged for two reasons. First, for Turkey,
the Georgian territory is an entrance corridor to the Caucasus and
Central Asia or Turkic World, beyond the Caspian Sea.14 Second, Georgia
possesses fundamental importance for Turkey since the hydrocarbons of
the Caspian Sea pass through the country to reach the Turkish ports
and the international markets.
Reciprocally, Turkey is a key country for Georgia for at least two
reasons as well. First, it is a window toward Europe for Georgia.
Turkey’s negotiations for EU membership are of great importance for
Tbilisi, as it aspires to go beyond its own Caucasus enclave. Second,
in the context of its conflictual relations with the other regional
superpower, Russia, Georgia needs Turkey as a balancing power, in
particular, to overcome its economic problems and counter the Russian
markets, which have been closed to it since the war between Georgia
and Russia in 2008.
Thus, since their establishment in the early 90s, relations between
Georgia and Turkey have been warm and carefully maintained through
regular mutual visits. The change of power that occurred with the
Revolution of the Roses in 2003, and the failure at the ballot box for
Saakashvili in October 2012 with the arrival to power of his rival
Bidzina Ivanishvili only had a limited amount of repercussions on
the good relations with Turkey. Still, these relations are sometimes
difficult to manage for Turkey since the AKP came to power and
established a rapprochement policy with Russia.
Georgia’s pro-Western stance and its desire to enter NATO have
rendered Turkey’s dual attempt to have good relations with both
Russia and Georgia difficult to navigate. Thus, in August 2008, when
Russia invaded a part of Georgia, which was seeking to recuperate its
secessionist province of South Ossetia, Turkey found itself in a very
awkward position. The diplomatic initiative to create the “Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Platform” by only grouping regional actors
to manage regional problems, quickly showed the limitations of Turkey’s
power in its immediate surroundings. 15
The generally good relations between Turkey and Georgia encounter
on occasion minor tensions. The activism of the Abkhazia minority
of Turkey regularly stirs up trouble, as they maintain commercial
activities with Abkhazia. But this region of Georgia is secessionist.
As Tbilisi tries to quell the insurgency, it looks at the exchanges
with Turkey with a critical eye, recognizing that they are out of
its control.
Meanwhile, there also exist some religious tensions between the
two countries. Georgians, in particular the Georgian Church, which
has seen an increasing political role over recent years, does not
appreciate the religious activism of certain Turkish groups on its
territory, in particular in Ajaria. More prosaically, the building
of new mosques or the restoration of older ones abandoned during the
Soviet era, which are financed by the private initiatives of certain
groups, like Suleyman Tunahan’s group, are badly perceived by certain
segments of the population, who feel that their Christian identity is
being threatened. Similarly, Turkey is seeking to rebuild the Aziziye
Mosque in Batumi, a vestige of the Ottoman past and domination of the
region.16 To counterbalance and resolve these tensions, Turkey has
offered to re-store old Georgian Churches in Turkey. These cooperation
efforts are continuing but their final outcome remains uncertain.
Their success depends on the strengthening of bilateral relations.
Finally, the question of Meshkete is divisive. The Meshketians, also
known as the Ahiska, are a small Turkish minority from Georgia –
deported in 1944 from their villages in the steps of Central Asia.
After the end of the Soviet era, similarly to a large number of
peoples of the Caucasus, many who were deported are seeking to return
to their homes. Supported by Turkey in their quest to return home,
these numerous Meshketians have not obtained Tbilisi’s agreement to
return to their lands, despite multiple promises.
Overall, relations between Turkey and Georgia are very good. The
development of the pipeline projects, in particular the TAP and
the TANAP will render the Turkish and Georgian economies even more
complementary and interdependent. Similarly, the annexation of the
Crimea by the Russians will most likely slow the progress of a renewal
of Russian-Georgiarelations, which Prime Minister Ivanishvili had
begun and will instead reinforce relations between Ankara and Tbilisi.
Conclusion
At the end of the Soviet era, the Caucasus and Central Asia have taken
an important place in Turkey’s foreign policy. However, Ankara’s
ambitions have been beyond its actual capacity for action. So, it
has returned to a more pragmatic and realist posture. Consequently,
Turkey’s foreign policy in this region has somewhat neglected Central
Asia but maintained a keen interest in the Caucasus, in particular,
because of its importance in the energy sector. Furthermore,
the diplomatic initiative of Foreign Minister Davutoglu has it as
a central goal to better Turkey’s relations with its neighbors,
and notably Armenia. The normalization of its relations with these
countries remains one of Turkey’s priorities, not only for economic
reasons but also for political and symbolic ones – as Turkey wants to
appear as a country at peace with its neighbors. This situation has
become ever more pressing in the Caucasus, as Turkey is trying not
to become more embroiled in the Syrian civil war and also is seeing
its relations with countries of the Middle East deteriorate.
For Ankara, however, for its relations to improve with Armenia, the
conflict of the Nagorno-Karabakh must be resolved. Thus, Turkey’s
best bet for partnership in the region is Azerbaijan. The conundrum is
that Azerbaijan’s strategy is to isolate Armenia. It won’t hesitate to
block Turkey’s efforts towards Armenia and will use its energy ticket
as a form of blackmail, taking Turkey as a “hostage” in the process.
Nevertheless, maintaining the status quo on the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict serves as a political lever for Baku in defense of its
domestic and foreign interests. This situation, which looks like it
may last, makes Baku the center of attention and decision making on
a number of unavoidable issues in the region, including how Turkey
can carry out its foreign policy in the South Caucasus.
This article was originally published in Insight Turkey.
Endnotes
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2 Greg Bruno, “Turkey at an Energy Crossroads”,
Council on Foreign Relations, November 20, 2008,
3 Gareth Winrow, “The Southern Gas Corridor and Turkey’s Role as
an Energy Transit State and Energy Hub”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 15,
N°1, (2013), pp. 145-163,
insight-turkey-vol_15_no_1_2013_winrow.pdf.
4 Eleni Fotiou, “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform,
What is at Stake for Regional Cooperation”, International Centre
for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), Athens, Greece, N°16, 2009,
5 Bayram Balci, “The Russian Intervention in Crimea: Erdogan’s
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6 Konrad Sasztowt, “Iran, Turkey and Azerbaijan: Heading
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Turkey”, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, (14 November, 2012),
8 Bayram Balci, “Between secular education and Islamic philosophy:
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14 Nigar Göksel, “Turkey and Georgia: Zero
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