Author: Kalantarian Kevo

[30-03-2004 ‘Region’]
————————————————- ———————
WE WERE RIGHT ON CYPRUS. WHY DID WE END UP HERE?
Source : `Turkish Daily News’ newspaper (Turkey)
Author: Mehmet Ali Birand
BUERGENSTOCK
Seeing all the negotiations being carried out here, international
games being played, all the pressures being exerted; reading the Annan
plan and listening to statements being made, I can’t help asking
myself the same question:
“We were always right on the Cyprus issue. We carried out the 1974
intervention to defend our rights. Then what happened? What happened
that we ended up being the wrong party in the eyes of the
international community? We cannot simply tie this to Greek
propaganda. There must be other reasons as well.”
Am I not right?
Cyprus was our just cause.
We won the support of the international community as well.
Remember the developments until 1974.
We did not forget what certain Greek Cypriot and Greek circles did
after the London and Zurich agreements to destroy the Turkish
community on the island in order to achieve the goal of unification
with Greece. Raids onto Turkish villages by Grivas and his team, their
massacre attempts, their retreat in the face of threats from Turkey
and coming back as soon as things cool down, we all remember these
very well. The last drop to pour the water out of glass came with a
coup carried out by a Greek junta toppling Greek Cypriot leader
Makarios to achieve Enosis.
Turkey had no option but military intervention after this. It was the
Greek junta and their extension in Cyprus that forced Ankara to take
this option. Since the international community was aware of this,
nobody opposed Turkey’s intervention at that time.
Turkey was right.
Then how did it happen that we ended up the unjust party?
Is the whole world setting up a plot against us? Is there a game
being played out in Cyprus to punish us? Did we make a mistake? If we
did make a mistake, where was it?
Looking back, we see a few major mistakes having been made by the
Turkish side.
First mistake: Intervention was two-staged
Turkey’s first big mistake was that it completed the military
intervention in two stages. The first operation was met with
understanding in the international community. But the lack of
sufficient preparation on the part of the Turkish Armed Forces and the
failure to send the needed back-up in time led to a failure to achieve
the military goals in the first stage of the operation.
Then a 4-5 week interval followed. In the meantime, a peace conference
was held in Geneva. There was a proposal to divide the island and
even to create five different cantons. The military operation resumed
when the desired outcome could not be obtained.
But this time the whole world rose up. Turkey, which had received
applause before, became an occupier dividing a poor and defenseless
country. The embargo imposed by the U.S. Congress, reaction from
world parliaments, resolutions passed in these parliaments condemning
Turkey and accusations from the United Nations, all came at that
stage.
The “liberating” Turkey came to be known as the “occupier.”
Second mistake: Not signing the peace deal
You will lose what you won in a military operation if you do not make
peace afterwards. The success will disappear.
We were a most typical example of this.
We kept settling on the island. And while doing it, we sent all the
diseases in Turkey to the island. Instead of creating a model that
would suit the needs of Cypriots, we attempted to create a second
Turkish Republic together with its military and bureaucracy in
Cyprus. We turned a blind eye to international realities. We wasted
the chance to make peace that was offered to us several times.
We kept changing policies.
We first said we intervened in order to restore the order as created
under the 1960 agreements. Then we came up with the thesis of
federation. Then we presented the proposals of confederation and
independence. We failed to win recognition from a single country for
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC).
We were left alone.
Throughout all these years, Greek Cypriots took clever steps because
they saw better than us the course that the developments had
taken. They turned the last corner by applying to the EU for
membership. The train was missed as Turkey failed to prevent the
membership attempts of Cyprus.
Let’s do better calculations for the future
Now, the last stage is due to be played until May 1.
If Greek Cypriots can reach the date May 2 without becoming the side
who spoils the agreement, they will get what they want. What will
corner them will be incorporation of the Annan plan into Cyprus’
accession treaty. And this may be achieved by May 1. After May 1, they
can easily block the Annan plan because they will have veto right
after that time.
After May 1, the Turkish side may find itself in a position which is
far worse than the Annan plan.
This is the real danger.
Let’s leave conspiracy theories aside and see, perhaps for the first
time, the truths clearly. Let’s derive lessons from past
mistakes. Instead of putting the blame on others, let’s understand our
own realities.
[25-03-2004 ‘Armenia-Azerbaijan’]
———————————————————————-
CLASHES BETWEEN THE MILITARY OF AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA IN KOSOVO?
Source : `Echo’ newspaper (Azerbaijan)
Author: H. Aliev, E. Alekperov
Bulgarian news agency reports about the conflict. The Defense
Ministry of the Country Does Not Confirm this Statement
Clashes occurred between the military forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia
stationed in Kosovo. This information was provided by Bulgarian
`Novinar’ news agency. This fact is brought forward by the agency as
one of the proofs of the failure of KFOR peacekeeping forces in
Kosovo. “KFOR-units are able to keep two communities (Serbian and
Albanian – Ed.) apart for a certain period of time, but it cannot last
forever. Moreover, when the contingents of such countries as
Azerbaijan and Armenia serve together in the international coalition”.
According to the reports by `Novinar’, the first clashes took place
already during the transportation of the servicemen via Budapest. The
agency also notes that there is a report of one `person killed’,
however it is not specified who he was – Azerbaijani or Armenian
military man.
In its turn, the Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan refutes the report of
the Bulgarian news agency. The Defense Ministry press-service
reported to `Echo’, that there are no Armenian servicemen in Kosovo
altogether. The press service keeps stating that official Yerevan
planned transportation of the peace contingent within the Greek
battalion. However, as this office reports, the plans of the Armenian
side fell flat. Besides, the press service also emphasized the fact
that Azerbaijani military men are transported to Kosovo via Turkey and
not via Hungarian capital. “Therefore, the reports of the Bulgarian
press do not correspond to reality”.
Commenting on the aggravation of the situation in Kosovo, the press
service noted that `fortunately, our servicemen did not participate in
military conflict”. The press service reported that 32 Azerbaijani
military men are in Gradush village near the city of Grizren.
Meanwhile, despite the statements of the Defense Ministry of the
country, Armenian media officially reported that on February 12 a
platoon of RA armed forces left for Kosovo. “Within the Greek
battalion, the Armenian platoon will participate in peacekeeping
mission in the Balkans”.
It is to be mentioned that the information source within the Defense
Ministry of the country also doubts whether `Novinar’ reports are
true. In its view, the Bulgarian press might confuse details related
to the murder of Armenian serviceman by the Azerbaijani officer Ramil
Safarov. The incident, as it is common knowledge, occurred in
Budapest. At the same time, the source confirmed the reports of the
Bulgarian news agency on the Armenian peacekeeping contingent in
Kosovo. However, according to the source, Armenian military men serve
at quite a distance from Azerbaijani peacekeeping units.
Besides, he noted that Azerbaijani peacekeepers are transported to
Kosovo via Turkey. The expert excludes the possibility of the clash
between the peacekeeping forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia also for the
reason that this information did not leak anywhere. “In case this
happened, international community would be informed”, the source
concluded.
It was also noted that the recent events in Kosovo kept the
Azerbaijani peacekeeping in full fighting capacity.
[23-03-2004 ‘Region’]
———————————————————————-
ANY INITIATIVE ON RECONSIDERATION OF KARS TREATY SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIATED
Source : `Azg’ newspaper (Armenia)
Author: Hakob Chakrian
On March 16, upon the initiative of Writers’ Union of Armenia a forum
of intellectuals was organized. It was devoted to Russian-Turkish
(March 16, 1921) and Kars (October 13, 1921) treaties. The forum
called on RA National Assembly to denounce the Kars Treaty and to
apply to State Duma of the Russian Federation with a claim to annul
the articles of Russian-Turkish treaty concerning Armenia.
What is this initiative conditioned by? The appeal to the National
Assembly on addressing State Duma is still more incomprehensible in
the sense that Kars Treaty is not simply a duplicate of
Russian-Turkish treaty. Russia also has its signature under it
similarly to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.
In other words, even if State Duma annuls the points of
Russian-Turkish treaty, pertaining to Armenia, still the fact that
Russia signed the Kars Treaty, will not allow RA National Assembly to
abrogate the treaty unilaterally without Russia’s
agreement. Apparently, the initiators of the forum missed this
circumstance, which raises doubts concerning the validity of the
initiative.
Ajarian crisis demonstrated that in the case of Kars Treaty, the
problem lay not only in the validity of reconsideration process but
also in controversial approaches and speculation with these issues on
international level.
Speaking about speculations, I mean Turkey. Its interests clashed with
Georgian and Russian resistance. That is, the problem of Kars Treaty
appeared on the agenda not only in Turkey but also in Georgia and
Russia. With the only difference that if in Armenia it was due to the
initiative of the Writers’ Union, in the countries mentioned it was
the result of the peculiar reaction of the Turkish Ambassador to
Azerbaijan, Unal Chevikoz.
On March 17 in Baku, Chevikoz declared to the journalists that Turkish
authorities, in accordance to Kars Treaty of 1921, are entitled to
deploy troops in Ajaria. Further, he added, `I think no explanations
are required in this aspect. The treaty will remain in force, and it
is already sufficient’. Georgian ambassador to Moscow, Constantine
Kemularia objected to it. He noted that in compliance with the Kars
Treaty, Ajaria cannot hope for the assistance of Turkey. He also
emphasized, `Any comments on the treaty are senseless. It is already
invalid. At present, international relations are built on the
realities of XXI century. Totally different relations appeared to form
between Russia and Turkey, Georgia and Turkey, Georgia and Russia”.
In its turn, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented its
objection to Georgian Ambassador in Russia, declaring that Kars
Treaty, signed in 1921 among Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey,
lost its validity. At the same time, the statement of MFA of Russian
Federation reminds about Turkey’s agreement to cede Ajaria to Georgia
under the condition that Ajaria be provided with the highest autonomy
status. In this period, Russian national newspapers started to
actively criticize Chevikoz, viewing his declaration about deployment
of troops in Ajaria as a challenge.
The approaches of the countries in question towards the Kars Treaty
are conditioned by the interests they have in Ajaria. By the
willingness to station troops in Ajaria, Turkey recognizes the
validity of the Kars Treaty. Georgia considers it `to be invalid’ in
order to exclude any interference (Turkey included) in ensuring
territorial integrity of the country. As for Russia, despite its
opposition to Turkish interference, by preservation of the status quo
in Ajaria, it plans to influence Georgia and insists, in an attempt to
account for its actions, on the validity of the Kars Treaty.
In other words, Georgia has polar views with Turkey and Russia on the
issue of the validity of the treaty, whereas Russia and Turkey are in
agreement. As regards the initiative of the Writers’ Union of Armenia
on reconsideration of the treaty, though Georgia involuntarily
supports the Armenian stand, viewing this issue as anachronism, still
it should be kept in mind that it is Russia that is the strategic
partner of Armenia.
Moreover, if RA National Assembly resolves to meet the appeal of the
forum, it will have to apply with the claim `to recognize the points
on Armenia of the Russian-Turkish treaty (16 March, 1921) invalid’ not
to Georgian parliament but Russian State Duma. Since State Duma will
not be able to ignore this position held by MFA of Russian Federation
on the treaty affecting the national interests of Russia, the claim
will probably be rejected. And it means reconsideration of the Kars
Treaty is not feasible.
—
Yerevan Press Club of Armenia, ‘Yeni Nesil’ Journalists’ Union of
Azerbaijan and Association of Diplomacy Correspondents of Turkey
present ‘Armenia-Azerbaijan-Turkey: Journalist Initiative-2002’
Project. As a part of the project web site has
been designed, featuring the most interesting publications from the
press of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey on issues of mutual
concern. The latest updates on the site are weekly delivered to the
subscribers.

A Rose Among Thorns – Georgia Makes Good
Foreign Affairs
March / April 2004
By Charles King
“Oh, fatherland! How I think of you now,” lamented Euripides’ Medea,
the princess of ancient Colchis — today part of the republic of
Georgia. “In every way the situation is bad.” Modern Georgians
understand her sentiment only too well. In the first decade and a half
since their independence from the Soviet Union, they have faced civil
war, separatist movements, economic malaise, rigged elections, and
dysfunctional government.
Recently, however, Georgians have started to take matters into their
own hands. In November, they staged a bloodless revolt against their
president, Eduard Shevardnadze, for overseeing fraudulent
parliamentary elections. When Shevardnadze tried to open the new
legislative session, protesters took over parliament peacefully, some
handing out roses to the police. At first, Shevardnadze responded by
declaring a state of emergency, but he soon thought better of his
legacy. Within days, he agreed to resign. New presidential elections,
which international observers deemed generally free, were held on
January 4, 2004. By an overwhelming majority, the vote awarded the
presidency to Mikheil Saakashvili, a 36-year-old Columbia
University-educated lawyer who had led the demonstrations.
During his brief electoral campaign and tenure as president,
Saakashvili has made all the right moves. He has promised to fight
corruption, to reform government-from the structure of the
constitution to taxation policy–and to improve relations with Russia
while maintaining strong ties with the United States. What his
government must do first, however, is find a way to win the allegiance
of all Georgia’s inhabitants, including staunch secessionists in the
north and a prickly potentate along the Black Sea. Before it can
become a real democracy, Georgia must become a real state.
VANISHING LINES
The peaceful ouster of Shevardnadze was a signal event in the politics
of Eurasia-but only because it is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere in
the region. Georgia is the only member of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, the association of 12 former Soviet republics,
that can be said to have genuinely democratic aspirations.
Some–Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova–still use the language of
democracy but have spent the last several years perfecting their own
brand of illiberalism. Others–Azerbaijan, Belarus, and
Turkmenistan–have tired of even pretending since the downfall of
communism, most governments across the region have simply replaced
Soviet authoritarianism with homegrown varieties. Elections–if they
are held at all–are systematically manipulated, either at the ballot
box or, more subtly, through control of the media and harassment of
opposition parties. In Russia, the “dictatorship of law” promoted by
President Vladimir Putin now seems disturbingly close to a
dictatorship pure and simple. If, as the old adage goes, democracy is
a system in which it is safe to lose an election, then Eurasia’s
democrats still need to watch their backs. Georgia’s “revolution of
roses” stands out as the former Soviet Union’s only successful popular
uprising against this trend and the lackluster statesmanship and
corruption that have attended it.
Observers have been quick to draw lessons from the Georgian
experience, for Eurasia and for other parts of the world. The billion
dollars in democracy and development aid that Georgia has received
from the United States since 1991–by far Washington’s largest per
capita investment in any Soviet successor state–seem to have paid
off. Washington at first lauded Shevardnadze as a beacon of democratic
reform, but as the 1990s progressed, his democratic credentials became
more suspect. The United States, along with nongovernmental
organizations such as the Open Society Institute, stepped up support
for the growing political opposition. That assistance was an important
catalyst of change. And it is evidence, observers say, that sustained
political engagement, party training, and civil-society building can
eventually bring down autocrats.
Yet the story of Georgia’s awakening is also a cautionary
tale. Development strategies there and in many other parts of the
world have sometimes encouraged democratization programs without
tackling basic problems such as undefined state boundaries or weak
government capabilities. In fairing states, the strategy has been to
build a democracy and hope that, in time, the rest will take care of
itself. But the history of Georgia since 1991 illustrates that leaving
fundamental questions unanswered–Is this one country or several? Who
is sovereign? Where are the country’s legitimate borders?-can stymie
reform and pollute public life.
Development specialists are not wholly blind to this problem, of
course, which is why “governance”-capacity building, institutional
design, anti- corruption campaigns–has recently, become a fashionable
focus of international assistance programs. But “governance” is simply
a euphemism for what used to be known as “politics,” the first
requirement of which is to know where power resides. Since the early
1990s, Georgia has been divided among a weak central government and
several functionally independent regions, with predictably corrosive
effects on national politics. Turning Georgia into a country that is
both functional and democratic is the goal of the post-Shevardnadze
leadership and of Georgia’s friends in the West. The coming months
will show whether it can be achieved without first settling the basic
issue of territorial control. So far, the lesson seems to be that it
cannot.
THINGS FELL APART
Georgia is among the smallest of the former Soviet republics—a
little bigger than West Virginia, with a population of about five
million. Yet it loomed large in Soviet history and post-Soviet
politics. Its capital, Tbilisi, was the site of one of the first major
Bolshevik operations, a 19o7 bank heist that swelled party
coffers. (One of its planners, Iosif Dzhugashvili, would later change
his name to Stalin.) Blessed with an appearing climate, productive
farmland, and legendary hospitality, Georgia was also among the Soviet
Union’s wealthiest republics. After the end of communism, it adopted a
strongly pro Western orientation and learned to leverage its strategic
location on the Black Sea’s eastern shore to become a major player in
discussions about routes for Eurasian oil and gas exports. (The
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline now under construction will be the
primary conduit for transporting hydrocarbons from the rich Caspian
basin to the rest of the world. Transit fees are expected to bring
Georgia billions of dollars in the coming decades.)
The breakup of the Soviet Union was accompanied by the fracture of
Georgia itself. In the northwest, members of the Abkhaz ethnic group
asserted their right to self-determination, and the Georgian army
launched a poorly executed war to prevent their secession. Ethnic
Ossetes also declared their own separate republic in the north, while,
in the south, Azeri and Armenian minorities complained of
discrimination and occasionally rumbled about breaking away. Political
differences, fueled by competition among regional clans and criminal
gangs, escalated even among ethnic Georgians. A full-blown civil war
of Georgians against Georgians raged alongside the secessionist
conflicts.
Because of these disputes, the state known as “Georgia” has largely
been a fiction of recent international diplomacy. Nearly 20 percent of
the country’s territory remains beyond the central government’s
control. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for example, function as de facto
independent countries, even though no one has recognized them. The
presence of Russian soldiers–in peacekeeping contingents authorized
by the Georgians themselves and on bases left over from the Soviet
era–has discouraged Tbilisi from trying to retake the areas by
force. And Adjaria, a province along the Black Sea, maintains an
uneasy “autonomous” relationship with the Georgian center—and hosts
a Russian military base to underscore it.
When Shevardnadze stepped into the presidency in 1992 promising to
restore Georgia’s territorial integrity and promote ties with the
West, he was greeted as a savior. Relative political calm did return
during his tenure, but he proved unable to solve the basic conundrums
territorial control and state performance. Today still, the central
government’s influence begins to wane just a few miles outside
Tbilisi. Even in the capital, average citizens often do without
electricity or Sunning water. Although the population is highly
educated, the economy is in shambles. Georgia’s per capita national
income is lower than Swaziland’s, and more than half of the population
lives under the poverty line.
Under Shevardnadze, the government’s inherent weakness was exacerbated
by a dysfunctional political system: Parties appeared and
disappeared. Elections were falsified. Corruption became rampant:
police officers extracted fines for imaginary traffic offenses and
government officials misappropriated international aid or helped sell
off state industries to their cronies. In the end, nothing became
Sheyardnadze in power like the leaving of it.
This is the difficult legacy that Saakashvili’s government has
inherited. The secessionists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia will look
no more kindly on the new leadership than they did on the old. There
are signs, in fact, that they may be even less inclined to cooperate
with energetic reformers than they were with the generally
accommodating and avuncular Shevardnadze. As soon as Shevardnadze
fell, the renegade regions appealed to Russia, their long-time
protector, to dissuade the new Georgian leadership from making
aggressive moves. Elsewhere, local elites have become accustomed to
running their own affairs, and efforts by the central government to
rein them in may produce conflict. That is the casee with Aslan
Abashidze, the potentate in Adjaria. Once a rival of Shevardnadze,
Abashidze threw in his lot with the former president and often
manipulated electoral results to guarantee a victory for
Shevardnadze’s party, as he did last November. Abashidze has already
proved to be a thorn in the side of Saakashvili by discouraging
Adjarians from participating in the latest presidential elections and
complicating plans for the next parliamentary ballot.
Then there are the entrenched interests of bureaucrats and business
people who benefited from the largesse and laxity of the Shevardnadze
years. (Off-the-record deals are said to account for 60 to 70 percent
of the country’s total economic activity) Corruption has long
tentacles in Georgia, and setting out to tame the criminal networks
that infest state structures can be a dangerous pursuit. Shevardnadze
himself was the target of several assassination attempts, even though
he was hardly a serious reformer. The murder of Zoran Djindjic, the
reformist prime minister who tried to clean up Serbia after Slobodan
Milosevic, undoubtedly weighs heavily on the minds of Saakashvili and
his cohort.
Georgia’s revolution injects a welcome dose of uncertainty in a region
where political outcomes have become oppressively predictable. It is
unclear, however, whether the country’s new leaders will have the
conviction and deftness to capitalize on Shevardnadze’s
departure. They will have to deal with (or buy off) local power
brokers without prompting them to turn to violence. They will have to
root out the widespread use of public office for private gain. They
will have to find ways to keep the electricity on and the water
flowing. Otherwise, Georgians will begin to wonder whether the end of
Shevardnadze really marked the beginning of something better.
BALANCE OF POWERS
Georgians say that the country’s biggest problem is Russia. The
Russian government has never denied that it takes a keen interest in
its neighbor, and Georgia’s secessionist leaders welcome Russian
support–they even visited Moscow just days after Shevardnadze
resigned. Russia has effectively cemented the status of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia as protectorates by maintaining preferential visa and
passport regimes with them and making it easier for their inhabitants
to obtain Russian citizenship. (It has extended that special
relationship to Adjaria as well.) Russia also operates military bases
in Georgia, in contravention of international agreements to close them
down.
To balance Russia’s influence, Georgia’s central government needs
outside help, especially from the United States, which has been the
country’s most generous backer for a decade. A stable and democratic
Georgia is the linchpin of U.S. policy in the Caucasus, and the
Caucasus, in turn, is a critical part of the strategic future of
Eurasia and the greater Middle East. The Clinton administration gave
Georgia massive amounts of aid, a good deal of which helped
Shevardnadze stay in power so long. Since the “revolution of roses”
last fall, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other senior
U.S. government officials have visited Tbilisi, underscoring
Washington’s commitment to Saakashvili and his associates. These moves
are encouraging to many Georgians, who say that the country needs to
establish the right “pressure gradient” in its foreign policy. They
hope that the United States and its allies will put pressure on
Russia, so that Russia, in turn, will put pressure on the Abkhaz and
South Ossetian leaderships to give up their quest for
independence. With a big enough push from the outside, their logic
goes, Georgia’s territorial problems would go away.
Things are more complicated than this, however. Abkhazia and South
Ossetia certainly depend on Russia. Their trade is oriented almost
exclusively toward the north, and Russian financial assistance,
especially via subsidized energy supplies, is the bedrock of their
existence. Moreover, Russian bases support local economies, even
outside the secessionist zones; closing them down without a plan for
replacing the jobs lost would be disastrous. At the same time,
residents of these regions remember the violent conflicts of the early
1990s and remain understandably wary of the central government. Over
the past decade, they have built their own administrations, security
forces, and–most critically-school systems, with little connection to
the rest of the country. Shevardnadze did little to reach out to the
average people in these peripheral regions or to restore their
confidence in the recognized government. Reversing that practice
should be one of the key criteria by which outside powers judge
Saakashvili’s leadership.
Thinking creatively about what a meaningfully united Georgia ought to
look like, instead of simply condemning Russia’s dark influence, is
the best way forward. There are several ways to bring together the
country’s disparate regions and interests, provided someone dares to
consider and implement them. Federations, confederations,
condominiums, and various forms of limited sovereignty have never
really been put on the table in Georgia, even though these solutions
are already being discussed in other parts of eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. Until now, the situation in Georgia has not been
sufficiently dire for anyone—at least not for anyone with real
political power-to worry about solving it.
Saakashvili has a chance to change Shevardnadze’s dismal legacy. But
that will require statesmanship in the purest sense of the word,
including articulating a clear case for why residents of Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, and any other part of the country should think of their
future as lying within a state controlled by Tbilisi. Continued
kvetching about territorial integrity and the nefarious designs of the
Russian Federation will only alienate the secessionists further. In
time, even Georgia’s friends may come to wonder whether a country with
fictitious borders and no plan for making them real is a country worth
helping.
Georgia’s strategic location and its pro-American foreign policy first
helped put the country on the United States’ radar screen. The
government’s weakness and Washington’s fear that terrorists might set
up camp in the country’s mountain passes have kept it there. Money has
flowed freely from Washington to Tbilisi for more than a decade, and
U.S. soldiers have helped train the Georgian military. It is only
recently, however, that the U.S. commitment to Georgia has come with
meaningful admonitions about democracy, human rights, and the rule of
law. Washington’s growing honesty about the reality of Georgian
politics helped bring about Shevardnadze’s resignation. The United
States should now help Georgia’s new leadership think creatively about
basic questions of sovereignty, territorial control, and institutional
design. The central government must recognize .he multiethnic and
multireligious reality of the country. It must accept a decade of
state-building in the secessionist regions and allow local governments
to be empowered. If these efforts succeed, Georgia could well become
the positive example for eastern Europe and Eurasia that observers
have long hoped for.
Charles King is Associate Professor of Foreign Service and Government
at Georgetown University and author of “The Black Sea: A History”.

Azeri security ministry arrests drug smugglers
Azad Azarbaycan TV, Baku
29 Mar 04
The National Security Ministry has obtained undeniable information
about the cultivation of drugs in territories under Armenian
occupation and its use as a transit route by drug barons. In a
statement issued today, the ministry said that the recent analysis of
operational information showed that a group of Azeri and Iranian
criminals smuggled drugs cultivated in Afghanistan, Iran, including
those planted in Karabakh and other occupied territories, into
Azerbaijan.
On 27 March Iranian citizen Xudan Panahi, 35, and four other members
of the criminal group, who smuggled drugs into Azerbaijan from the
Fuzuli sector of the Iran-Azerbaijan state border, were detained. They
were arrested with 6.93 kg marijuana, 984.5 g cannabis, 154 g of
heroine and 27.04 g of raw opium.
According to preliminary investigation, the narcotic substances were
prepared in Azerbaijan’s occupied territories. A criminal case into
the fact has begun. Operational and investigation measures are under
way to find other members of the gang.

US deputy state secretary arrives in Azerbaijan
Azad Azarbaycan TV, Baku
26 Mar 04
The fight against international terrorism will be discussed in the
course of US Deputy State Secretary Richard Armitage’s visit to
Azerbaijan which begins today. Mr Armitage arrived in Azerbaijan
nearly an hour ago. His meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham
Aliyev is planned for tomorrow.
The sides will discuss the settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh
problem, bilateral relations, international terrorism and the fight
against transnational crimes. Armitage discussed the settlement of the
Nagornyy Karabakh conflict with Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan
Oskanyan during his visit to Armenia before arriving in Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan’s ANS TV reported at 1700 gmt on 26 March 2004 that Richard
Armitage will arrive in Azerbaijan in a few hours

Armenian leader, US deputy state secretary discuss bilateral ties, Karabakh
Mediamax news agency
26 Mar 04
YEREVAN
Armenian President Robert Kocharyan received US Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage in Yerevan today.
Mediamax quoted Kocharyan as saying during the meeting that he was
pleased with the level of bilateral US-Armenian relations and stressed
the importance of expanding this cooperation.
During the meeting the Armenian president and the US deputy secretary
of state discussed the prospects for the development of the South
Caucasus and ways of resolving the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict.

Pan Armenian Network, Armenia
March 26 2004
“WELL DONE, RAMIL!”
A manifestation of young men supporting Ramil Safarov who killed in
Budapest the Armenian officer took place in Baku.
On March 21 the time set by the Hungarian Court for the preliminary
investigation of the Azeri Ramil Safarov who killed the officer of
the Armenian army Gurgen Margaryan ran out. However, the
investigative bodies did not manage to finish and the court elongated
the imprisonment for another month. It is supposed that the
investigation will be completed in mid April and Safarov will be
accused of murder with aggravating circumstances.
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ As expected, in Azerbaijan they are doing their
best so that the trial becomes a propaganda show. For this purpose,
while meeting Safarov in Budapest his advocate Elchin Usubov
instructed him about his behavior during the trial. He told him to
change some of the accents of his evidences in order to achieve a
maximum propaganda effect. But the legend is the same – Safarov
killed him under the impression of the events of Khojalu and the
occupation by Armenians of his village in Cebraili region. In Baku
they hope that thanks to this it will be possible once more to
underline the ”Armenian aggression”.
The investigator agreed to attach the documents concerning the events
of Khojalu and Cebrail to the case. During few days in Baku they
prepared and translated in English a huge pack of documents. The
advocate Usubov and the head of department of international relations
of the Prosecutor’s office of Azerbaijan Ruslan Gajiyev took them to
Budapest. However, the investigator did not accept the materials as
they were not formulates as ”established by the Law”. It is
difficult to understand what it means. According to Azerbaijan, this
is because the documents were in English and not in Hungarian. But
maybe also that the investigator has noticed the propaganda character
of the materials, however, the Azeris now elaborate a new package and
translate the documents in to Hungarian.
Safarov now remains in a single cell of the isolator. Judging from
Baku press, he feels himself as in a resort. Eats three times a day,
every Thursday his relatives or their representatives visit him.
There is a TV set, radio, hot and cold showers in the cell. He calls
frequently his parents in Baku who are now going to visit him, so,
the murderer feels himself rather comfortably.
Meanwhile, the calls to recommend Safarov for a state decoration
continue to be pronounced in Baku. Recently a member of the committee
on protection of Ramil Safarov, parliamentarian Zahid Oruj met the
murderer and told about how his compatriots loved him. Last week the
presentation of the official internet site of Safarov containing
propaganda took place in Baku. More than $30 thousand was collected
on the bank account on the name of his father. The head of the
organization of national unity businessman Nadir Aliyev said he will
pay a certain sum each month to the father of the murderer.
Meanwhile, we should remind that his case supposes life imprisonment.
However, if he is released he will become a hero. This should
understand the investigative bodies of Hungary and, first of all, the
Judge who will read the verdict. He himself will commit a crime if he
sets him free some day.

Louisville Courier Journal, KY
March 19 2004
Orchestra’s stirring ‘Triptych’ is a fusion of color and sound
By ANDREW ADLER – March 19, 2004
[email protected]
The Courier-Journal
In a program note meant to accompany his “New England Triptych,”
William Schuman writes of how his 1956 work forges a “fusion of
styles and musical languages” with 18th-century composer William
Billings.
It’s not too much of a leap to make a similar comparison of Aram
Khachaturian’s Violin Concerto, except here the fusion is not with a
single composer, but with an entire tradition of Armenian folk music.
Both pieces, however, speak powerfully in purely symphonic terms, and
they made for an exceptionally engaging first half of yesterday’s
U.S. Bank Coffee Concert at the Kentucky Center. If you crave a
molten swirl of instrumental color and texture, this was definitely
the kind of stuff to get your blood boiling. Whatever the ethnic
context, music director Uriel Segal made what could have been an odd
stylistic transition seem like the most sensible thing in the world.
Schuman is a bedrock composer of 20th-century America, and his “New
England Triptych” has long been among his most successful creations.
No wonder – the music has immediate, undeniable appeal as it moves
through a trio of Billings’ hymn treatments. The score has the sure
hand of a composer who understands how to bend commonplace elements
to uncommon benefit.
Few would describe the “Triptych” as especially demanding of
listeners – yet it speaks with freshness hearkening back to early
American musical practice, and reaching forward toward a universally
embraceable contemporary idiom.
The work’s second and third movements are particularly fine.
Yesterday’s account was at its strongest in these portions. Billings
took the hymn “When Jesus Wept” as one departure point refashioned by
Schuman in the work’s central essay. The music is achingly beautiful,
and the Louisville Orchestra’s strings played with a hushed,
sustained intensity that proved deeply affecting. Later on, during
the third-movement “Chester” hymn, Segal urged the full orchestra
forward in a blaze of crackling dynamics.
Khachaturian wrote quite a bit of orchestral literature. The appeal
of his best works, such as the big ballets “Spartacus” and “Gayane,”
have not diminished over the decades. The Violin Concerto doesn’t
rise quite to that level, coming off rather self-consciously as
appealing to the populist aesthetic sentiments of the Stalinist
regime. Still, the concerto knows how to push the right expressive
buttons.
In violinist Silvia Marcovici, the orchestra had a guest soloist able
to take all that the concerto threw at her and find the elemental
worth of every page.
The concerto sometimes can seem tumultuous for its own sake, yet
Marcovici remained unfazed by Khachaturian’s frenetic surfaces. My
only real reservation was that – in playing from a score – in the
third movement she directed her attentions more toward her music
stand than toward her Whitney Hall listeners, which compromised both
the focus of her tone and the sense of connecting with listeners.
The orchestra itself played with laudable discipline, which carried
over to at least the first three movements of Beethoven’s Symphony
No. 5. Segal led this piece with brisk tempos and lean proportions,
emphasizing clarity of attack and careful sectional balances.
His argument and the orchestra’s response was laudable through the
scherzo but weakened in a final movement that resisted taking shape.
Here, the brass playing didn’t have quite the crispness heard earlier
on, and in general the phrasing broadened so that momentum – which in
the Fifth should be inexorable – was merely indefinite.

Karabakh to be full party to talks – separatist leader
Mediamax news agency
17 Mar 04
YEREVAN
The Nagornyy Karabakh Republic (NKR) will be involved in the
negotiations to resolve the Karabakh conflict as a full party, the
Nagornyy Karabakh president, Arkadiy Gukasyan, told the OSCE
chairman-in-office, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passi, in
Yerevan today.
Gukasyan said the fact that the NKR is not involved in the talks
between Armenia and Azerbaijan was temporary.
Commenting on the forthcoming meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani
foreign ministers in Prague, Gukasyan said “this format cannot
facilitate the Karabakh settlement”.
“All contacts are important but the problem can hardly be resolved
without Karabakh,” the NKR president said.

PRESS RELEASE
Department of Armenian Studies, Haigazian University
Beirut, Lebanon
Contact: Ara Sanjian
Tel: 961-1-353011
Email: [email protected]
Web:
HAIGAZIAN UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ARMENIAN STUDIES
invites to a lecture on
The Armenian Genocide in the Memoirs of Syrians
(in Armenian)
by
Dr. Nora Arissian
(Damascus)
Friday, March 19, 2004 – 7:30 p.m.
Haigazian University Auditorium – Mehagian building, Mexique Street,
Kantari, Beirut
N.B. Please accept this message as a personal invitation.
Haigazian University is a liberal arts institution of higher learning,
established in Beirut in 1955. For more information about its activities
you are welcome to visit its web-site at <; . For additional information on the activities of its Department of Armenian Studies, contact Ara Sanjian at

Baku Today, Azerbaijan
March 11 2004
Araz Azimov: ‘EU could take more active role in peace process’

European Union’s special representative for South Caucasus Heikki
Talvitie will visit Azerbaijan on March 18, 2004.

11/03/2004 15:12
Baku Today
Commenting on European Union’s(EU) role in peace process over Nagorno
Karabakh conflict deputy foreign minister Araz Azimov said, European
Union could take more active role in mediating a settlement to the
conflict.
Azimov said, there are two possible ways for EU involvement in the
process.Either EU might delegate one of its member states France,
which is presiding over Minsk group, to act on its behalf for the
mediation, or EU may participate together with Minsk group in the
peace process.
Talking on next meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia
Azimov said, the time of a meeting has not been fixed yet. However,
Azimov said, deputy foreign ministers of the two countries might meet
in the near future.