ARMENIANS SEEM DETERMINED TO MISREAD CRIMEA
INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND PEACE REPORTING, UK
IWPR Caucasus Reporting
March 28 2014
Views differ in Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh, but both fail to see
risks in backing Russia’s stance.
By Richard Giragosian – Caucasus
For Armenians, history has always been a central pillar of identity.
Even more significant for Armenians is the denial or selective
misinterpretation of history, which have always triggered intense
and immediate condemnation.
Given these tenets of identity, the recent determination of
many in Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh to apply their own selective
interpretation of history and to resist more mainstream interpretations
of the Crimean crisis is bewildering.
Yet underlying this seemingly contradictory view of Crimea and its
dubious referendum, there is an even deeper level of complexity. This
is evident on several levels.
First, Armenians in Nagorny Karabakh and in Armenia proper, who are
normally united, now differ in their perspectives on Crimea.
For many people in Karabakh, the recent referendum in Crimea
is a validation and a vindication of their own quest for
self-determination. This was most evident in the celebratory, joyous
public reaction to news of the Crimean vote.
For Armenia, however, the Crimean issue has more to do with the
country’s strategic “partnership” with Russia.
It was this perspective that prevailed in determining the Armenian
government’s response to the Ukraine conflict, which had initially
been cautious. It became ever clearer this week when Armenia openly
backed the Russian position by voting against a resolution at the
United Nations General Assembly that reaffirmed Ukraine’s territorial
integrity and labelled as illegal the referendum that led to Crimea’s
annexation by Russia.
To another degree of complexity, the implications of these two
positions mean that both of them present greater challenges and greater
threats than any possible benefits or dividends they might bring.
For Nagorny Karabakh, the danger of embracing the Crimean referendum
is that its own argument for self-determination risks being diluted.
There are three main reasons for this. First, in the absence of any
real threat to Crimea’s security, events there were largely driven
by Russian expectations and demands. In contrast, the core issue
of Karabakh’s bid for self-determination has always been security,
in the wake of a pattern of violence from Azerbaijan.
Second, the Crimean referendum itself was never really a question of
“national” self-determination. Rather, it was one of “regional”
self-determination, with no attempt to use Ukrainian legal,
political or constitutional processes for this purpose. Here too,
Nagorny Karabakh’s experience of dialogue and negotiation, and its
experiment in using Soviet constitutional avenues make the Karabakh
referendum starkly different.
A third key difference is rooted in the referendum itself. Crimeans
voted to join the Russian Federation and – in contrast to nearly all
other cases of self-determination – never sought or even suggested
any degree of outright independence. Against that backdrop, Karabakh’s
current embrace of Crimea as an inspiration is more likely to weaken
and dilute the essence of its own quest. Such a development would be
a deadly blow to the sacrifice and tenacity of the Karabakh Armenians.
It would weaken not only their case before the international community,
but also their position vis-a-vis the mediators in the conflict.
The worst-case scenario for Nagorny Karabakh, however, has more
to do with Russia than with Crimea. Newly-assertive and resurgent,
Russia now seems to recognise no limits or restraints. With reckless
disregard and disdain for the costs and repercussions of its actions,
Moscow may select new targets and other objectives, including Karabakh.
Russia may now move to expand and extend its power and influence
in the South Caucasus. Karabakh could be an appealing means toward
that end. This route could involved a dangerous bid for greater if
riskier dividends, in which Moscow would seek to transform the frozen
Karabakh conflict into a hot war, with only Russia and its peacekeepers
capable of direct and immediate intervention. Such a scenario would
mimic Russia’s leverage in the phase prior to the August 2008 war
with Georgia. In the frozen Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts,
it was the deployment of Russian-led peacekeepers and the issuing of
Russian passports that defined and defended Moscow’s interests.
The case of Armenia, meanwhile, is in some ways even more dangerous.
By adopting the Russian stance on Crimea, Yerevan seems destined to
become a prisoner in its partnership with Moscow. And as the West
moves to impose greater sanctions against Russia, Armenia may become
even more isolated, trapped on the wrong side of history.
Perhaps even more distressingly, Armenia may also remain constrained
within the new Iron Curtain that Russian president Vladimir Putin seems
intent on constructing within the borders of the former Soviet Union.
Richard Giragosian is director of the Regional Studies Centre, an
independent think tank in Yerevan, Armenia.
http://iwpr.net/report-news/armenians-seem-determined-misread-crimea