Author: Kalantarian Kevo

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Iran Report
Vol. 7, No. 32, 20 September 2004
A Review of Developments in Iran Prepared by the Regional Specialists
of RFE/RL’s Newsline Team.
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HEADLINES:
* THEOLOGICAL COMMUNITY CONTENDS WITH CHANGING WORLD
* RELIGIOUS MINORITIES FACE PERSECUTION…
* …AS DO SUFI MUSLIMS
* PARTIES HINT AT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
* IRAN VIEWS HERAT PROVINCE DEVELOPMENTS POSITIVELY
* KHATAMI HOPES TAJIK VISIT WILL LEAD TO BETTER TIES
* IRANIAN MILITARY SITE INTERESTS IAEA
* IAEA CRITICAL OF IRANIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION
* IS WEAPONIZATION NEAR?
************************************************************
IRAN’S THEOLOGICAL COMMUNITY CONTENDS WITH CHANGING WORLD. The
1979 Islamic revolution struck Iran’s religious community as the
dawn of a new and promising era for the country and its faithful. A
quarter of a century later things don’t look so rosy for the
clerics — many Iranians view them with disdain, and Al-Najaf, the
center of Shi’a learning in Iraq, seems set to eclipse the
Iranian theocratic center of Qom.
The major Shi’a cities in Iran are Qom and Mashhad. There
are almost 60 seminaries in Qom, the most prominent of which are
Fayzieh, Dar ul-Shafa, Hojjatieh, Sayteh, and Golpayegani. Qom also
has 10 libraries, and several Islamic periodicals are published
there. Mashhad is the site of the tomb of Imam Reza and 20
seminaries, including Khairat Khan, Mirza Jafar, and Navvah. There
are also seminaries in Isfahan (ex: Chahar Bagh, Mullah Abdullah),
Shiraz, Tabriz, Tehran, and Yazd.
Fifteen years ago, Nikola B. Schahgaldian wrote in “The
Clerical Establishment in Iran,” (RAND Publication Series prepared
for the Office of the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy,
[June 1989]), that the estimated number of Iranian clergymen ranged
from 90,000 (media observers), to 200,000 (Iranian clerics
themselves), to 300,000 (European sources). Another 50,000-60,000
Iranians had some religious training. There were about 40,000
theology students at Iranian seminaries. Finally, there were some
60,000 people with no formal training or qualifications who acted as
urban preachers, rural-prayer leaders, and procession organizers.
In early September 2004, a prominent theologian told a
reporter that Iran remains very attractive to religious scholars.
Hojatoleslam Husseini-Bushehri, who is either director of the Qom
Theological Seminaries (Howzeh-yi Elmieh-yi Qom) or the Qom
Theological Lecturers Association (Jameh-yi Mudarresin-i Howzeh-yi
Elmieh-yi Qom), announced that there are hundreds of scholars from
around the world studying at religious institutions in Isfahan,
Mashhad, Qom, Tehran, and other cities, “Resalat” reported on 5
September. In Qom alone, Husseini-Bushehri said, there are 50,000
students from 70 countries. There are 300 religious research centers
in Qom, he added, and 3,000 seminaries in the entire country.
Other major Shi’a centers are in the Iraqi cities of
Al-Najaf and Karbala, and the Baghdad neighborhood of Khazimiyah.
“Najaf has been the revered center of Shiite Islam for 1,000 years;
it is the most respected shrine,” Iranian scholar Abdolkarim Soroush
said in an interview (“Rise of Iraqi Shiites Threatens Iranian
Theocrats,” “New Perspectives Quarterly” vol. 21, no. 2 March 2004).
The seminary in Qom, Soroush added, “is barely 100 years old.” With
the demise of Saddam Hussein’s regime, therefore, Al-Najaf is
likely to become a center of apolitical and quietist Shi’a Islam.
Lebanon’s importance as a site of Shi’a learning is
growing, particularly in terms of teaching Lebanese ulama (see Rula
Jurdi Abisaab, “The Lebanese Hawza of al-Rasul al-Akram: Toward a
Redefinition of the Shi’ite ‘Alim,” in “Distant Relations:
Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years,” Houchang Chehabi and Hassan
Mniemnieh, eds., [London: IB Tauris, 2004]).
The number of religious students and seminary instructors in
Iran appears to remain high even if the exuberance of the early
revolutionary years has worn off. There is a practical explanation:
clerics have a “head start” in seeking government jobs, and their
children get into the best schools (Christopher de Bellaigue, “Who
Rules Iran?” “The New York Review of Books,” vol. 49, no. 11, 27 June
2002). Moreover, students who study under popular clerics receive a
stipend, which is important given the difficulty of finding real
jobs. A visitor to Qom told the “RFE/RL Iran Report” that one
encounters individuals who have spent many years in the seminary
without completing their studies.
Some seminarians’ lack of purpose or identity or sense of
rootlessness is furthered by the disdain many people have for the
lower echelons of the clerical classes. In fact, such disdain is not
a new phenomenon. During the 1960s and 1970s the “clergy were often
described in unflattering terms as venal, greedy, and hypocritical,”
whereas leading clerics “were generally described as pious and
learned” (Eric Hooglund, “Social Origins of the Revolutionary
Clergy,” “The Iranian Revolution and The Islamic Republic,” Nikki R.
Keddie & Eric Hooglund, eds., Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1986, p. 80).
The 1979 revolution not only affected the nature of the
Iranian government but it changed the relationship between religion
and politics. The traditional criteria for judging a clergyman’s
stature (such as theological learning, writing, jurisprudence,
knowledge of canon law, and the opinion of other top clerics) became
less relevant, and political factors now play a greater role.
Three incidents illustrate this point. The 1989 succession to
the supreme leadership by Ali Khamenei and his hasty promotion to the
rank of ayatollah was one such case. Khamenei was only a hojatoleslam
but had served as president; the constitution was amended so the
supreme leader no longer had to be a source of emulation (see article
109). With the deaths of Grand Ayatollah Abolqasem Khoi (1992), Grand
Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Golpayegani (1993), and Grand Ayatollah Ali
Araki (died 1994), there was an attempt to promote Khamenei to the
rank of source of emulation. Khamenei himself withdrew from
consideration. (See “RFE/RL Iran Report,” 23 November 1998.)
The third incident illustrating the impact of politics on the
religious system relates to the 1997 presidential campaign. Thirty
members of the Qom Theological Lecturers Association were invited to
a meeting at which they were advised to declare their support for the
leading conservative candidate. Several clerics avoided the meeting,
but 14 of those in attendance informed the press that the seminary
backed the conservative candidate. The clerics who did not attend the
meeting subsequently expressed their dissent: “Those who pretend that
none of the 30 members was against [conservative candidate Ali Akbar]
Nateq-Nuri forget that Ayatollahs Mohammad Fazel [-Lankarani], Nasser
Makarem [-Shirazi], [Ebrahim] Amini [-Najafabadi], [Ali Akbar] Masudi
[-Khomeini], myself [Karimi] and a few others are also members of
that association.” (Azadeh Kian-Thiebaut, “Time for reform of the
Islamic revolution,” “Le Monde Diplomatique,” January 1998.)
Some clerics’ rejection of political involvement or a
theocratic state was not completely unexpected. In the mid-1980s
scholars were writing that some of the leading clergymen prefer “the
looser visayat-i fuqaha, which they interpret as general supervision
by the clergy over affairs…. At the most, these clerics are willing
to concede the principle of vilayat-i faqih in times of exceptional
turmoil but contend that it lapses when a government is installed, a
parliament is elected and a new state order comes into being.”
(Sharough Akhavi, “The Revolutionary Clergy,” “The Iranian Revolution
and The Islamic Republic,” Nikki R. Keddie & Eric Hooglund, eds.,
[Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986], p. 61.)
By the mid-1990s, withdrawal was, in some cases, becoming
opposition to the Khomeini interpretation of the Islamic state in
which clerics hold executive power. “Already, the higher-ranking
ulama, under the banner of the institution of marja’iyat, are
moving to their traditional role of opposing the state with seemingly
traditional reasoning, i.e. the illegitimacy of the state in the
absence of the Lord of the Age.” (Maziar Behrooz, “The Islamic State
and the Crisis of Marja’iyat in Iran,” Comparative Studies of
South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, Vol. XVI, No. 2 [1996].)
The leading clerics’ unhappiness with the country’s
politics is illustrated by the point that eight of the top 12
ayatollahs reportedly refused to vote in the February 2004
parliamentary elections (Grand Ayatollah Yusef Sanei, cited by the
“Chicago Tribune,” 2 May 2004).
Nevertheless, there still are many clerics in Iranian
governmental institutions. In this case, it is the middle-ranking
clerics who dominate and they are not likely to want the system to
change because of its benefits to them.
“First, those mollas [sic] who have gained political power
can be expected to be reluctant to return to the mosques to become
once again simply preachers. Second, the fact that so many
politically active mollas [sic] come from lower-class backgrounds,
and also that so many of the tullab [religious students] have similar
origins, means that their support of the concept of clerical
political activism is tantamount to having an assured means of upward
mobility. Third, clerical control of the government has meant
clerical control of government revenues, and thus financial
independence form the traditional support of private, lay persons.”
(Eric Hooglund, “Social Origins of the Revolutionary Clergy,” “The
Iranian Revolution and The Islamic Republic,” Nikki R. Keddie & Eric
Hooglund, eds., [Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986], p. 82.)
Developments in Iraq, combined with the 25 years of
mismanagement by the Iranian theocracy, indicate that the Shi’a
community will undergo major changes in the coming decade. The
Iranian theocracy is faced with two choices: complying with public
sentiments and basing its legitimacy more on popular support than on
religion, or continuing to impose itself on the Iranian people. (Bill
Samii)
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES FACE PERSECUTION… The U.S. State Department
renamed Iran as a Country of Particular Concern in its sixth Annual
Report on International Religious Freedom, which was released on 15
September (). Other
countries of concern are Burma, China, Eritrea, North Korea, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, and Vietnam.
Iran’s religious minorities — Baha’is, Christians,
Jews, and Sunni Muslims — report “imprisonment, harassment,
intimidation, and discrimination based on their religious beliefs,”
and all the minorities suffer some “officially sanctioned
discrimination.” Jews feel threatened because of the government’s
anti-Israel policies and Baha’i sites have been destroyed (see
“RFE/RL Iran Report,” 13 September 2004).
According to the State Department report, evangelical
Christians are not allowed to proselytize. Security personnel monitor
churches and demands worshippers’ identity papers.
Indeed, approximately 80 evangelical Christians were arrested
on 9 September when police raided the Assemblies of God annual
conference in Karaj, BosNewsLife reported, citing Compass news
agency. Radio Farda reported on 12 September that most of those
arrested were released, and that many who spoke to the station had
requested anonymity for fear of retribution.
Michael Kolahdozan is one of two Catholics in Shiraz, “The
Daily Star” reported on 17 September, and he finds it difficult to
practice his religion. “I go to an Anglican church here as there is
no Catholic service. There is in Isfahan and Tehran, but they are
Armenian Catholic churches, and I don’t speak Armenian,” he
explained. Kolahdozan added that he sometimes goes to a synagogue.
His parents live in Australia and his sister lives in England, and
Kolahdozan finds it difficult to find a compatible partner. “I cannot
find a wife and do not want a Muslim girl. The only woman I could
marry would be in Tehran, but they are mainly foreigners. I want
somebody who can speak my language,” he said. (Bill Samii)
…AS DO SUFI MUSLIMS. The State Department’s Annual Report on
International Religious Freedom, which was released on 15 September
(), refers to
“government repression of Sufi religious practices, including the
constant harassment and intimidation of prominent Sufi leaders by the
intelligence and security services.” The size of the Sufi population
is unknown.
There are four major Shi’a Sufi orders in Iran, according
to Moojan Momen’s “An Introduction to Shi’i Islam” (New
Haven, 1985). The Nimatullahi order is the largest and is divided
into five branches. The Kawthar Ali Shahi branch is centered in
Hamedan, Maragheh, and Tehran. The Shamsieh or Shamsul Urafa branch
has a “khanagah” (meeting place) in Tehran. The Dhur-Riyasatayn
branch expanded in the 1980s, with branches being built throughout
Iran and even in the United States and England. The Gunabadi branch
is headquartered in Bidukht. The Safi Ali Shahi branch has at least
10 khanagahs throughout Iran.
The Dhahabi order is based in Shiraz, where, as of 1985, it
maintained a khanagah. It also has meeting places in Tehran and
Tabriz. The Nurbakhshi order was influential in the Safavid era
(1501-1722), and it was important in the spread of the Shi’a
faith in India. Having been suppressed near the end of the Safavid
era, it never re-established itself in Iran, although a few
practitioners remain. The Khaksar order appears to have little real
organization, many members claim to be sheikhs, and among its members
are many wandering dervishes. This order has several different
branches and meeting places in different cities. (Bill Samii)
KHAMENEI WARNS THAT ISLAMIC WORLD IN DANGER. Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei said at the 16 September closing ceremony of a Koran
recitation contest in Tehran that there is a war against the Islamic
community, state radio reported. “This war has economic, political,
cultural, military and security aspects,” Khamenei continued, “And
today, it has the greatest propaganda tools at its disposal.” Events
in Palestine, Iraq, or Afghanistan are not part of a war against
individual countries but are part of a bigger war against the
existence of Islam in the region. Khamenei said the Islamic
community’s survival is ensured by “a new Islamic spirit,
movement, and awakening,” and he warned, “they want to destroy this.”
Khamenei said the Islamic community can survive “through the Koran.
The Koran taught us everything. We should learn and understand the
Koran.”
Khamenei struck a similar chord in a 13 September speech to
state officials — on the occasion of Mab’ath, the anniversary of
Mohammad’s appointment as prophet. He said that there is a war
against the Islamic world because of its resources, state radio
reported. The global arrogance proclaims democracy and freedom, he
said, but it is trying to destroy the Islamic nation. In case there
were any questions about who he was discussing, Khamenei spelled it
out: “The arrogant power of America, this absolute manifestation of
depravity, is spreading wickedness from all its fingers in the
Islamic region today.” “The Islamic world should unanimously stand
against America’s arrogant aggression anywhere and in whatever
form. They should know that apart from resistance, there is no way to
repel the wicked nature of the evil that has manifested in the
arrogant America,” Khamenei advised. He continued: “No leniency,
flexibility, or retreat will reduce the unquenchable thirst of the
arrogant. They will not accept anything less than absolute domination
over the Islamic world, especially the Middle East region.” (Bill
Samii)
PARTIES HINT AT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. Though Iran’s next
presidential election is still nine months away, there is a great
deal of speculation about the likely candidates.
“I would rather someone else enter the presidential race, but
if the society as well as prominent pundits conclude that I can
fulfill this task better, I will announce my readiness,” Expediency
Council Chairman Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani told
reporters in Mashhad on 16 September, IRNA reported. Rafsanjani added
that there is plenty of time for other candidates to come forward.
The reformist Islamic Labor Party’s Abbas Ahmadi told
Fars News Agency on 10 September that Hashemi-Rafsanjani has met with
leaders of his organization and announced that he would run as a
candidate under certain conditions. Rafsanjani said his decision
would depend on the country’s political climate, and he would do
it for the sake of the revolution and the system.
Former Prime Minister Mir Hussein Musavi is the
reformists’ favorite, but he is being coy about his intentions
(see “RFE/RL Iran Report,” 6 September 2004). Given the difficulties
President Hojatoleslam Mohammad Khatami has had in accomplishing
anything substantive since being elected in May 1997, Musavi’s
hesitation is understandable.
“Election of an informed, experienced, faithful, and capable
manager will expedite [Iran’s] development,” Majid Ansari of the
pro-reform Militant Clerics Association (Majma-yi Ruhaniyun-i
Mubarez) said in the 23 August “Aftab-i Yazd.” He added that a strong
democracy with public support through elections will neutralize
foreign threats. Musavi, therefore, is the only candidate for the 2nd
of Khordad Front, Ansari said, adding, “We are still talking to
Musavi.”
Another prominent member of the Militant Clerics Association,
Hojatoleslam Ali-Akbar Mohtashami-Pur, also weighed in on
Musavi’s behalf, “Aftab-i Yazd” reported on 11 September.
Mohtashami-Pur described Musavi’s “main qualifications” as “his
trustworthiness, truthfulness, and honesty.” He added that Musavi
managed the country during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq and said that
the country’s infrastructure is under attack. “We need
individuals such as Engineer Musavi, whose main concern day and night
is the people.”
Ansari said on 12 September that efforts to persuade Musavi
to run as a presidential candidate are continuing, IRNA reported.
Addressing the annual meeting of the Office for Strengthening Unity
student organization, Ansari added, “The president is representing
the republican aspect of the system and the presidential election
will represent the religious democracy in Iran.”
An anonymous “informed source” said in the 8 September
“Resalat” that Musavi definitely will not be a candidate. Quoting an
anonymous “prominent theoretician of the 2nd of Khordad Front,” the
source said: “the 2nd of Khordad Front groups are now going to select
another person as their candidate in the presidential elections. This
is because Mir Hussein Musavi has announced explicitly and clearly
that he is definitely not going to stand as a candidate.” Musavi
reportedly gave many reasons for not running, but the source refused
to share them.
Hamid Reza Taraqi, a member of the conservative Islamic
Coalition Party’s central council, said its strategy is to
encourage high public participation in the election by supporting the
candidate most likely to unite the voters and gather the highest
number of votes, ISNA reported on 7 September. Taraqi said Ali Akbar
Velayati — former foreign minister and current adviser to the
supreme leader — might be a candidate but the Islamic Coalition
Party has not started considering candidates. Taraqi concluded that
the party has not made a decision on Velayati or anybody else.
Another Islamic Coalition Party member, Hassan Ghafurifard,
said in the 4 September “Sharq” that Velayati has decided to run for
president. “As far as I know, he has decided to stand for the
elections and he has even made the arrangements for his campaigning.”
Urumiyeh parliamentary representative Abed Fatahi has
mentioned Expediency Council secretary and former Islamic Revolution
Guards Corps commander Mohsen Rezai as a possible candidate for
president, the reformist “Aftab-i Yazd” reported on 9 September.
“Channels and sources close to Mohsen Rezai are propounding the
likelihood of his presence in the presidential election, which in
some respects is a source of delight.” Among Rezai’s advantages
over other possible candidates, Fatahi mentioned “his youth and the
fact that he was a fighter and an expert in economic, political, and
military affairs.” (Bill Samii)
ARREST OF IRANIAN JOURNALISTS ANGERS RSF. Radio Farda reported on 9
September that Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has expressed outrage
over the recent arrest of three journalists — Hanif Mazrui, Babak
Ghafuri-Azar, and Shahram Rafizadeh — and called on the Iranian
government to release them promptly
(
4-8ff04fd38b71.html; see also
62).
The arrests are part of a recent crackdown on pro-reform
Internet sites, and according to Radio Farda, many Iranian weblogs
have expressed concern about this issue. Radio Farda’s
correspondent noted that the government blocked access to three
websites — baamdad.com, emrooz.ws, and rouydad.info — in late
August.
The sites later reappeared, albeit with different addresses
and formats, the BBC reported
(). The
government also closed three Internet cafes in Bushehr, RSF reported
(). Moreover, Hamid
Motaghi, the head of the Naqshineh website ()
in Qom, which has been blocked since March, was summoned to court on
21 August and freed after posting bail of 100 million rials
($11,437).
RSF on 14 September called for the immediate release of
Mazrui, Ghafuri-Azar, and Rafizadeh and referred to their “unfair
detention,” according to the RSF website
(). The journalists
are connected with the rouydad.com website, which is run from the
Netherlands by exiled journalist Sina Motallebi. RSF expressed
concern that they have been transferred to a “special wing” of Evin
prison that is reputedly a place of torture and to which only
intelligence service interrogators commanded by Judge Said Mortazavi
have access.
RSF also noted that Said Motallebi, the father of Sina
Motallebi, has been arrested in an effort to gag his son, and it
added, “We call on the Iranian judicial authorities to halt this vile
blackmail.” Said Motallebi was arrested on 8 September, and the
authorities reportedly threatened to make him “another Purzand” — a
reference to the 75-year old Siamak Purzand, who has been imprisoned
since 30 March 2003. (Bill Samii)
IRAN VIEWS HERAT PROVINCE DEVELOPMENTS POSITIVELY. Iranian Ambassador
to Kabul Mohammad Reza Bahrami told reporters on 13 September that it
is natural for his government to be concerned about the situation
along Iran’s eastern border, Iranian state radio reported on 14
September. Bahrami said that former Herat Province Governor Ismail
Khan had important roles in the struggles against the Soviet invaders
and then the Taliban, but now there is an Afghan central government
that is responsible for the entire country. Bahrami added that Iran
supports the Afghan government’s promotion of domestic security.
Iran has traditionally had a close relationship with Ismail
Khan, who spent time in Iran after fleeing a Taliban jail. A U.S.
intelligence officer once described him as an Iranian intelligence
asset, and after 2001 he traveled to Iran several times and
reportedly was the beneficiary of Iranian arms and money (see “RFE/RL
Iran Report,” 17 December 2001; 28 January, 11 February 2002; 10
March, 15 December 2003; and 6 September 2004).
Tehran is, however, familiar with Ismail Khan’s
replacement. New Herat Province Governor Seyyed Mohammad Khairkhwah
served as an ambassador to Iran until March 2002.
Khairkhwah met with the Iranian consul in Herat, Ali
Najafimanesh, on 15 September, Herat TV reported. Khairkhwah
described the government’s objectives and stressed the importance
of bilateral ties, while Najafimanesh discussed Iranian
reconstruction projects in the province and hoped that stability
would be established soon. Also in attendance were security commander
Brigadier General Ziaudin Mahmudi, the National Security
Department’s General Mayel, and Mohammadullah Afzali, the head of
the Foreign Ministry’s office in Herat. (Bill Samii)
IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN SIGN POLICE COOPERATION AGREEMENT. Afghan
Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali and Iranian Ambassador to Kabul
Mohammad Reza Bahrami signed an agreement on cooperation in police
affairs on 13 September, Afghan Radio Kelid reported on 14 September.
Under the agreement, Iran will build and equip 25 border posts, train
180 Afghan police officers in Iran, and donate 125 motorcycles to the
Afghan police. (Bill Samii)
IRAN-AFGHANISTAN WATER DISCUSSIONS TAKE PLACE IN TEHRAN. Iranian and
Afghan officials met in Tehran on 8 September in what IRNA described
as their first joint meeting within the framework of the 1973 Helmand
(Hirmand) River treaty. The river flows from Afghanistan to Lake
Hamun, and its waters are then used in Iran’s Sistan va
Baluchistan Province. Availability of water has been hampered in
recent decades by Soviet tactics during the war in Afghanistan,
drought, and poor relations between the former Taliban regime and the
Iranian government. The situation has improved since 2002, but
Iranians still complain of water shortages (see “RFE/RL Iran Report,”
29 May 2000; 10 and 23 September, 4, 11, and 25 November, 9 December
2002; 6 January and 20 October 2003, and 6 September 2004). Deputy
Energy Minister Reza Ardakanaian told IRNA that they are preparing
the grounds for implementing the treaty. He said that under normal
circumstances, Iran’s annual share is 820 million cubic meters.
Ardakanian added that decisions made at the meeting will go into
effect on 22 September, when the “water year” begins. (Bill Samii)
IRANIANS, TAJIKS INK PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS. President Hojatoleslam
Mohammad Khatami and a delegation of Iranian officials arrived in
Dushanbe on 11 September on the third leg of a trip that had already
taken them to Yerevan and Minsk, international news agencies
reported. The Iranians and their Tajik hosts met with President
Khatami and his Tajik counterpart, Imamali Rahmonov, and signed seven
memorandums of understanding, including one on “bilateral cooperation
based on mutual respect and protection of both countries’
interests.” Other agreements addressed the operation of the
hydroelectric power plant at Sangtudeh, “herbal quarantine,” and the
establishment of an Iranian trade center. Yet another agreement
allowed for land in Tehran for the construction of a Tajik Embassy.
Khatami and Rahmonov flew to the Sangtudeh construction site in
southern Tajikistan on 13 September, the Avesta website reported.
According to the agreements, Iran will invest $250 million in the
project and will own 51 percent of it. (Bill Samii)
KHATAMI HOPES TAJIK VISIT WILL LEAD TO BETTER TIES. Iran was the
first country to recognize Tajikistan’s independence in the early
1990s, RFE/RL’s Antoine Blua reports. Since then, expectations
were that the two countries — which share a common language — would
develop close ties. That hasn’t happened. Iranian President
Mohammad Khatami visited Tajikistan from 11-14 September to try to
change the situation.
Khatami’s three-day trip started 11 September and
featured talks with Tajik President Imamali Rakhmonov. The two
considered a broad range of issues related to bilateral cooperation
in the fields of economy, trade, and industry. Khatami said on 12
September that Iran would do what it could to help the Tajik economy
to develop. “And be sure that our policy and our strategy is to
cooperate with Tajikistan in vast areas. We consider Tajikistan’s
[development] as [part of our own] development,” Khatami said. He
added that Iran will invest more than $700 million in the Tajik
economy in the coming five years.
Davood Hermidas Bavand, who teaches international law in
Tehran, says Khatami’s trip is part of Iran’s effort to
develop closer economic relations with Central Asia: “Iran’s
[original] expectation to develop an extremely close relationship
with Tajikistan gradually caved into insignificance — once Iran and
Turkey engaged in a kind of rivalry. [Neither country] has been able
to fulfill the expectations of Central Asia in economic terms. In
light of past experience we learned to engage in commercial and
economic terms where there is a need for the people of Tajikistan and
Central Asia as well as for Iran.”
Khatami said Iran will allocate money to finish work on
Tajikistan’s Sangtudeh hydroelectric plant on the Vakhsh River.
President Rakhmonov said the Iranian side will assume 51 percent of
the total construction cost, estimated at about $500 million.
“Fifty-one percent of the Sangtudeh hydroelectric plant is the
Islamic Republic of Iran’s. Forty-nine percent is Tajik and other
countries, including Russia. To complete the construction of this
power station in four years, Iran has promised $250 million and the
Russian Federation $100 million,” he said.
A planned highway linking landlocked Tajikistan and Iran via
northern Afghanistan was also high on the agenda of the talks.
Iran’s ambassador to Tajikistan, Nasser Sarmadi Parsa,
earlier expressed dissatisfaction about the current level of
bilateral trade, which totaled $100 million last year. He stressed
that a highway linking Tajikistan and Iran would greatly promote
economic cooperation. He noted the 110-kilometer road from Iran to
Herat has already been built.
Iran is hoping a series of road projects in Central Asia will
spur economic development.
Mohammad-Reza Djalili, a professor at the Graduate Institute
of International Studies in Geneva, points out a road link to Central
Asia would serve Iran’s strategic purposes. “Iran also has a
strategic interest. The reconstruction of communication
infrastructure — roads, bridges, etc. — in Tajikistan and linking
them to the Iranian border through Afghanistan, would create a
tremendous inter-Asiatic communication route. Land transportation
could then be done from China to Europe through Tajikistan,
Afghanistan, and Iran,” he said. (Antoine Blua of RFE/RL’s News
and Current Affairs department, Farangiz Najibullah of RFE/RL’s
Tajik Service)
IRANIAN PRESIDENT ASSESSES THREE NATION TOUR POSITIVELY. Hojatoleslam
Mohammad Khatami told reporters at Mehrabad Airport on 14 September
that his trip to Armenia, Belarus, and Tajikistan went well, IRNA
reported the next day. He referred to the signing of agreements in
all three countries but allowed that bilateral trade with Tajikistan
could be better. Khatami said, “Iran’s trade exchanges with
Tajikistan have been increased during recent years by three times but
there still exist some potentials for further promotion of ties.” The
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) summit took place in Dushanbe
on 14 September, and Khatami cited approval of Iranian proposals on
reforming the organization’s decision-making process and on
establishing a free trade zone (FTZ). Khatami said the FTZ would be
set up by 2015. The Iranian president said he met with counterparts
from Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as well as prime
ministers from Pakistan and Turkey. (Bill Samii)
IRANIAN MILITARY SITE INTERESTS IAEA. The International Atomic Energy
Agency’s (IAEA) board of governors began discussions on the
Iranian nuclear program on 13 September in Vienna, and unidentified
diplomats said on 10 September that the IAEA has asked to inspect the
military site at Parchin, located about 30 kilometers southwest of
Tehran, AFP reported. Among the activities that reportedly take place
there is research on chemical explosives by the Defense Industries
Organization. Parchin is not mentioned in an IAEA report currently
under consideration in Vienna.
Hussein Musavian, spokesman for the Iranian delegation at the
Board of Governors meeting, rejected on 13 September news reports
that the IAEA has asked to visit the Parchin military site, IRNA
reported.
David Albright of the Institute for Science and International
Security on 15 September released satellite imagery of the site and
told Reuters that UN inspectors should determine what is going on
there (for the ISIS imagery and analysis, see
). According
to the analysis, the site is “a logical candidate for a nuclear
weapons-related site, particularly one involved in researching and
developing high explosive components for an implosion-type nuclear
weapon.”
Musavian on 16 September again dismissed the allegations,
Reuters reported. “This is a new lie, like the last 13 lies based on
news reports that have been proved to be lies,” he said.
An anonymous “senior U.S. official” told Reuters on 17
September that satellite imagery of the Parchin military site
“clearly shows the intention to develop weapons.” Another senior U.S.
official was less sanguine, and according to an anonymous “Western
diplomat” cited by Reuters, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency is
unsure about the Parchin site’s possible nuclear function.
Anonymous diplomats said in the 17 September “Washington
Post” that the UN has been negotiating with Iran since June for
access to not just one but four military sites that have possible
dual-use equipment. This is considered a sensitive issue because it
affects the security of Iranian conventional military programs,
according to “The Washington Post.” The IAEA has been gathering
information on the Parchin site for almost two years.
IAEA Director-General Mohammad el-Baradei’s comments at a
17 September news conference in Vienna were more diplomatic. “We are
aware of this new site that has been referred to,” he said according
to Radio Farda. “We do not have any indication that this site has any
nuclear-related activities. However, we will continue to investigate
this and other sites, we’ll continue to have a dialogue with
Iran.” (Bill Samii)
IAEA CRITICAL OF IRANIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION. The relatively tough
wording of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 18 September
resolution on Iran has prompted an angry reaction from Tehran. Press
reports that preceded the resolution’s publication indicated that
Iranian behavior is frustrating some members of the international
community.
IAEA Director-General el-Baradei discussed implementation of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement in Iran on 13
September, the opening day of the Board of Governors meeting,
according to the agency’s website
(
n). He said understanding of the Iranian nuclear program is
increasing, Iran has fulfilled all requests for access, and it has
responded to IAEA information requests, “although in certain
instances the process needs to be accelerated.”
El-Baradei said there are two issues that need to be
resolved. The first is the source of and reason for uranium
contamination found at certain locations and on some domestically
produced equipment. Investigations of Iranian statements regarding
the absence of P2 centrifuge-related activities between 1995 and 2002
are necessary, he added. El-Baradei expressed concern about
Tehran’s reversal of its decision to suspend some
enrichment-related activities, and he urged Iran “to continue to
accelerate its cooperation, pursuing a policy of maximum transparency
and confidence building, so that we can bring the remaining
outstanding issues to resolution within the next few months and
provide assurance to the international community.”
France, Germany, and Great Britain warned Iran on 13
September that its reversal of its pledge to suspend uranium
enrichment is undermining their confidence, international news
agencies reported. Foreign Minister Jack Straw warned, “What Iran has
to understand is that it cannot turn the issue of confidence on and
off like a tap,” the “Financial Times” reported on 14 September.
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said, “There is the risk of
Tehran making a miscalculation. I hope that it sees and understands
that. If not, we could be in a serious situation,” Reuters reported
on 14 September. French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier said that
negotiations with the Iranians remain difficult almost a year after
their promise to suspend enrichment activities, Radio France
International reported on 13 September.
Hussein Musavian, spokesman for the Iranian delegation at the
current IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, stressed on 13
September that the suspension of uranium enrichment would last “just
for a short, temporary period,” Reuters reported. Iran reportedly is
growing frustrated by continuing inspections of its nuclear
facilities.
In a critique of the situation in which Iran finds itself,
Tabriz parliamentary representative Akbar Alami told ISNA on 13
September that some Iranian officials were complacent and
inordinately optimistic about Europe. Rather than dealing with
European states, Alami said, the issue should have been handled
normally, through the legislature, the Foreign Ministry, the Iranian
Atomic Energy Organization, and the IAEA. The nuclear issue is
secondary to the Europeans’ and America’s real concern, Alami
said, which is the nature and power of a state that has interests
that conflict with their own. As long as this situation prevails, he
said, they will not allow Iran to become an independent nuclear
power.
Representatives to the IAEA board of governors met behind
closed doors on 15 September in order to discuss the wording of a
resolution on the Iranian nuclear program, csmonitor.com reported.
U.S. officials reportedly seek tough language and a 31 October
deadline to “remedy all failures identified to date” by the IAEA,
according to the website, and they also want the removal of any
references to a state’s right to peacefully pursue nuclear
energy.
Iranian official Hussein Musavian described the U.S. draft
resolution by saying, “The Americans have put forward a draft, which
is, relative to the one put forward by the Europeans, extraordinarily
harsher against Iran,” Iranian state television reported. The next
day he said that the draft resolution is unacceptable, Mehr News
Agency reported on 16 September. China rejects the resolution and
amendments proposed by Russia are not included, he said, adding that
Tehran seeks major changes to the draft resolution.
The resolution adopted by the board of governors on 18
September notes “with serious concern” that Iran has not suspended
“all” activities relating to the enrichment and reprocessing of
uranium, and it also expresses concern about Iran’s plan to
introduce 37 tons of yellowcake uranium at its conversion facility
(
). Yellowcake can be converted into uranium hexafluoride, which in
turn can be enriched in centrifuges. The resolution also “strongly
urges” Iran to comply with IAEA requests for information and access
to individuals and locations, citing a date of 25 November, which is
when the next board of governors meeting takes place. The resolution
“deeply regrets” Iran’s reversal of stated intentions of
suspending enrichment and reprocessing activities.
Hojatoleslam Hassan Rohani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme
National Security Council, said on 19 September that “Today, all
ambiguities of Iran’s nuclear case have been cleared for the
agency,” IRNA reported. He criticized the three European powers for
failing to comply with commitments to help the Iranian nuclear
program. “In regard to the suspension of uranium enrichment, the
resolution has asked us to suspend this process immediately,” he
added, according to Radio Farda. “For the time being, the Islamic
Republic of Iran has not decided to prolong the suspension.” (Bill
Samii)
IS WEAPONIZATION NEAR? International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Director-General el-Baradei said on 14 September that there is no
firm evidence that Iran is trying to develop a nuclear weapons
capability, but it is not clear if its activities are entirely
peaceful, Reuters reported. “Have we seen any proof of a weapons
program? Have we seen undeclared [uranium] enrichment? Obviously
until today there is none of that,” el-Baradei said. “But are we in a
position to say that everything is peaceful? Obviously we are not at
this stage,” he added.
Iran is no “more than 12 to 48 months from acquiring a
nuclear bomb, lacks for nothing technologically or materially to
produce it, and seems dead set on securing an option to do so,”
according to a draft report from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center (NPEC) released on 13 September
().
The study — which is partly funded by the Pentagon and includes
input from leading experts on Iran, the Middle East, and
proliferation issues — warns that after Iranian acquisition of a
nuclear -weapons option regional proliferation could increase, Iran
might manipulate oil prices upward, and Iran could increase its
support for terrorist organizations.
A day earlier, Israeli Defense Forces intelligence chief
Major General Aharon Farkash-Ze’evi said that at the current rate
Iran will be able to independently achieve nuclear-weapons capability
by the spring of 2005, “Haaretz” reported on 13 September. “”This
does not mean that it will have a bomb in 2005. It means that it will
have all the means at its disposal to build a bomb,” he added. (Bill
Samii)
CORRECTION. The 13 September “RFE/RL Iran Report” asserted that
Tehran military governor Teimour Bakhtiar wielded the first pickax to
strike the dome of the Baha’i center in Tehran in May 1955. New
York University’s professor Farhad Kazemi wrote in to say that
armed forces chief Nader Batmanghelidj struck the first blow while
Bakhtiar looked on, and afterwards military governorship personnel
completed the destruction. (Bill Samii)
*********************************************************
Copyright (c) 2004. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.
The “RFE/RL Iran Report” is a weekly prepared by A. William Samii on
the basis of materials from RFE/RL broadcast services, RFE/RL
Newsline, and other news services. It is distributed every Monday.
Direct comments to A. William Samii at [email protected].
For information on reprints, see:
Back issues are online at

DARFUR: ACTION NOT WORDS
Azg/am
18 Sept 04
America’s declaration that genocide is taking place in Sudan has
injected fresh urgency – and controversy – into the international
debate about what the UN unhesitatingly calls the world’s worst
humanitarian crisis. It was only to be expected that the Khartoum
government would reject the charge, but there has also been a lukewarm
response elsewhere to Colin Powell’s statement to the Senate foreign
relations committee. The US secretary of state says genocide is
taking place on the basis of evidence that black African villagers
in Darfur are being targeted with the specific intent of destroying
“a group in whole or part”. Human rights organizations have welcomed
the shift. Britain’s official response is that grave crimes are
being committed by the government-backed Janjaweed Arab militias and
that the UN should mount an urgent investigation. Is this a case of
diplomatic sensibilities masking a brutal truth? Is it right to have
reservations about using the G word?
Situations previously characterized as genocide include the Turkish
massacre of 1.5 million Armenians during the first world war and,
less controversially, the Nazis’ extermination of six million Jews
in the second world war, when the term was coined from the Greek
word genos (race or tribe) with the Latin word cide (to kill). It
has been widely applied to Pol Pot’s Cambodia of the 1970s and made
bloody reappearances in Rwanda in 1994 and in the aftermath of the
wars of the Yugoslavian succession. Slobodan Milosevic, the former
Serbian president, is facing a genocide charge at the Hague war crimes
tribunal. Radislav Krstic, a Bosnian Serb general, was convicted of
genocide for his role in the Srebrenica massacre of 7,000 Muslim men
and boys.
Sudanese officials will admit to nothing more than a humanitarian
crisis created by ethnic strife and have contemptuously accused
Mr. Powell of seeking black votes in the forthcoming US presidential
election. Khartoum also argues that the intervention will undermine
delicate peace negotiations with Darfur rebel groups in Nigeria. Most
of the facts, though, are indisputable: 50,000 people have died since
February 2003 and over a million have been displaced. Aid workers
yesterday reported a new mass influx of refugees into one camp in
southern Darfur. Harrowing images have been on our TV screens for
long enough to fuel demands for something that goes beyond agonized
handwringing and ineffective quiet diplomacy
It is true that behind the debate in the US lies guilt about
the shameful failure to act when the first reports of genocide
emerged from Rwanda a decade ago. That is only natural. The genocide
characterization may also be intended to galvanise the international
community-though targeted sanctions such as an assets freeze and a
travel ban on senior Sudanese officials would be more effective than
the oil embargo currently being proposed by Washington. That is opposed
by China, an importer of Sudanese oil and a security council member,
as well as by Pakistan and Algeria. And there is the familiar dilemma
that such sanctions are a notoriously blunt instrument, as the Iraqi
experience taught. But urgent though the crisis is, Washington and
London are still not trying the sort of heavy-duty arm-twisting they
tried when seeking a second UN resolution authorizing war on Saddam.
Mr. Powell’s intervention puts the US a step ahead of the EU, which
says it wants a UN investigation. But the real question is not about
a dictionary definition of genocide. No one can claim that Sudan
is not experiencing a terrible human tragedy. As Oxfam has been
warning in appeals for help to save lives: time is short and people
are dying. Recognizing the scale of human suffering is a prerequisite
to action. Words, however resonant, are not enough.
The Guardian/UK, 11 Sept. 2004

Travel Column: Armenia’s Lesson in Street Life
Travel Watch
National Geographic Traveler Magazine
September 17, 2004
By Jonathan B. Tourtellot
A small experiment in Gyumri, Armenia has shown how easy it is to
turn an urban dead zone into an appealing, living place. Gyumri boasts
two Soviet-era monumental, lifeless city squares. You know the type:
asphalt deserts walled by concrete office facades, beloved by urban
planners and hated by travelers on foot. In a remote corner of one
square, a Gyumri company recently installed just three things: a park
bench, a street lamp, and a seesaw.
According to the New York-based Project for Public Spaces, magic
resulted. Kids flocked to the seesaw, parents in tow. Parents began
to chat with each other. Soon street vendors set up stands next to the
bench, drawing more people. Three tiny seeds had bloomed into a garden
of street life. Any visitor entering that square would automatically
gravitate toward the lively corner.
Modern cities abound in dead zones; some are even handsome. But it’s
people that make a town worth visiting. Nothing makes a town or city
more appealing for tourists than lively, pedestrian-friendly streets
and squares.
It’s a lesson Europe seems to be learning, as city after city there has
created car-free zones. In the ultra-motorized U.S.–despite success
stories like San Antonio’s riverwalk–cities have been slower to
embrace the idea of streets that are more populated by people than
by traffic. Yet all you need to do is set aside a few blocks and
provide ways for people to do what people like to do–eat, drink,
talk, play. Tourists show up. Businesses thrive.
As the Gyumri experiment shows, it doesn’t take much to turn a square
with nothing into a square with something. Bring on the seesaws.
Photo Caption: Men sit on a bench in Dilizhan, Armenia. In another
town, just such a streetscape is sprouting in a once barren plaza
(Photograph by George F. Mobley, copyright National Geographic
Society).
TravelWatch is produced by the geotourism editor for National
Geographic Traveler magazine, Jonathan B. Tourtellot. TravelWatch
focuses on sustainable tourism and destination stewardship. Look for
TravelWatch every other Friday.

German co. to pump $20-$25 mln into Armenian metals plant
Interfax
Sept 16 2004
Yerevan. (Interfax) – Germany’s Cronimet intends to invest $20
million-$25 million in the Pure Iron works in Yerevan, which processes
molybdenum concentrate.
The money should reach the plant in 2005-2006, in accordance with
an investment program, Genrik Karapetian, the plant’s director,
told Interfax.
Most of the money will be spent making the plant more environmentally
friendly, introducing new technology and putting new products on line,
Karapetian said.
The Pure Iron works currently produces pure molybdenum but eventually
plans to make metal plates and special alloys, he said.

Glendale News Press
LATimes.com
Sept 14 2004
Sending out smoke signals
County officials warn of secondhand smoke dangers, focusing on
Armenian community.
By Jackson Bell, News-Press
DOWNTOWN GLENDALE – Since Armenian immigrants are believed to use
tobacco products “well above” the county’s average of 15.6%, community
leaders and officials are promoting a campaign to extinguish smoking.
Before a small gathering Tuesday morning at Brand Boulevard and Harvard
Street, Linda Aragon of the Los Angeles County Department of Health
Services introduced the first initiative to educate the community on
the dangers of secondhand smoke.
“Although we don’t yet have specifics, we know anecdotally that the
Armenian community’s tobacco use is well above the county average,”
said Aragon, who is acting director of the department’s Tobacco Control
and Prevention branch. “What we’re trying to do is make people aware
that smoking is an issue … and it’s a lot of work because there is
still denial that secondhand smoke kills.”
Aragon said secondhand smoking is the third-leading cause of
preventable death in the United States. She added that for every eight
people who die from smoking, they take one secondhand smoker with them.
The city’s six-month, nearly $200,000 campaign is part of a larger
$1.1-million effort throughout the county to curb smoking among such
minority groups as blacks, Koreans and Latinos. It also targets the
lesbian and gay community.
“The U.S. has had a big head start in educating against smoking and
secondhand smoking,” said Greg Krikorian, whose Krikorian Marketing
Group is helping to run the health department campaign. “In foreign
countries, [tobacco education] is not a common practice.”
Krikorian, who serves as president of the Glendale Unified School
Board, added that smoking is such a tradition in the Armenian community
that cigarettes are commonly offered as hors d’oeuvres when welcoming
guests to homes.
The campaign, which began in May, features billboards throughout
the city along with print and television ads. One of the billboards
on Brand Boulevard – which was about 200 feet south of the news
conference – asks, “Who is your secondhand smoking harming?” in
Armenian and depicts a family frowning at a father who is smoking.
Also showing their support at the event were Glendale Adventist
Medical Center’s chief executive officer Scott Reiner and Los Angeles
County Supervisor Michael D. Antonovich. American Cancer Society
representatives passed out pamphlets about the ill effects of smoking.
“Secondhand smoke impacts children’s respiratory systems and their
overall health,” Antonovich said. “It’s an effort to make the public
more cognizant of the dangers of secondhand smoke.”
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

LONDON TO HOST ARMENIAN ART EXHIBITION
ArmenPress
Sept 14 2004
YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 14, ARMENPRESS: The British capital will host an
exhibition of Armenian artifacts, dating back to 12-18th centuries-
manuscripts, books, icons and other artifacts. It will open on
September 23 and will run until October 15. The opening ceremony is
timed with Armenia’s Independence Day. Armenian ambassador to Great
Britain, Vahe Gabrielian, will attend the opening ceremony.

Armenian Assembly of America
122 C Street, NW, Suite 350
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: 202-393-3434
Fax: 202-638-4904
Email: [email protected]
Web:
 
PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
September 13, 2004
CONTACT: Christine Kojoian
E-mail: [email protected]
NATO CANCELS KEY MILITARY EXERCISES IN AZERBAIJAN
SAYS BAKU VIOLATED “PRINCIPLE OF INCLUSIVENESS”
Washington, DC – The Armenian Assembly of America commended NATO for its
decision to cancel military exercises set to begin in Azerbaijan today after
Baku’s repeated attempts to bar Armenia’s participation. Armenia was among
several dozen countries due to take part in the annual exercises, but Azeri
officials were clear to point out that they did not want Armenians on their
territory.
U.S. General James Jones, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, expressed
regret over the country’s refusal to grant entrance visas to five Armenian
officers to take part in the military exercises dubbed “Cooperative Best
Effort (CBE) 2004.”
In a statement released today, NATO said in part: “All PfP [Partnership for
Peace] exercises are agreed and conducted on the principle of inclusiveness
for all Allies and Partners which wish to participate. Nations participating
in Cooperative Best Effort 2004 agreed and have supported the exercise based
on this principle. We regret that the principle of inclusiveness could not
be upheld in this case, leading to the cancellation of the exercise.”
“We applaud NATO for its principled stance and refusal to succumb to
Azerbaijan’s pressure to bar Armenia, an active participant of the PfP
program, from these exercises,” said Assembly Board of Directors Chairman
Anthony Barsamian.
“Azerbaijan’s refusal to honor international commitments is part of an
escalating pattern throughout 2004 of its hostility towards all things
Armenian,” continued Barsamian. “By not properly condemning the murder of
an Armenian officer at a NATO event earlier this year, by constantly
threatening Armenia and NKR with another military offensive and by not
denouncing the remarks of its Defense Ministry spokesperson predicting
Armenia’s conquest by Azerbaijan within 25 years, Azerbaijan’s senior
leadership have shown their true colors to the international community.”
Armenia, as part of its commitment to international security in the
Caucasus, invited both Azerbaijan and Turkey to participate in the NATO
exercises held in Yerevan last year. Although Turkish troops attended,
their Azeri counterparts refused. NATO’s debut in Yerevan was noteworthy in
that two conflicting countries united to participate in the games.
The Armenian Assembly of America is the largest Washington-based nationwide
organization promoting public understanding and awareness of Armenian
issues. It is a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt membership organization.
NR#2004-081

Bulgarian Top Journalists Parties at 60
Sofia news—Novinite.com
11 September 2004, Saturday.
Bulgarian top journalist Kevork Kevorkyan invited friends and
associates to a dinner Saturday, to mark his 60th birthday.
Armenian-born Kevorkyan has been working in the state Bulgarian
National Television for 30 years, 25 being dedicated to the legendary
Every Sunday program. The show itself recently celebrated an
anniversary of 25 years on screen.
The professional ideology of Every Sunday is to present “the world
as it is” and to be “the territory of free speech”. The “guru” of the
TV broadcast, Kevork Kevorkyan, tops all sociological researches for
journalistic popularity and public influence.

FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway
The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one’s belief or religion
The right to join together and express one’s belief
=================================================
7 September 2004
BELARUS: WAS BAPTIST FINE AN “EXCEPTION”?
ticle_id=405
Although unregistered religious communities still face intermittent fines
for religious activities, Protestants in Belarus have told Forum 18 News
Service that a fine imposed in January on Baptist Union member Yuri
Denishchik for holding a religious meeting in a private home was an
“exception”. They say that ahead of October’s parliamentary elections, the
authorities are not currently interfering in services, open-air
evangelistic meetings and youth camps held by registered Protestant
communities. “There are a lot of active Protestants in Belarus and
President Lukashenko can’t afford to alienate them right now,” one source
told Forum 18. He assumed there to be “some kind of instruction not to
touch Protestants at the moment”. But senior Baptist pastor Gennadi Brutsky
told Forum 18 that problems persist, though so far they have been solved
through compromises.
9 September 2004
EASTERN EUROPE: OSCE CONFERENCE ON DISCRIMINATION – A REGIONAL SURVEY
Ahead of the OSCE Conference on Tolerance and the Fight against Racism,
Xenophobia and Discrimination on 13-14 September 2004 in Brussels, Forum 18
News Service surveys some of the more serious
discriminatory actions against religious believers that persist in some
countries of the 55-member OSCE. Despite their binding OSCE commitments to
religious freedom, in some OSCE member states believers are still fined,
imprisoned for the peaceful exercise of their faith, religious services are
broken up, places of worship confiscated and even destroyed, religious
literature censored and religious communities denied registration. Forum 18
believes most of the serious problems affecting religious believers in the
eastern half of the OSCE region come from government discrimination.
* See full article below. *
10 September 2004
TURKMENISTAN: BAPTISTS RAIDED AND JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES REJECT PRESIDENTIAL
PORTRAITS
In the third known set of raids on religious communities in August, police
interrogated and threatened members of a Baptist church in the western town
of Balkanabad, warning Nikolai Matsenko that any further unregistered
services in his home will lead to fines. Meanwhile a Jehovah’s Witness
elder told Forum 18 News Service from the capital Ashgabad that if his
faith gets registration, it will reject official demands made of other
faiths to hang the country’s flag and a portrait of the president where it
worships. “These are unacceptable demands,” he declared. Forum 18 has been
unable to get confirmation of a 5 September report that President
Saparmurat Niyazov ordered the registration procedure for religious
organisations to be tightened up once more.
9 September 2004
XINJIANG: SECURITY SERVICE INVESTIGATION FOLLOWED ORTHODOX PRIEST’S
DEPORTATION
Kazakhstan-based Russian Orthodox priest Fr Viarion Ivanov had visited
China’s north-western Xinjiang region to serve the local Orthodox who have
no priests, but in December 2003 was detained by Chinese customs, was
interrogated for a week, had his religious literature confiscated and was
deported. “They questioned me for five hours a day. The special services
representatives proved to be amazingly well-informed,” Fr Ivanov told Forum
18 News Service. Local Orthodox told Forum 18 in Xinjiang in early
September that virtually all the Orthodox believers in the city of Ghulja
were questioned by the security services about Fr Ivanov’s activity. In
Ghulja the Orthodox can at least meet for prayers in church without a
priest, but in another Xinjiang town, Tacheng, local Russian Orthodox have
had no success so far in applying to rebuild their church.
9 September 2004
EASTERN EUROPE: OSCE CONFERENCE ON DISCRIMINATION – A REGIONAL SURVEY
By Felix Corley, Editor, Forum 18 News Service
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which has
as members all the states of Europe, Central Asia and North America, works
not by coercion but by consensus and persuasion. Membership is not
compulsory: states have the free choice whether to accept the binding OSCE
commitments by joining or not. The commitment of all OSCE states to respect
freedom of religion is clear. The 1990 OSCE human dimension conference
declared “everyone will have the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion. This right includes freedom to change one’s religion or
belief and freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief, either alone or in
community with others, in public or in private, through worship, teaching,
practice and observance. The exercise of these rights may be subject only
to such restrictions as are prescribed by law and are consistent with
international standards.” Yet government discrimination against religious
believers remains disturbingly pervasive.
As delegates assemble in Brussels for the OSCE Conference on Tolerance and
the Fight against Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination on 13-14 September
2004, many ask how violators of these fundamental OSCE commitments –
especially Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Armenia – can
be allowed to continue as members of an organisation whose fundamental
principles they blatantly flout. OSCE officials argue off the record that
it is better to keep violators in, with the hope that they can be persuaded
to mend their ways, rather than expel them, abandoning local people to the
clutches of their governments. The result is that persecuted believers
Forum 18 News Service has spoken to in a number of states
now have little faith in what the OSCE can and will do for them to protect
their right to religious freedom.
The OSCE has reaffirmed that discrimination against religious believers is
as unacceptable as discrimination against ethnic or other social groups or
individuals. Meeting in the Dutch city of Maastricht in 2003, the OSCE
Ministerial Council stressed in its Decision No. 4 on Tolerance and
Non-Discrimination that it “[a]ffirms the importance of freedom of thought,
conscience, religion or belief, and condemns all discrimination and
violence, including against any religious group or individual believer” and
“[c]ommits to ensure and facilitate the freedom of the individual to
profess and practice a religion or belief, alone or in community with
others, where necessary through transparent and non-discriminatory laws,
regulations, practices and policies”. The ministerial council also
emphasised what it believed is the importance of a “continued and
strengthened interfaith and intercultural dialogue to promote greater
tolerance, respect and mutual understanding”.
While many governments would prefer this conference to concentrate on
tackling social discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, in
much of the region it is important to stress that the most serious
discrimination against religious believers, at least, comes from
governments. In many states discrimination is enshrined in law and in
official practice (from national to local level). Believers will only be
free of such discrimination if such discriminatory laws are abolished or
amended, and if other laws and international commitments guaranteeing
religious freedom are put into practice.
Social discrimination against religious minorities does exist – especially
among Orthodox in Georgia, among Muslims in Central Asia, and among ethnic
Albanians (whether Muslim or Catholic) in Kosovo – but only in exceptional
circumstances has this led to persistent denial of believers’ rights.
Governments have a duty to promote tolerance and harmony in society, but
many could start with improving their own behaviour.
It is also important to remember that criticising the beliefs of another
faith does not constitute a crime: only violence or incitement to violence
is. A key element of religious freedom is the right peacefully to expound
and promote the beliefs of one’s faith and to set out how they might differ
from those of other faiths.
In the run-up to the July 2003 OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting
on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Forum 18 News Service
surveyed some, but not all, of the continuing abuses of religious freedom
in the eastern half of the OSCE region (see F18News 9 July 2003
). Discrimination against
believers also occurs in other OSCE countries (such as the About-Picard law
in France, restrictions on newer religious communities in Belgium and
discrimination against minority faiths in Turkey). It is disturbing that
one year on, almost all the abuses Forum 18 noted in 2003 have continued
unchecked.
RELIGIOUS WORSHIP: An alarming number of states raid religious meetings to
close down services and punish those who take part. Turkmenistan is the
worst offender: all unregistered religious activity is illegal and no
non-Muslim and non-Russian Orthodox religious communities – even the few
registered minority communities – are able to hold public worship freely.
Uzbekistan and Belarus specifically ban unregistered religious services. In
Belarus, numerous Protestant congregations – some numbering more than a
thousand members – cannot meet because they cannot get a registered place
to worship. Officials in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan also raid
places where worship is being conducted. In Macedonia, members of the
Serbian Orthodox Church have difficulty holding public worship and leaders
have been prosecuted. In Russia and some other states, minority faiths are
often denied permission to rent publicly-owned buildings available to other
groups.
PLACES OF WORSHIP: Opening a place of worship is impossible in some states.
In Turkmenistan non-Muslim and non-Russian Orthodox communities cannot in
practice open a place of worship, while those that existed before the
mid-1990s were confiscated or bulldozed. Uzbekistan has closed down
thousands of mosques since 1996 and often denies Christian groups’ requests
to open churches. Azerbaijan also obstructs the opening of Christian
churches and tries to close down some of those already open, while in 2004
it seized a mosque in Baku from its community and tried to prevent the
community meeting elsewhere. Belarus makes it almost impossible for
religious communities without their own building already – or substantial
funds to rent one – to find a legal place to worship. An Autocephalous
Orthodox church (which attracted the anger of the government and the
Russian Orthodox Church) was bulldozed in 2002. In Slovenia, which
represents the incoming OSCE Chair-in-Office, the Ljubljana authorities
have long obstructed the building of a mosque. In Bulgaria, the current
Chair-in-Office, in July 2004 the police stormed more than 200 churches
used by the Alternative Synod since a split in the Orthodox Church a decade
ago, ousting the occupants and handing the churches over to the rival
Orthodox Patriarchate without any court rulings.
REGISTRATION: Where registration is compulsory before any religious
activity can start (Turkmenistan, Belarus and Uzbekistan) or where
officials claim that it is (Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan), life is made
difficult for communities that either choose not to register (such as one
network of Baptist communities in the former Soviet republics) or are
denied registration (the majority of religious communities in Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan). Registration in Turkmenistan is all but impossible,
despite the reduction in 2004 from 500 to 5 in the number of adult citizens
required to found a community. In countries such as Azerbaijan or
Uzbekistan, registration for disfavoured communities is often made
impossible – officials in the sanitary/epidemiological service are among
those with the power of veto in Uzbekistan. Belarus, Slovenia, Slovakia,
Macedonia, Russia and Latvia are also among states which to widely varying
degrees make registration of some groups impossible or very difficult.
Moscow has refused to register the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the city, despite
their national registration. Some countries – including the Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Austria, with plans for similar moves in Serbia – grant full
status as religious communities to favoured religious communities only.
Faiths with smaller membership or which the government does not like have
to make do with lesser status and fewer rights.
RELIGIOUS LITERATURE: Belarus and Azerbaijan require compulsory prior
censorship of all religious literature produced or imported into the
country. Azerbaijani customs routinely confiscate religious literature,
releasing it only when the State Committee for Work with Religious
Organisations grants explicit written approval for each title and the
number of copies authorised. Forbidden books are sent back or destroyed
(thousands of Hare Krishna books held by customs for seven years have been
destroyed). Even countries without formal religious censorship – eg.
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan – routinely confiscate imported religious
literature or literature found during raids on homes. Uzbekistan routinely
bars access to websites it dislikes, such as foreign Muslim sites.
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: Believers from minority religious communities in
institutions such as prisons, hospitals or the army may face difficulties
obtaining and keeping religious literature, praying in private and
receiving visits from spiritual leaders and fellow-believers. In
Uzbekistan, even Muslim prisoners have been punished for praying and
fasting during Ramadan. Death-row prisoners wanting visits from Muslim
imams and Russian Orthodox priests have had requests denied, even for final
confession before execution.
DISCRIMINATION: Turkmenistan has dismissed from state jobs hundreds of
active Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses and members of other religious
minorities. Turkmen and Azeri officials try to persuade people to abandon
their faith and “return” to their ancestral faith (Islam). Although the
order has now reportedly been rescinded, Armenia ordered local police
chiefs to persuade police officers who were members of faiths other than
the Armenian Apostolic Church to abandon their faith. If persuasion failed,
such employees were to be sacked. Belarus has subjected leaders of
independent Orthodox Churches and Hindus to pressure – including fines,
threats and inducements – to abandon their faith or emigrate. Officials in
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus repeatedly attack disfavoured religious
minorities in the media, insulting their beliefs, accusing them falsely of
illegal or “destructive” activities, as well as inciting popular hostility
to them.
RELIGIOUS SCHOOL CLASSES: Some states have allowed the dominant faith to
determine the content of compulsory religious education classes and
textbooks in state-run schools. In Belarus, minority faiths complain their
beliefs are inaccurately and insultingly presented. In Georgia, classes
often became denominational Orthodox instruction, with teachers taking
children to pray in the local Orthodox church.
GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE: Many governments meddle in the internal affairs of
religious communities. Central Asian governments insist on choosing
national and local Muslim leaders. Turkmenistan ousted successive chief
muftis in January 2003 and August 2004. Tajikistan has conducted
“attestation tests” of imams, ousting those who failed. Islamic schools are
tightly controlled (in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, schools have either
been closed or access to them restricted). Turkmenistan obstructs those
seeking religious education abroad. Some countries with large Orthodox
communities (but not Russia or Ukraine), try to bolster the largest
Orthodox Church and obstruct rival jurisdictions (Belarus, Bulgaria,
Macedonia, Georgia, Moldova). Russia has prevented communities from
choosing their leadership, expelling a Catholic bishop and several priests,
and dozens of Protestant and other leaders, while the secret police tried
to influence the choice of a new Old Believer leader in February 2004.
PROTECTION FROM VIOLENCE: Law enforcement agencies fail to give religious
minorities the same protection as major groups. Between 1999 and 2003,
Georgia suffered a wave of violence by self-appointed Orthodox vigilantes,
with over 100 attacks on True Orthodox, Catholics, Baptists, Pentecostals
and Jehovah’s Witnesses in which believers were physically attacked, places
of worship blockaded and religious events disrupted. The authorities – who
know the attackers’ identity – have punished only a handful of people with
suspended sentences. In some cases, police cooperated with attacks or
failed to investigate them. In Kosovo the Nato-led peacekeeping force and
United Nations police have repeatedly failed to protect Serbian Orthodox
churches in use and graveyards, especially during the upsurge in anti-Serb
violence in March 2004, when some 30 Orthodox sites were destroyed or
heavily damaged. Few attackers have been arrested or prosecuted.
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MIGRANTS: Many religion laws restrict the rights of
legal residents who are not citizens, requiring founders and leaders of
religious organisations to be citizens. Azerbaijan provides for deportation
of foreigners and those without citizenship who have conducted “religious
propaganda”. In the past decade, Turkmenistan has deported hundreds of
legally-resident foreigners known to have taken part in religious activity,
especially Muslims and Protestants. Some states (including Russia and
Belarus) have denied visas to foreign religious leaders chosen by local
religious communities.
LACK OF TRANSPARENCY: Major laws and decrees affecting religious life are
drawn up without public knowledge or discussion. Examples are the
restrictive laws on religion of Belarus and Bulgaria in 2002, and planned
new laws in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. International organisations,
such as the OSCE or the Council of Europe may be consulted but governments
often refuse to allow their comments to be published or ignore them. Many
countries retain openly partisan and secretive government religious affairs
offices. Between 1999 and 2003, Slovenia’s religious affairs office refused
to register any new religious communities. Azerbaijan’s has stated which
communities it will refuse to register and what changes other communities
will have to make to their statutes and activities to gain registration.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORTING: Those reporting on religious freedom such as
Forum 18 News Service and groups campaigning on the issue
face lack of cooperation, obstruction and harassment. Those suspected of
passing on news of violations have been threatened in Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, with the aim of forcing silence. In a region
without much government transparency or a genuinely free media, officials
involved in harassing religious communities often refuse to explain to
journalists what they have done and why. Local religious freedom
campaigning groups are denied registration or kept waiting. Demonstrators
protesting in Belarus against the restrictive 2002 religion law were fined.
In September 2004, the Belarus bureau of the Union of Councils for Jews in
the Former Soviet Union, which included monitoring religious persecution in
its work, was denied registration. Government reports on religious freedom
issues to bodies such as the OSCE or Council of Europe are often
confidential and closed to public scrutiny.
CONCLUSION: Many of these discriminatory restrictions predate the 11
September 2001 terrorist attacks – and 1999 Islamic-inspired incursions
into Central Asia – so governments cannot validly argue that such
restrictions are necessary to ensure public security. The comprehensive
nature of many of these measures shows the hostility of some OSCE member
states to the right to exercise the faith of one’s choice freely, something
described by the European Court of Human Rights in 1993 as “one of the
foundations of a democratic society”.
(END)
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F18News
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KLO Protests in Sheki
Baku Today, Azerbaijan
Sept 9 2004
09/09/2004 23:44
Members of the Karabagh Liberation Organization’s (KLO) branch
in Shaki, a city in the West of Azerbaijan have held a picket in
protest against the planned participation of Armenian officers in
NATO exercises to be held in Baku in September.
AssA-Irada — The KLO deputy chairman Shamil Mehdi told AssA-Irada
that during the picket arranged close the city’s Cemetery of Martyrs
the protesters showed placards “Shame on those who invite Armenians
to Azerbaijan!”, “Freedom to Garabagh!” and “Release KLO members!”.
A statement condemning Armenian officers’ planned visit to Azerbaijan
was issued at the end of the protest action.