Le difficile retour des Arméniens de Syrie sur la terre de leurs anc

Arménie
Le difficile retour des ArmĂ©niens de Syrie sur la terre de leurs ancĂȘtres

Avec la guerre, des milliers d’ArmĂ©niens installĂ©s en Syrie depuis
plusieurs générations, principalement à Alep, se sont réfugiés en
ArmĂ©nie. Mais pour nombre d’entre eux, retrouver la terre de leurs
ancĂȘtres est une dĂ©sillusion.

L’ArmĂ©nie est moins prospĂšre que la Syrie d’avant-guerre. Sans travail
ni perspectives dans leur pays d’accueil, et malgrĂ© les aides
gouvernementales et celles de l’Église, De nombreux ArmĂ©niens ont des
difficultés à joindre les deux bouts et espÚrent rentrer en Syrie, une
fois la paix revenue. D’autres pensent Ă  l’Europe ou l’AmĂ©rique du
Nord. Enfin, certains se résignent et tentent de construire une
nouvelle vie dans ce pays qu’ils ne connaissent pas. Nos reporters
sont allés à la rencontre de ces Arméniens de Syrie.

Par Sophie CLAUDET , François LESCALIER

Voir la vidéo, lien plus bas

samedi 21 juin 2014,
Jean Eckian (c)armenews.com

DÂŽautres informations disponibles : France 24.com

Armenians speak at Austria protest against Turkey PM’s visit

Armenians speak at Austria protest against Turkey PM’s visit

June 21, 2014 | 00:34

More than 20,000 people participated in the protests that were held
Friday in Austria’s capital city Vienna, and in connection with
Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Austria, but solely 8,000
of the participants were against Erdogan.

A total of 14,000 Erdogan supporters took part in the demonstrations
and the remaining 8,000 protestors were Armenians, Kurds, Assyrians,
and Alawites, an Austrian-Armenian community representative told
Armenian News-NEWS.am.

“The Armenian National Committee in Austria delivered speeches. There
was also a melee during the demonstrations, but, fortunately, no one
was affected,” the representative said adding that the Armenians were
not involved in the clashes.

News from Armenia – NEWS.am

Hraparak: Education Minister Lost His Former Enthusiasm

HRAPARAK: EDUCATION MINISTER LOST HIS FORMER ENTHUSIASM

Friday,
June
20

“Hraparak” paper writes that Armenian Minister of Education and Science
Armen Ashotyan ‘has lost his former ardor and enthusiasm”. He writes on
Facebook only about educational themes and has stopped communicating
actively with reporters. He now deals only with problems of his
sphere. “In reality, the new Armenian government does not need his
political services anymore,” the paper says.

TODAY, 11:44

Aysor.am

Kazimirov: Armenia’s Accession To EAEU Can Have No Direct Impact On

KAZIMIROV: ARMENIA’S ACCESSION TO EAEU CAN HAVE NO DIRECT IMPACT ON THE KARABAKH PEACE PROCESS

by Ashot Safaryan

Friday, June 20, 13:05

Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) can have
no direct impact on settlement of the Karabakh conflict, Vladimir
Kazimirov, the former OSCE MG Co-Chair of Russia, told reporters in
Yerevan on 20 June.

He said that the economic and commercial components in the EAEU
weigh upon the political one. In the Karabakh peace process, the
economic interests are of secondary importance. Expecting resolution
of the Karabakh conflict with accession to the EAEU is the same as
“to scratch the left ear with the right hand,” Kazimirov said.

Nevertheless, in case of desire, one can find some indirect impact,
he said.

Armenia announced an intention to access the EAEU on 29 May in Astana.

http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=10FC6B90-F85A-11E3-80E70EB7C0D21663

Astana: Armenian Ethnocultural Centre Preserves Culture, Encourages

ARMENIAN ETHNOCULTURAL CENTRE PRESERVES CULTURE, ENCOURAGES UNITY

Astana Times, Kazakhstan
June 19 2014

By Dmitry Lee in Nation on 19 June

ASTANA – Hard work, dedication and entrepreneurial spirit, these are
the qualities represented by the three colours of the Armenian flag.

Red stands for the Armenian highland, its people’s continued struggle
for survival and their maintenance of Christianity, independence
and freedom. Blue symbolises the will of the Armenian people to
live beneath peaceful skies. Orange marks Armenians’ creativity and
hard-working nature.

Today, Armenians live in small communities in over 70 countries,
with the largest populations living in the U.S., Russia, France and
Lebanon. The Armenian diaspora totals about eight million people. More
than 25,000 Armenians live in Kazakhstan.

“In Yerevan [the capital of Armenia], there is an Institute of Ancient
Manuscripts that archives ancient manuscripts from all over the world.

Among these manuscripts there are scripts in the Kazakh language
but using Armenian words,” Chairman of Astana’s Van Armenian
Ethnocultural Centre Gagik Martirosyan told The Astana Times in an
exclusive interview. “This proves that Kazakhs and Armenians had ties
thousands of years ago,” he said.

Historical records show that Armenian warriors and traders once roamed
freely in many parts of Central Asia, often fighting alongside local
warlords in return for trading privileges. In more recent history,
Armenians arrived in Kazakhstan in the 1860s, when the Russian Empire,
which at the time controlled Armenian-populated areas in the North
Caucasus, moved to explore the Kazakh steppes. Armenians accompanied
them, acting as interpreters for the Russians as well as consultants
and businessmen for the emerging oil industry.

Today, Armenians at the Van Centre are engaged in various industries
in their adopted nation, Martirosyan said, mostly in construction
and building.

“We have about 50 members in our ethnocultural centre who come from
different working backgrounds. Our deputy is a doctor, there are
retirees, some are businessmen, and whoever can help financially
contributes to our centre, where our goals are to maintain fluency
in our language. We teach the language to children … teach them
to dance national dances, pay our dues to our ancestors and try to
keep our traditions and history alive, and to proudly represent our
nation,” Martirosyan explained.

The community all chips in to maintain the centre, the chairman says.

The office is provided by a local ethnic Armenian businessman,
for example. In addition, Martirosyan said, “the city akimat (local
government) also allots funds to preserve our language and culture.”

With so many local businesspeople involved in the centre, it has also
become a site for networking.

According to Martirosyan, Kazakhstan’s favourable tax policy attracts
many Armenians.

“In Kazakhstan, you pay your taxes and sleep in peace; you don’t have
to worry about other things. The taxing policy also helped create
the middle class and it grows stronger. The government relies on the
middle class, as opposed to Armenia, for instance, [where] there is
almost no middle class.”

Today, the Armenian economy, with a population of about three million,
relies on the investment and support of Armenians abroad. In the Soviet
era, the country’s economy was based largely on chemicals, electronics,
machinery, processed food, synthetic rubber and textiles, but with
the dissolution of the Armenian Soviet Republic, the economy collapsed.

Armenia’s economy has grown since 1995 and inflation has been
negligible for the past several years. New sectors such as
precious-stone processing and jewellery making, information and
communication technology and even tourism are beginning to supplement
more traditional sectors of the economy, like agriculture. The 1994
cease-fire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has also helped boost
the economy.

Armenians, like the country’s many other ethnic groups, are represented
in the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan (APK). The APK was
established by President Nursultan Nazarbayev in 1995; in 2007, the
President signed a decree giving the APK the right to contribute
nine of its members to the Mazhilis (lower house of Parliament),
a unique privilege for such an assembly.

“I would like to wish the [government] of Kazakhstan to continue the
flexible and righteous policy towards all peoples. As our President
says, our strength lies in the unity of all nations. All these nations
that live in Kazakhstan contribute something to the development
of the country. Today in Kazakhstan we can grow, build, continue
developing, work, live – we have peaceful skies over our heads,”
Martirosyan concluded.

http://www.astanatimes.com/2014/06/armenian-ethnocultural-centre-preserves-culture-encourages-unity/

PACE As Lever Of Western Pressure On Yerevan Joining EaEU

PACE AS LEVER OF WESTERN PRESSURE ON YEREVAN JOINING EAEU

Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
June 19 2014

19 June 2014 – 12:08pm

Susanna Petrosyan, Yerevan. Exclusively to Vestnik Kavkaza

On June 17-18th co-reporters of the PACE Monitoring Commission
on Armenia, Acsel Fisher and Alan Mill, visited Armenia. The last
time they visited Armenia was in January 2012. Meanwhile, Armenia
is still being monitored, as a country which hasn’t fulfilled all
the recommendations of the Council of Europe. In this context, the
co-reporters should visit Armenia every two years at least, but they
haven’t appeared for 2.5 years.

What is the reason for the unexpected visit?

The PACE Monitoring Commission is an important political lever
of pressure of the West on the vulnerable administration of Serge
Sargsyan, which came to power on the rebound of the events of March
1st 2008. The topic of March 1st is touched on in all PACE resolutions
on Armenia adopted in the last six years.

At the same time, the co-reporters’ behaviour was aimed at protecting
Serge Sargsyan’s administration, the government, and the parliamentary
majority. It caused dissatisfaction of the opposition, civil society
and relatives of the people who perished on March 1st. They are
indignant about the fact that the 1837 resolution of PACE on October
5th 2011 states that “the page of the events of March 1st is closed.”

Some experts believe that the PACE promoted the positions of the West,
which is interested in Sargsyan’s administration being in power in
Armenia, despite their statements on support of democratic processes.

The Armenian authorities realized that the Council of Europe wouldn’t
investigate the events of March 1st 2008 in detail and blocked all
attempts by the opposition to establish a parliamentary commission
to investigate the developments.

In December 2012 the parliamentary majority offered the opposition
a compromise: in order to avoid politicization of the matter ahead
of the presidential elections the discussion should be postponed to
the postelection period. The speaker of the parliament, the current
premier Ovik Abramyan, gave public guarantees that the question on
establishing a commission on the events of March 1st would have been
included on the agenda right after the elections and the Republican
Party of Armenia would have voted for the draft. However, in spring
2013 the parliamentary majority rejected the opposition’s draft on
the commission.

In February 2014 the Armenian National Congress tried to revive
discussion in parliament on establishing the commission. That time
the authorities blocked the initiative by the opposition once again.

“Such behaviour by the authorities confirms that a series of crimes
leads to the top authorities of the country; it explains the policy
of hiding information about the events of March 1st,” the head of
the ANC Levon Zurabyan thinks.

Representatives of the opposition in the PACE tried to achieve a
second analysis of the events on March 1st, but due to efforts of
various PACE officials these initiatives were blocked.

It turns out that the PACE Monitoring Commission has never taken
any steps against the Armenian government. During the current visit,
the co-reporters stated for the first time that those guilty of the
deaths of 10 innocent people hadn’t been found, even though so many
years had passed.

It seems PACE’s shift from hushing-up the tragedy to such a strict
position is connected with the inconsistent foreign policy of official
Yerevan. The West is dissatisfied with Sargsyan’s decision to join the
Eurasian Economic Union. PACE is still one of the levers of pressure
on the Armenian government by the West. We can’t rule out that a new
resolution on Armenia, which will be developed by PACE in summer,
will be unpleasant for the Yerevan authorities.

http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/56623.html

Strengths And Constraints Of Turkish Policy In The South Caucasus

STRENGTHS AND CONSTRAINTS OF TURKISH POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
June 19 2014

by Bayram Balci

ABSTRACT

Just after the end of the Soviet Union and the emergence of three
independent states in the South Caucasus Turkey started to manifest
a real interest for this region. Energy issue, which is the key issue
in this Turkish policy since the beginning, is expected to remain the
key priority for Turkey because of its growing economy. Ankara tries
to have a balanced relations with the three South Caucasian countries,
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, but for multiple reasons, Turkey’s
policy in the South Caucasus is still determined by its relations
with Azerbaijan who is the best ally and economic partner for Ankara.

Turkey, despite being an immediate neighbor of the South Caucasus or
Caucasian countries and having a shared history because of the Ottoman
domination of this region, has only recently expressed an interest and
developed a foreign policy towards the three South Caucasus republics.

Since their accession to independence in 1991, Ankara has established
unique ties with these nations. However, Turkey is not the only
regional power to be looking into its neighborhood. Two other
neighbors, which have also historically dominated this region, are
manifesting a likewise legitimate interest: Russia and Iran.

In fact, with the end of the Soviet Union, the new geographical
configuration in the area fed the expectation that a new struggle for
influence in this region would soon be revived amongst the old empires:
the Russians, the Safavids, and the Ottomans and their heirs, Russia,
Iran, and Turkey. But this confrontation has not taken place.

To date, political pragmatism and economic cooperation have prevailed.

In particular, Turkey and Russia have succeeded in avoiding all
direct conflict in the affairs of the Southern Caucasus. Still,
they can be considered the sources of polarization in conflicts,
such as the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh or the secessionist
movement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia.

A General Perspective of Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Southern
Caucasus

The end of the bipolar world was a watershed moment in the history of
Turkey’s foreign policy. No longer having to serve the role of the
buffer zone between East and West, Turkey aspires to become a major
political actor and to impose itself on the regional scene in the
post-Soviet era. The Turkic republics of the area are of particular
importance to Turkey. In the heart of the Caucasus stands Azerbaijan,
culturally and politically the closest to Turkey. Fearful that this
new region would fall under the influence of countries hostile to
the West, like Iran or Saudi Arabia, or to avoid a return of Russia,
Turkey’s western allies strongly encouraged Ankara to present itself
as a model of secular development. However, for a multitude of reasons,
including a lack of sufficient resources, the reticence of these newly
formed republics to relinquish their sovereignty in exchange for
an outside model, and their apprehension of Russia’s return to its
“old neighborhood,” Ankara has revisited its far sighted ambitions
and returned to a more realistic approach.1

When the AK Party acceded to power in 2002, it put into place a more
assertive foreign policy largely due to the economic miracle of the
“Anatolian Tigers.” At the same time, Turkey was cautious not to
be overly ambitious in the Caucasus to avoid stirring up trouble and
rubbing Russia the wrong way. As it turned out, the results were mixed,
and even disappointing politically, however there was success in the
economic and cultural spheres. Turkey’s priority was in the area of
energy and its participation in the realization of the “project of
the century,” the construction of the Baku, Tbilisi, Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline. Following long and intense negotiations and political
maneuvering, in 2005, the BTC turned Turkey into a key country
for the transit of hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea to European
markets.2 The BTC was extended by the Baku, Tbilisi, and Erzurum
pipeline for the transport of natural gas. This very pipeline is in
the process of being further extended by the construction of two new
pipelines that are underway: TAP and TANAP, respectively the Trans
Adriatic Pipeline and the Trans Anatolian Pipeline. Once completed,
they will allow for an improved transit of gas from the Caspian Sea
to the Markets of Europe – passing though Georgia, Turkey, Albania,
Greece, and Italy. By reducing European dependence on Russian natural
gas, these pipelines will turn Turkey into an energy hub and a major
actor for exchanges between Europe and the Caspian basin.3

Politically and geo-strategically, Turkey is still not the major
actor its foreign policy architects dreamt of being at the end of the
Soviet era. Two events illustrate this current failure in Turkey’s
foreign policy ambitions and have forced it to be more modest. First,
as a close ally to Azerbaijan, Turkey did little to help resolve
the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh. The Minsk group, which did not
include Turkey and had the mission to promote the advancement of the
peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, produced little
in accomplishing any significant improvement in a conflict that has
been frozen for over twenty years. Second, the short war in the summer
of 2008 between Russian and Georgia also revealed Turkey’s political
effacement in the Southern Caucasus. Having normally good relations
with both Russia and Georgia, Turkey attempted to play a mediation
role in the conflict but rapidly became aware that it was ineffective.

Confronted by Russia’s growing ambitions, Turkey has little leverage,
especially in the Southern Caucasus. Thus, Ankara launched the
“Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform,” which brought together
the three Caucasus Republics, Turkey, and Russia. Unfortunately, these
efforts only revealed Turkey’s position of inferiority in relation to
Russia in this region. 4Most recently, in March 2014, Ankara has felt
its impotency in the region following Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Turkey’s diplomats were forced to curtail their criticism of this
act to avoid all direct confrontation with a major economic partner:
Russia.5

However, when it comes to “soft power,” Turkey has considerable
influence in the Southern Caucasus. Turkey’s television broadcasts of
shows and programs are exceptionally popular in Azerbaijan. Reciprocal
tourism is flourishing between Turkey and the Caucasus. Turkish
religious influence is notable, not only in Azerbaijan but also in the
Muslim regions of Georgia (in the region of Adjara and the border areas
of Azerbaijan). Indirectly linked to this soft power are the cultural
and educational activities of the Gulenist movement, which reaches
both Azerbaijan and Georgia where five schools and one university
have been established. However, since an open political rift has
erupted in Turkey between Prime Minister Erdogan and Fethullah Gulen
(the spiritual leader of the Gulenist movement), serious repercussions
could emerge in the region, especially in Azerbaijan where the Gulen
movement affiliated activities have already been severely scrutinized
by local authorities. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that a generation
of political elites has been formed because of these educational
establishments created by the Gulenist movement. Still, despite the
State University of Yerevan opening of a Department of Turkish Studies
with more than 200 students studying Turkish language and civilization,
soft power in Armenia remains weak.

There are evident disparities in the bilateral relations between
Turkey and each of these Republics of the Southern Caucasus. Each
of these three countries has striking differences. More importantly,
they each represent diverse interests for Tukey. Thus, they each have
taken on a unique place in Ankara’s foreign policy.

Turkey-Azerbaijan, a Quasi-perfect Convergence of Viewpoints and
Interests in the Southern Caucasus

Azerbaijan holds a unique place in Turkey’s foreign policy, not only
in the Caucasus and in the general Turkic speaking region but also
beyond. This closeness is not only due to the shared cultural and
linguistic affinities but also to the strong political and strategic
interests that exist between these two countries. Their bilateral
relations are often characterized as “two states, one nation.” With
the end of the Soviet Empire, Turkey sought to recreate a solidarity
based on “Turkishness,” connecting all Turkish speaking nations.

Azerbaijan was the most enthusiastic in heeding this call. Good
bilateral relations are not limited to official government
interactions, as the two societies are very close and intertwined
culturally. Many Turks are of Azerbaijani origin, and since the end
of the Soviet era, there is an increasing number of marriages between
Turks and Azeris. Ethnically, these two people are almost identical.

This is true to the extent that religious differences are erased, as
Turkey is a Sunni majority country and Azerbaijan is 65% Shiite. All
these factors explain the generally good relations between Turkey
and Azerbaijan; however, they do not mask certain emerging tensions.

At the beginning of Azerbaijan’s independence, relations were warm
between the two countries. The first President of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz
Elchibey, was known for his Pan-Turkism and his strong attachment to
Turkey. However, in 1993, he was overthrown by a coup d’état and
was replaced by Heydar Aliyev, who put in place a more pragmatic
foreign policy that was less tied to Turkey. Still, he maintained
good relations with Ankara. Since 2003, his son Ilham has followed
a similar political line and has been able to manage Azerbaijan’s
neighbors. Concretely, Turkey has actively supported Azerbaijan’s
position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as other regional
security issues; for example, when tensions emerged between Azerbaijan
and Iran.6 In exchange, Azerbaijan supports Turkey’s initiatives,
like the Turcophone Summits, even if these summits are not met with
much enthusiasm in Central Asia. In sum, Turkey and Azerbaijan share
similar positions on the Armenian question of genocide, conflict in
the Nagorno-Karabakh, and regional security issues.

In terms of economics, the two countries are linked through a
multiplicity of accords, which permit exchanges in all sectors,
however the energy section is by far the most dynamic. A number of
Turkish companies are investing in Azerbaijan, but the BTC, the BTE
and the other pipelines that are under construction, like the TAP
and the TANAP, represent the keys to relations between these two
counties, and even their future. Moreover, petrol revenues have
permitted Azerbaijan to massively invest in the Turkish economy.7

In the area of ideas, relations are even more developed and have
history. The Turkish Republic was ideologically founded by the
intellectuals who were in same cases originated from Azerbaijan. The
Soviet “parenthetical” was not an obstacle to renewing the cultural
and religious relations between the two countries when the Soviet
Union collapsed. Turkish television networks are avidly followed in
Azerbaijan, and the similarity of the language is apparent in the
streets of Baku. In the religious domain, Azerbaijani Shiism and
Turkish Sunnism do not hinder cooperation between the two countries.

The Turkish Religious Affairs Administration, “Diyanet,” cooperates
with the Spiritual Leader of Baku, and a number of Turkish Islamic
movements are implanted in Azerbaijan, like the disciples of Suleyman
Hilmi Tunahan, or those of the mystic Nakshibendi Osman Nuri Topbas.

Finally, in the area of education, there is the strong presence of
the educational institutions set up by Fethullah Gulen. A number of
his followers have set up universities as well as dozens of schools
and exam preparatory schools.8

Thus, relations between the two countries are excellent at all levels.

They are grounded but it does not mean that certain tensions do not
exist. In particular, when Ankara moves towards normalizing its
relations with Armenia, it meets with strong resistance from its
Azerbaijani ally. The next section will demonstrate how Turkey’s
foreign policy towards Armenia is decided, really, in Baku rather
than in Ankara.

Turkey-Armenia, an Impossible Reconciliation?

Relations between Turkey and Armenia remain, to say the least,
very delicate and complex, as history and the frozen conflict in the
Nagorno-Karabakh weigh heavily on the present. Turkey did recognize
Armenia’s independence at the end of the Soviet era and considered
establishing diplomatic relations with Yerevan. However, these
relations were short lived. In 1993, in solidarity with Azerbaijan,
Turkey closed its borders with Armenia to protest against the
occupation of Karabakh and certain other Azerbaijani towns by
the Armenian forces. Ever since, this cold conflict has been an
insurmountable obstacle in the normalization of relations between
the two countries and has had an impact on Turkey’s foreign policy
in the Caucasus.

The other thorny issue is the question of the Armenian genocide.

Armenia qualifies the massacre of the Armenian populations in 1915
under the Ottoman Empire as genocide and actively advocates in the
international community to have it recognized as such.9 Turkey does
not deny the massacres, but it contests the extent of the tragedy,
which it argues took place in the context of the Russian-Turkish wars
and these tragic events had an impact on all parties involved.

Also, but none the less not a marginal issue, the exact demarcation
of the border between the two countries is a subject of controversy.

Turkey fully recognizes its actual borders, but Ankara still considers
that Yerevan is ambiguous on this issue and has invited it to clarify
its position on the official border.10

Having been stuck in an impasse throughout the 1990s, relations with
Armenia have improved since the AK Party came to power and introduced
its foreign policy of “zero problems with neighbors.” Turkey has
tried to improve its relations with all of its neighbors. The first
steps were made in 2008, within the framework of “football diplomacy.”

Taking advantage of soccer matches between Turkey and Armenia in
2008 to qualify for the Euro Cup, President Abdullah Gul and his
counterpart, Serzh Sargsyan, held mutual visits. These visits,
undoubtedly, opened the door for dialogue and other bolder
initiatives. Secret negotiations led to the preparation of the
“Negotiation of the Protocols” to normalize relations between Turkey
and Armenia.”11 However, these efforts, no matter how sincere they
may have been, fell to the weigh side under the reaction and pressure
coming from Azerbaijan, who accused Turkey of treason and trying to
marginalize Baku from the negotiations, especially excluding the
Nagorno-Karabakh from the equation. In retaliation, Azerbaijan
threatened to increase the price of oil and other derivative
products exported to Turkey. Azerbaijan even threatened to use
Russia as a transport route for oil and gas instead of Turkey.12
Thus, Azerbaijan’s leverage over Turkey compromised the successful
resolution of these Protocols and the revelations to the public of
these secret talks forced the two parties to retract themselves from
previous positions, holding a much less conciliatory stance. In fact,
the Protocols failed to obtain the approval of the two parliaments
without which any normalization is impossible.

However, this failure to achieve normalization cannot be viewed as a
total failure. The process allowed Turkish and Armenian negotiators
to meet. It also encouraged civil society on both sides of the border
to start a serious discussion and to reflect upon these painful topics.

Initiated before these political discussions took place – the
dialogue between historians, intellectuals, and academics now is a new
development and opens the door to many other initiatives. True, next
year’s commemoration in 2015 of the hundred year old tragedy of 1915
risks polarizing the two camps but the first efforts of negotiations
gives us hope that dialogue is possible. Indeed, in April 2014, the
Turkish Prime Minister’s official expression of condolences for the
descendants of the Armenian died in 1915 under Ottomans was a step
forward in the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia.13

Turkey and Georgia, the Bridge Between the Caspian and Europe

Turks and Georgians have a long common history marked by conflicts of
bordering countries. The Ottoman Empire dominated for a longtime part
of the current Georgian territory, notably the province of Ajaria,
which was islamicized as of the 16thcentury. Despite this tumultuous
past, the advent of an independent Georgia from the Soviet Union
in 1991 allowed a development of good relations between Ankara and
Tbilisi, which Turkey privileged for two reasons. First, for Turkey,
the Georgian territory is an entrance corridor to the Caucasus and
Central Asia or Turkic World, beyond the Caspian Sea.14 Second, Georgia
possesses fundamental importance for Turkey since the hydrocarbons of
the Caspian Sea pass through the country to reach the Turkish ports
and the international markets.

Reciprocally, Turkey is a key country for Georgia for at least two
reasons as well. First, it is a window toward Europe for Georgia.

Turkey’s negotiations for EU membership are of great importance for
Tbilisi, as it aspires to go beyond its own Caucasus enclave. Second,
in the context of its conflictual relations with the other regional
superpower, Russia, Georgia needs Turkey as a balancing power, in
particular, to overcome its economic problems and counter the Russian
markets, which have been closed to it since the war between Georgia
and Russia in 2008.

Thus, since their establishment in the early 90s, relations between
Georgia and Turkey have been warm and carefully maintained through
regular mutual visits. The change of power that occurred with the
Revolution of the Roses in 2003, and the failure at the ballot box for
Saakashvili in October 2012 with the arrival to power of his rival
Bidzina Ivanishvili only had a limited amount of repercussions on
the good relations with Turkey. Still, these relations are sometimes
difficult to manage for Turkey since the AKP came to power and
established a rapprochement policy with Russia.

Georgia’s pro-Western stance and its desire to enter NATO have
rendered Turkey’s dual attempt to have good relations with both
Russia and Georgia difficult to navigate. Thus, in August 2008, when
Russia invaded a part of Georgia, which was seeking to recuperate its
secessionist province of South Ossetia, Turkey found itself in a very
awkward position. The diplomatic initiative to create the “Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Platform” by only grouping regional actors
to manage regional problems, quickly showed the limitations of Turkey’s
power in its immediate surroundings. 15

The generally good relations between Turkey and Georgia encounter
on occasion minor tensions. The activism of the Abkhazia minority
of Turkey regularly stirs up trouble, as they maintain commercial
activities with Abkhazia. But this region of Georgia is secessionist.

As Tbilisi tries to quell the insurgency, it looks at the exchanges
with Turkey with a critical eye, recognizing that they are out of
its control.

Meanwhile, there also exist some religious tensions between the
two countries. Georgians, in particular the Georgian Church, which
has seen an increasing political role over recent years, does not
appreciate the religious activism of certain Turkish groups on its
territory, in particular in Ajaria. More prosaically, the building
of new mosques or the restoration of older ones abandoned during the
Soviet era, which are financed by the private initiatives of certain
groups, like Suleyman Tunahan’s group, are badly perceived by certain
segments of the population, who feel that their Christian identity is
being threatened. Similarly, Turkey is seeking to rebuild the Aziziye
Mosque in Batumi, a vestige of the Ottoman past and domination of the
region.16 To counterbalance and resolve these tensions, Turkey has
offered to re-store old Georgian Churches in Turkey. These cooperation
efforts are continuing but their final outcome remains uncertain.

Their success depends on the strengthening of bilateral relations.

Finally, the question of Meshkete is divisive. The Meshketians, also
known as the Ahiska, are a small Turkish minority from Georgia –
deported in 1944 from their villages in the steps of Central Asia.

After the end of the Soviet era, similarly to a large number of
peoples of the Caucasus, many who were deported are seeking to return
to their homes. Supported by Turkey in their quest to return home,
these numerous Meshketians have not obtained Tbilisi’s agreement to
return to their lands, despite multiple promises.

Overall, relations between Turkey and Georgia are very good. The
development of the pipeline projects, in particular the TAP and
the TANAP will render the Turkish and Georgian economies even more
complementary and interdependent. Similarly, the annexation of the
Crimea by the Russians will most likely slow the progress of a renewal
of Russian-Georgiarelations, which Prime Minister Ivanishvili had
begun and will instead reinforce relations between Ankara and Tbilisi.

Conclusion

At the end of the Soviet era, the Caucasus and Central Asia have taken
an important place in Turkey’s foreign policy. However, Ankara’s
ambitions have been beyond its actual capacity for action. So, it
has returned to a more pragmatic and realist posture. Consequently,
Turkey’s foreign policy in this region has somewhat neglected Central
Asia but maintained a keen interest in the Caucasus, in particular,
because of its importance in the energy sector. Furthermore,
the diplomatic initiative of Foreign Minister Davutoglu has it as
a central goal to better Turkey’s relations with its neighbors,
and notably Armenia. The normalization of its relations with these
countries remains one of Turkey’s priorities, not only for economic
reasons but also for political and symbolic ones – as Turkey wants to
appear as a country at peace with its neighbors. This situation has
become ever more pressing in the Caucasus, as Turkey is trying not
to become more embroiled in the Syrian civil war and also is seeing
its relations with countries of the Middle East deteriorate.

For Ankara, however, for its relations to improve with Armenia, the
conflict of the Nagorno-Karabakh must be resolved. Thus, Turkey’s
best bet for partnership in the region is Azerbaijan. The conundrum is
that Azerbaijan’s strategy is to isolate Armenia. It won’t hesitate to
block Turkey’s efforts towards Armenia and will use its energy ticket
as a form of blackmail, taking Turkey as a “hostage” in the process.

Nevertheless, maintaining the status quo on the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict serves as a political lever for Baku in defense of its
domestic and foreign interests. This situation, which looks like it
may last, makes Baku the center of attention and decision making on
a number of unavoidable issues in the region, including how Turkey
can carry out its foreign policy in the South Caucasus.

This article was originally published in Insight Turkey.

Endnotes

1 Mustafa Aydin, “Foucault’s Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and
the Caucasus”, Turkish Studies, Vo. 5, Issue 2, (2004), pp. 1-22.

2 Greg Bruno, “Turkey at an Energy Crossroads”,
Council on Foreign Relations, November 20, 2008,

3 Gareth Winrow, “The Southern Gas Corridor and Turkey’s Role as
an Energy Transit State and Energy Hub”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 15,
N°1, (2013), pp. 145-163,
insight-turkey-vol_15_no_1_2013_winrow.pdf.

4 Eleni Fotiou, “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform,
What is at Stake for Regional Cooperation”, International Centre
for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), Athens, Greece, N°16, 2009,

5 Bayram Balci, “The Russian Intervention in Crimea: Erdogan’s
Dilemma”, Eurasia Outlook, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, March 14, (2014),
2014/03/14/russian-intervention-in-crimea-erdogan-s-dilemma/h3u8?reloadFlag=1.

6 Konrad Sasztowt, “Iran, Turkey and Azerbaijan: Heading
Towards a Regional Crisis?” PISM, N° 35, (September 2012),

7 Vusal Gasimli, “Azerbaijan Eyes to Become Top Investor in
Turkey”, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, (14 November, 2012),

8 Bayram Balci, “Between secular education and Islamic philosophy:
the approach and achievements of Fethullah Gulen’s followers
in Azerbaijan”, Caucasus Survey, Vol. 1, N° 1, (2013),

9 ICG, International Crisis Group, Turkey and
Armenia: “Opening Minds, Opening Borders”, Europe
Report, N° 199, April 2009), 44 p. Available from:

10 Nigar Göksel, “Turkey and Armenia Post Protocols:
Back to Square One?” TESEV, (October 2012),

11 Yigal Schleifer, “Why the 2009 Turkey-Armenia
Protocols Broke Down?” Eurasianet, (March 2, 2012),

12 Nona Mikhelidze, “The Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement at
the Deadlock”, Istituto Affari Internazionali, (March 2010),

13 Joshua Kucera, “Turkey & Armenia: Are Erdogan’s
“Condolences” a Turning Point?” Eurasianet, (April 24, 2004),
68304.

14 Nigar Göksel, “Turkey and Georgia: Zero
Problems?” The German Marshall Fund of the United
States, (June 19, 2013),
wpcontent/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1372172079Goksel_TurkeyGeorgia_Jun13.pdf.

15 Igor Torbakov, “The Georgia Crisis and Russia-Turkey
Relations”, The Jamestown Foundation, (2008),

16 Salome Achba,”Dispute about Aziziye Mosque”, Religiebi Info,

http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkey-energy-crossroads/p17821.
http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=104737.
http://carnegieendowment.org/
http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=11387.
http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/3044.
http://www.caucasussurvey.org/vol1no1/downloads/Between%20secular%20education%20and%20Islamic%20philosophy.pdf.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/mediareleases/2010/europe/Turkey%20and%20Armenia%20Opening%20Minds%20Opening%20Borders.aspx.
http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/TurkeyArmenia.pdf.
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65078.
http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai1005.pdf.
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/
http://www.gmfus.org/
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/me-dia/GeorgiaCrisisTorbakov.pdf.
http://religiebi.info/index.php?a=main&pid=58&lang=eng.
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/18/strengths-and-constraints-of-turkish-policy-in-south-caucasus/he0a

China Keen On Armenian Satellite Launch Project

CHINA KEEN ON ARMENIAN SATELLITE LAUNCH PROJECT

YEREVAN, June 19. /Novosti-Armenia/. China is interested in the
project on building and launching of the Armenian telecommunication
satellite, the press office of Armenia’s ministry of transport and
communication reported referring to the minister Gagik Beglaryan’s
meeting with representatives of China Great Wall Industry Corporation
(CGWIC) and the Chinese academy of space technologies.

Armenia is planning to launch its own satellite, Armsat. Armcosmos
company has been set up for this purpose. Total cost of the project
is assessed at 250 million dollars; the authorities plan to attract
private investments in the project. The satellite will open up
opportunities in defense, science, telecommunications, Novosti-Armenia
reported referring to RIA Novosti.

Beglaryan said at the meeting Armenia is seeking opportunities for
cooperation with various countries. The project started in 2012 and is
in the stage of coordination of the orbit attitude now. The Armenian
side received proposals on consultations and management. Beglaryan
said Armenia will submit proposals and its turn and wait for response.

Vice president of China Great Wall Industry Corporation Zhao Chun
Chao said the Chinese side is ready to get engaged in the entire range
of works from design to Armsat, construction and up to launching and
servicing, as well as training of Armenian specialists.

Back in 2012 Roscosmos said an agreement was reached on building a
satellite with Russia by 2016 under a contract expected to be signed
within a year. But no news was reported on this later on. In March
2014 only plans about setting up a joint Armenian-Russian center on
space training and studies were reported. -0–

– See more at:

http://arka.am/en/news/technology/china_keen_on_armenian_satellite_launch_project/#sthash.KW75gynG.dpuf

Azerbaijan Shuts Down ‘Gulen-Linked’ Schools

AZERBAIJAN SHUTS DOWN ‘GULEN-LINKED’ SCHOOLS

11:20 * 19.06.14

Azerbaijan’s government-run energy company has announced that private
schools formerly run by a movement led by U.S.-based Islamic scholar
Fethullah Gulen have been closed down, the Hurriyet Daily News reports.

>From February to April, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan
Republic (SOCAR) took over dozens of private high schools, university
exam preparation centers and universities run by a Turkish education
company called Cað Ogretim which is allegedly linked with the Gulen
movement.

SOCAR announced June 18 that it decided to close these schools, which
had been operated by the company now known as Azerbaijan International
Education Center, due to high maintenance costs and difficulties in
project management.

Turkish government accuses Gulen-led ‘Hizmet’ (Service) movement of
forming a shadow structure within the Turkish state and of plotting
to topple the government.

In March, Azeri media reported that Azerbaijan sacked Elnur Aslanov,
head of President Ýlham Aliyev’s Political Analysis and Information
Department, accusing him of having links with the movement.

Newspapers had said Gulen’s network had also infiltrated state
institutions in Azerbaijan and found cohorts among some politicians.

Armenian News – Tert.am

45 Days In Hell: Syrian Armenians Kidnapped And Tortured By FSA

45 DAYS IN HELL: SYRIAN ARMENIANS KIDNAPPED AND TORTURED BY FSA

Wednesday, June 18th, 2014

A snapshot of the ‘Balanko.’ (Photo: SyrianTube.net / 2014)

BY SARKIS BALKHIAN
>From the Armenian Weekly

In October 2013, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a report titled
“You Can Still See Their Blood” that documented the atrocities
committed by extremist groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and
al-Sham (ISIS) and Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, against civilians
in Latakia, Syria.[1]

In response to the report, the Supreme Military Council (SMC) of
the Free Syrian Army (FSA) “wholeheartedly condemned” the crimes and
reiterated its “full commitment to respecting the rule of law.” The SMC
“stressed that the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra,
Ahrar al-Sham, Suqour al-Izz, and Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar are
not part of the SMC command structure and do not represent the values
of the FSA or the Syrian revolution.”[2]

Three months earlier, on July 26, 2013, the Free Syrian Army had
kidnapped seven Syrian Armenians (four men and three women) while they
were leaving Aleppo to resettle in Yerevan, Armenia. The women were
released within the first 10 hours, while the men were incarcerated
for 45 days.

This report documents the experience of those four men according to
the first-hand accounts of Carlo Hatsarkorzian and Sako Assadourian.

The conundrum: ‘good rebels’ vs ‘bad rebels’

Over the past two years, Western politicians with vested interests in
the outcome of the Syrian conflict and the ousting of the Assad regime
have asserted the notion of “good rebels” versus “bad rebels.” These
policymakers affirm that the good rebels consist of battalions fighting
under the command of the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian
Army to bring justice, freedom, and democracy to the Syrian people,
whereas the bad rebels are jihadists seeking the creation of an
Islamic Caliphate across the MENA region.

The primary purpose of classifying the Syrian rebels into two
principal categories–the good and bad–is to legitimize and justify
any political, military, and financial support provided by the Western
governments and their regional allies to the “good rebels” of Syria.

On Sept. 2, 2013, while the four Armenians were being tortured by the
FSA, President Barack Obama had a private meeting with U.S. Senator
John McCain to discuss the potential for an intervention in Syria
and the possibilities of arming the “good rebels”–that is, the Free
Syrian Army.[3]

“He [Obama] said that he was willing to upgrade the capabilities of
the Free Syrian Army,” McCain stated in an interview with the Daily
Beast. “For the first time we have an outline of action that could
lead to the removal of Bashar al-Assad… I’m certainly willing to
join that effort, but I need to know a lot of the details.”[4]

The rhetoric used by these policy makers has influenced the mainstream
media’s coverage of the ongoing conflict. The vast majority of media
sources have been quick to overlook the crimes of the FSA and have
instead focused on the crimes perpetrated by the Syrian government
and the “bad rebels”–the jihadists.

Moreover, international human rights groups have failed to properly
document the plight of the minority groups in Syria. Whether or not
this failure stems from the fact that the vast majority of these
groups either support Assad’s regime or fear persecution in the
absence of his secular government is up for debate. But one thing is
certain–without the adequate documentation and condemnation of the
human rights violations against all Syrians, including minorities,
the cycle of crime will continue.

Prelude In late July 2012, the armed conflict arrived in Aleppo,
changing the destiny of Syrian Armenians forever. Prior to the
beginning of the conflict, Carlo Hatsarkorzian, 21, worked as a
mechanic at his family’s workshop in the Argoub district of Aleppo, and
Sako Assadourian, 27, as a goldsmith. They both came from lower-middle
class families.

In September 2012, rebels took over the neighborhood forcing the
Hatsarkorzians to close their workshop. Carlo moved to Armenia,
where he started working as a construction worker for 3,000 AMDs
($7.50) per day.[5]

In December, Carlo booked a round-trip flight to Aleppo to visit his
family for the New Year. He never made the return flight because the
Aleppo International Airport was shut down in early January. He’d
remain in Aleppo until that life-defining journey in July 2013.[6]

In June 2013, Sako, a former Syrian Arab Army soldier, received
a notice demanding his return to the army. His mother, Siranoush,
begged Sako to leave the country and to join his brother in Yerevan.[7]

By late July, Carlo, Sako, Garo Boboghlian, and Nareg Varjabedian,
along with three Armenian women, decided to leave Aleppo for Yerevan.

What followed would haunt them for years to come.

A journey to hell

Abduction In the morning of July 26, the seven Armenians got on a
bus headed towards the Bab al-Hawa border point with Turkey. By 11
a.m., the bus had stopped at an FSA checkpoint near what is known
as the Maabar al-Mawt (the Corridor of Death) in the Bustan al-Qasr
neighborhood of Aleppo.

“At the checkpoint, the FSA soldiers requested our documentation,” Sako
told the Armenian Weekly. “When they realized that we were Armenians,
they transferred us to their headquarters.” Later that evening, at
around 6:30 p.m., the women were released and sent off to Turkey,
while the FSA comrades gave a warm “welcome” to the four Armenian men.

“They forced us to kneel down and say the Lord’s Prayer [Derounagan
aghotk in Armenian], while a dozen of their soldiers beat us up until
we all started bleeding,” said Carlo. “They hit us with their hands,
feet, and anything they could find.”

The abuse was both physical and psychological. While being tortured
physically, the four men were subject to verbal abuse, threats, and
dehumanization. “You [the Armenians] are all traitors! You are the
kafirs [infidels] who support Assad! We will kill you tomorrow!”

The headquarters In the town of Hraytan, the Free Syrian Army
headquarter consisted of a deserted liquor warehouse and a villa
positioned across the street.

Over the course of those 45 days, the four men were placed in 3
different cells.[8]

At the compound, the majority of the FSA soldiers did not use their
official names when communicating with each other; instead they
addressed one another using “Abu Ahmad” or “Abu Mohammad,” meaning
“the father of Ahmad” or “the father of Mohammad” in Arabic.[9]

The chain of command at this particular base was divided into two
branches: religious and military. The head of the religious branch was
the Sheikh, the holy leader who was vested by Sharia law and whose
verdicts were conclusive. The military command was in the hands of
“Abu Ali,” a defector from the Military Intelligence Directorate of
Syria, the “Mukhabarat.”[10]

Ironically, prior to the FSA takeover of the Hraytan region, the
buildings where the four Armenians were held captive belonged to a
Syrian-Armenian family that imported the Efes brand of Turkish beer.

Following the takeover, the Free Syrian Army upgraded the Chaprazian
family properties, investing heavily in transforming the warehouse and
villa into a high-security concentration camp from which no prisoner
could escape.

Unfortunately for the FSA, not too long after the release of the
four Armenians, the “bad rebels” of Syria–the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS)–took over the Hraytan region and, along with it,
the FSA headquarters.[11]

The snapshots included in this piece are cropped from a video prepared
by the ISIS militants and published by the pro-regime news agency
Syriantube.net. The video demonstrates the various torture methods
used by the FSA and the locations of the warehouse and villa. Both
Armenian interviewees, Sako and Carlo, confirmed that the video
recording is from the site of their captivity, and the torture
techniques demonstrated therein correspond to what they experienced.

The first 23 days After they were beaten on the first day, the four
men were taken to prison cell no. 1 in the warehouse, where they were
kept for six days.

They were subjected to numerous verbal abuses but no physical
torture.[12]

A snapshot of prison cell no. 1 at the FSA headquarters. (Photo:
SyrianTube.net / 2014)

In prison cell no. 1, they were accompanied by FSA soldiers convicted
by their own military tribunal, for crimes such as theft and “illegal
murder.” On average, the FSA soldiers were kept imprisoned for 30
days, and then released, to continue their battles against the Assad
regime. On July 27, one day after the abduction of the four Armenians,
an Arab Christian was also brought in to prison cell no. 1.[13]

During those initial six days, Abu Ali and his comrades systematically
harassed the men and blackmailed them. “Who the hell are you? Everyone
is talking about you. Everyone is pressuring us to release you,”
he said. “Unless the Syrian-Armenian community is able to convince
the Syrian Army to remove its military check-points near the Meedan
neighborhood in Aleppo, we will kill you.”[14]

“They did not understand that the Syrian-Armenian community has no
leverage over the Syrian Army,” explained Sako. “They didn’t accept
the fact that our lives were worth nothing in the grand scheme of
this conflict.”

Following the first six days, the four men were transferred to solitary
confinement–to prison cell no. 2–where they were left without water
and food for around two days.[15]

The entrance to prison cell no. 2 (Photo: SyrianTube.net / 2014)

On the third day, Abu Ali opened the gate, stepped into the underground
cell, and shouted, “Are you still alive?” The men were dehydrated. They
didn’t have the energy to respond.[16]

Abu Ali asked, “Do you want water?” They pleadingly said, “Yes.” One
of the soldiers accompanying Abu Ali went away for a few seconds
and returned with a bottle of water. After the four men finished
drinking, Abu Ali sardonically said, “That was the water from the
swimming pool!”[17]

“The swimming pool is where the FSA soldiers used to swim and urinate,”
Carlo said. “We had no choice but to drink. It was urine or death.”

Cell no. 2 was located in the basement of the villa. It was a dark
locker room consisting of two small rooms and a narrow hallway. Each
room could fit one person at a time. The four Armenians established a
rotation system, where two of them would sleep on the concrete floor
of the rooms, while the other two would sit in the narrow hallway.

This was their life for 17 dark days.[18]

On the 24th day of their journey, the four Armenians were transferred
back to the warehouse, to prison cell no. 3, also known as “the party
room.” The men thought that the worst was behind them.[19]

Interrogation (a conversation with the Sheikh) That morning, the Sheikh
summoned the four men to an interrogation session. “You Armenians
are civilians,” he told them. “We are in a war against the Alawites,
against Assad’s Army. Why did the Armenians pick up arms against us,
against the Sunnis? Why are you supporting Assad?”[20]

Entrance to prison cell no. 3 (Photo: SyrianTube.net / 2014)

As Sako recalls the conversation with the Sheikh, he subconsciously
switches to Arabic. “No. We are not supporting Assad. The Armenians
who picked up arms are stationed in their own neighborhoods to defend
the Armenian population.”

The Sheikh disagreed. “No, the Armenians are against us. The FSA
constantly tried to penetrate the Meedan neighborhood, but the
Armenians were stationed at the army’s checkpoint and fought against
us. The Armenians are like the Alawites.”

Sako reluctantly disagreed, “Honorable Sheikh. We are not like the
Alawites. After the Genocide, when the Armenians arrived to Syria,
it was the Sunnis who took us in. We lived together in peace and
harmony long before the Baath Party came to power.”

After a moment of silence, the Sheikh asked, “Are you a supporter of
Assad or are you against his regime?”

Sako responded, “I am against the regime.”

“You are a liar.”

Sako continued, “I am not lying my Sheikh. I am against the regime.

Every Syrian citizen is against the regime, against the corruption of
the government. But there is a difference between civil disobedience
and a violent destructive war. Every Syrian wanted reform, but we
don’t want the country to be destroyed in the process.”

The Sheikh angrily replied, “No. You are a liar. All of you are against
us. The Kurds, the Druze, the Christians, the Armenians, the Shiite,
and the Alawites are all against the Sunnis. We are going to teach
you all a lesson.”

Sako responded, “Dear Sheikh, the Armenians are different. The Druze
and the Shiites had weapons long before this conflict. The Armenians
are civilians. They never had weapons, they only picked up arms to
defend their own neighborhoods.”

The Sheikh disagreed. “If you didn’t want to get involved in this
conflict, you should have gone to your country, Armenia. But you
didn’t. Your archbishop is with the government. Every Armenian is with
the government. Where did the Armenians get their weapons form? Didn’t
you get them from Assad’s army? Aren’t you using it against the FSA?”

Sako replied, hopelessly, “I don’t know. I did not pick up arms. I
don’t know.”

The Sheikh opened his laptop and retrieved some files. He showed
pictures of “Armenians carrying weapons in Aleppo.” The Sheikh asked,
“Who is this guy?” The four men replied, “We don’t know.”

As he flipped through the pictures, the Sheikh furiously asked,
“Isn’t this George? Isn’t this Daron? You all know each other. You
are lying to me. Tonight you will enjoy the party.” The livid Sheikh
sent the men back to their prison cell.

The FSA had extensive records on the Syrian Armenians who they alleged
had carried arms. They had personal information including names,
addresses, and pictures.[21]

Torture That evening, a few FSA soldiers, who appeared to be under
the influence of narcotics, entered the room and asked the men to
stand up and follow them. One of the Armenians said, “Are you going
to release us?”

“No. We are taking you to the party.”[22]

When the four Armenians walked out of the prison cell, the FSA soldiers
began to attack them: striking, punching, slapping, pushing, pulling,
kneeing, and kicking. Winded and humbled, the men were hauled across
the hall and placed near the Balanko. “You will like this game,”
said one of the soldiers.[23]

The Balanko was a steel chain that hung from the ceiling with a
hook at the end. It is customarily used to offload or unload heavy
shipments. In this instance, the shipments were the four Armenians.

A snapshot of the ‘Balanko.’ (Photo: SyrianTube.net / 2014)

“They lowered the Balanko to the ground. One of the soldiers brought
a rope, tied my bare feet together, and my hands behind my back,”
Sako recalled. “After connecting the hook to the rope, they gradually
lifted me up until I was one meter above the ground. I was hanging
upside-down. They started slapping me. I swung like a pendulum.”

“After a few minutes, one of the soldiers grabbed an iron rod and
started pounding my lower body,” said Sako. “Then another soldier
grabbed an electrical wire and started hitting the bottom of my bare
feet. The pain was excruciating.”

The four Armenians took turns riding the Balanko. While they were
being tortured, the soldiers continued to hurl verbal abuses and swear
words. “The blasphemies ranged from Bashar al-Assad to the Armenians
and even the Virgin Mary,” said Carlo.

Following the Balanko, the four men had no energy to stand. They
crawled back to their prison cell, while the FSA soldiers continued
to kick them.

The next day, the process was repeated. But this time, while the men
were hanging from the Balanko, the FSA soldiers called the families
of the prisoners on the phone. “They placed a gun to my head and told
me to repeat their words in Arabic,” said Carlo. “They told me that
if I used a single Armenian word, they would shoot me.”

While Sako was hanging from the Balanko, Carlo was on the phone with
Sako’s relatives. “I told Sako’s aunt exactly what the FSA soldiers
were telling me. Initially, they asked for a ransom,” said Carlo.

“They wanted our families to hear our pleas while we were being
tortured.”

Sako ended up speaking with Carlo’s parents and asking them for a
ransom of 10,000,000 SYP (around $60,000 at the time). Garo and Nareg
spoke to their respective families. Each family was told to pay that
sum in exchange for their son’s release.[24]

Torture at the FSA headquarters (Photo: SyrianTube.net / 2014)

The next day, the Balanko ride became more violent, as the soldiers
began hitting the prisoners’ upper body. “After the ride was
completed, they brought an electric wire, connected it to our feet,
and electrocuted us,” said Sako.

While Sako was being electrocuted, one of the FSA soldiers realized
that Sako’s toenail was coming off from the extensive beating he had
received. “Let me put you out of your misery; I will remove that nail
for you,” the soldier told Sako.[25]

“He brought pliers and ordered the other soldiers to pin me down,”
said Sako. “He denailed my left toe. I actually did not feel a thing.

My body was too numb from all the beating and electric shocks.”

At the end of that day, Abu Ali informed the four men that they
should expect the torture “party” to continue until their families
paid the ransom.

Exhausted from the beatings, electric shocks, and the denailing, Sako
pleaded, “My parents are poor. They can’t pay you the ransom. If you
are not going to let me go, why don’t you just kill me?”

Abu Ali replied, “If your parents don’t pay the ransom, then you are
going to enjoy the Balanko party for a long time. Your life belongs
to us now. You are going to wish you were dead. You are going to
beg us to kill you, but we won’t. You’re going to live through this
hell forever.”

In the early hours of the next morning, a Kurdish rebel group,
likely affiliated with the Popular Protection Units (YPG), launched an
offensive on the FSA checkpoints near the compound. By the afternoon,
the FSA soldiers had captured a few Kurdish rebels and transferred
them to their headquarters. To make room for the new prisoners,
the four Armenian men were transferred back to prison cell no. 1.[26]

“Thanks to the Kurdish offensive we were spared the Balanko ride and
the electric shocks. After that point, we were mere observers. We
watched the Kurdish rebels get tortured by the hands of the FSA,”
said Carlo.

Prison labor The Kurdish offensive came on the 27th day of the
Armenians’ captivity. After that, the four men were no longer tortured
physically, although the verbal abuse continued up until their release.

The FSA implemented its prison labor policy by forcing the four
Armenians to assist with their everyday work. “We were forced to
clean the bathrooms of the soldiers, the FSA offices, and the bedrooms
located in the villa,” recalled Carlo. “We also worked as carriers,
transferring the shipments that arrived at the headquarters.”

The FSA headquarters received empty gas tanks on a regular basis. The
Armenians off loaded the tanks and transferred them to the production
room. There, the gas tanks were transformed into ammunition for the
FSA’s mortar bombs.[27]

Over the past three years, the Syrian opposition has used mortar
bombs on a consistant basis. In recent weeks, more than 80 mortar
bombs were launched against the predominantly Armenian neighborhoods
of Meedan and Sulaymaniyah in Aleppo. These assaults have resulted
in the death of numerous Armenians and the destruction of Armenian
churches, schools, and homes.

This was not lost on the FSA soldiers, who continuously reminded the
four men that they were aiding in the murder of fellow Armenians.

“Today we are going to attack the Meedan, Sulaymaniyah, and Azizieh
neighborhoods. Thank you for your assistance guys,” said Abu Ali
sarcastically.[28]

“We knew very well where the mortar bombs were heading,” said Sako.

“We were helping the FSA in its assault against the Armenian
neighborhoods. But we had no choice. It was either compliance, Balanko,
or death.”

The Quran In the last 18 days of their captivity, the four men were
forced to learn the Quran. When they were transferred to prison cell
no. 1, the Sheikh had told them, “Every day you are going to learn
verses from the Quran and every night you will be tested. If you make
a mistake you will be sent to the Balanko.”

“They forced us to pray with their soldiers,” said Carlo. “We asked
some of the Kurdish prisoners who were accompanying us in the prison
cell to teach us the Quran and the proper ways of prayer.”

“Every night, the FSA soldiers used to examine us,” said Sako. “We
were good students. We learned the verses very well. We could not
afford to make a mistake. Fearing the Balanko, we learned and prayed
with the soldiers like proper Muslims.”

The Facebook message from within On Sept. 1, 2013, the 37th day
of captivity, an FSA officer entered the prison cell and asked,
“Is there anyone who understands computers?”

Carlo volunteered. “I volunteered because I wanted to go out of the
warehouse. The officer took me to the FSA office located in the villa.

He wanted me to download some programs. Based on his demands, I
realized that he didn’t understand a thing from computers.”

A snapshot of Carlo’s Facebook post on his own timeline.

Carlo told the officer that he needed some time to surf the web in
order to locate a free-of-charge downloading option. As he was surfing
the web, the officer received a phone call, stood up, and walked out
of the office. Carlo logged onto his Facebook account, and posted a
pleading message on his wall. The message stated, in Armenian, “please
get us out of here as soon as possible… let the Prelacy give money
so we can get out of here sooner rather than later … plzzzzzzzzzzzz”
(hagetsek mezi hosge hanel vargian m arach.. arashnortarane togh tram
da vor shoudov yellenk hosge … plzzzzzzzzzzzz).

‘Freedom’ in Syria: On Sept. 9, 2013 Narek Varjabedian was released
by the FSA, after his family had managed to pay the ransom. The amount
was less than the initial sum demanded by the FSA.

As mentioned earlier, Carlo and Sako came from lower middle-class
families. Due to their family’s financial limitations, their release
was postponed. Carlo’s mother sold her jewelry to conjure up a small
amount of money for her son.

When Carlo’s father realized that Sako’s family was unable to pay for
their son’s release, he asked community members to donate. They did.

On Sept. 10, 2013 a day after Narek was released, Carlo Hatsarkorzian,
Sako Assadourian, and Garo Boboghlian were released and sent back
to Aleppo.

When Sako finally arrived at his aunt’s house, he was greeted with a
subdued welcome. “After a few minutes I realized that my father and
mother were not around,” said Sako. “Everyone was wearing black. I
asked my aunt, ‘Where is my father? Where is my mother?'”

My aunt told me to sit down. My relatives handed me a glass of water
and told me, “Fifteen days after your kidnapping, your father had a
heart attack. He passed away. I’m sorry.”

“When I heard that my father had passed away, I lost control of
myself,” Sako told the Weekly, with tears in his eyes. “I started
banging my head to the wall. I kept repeating, I wish I had died in
that prison. I wish I had not come out to hear this news.”

On the day of his release, Sako’s mother, who suffered from mental
health issues, had flown from Beirut to Yerevan. She had lost all
hope of seeing Sako again, and had gone to Yerevan to be reunited
with her younger son, Anto.[29]

In the meantime, Carlo was struggling to cope with his newfound
“freedom.” With Aleppo under heavy bombardment, he suffered from
post-traumatic stress disorder, and kept dreaming that he was still
a prisoner at the FSA headquarters. “I used to wake up in the middle
of the night and start crying,” said Carlo. “My parents told me that
I had to leave Aleppo and return to Armenia. I did.”

Not long after, Sako was offered an escape route as well. To cover
his transportation costs, Sako borrowed $200 from a friend and left.

“Initially I was hesitant to leave Aleppo. I kept thinking to myself,
‘What if I am captured again?'” recalled Sako. “But eventually,
I took a few tranquilizers and set off to Armenia.”

Life in Armenia For more than two months following his arrival in
Yerevan, Sako was unable to seek employment; his mother’s psychological
condition had deteriorated, and she was admitted to the Avan Mental
Hospital.

After her condition gradually stabilized and she returned home,
Sako started working as a construction worker. Not long after, Sako’s
younger brother decided to leave his family, saying he could no longer
withstand the depressing environment of their household.

“It’s been more than five months since my brother left us,” Sako said.

“Until today we do not know about his whereabouts. Initially I believed
him: I thought that we were depressing him. But a few weeks after his
departure, I found out that my brother had accumulated $750 worth of
phone bill debts. That was his parting gift for me.”

Siranoush (Photo: Sako Assadourian)

Now, Sako is living in a one-bedroom apartment with his mother and
cousin. He makes approximately $250 (100,000 AMD) per month and pays
$125 (50,000 AMD) in rent. Between the debt left behind by his brother,
the monthly utility fees, and the accumulated rent, Sako felt lost. His
landlord, who had been considerate enough to grant the family a grace
period on the rental payments, ultimately grew tired of waiting and
requested his money.

In recent months, the Aleppo Compatriotic Charitable Organization
(ACCO), which assists refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in both Armenia and Syria, has provided rental subsidies to Sako’s
family. The ACCO also referred Sako’s case to the Caritas Foundation
in Armenia, which in turn has paid off some of the accumulated debt.

But Sako and his family continue to struggle in Armenia.

Carlo has moved back into his old apartment in the outskirts of
Yerevan. He shares the apartment with a friend from Syria. He’s
currently working as a carpenter, making $225 per month. His portion
of the housing rent is $50 per month. Carlo saves as much money as
possible and sends it to his struggling family in Aleppo.

Conclusion In its latest report, the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic portrayed the Free
Syrian Army–or the “good rebels”–as “Syrian moderate nationalists
organized in a conglomeration of armed groups affiliated to the
internationally backed Supreme Military Council, fighting the
Government and calling for the formation of a democratic and
pluralistic State. It also includes moderate Islamic groups and
armed groups with local agendas limited to their communities’
aspirations.”[30]

The abduction, torture, dehumanization, and the lack of due process
experienced by Carlo Hatsarkorzian, Sako Assadourian, Garo Boboghlian,
and Narek Varjabedian reflects a reality that contradicts the
international commission’s depiction of the FSA.

In fact, the experiences of these four Armenians reveal one of two
things about the Supreme Military Council: that either the SMC has
no control over the FSA battalions under its chain of command, or
that the SMC of the Free Syrian Army has no intention of creating a
democratic and pluralistic state in the Syrian Arab Republic, where
the rights of minority groups such as, the Armenians are preserved.

The independent commission’s March 18, 2014 report was based on
investigations conducted between July 15, 2013 and Jan. 20, 2014–the
same period of time that saw the kidnapping and torture of these four
Armenians. Within that same interval, Wanis (father) and Minas (son)
Levonian were abducted by ISIS and brutally executed on Jan. 8 or 9,
2014.[31] After their execution, the Aleppo Sharia Committee refused
to hand over their bodies for a proper Armenian burial.

Moreover, during this specific interlude, numerous other Armenians
were kidnapped and subjected to human rights violations. And yet,
the independent commission’s report fails to make a single reference
to human rights violations committed against the Armenian population
of Syria.

More than three years into the Syrian conflict, local and international
human rights organizations have failed to properly document the
constant violations and crimes committed against the Armenians. This
consistent negligence of the plight of the Armenians compels us to
believe that in the eyes of the international community, the Armenians
are an insignificant segment of Syrian society.

How you can help Carlo and Sako are de facto political refugees who
have endured an insurmountable amount of terror at the hands of the
Free Syrian Army.

Considering their recent experience in Syria, both men are unable and
unwilling to return to Aleppo. Their desire is to find a permanent
home in Armenia.

Recognizing the unique and urgent circumstance of these two men, the
Aleppo Compatriotic Charitable Organization NGO recently launched
an online fundraising campaign to raise funds for the purchase
of apartments for Carlo, Sako, and their respective families. The
California based non-profit, the Ani & Narod Memorial Fund, Program
on Justice & Equity for Syrian-Armenian Refugees, will match up to
$5,000 in donations, towards the purchase of these apartments.

You can donate to ACCO by visiting their website or by sending a
check to the organization’s offices in New Jersey: Aleppo Compatriotic
Charitable Organization, 2 Marvin Rd., Middletown, NJ 07748.

Please specify the purpose of your donation by writing “Carlo & Sako
Apartments” in the memo line. For further information about this case,
contact the author via email.

Notes

[1] hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria1013_ForUpload.pdf

[2]hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/The_Supreme_Military_Council_of_the_Free_Syrian_Army_response_to_You-can-still-see-their-blood_0.pdf

[3]
thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/02/obama-to-arm-syrian-rebels.html

[4] Ibid.

[5] The Armenian Weekly interview by Skype with Carlo Hatsarkorzian,
April 23, 2014

[6] Ibid.

[7] The Armenian Weekly interview with Sako Assadourian, Yerevan,
Armenia, April 11, 2014

[8] Ibid.

[9] The Armenian Weekly interviews with Sako Assadourian & Carlo
Hatsarkorzian on different days

[10] During the interview with the Armenian Weekly, both Carlo and
Sako, provided the real identity of the FSA military commander,
“Abu Ali,” but in order to protect themselves and their families,
they requested not to publish those details.

[11] emmejihad.wordpress.com/tag/hraytan/

[12] The Armenian Weekly interview by Skype with Carlo Hatsarkorzian,
April 23, 2014

[13] Ibid.

[14] The Armenian Weekly interview with Sako Assadourian, Yerevan,
Armenia, April 11, 2014

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] The Armenian Weekly interview by Skype with Carlo Hatsarkorzian,
April 23, 2014

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] The Armenian Weekly interview with Sako Assadourian, Yerevan,
Armenia, April 11, 2014

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] The Armenian Weekly interview by Skype with Carlo Hatsarkorzian,
April 23, 2014

[29] The Armenian Weekly interview with Sako Assadourian, Yerevan,
Armenia, April 11, 2014

[30] The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian
Arab Republic, March 18, 2014 Report

[31] english.al-akhbar.com/content/story-two-armenians-arrested-isis

http://asbarez.com/124218/45-days-in-hell-syrian-armenians-kidnapped-and-tortured-by-fsa/