The Jamestown Foundation
Tuesday, January 4, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 2
EURASIAN DAILY MONITOR
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Moscow scuttles OSCE border patrols in Georgia
*Georgian president reviews accomplishments of 2004
*New equipment won’t alleviate shortcomings of Russian air force
*”Year of Russia in Kazakhstan” ends with little fanfare
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AXING THE BMO, RUSSIA MENACES GEORGIA
Using its veto power in the OSCE, Russia has carried out its threat to
terminate the mandate of the organization’s Georgia Border Monitoring
Operation (BMO) as of December 31. This unarmed international mission,
patrolling the Georgia-Russia border on Georgian territory, has played
a key role in shielding Georgia against Russian threats to pursue
alleged “Chechen and international terrorists” into Georgian
territory, e.g. in Pankisi. Russia cast its veto on December 30 in
Vienna, at the OSCE Permanent Council’s last session of 2004 (RFE/RL,
December 30; Itar-Tass, December 31).
Moscow has long tried to build a case for military intervention in
Georgia, or at least for Russian deployment on the Georgian side of
the border, through those accusations. The BMO’s internal reports to
the OSCE helped to disprove the accusations; moreover, the monitors
reported on some of the Russian air raids over Georgian territory,
despite Russian denials. Consequently, Moscow wants to eliminate the
BMO and to exclude any international presence, so that Georgia would
be left to face Russia one-on-one.
Without an international presence, Russia would be emboldened to: a)
try to impose its own presence on the Georgian side of the border; b)
exert political and psychological pressure on the Georgian government,
so as to extract concessions on other issues, under the threat of
“anti-terrorist” action inside Georgia; c) divert attention from the
issue of Russian troops and bases in Georgia, as Moscow has already
done with some success by forcing the now-phony issue of “terrorists
in Pankisi” to the top of the agenda with Tbilisi and Washington.
Contrary to some ongoing speculation, Russia’s move to terminate the
BMO has nothing to do with Kremlin frustrations over its recent defeat
in Ukraine and a presumed quest for compensatory satisfaction on the
Georgia front. Russia had threatened to veto an extension of the BMO
throughout 2004. Analysts who interpret Russia’s move as an
understandable reaction to the Orange Revolution and recommend
demonstrating “goodwill” by giving in to Moscow on the Georgia border
monitoring issue miss this key point.
Moscow now proposes forming a purely bilateral Russian-Georgian
“border police” force, albeit with Western financing, in place of the
BMO. Inasmuch as the BMO operated by definition on Georgian territory,
the Russian-proposed substitute could be used for deploying Russians
on the Georgian side of the border.
For public consumption, Russia argued throughout the year that the BMO
has been “ineffective,” as well as too costly to the OSCE budget, and
must therefore cease. In reality, the BMO proved highly effective, and
its cost was borne by Western countries. Shortly before the OSCE’s
year-end conference, Moscow changed its argument. It now claims that
the BMO has fulfilled its tasks, managed to improve the situation on
the border, and is therefore no longer needed. In the latest twist to
its case, Moscow now contends that Russian and Georgian border guards
and intelligence services cooperate well with one another, and can
henceforth protect the common border on a bilateral basis, without an
international presence (Foreign Affairs Ministry statements,
Itar-Tass, December 30, 31; January 1).
Both sets of assertions contradict Moscow’s own propagandistic
accusations that Georgia tolerates “Chechen terrorists” crisscrossing
that border. Those accusations will probably continue as a means of
pressuring Georgia into accepting a Russian-Georgian operation,
instead of the BMO or some other international operation.
Moscow has repeatedly presented its key argument that it cannot
tolerate any international presence, even this unarmed one, near
Russia’s borders. This contention seems to impress the French and
German governments, whose position is now bringing confusion to the
European Union’s collective position on this and other issues.
Border security is one of the key dimensions to the EU’s evolving
security and neighborhood policies. Consequently, Georgia asked the EU
to undertake a border monitoring operation in Georgia, should Russia
kill the BMO. The consent of Georgia would be sufficient, and that of
Russia is not required for this. The U.S. State Department supports
the idea. The EU seemed to give it favorable consideration and held a
pre-Christmas meeting in Brussels to send a signal of intent to
Russia. However, the Franco-German position thwarted that signal and
emboldened Moscow. The issue remains under consideration in Brussels.
The OSCE’s outgoing Bulgarian and incoming Slovenian chairmanships
informally suggested a compromise with Russia, whereby the BMO’s
mandate would be extended for six months only, and its personnel and
funding deeply cut. The idea was designed to “save” not the BMO, but
the OSCE institutionally and politically through “consensus” with
Russia at the expense of Georgia, international security, and legal
principle. The BMO’s survival in a reduced form would have diminished
its effectiveness and credibility, robbing Georgia and its Western
friends of a crucial counter-argument to Moscow’s propaganda about
“Chechen terrorists” using Georgian territory. Moscow might then have
been justified in arguing that the BMO had become
ineffective. Moreover, Russia would almost certainly have reopened the
issue as a bargaining card at the six-month interval.
In Russia’s view, the BMO is obligated to stop its patrolling and
reporting as of January 1, 2005, start packing immediately, and phase
itself out within a few months. Meanwhile, Moscow seems to be hinting
that it might accept some compromise in return for Western concessions
on several of the following Russian demands: a) creating a common
OSCE-“CIS” [in fact, Russian-Belarusian-Central Asian] system of
monitoring and evaluating elections and setting up a joint working
group for that purpose; b) holding a high-level seminar on military
doctrines; and c) calling an international conference on energy
supplies and security. The United States and other Western countries,
unwilling to turn NATO and EU functions over to the OSCE, let alone to
abdicate from democratic standards, have until now resisted those
Russian initiatives in varying degrees.
Meanwhile, Russia continues to block the adoption of the OSCE’s 2005
budget, underscoring the OSCE’s vulnerability to Russian
blackmail. The organization maximizes its vulnerability by maintaining
secrecy, hoping at each step for backstage compromises with Russia,
thus encouraging the latter’s use of “salami tactics.” The OSCE would
be better placed to resist the blackmail by exposing it publicly. The
BMO was this organization’s one and only successful undertaking in the
security sphere. Without the BMO, or with an emasculated version of
it, the OSCE’s credibility as a security actor — already compromised
over Trans-Dniester, South Ossetia, Karabakh, the CFE Treaty, and
Istanbul Commitments — would descend to nil.
On the positive side, however, the BMO’s and indeed the OSCE’s demise
as a security actor can at last open the way for direct Western
involvement — in this case, a border monitoring mission in Georgia
under EU aegis. The United States can keep a low profile and
contribute a portion of the funding for such a mission. Russian
personnel can be invited to participate, as they did in the BMO. The
time for action is short: a substitute operation must be in place
before the ice and snow start melting in the high-altitude passes in
April. Given the EU’s characteristically slow decision-making process,
the United States could help jump-start a political initiative in
Brussels for a EU-sponsored border monitoring operation in Georgia.
At stake is not only Georgia’s security and sovereignty. The larger
issue is Russia’s behavior toward neighboring countries
generally. Giving in to Russia over a genuinely democratic,
pro-American, EU-aspirant country, and accepting a Russian veto over
its neighbor’s border security arrangements, would embolden Moscow
into pressuring other countries as well.
–Vladimir Socor
SAAKASHVILI RINGS IN NEW YEAR WITH YUSHCHENKO
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili delivered his New Year’s
address to Georgia from the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, where he had
flown to congratulate Viktor Yushchenko on his victory in the
presidential elections. This step emphasizes the importance
Saakashvili gives to warm relations with a Yushchenko-governed
Ukraine.
Before his departure for Kyiv, Saakashvili convened a news conference
on December 29 to evaluate his government’s performance for 2004. He
called the year “the most successful in independent Georgia’s
history.”
As expected, Saakashvili named the restoration of control over the
Ajarian Autonomous Republic as the year’s most important
achievement. The president also enthusiastically spoke about increased
budgetary revenues and expenditures, adoption of a more liberal tax
code, the new tax law, and the program for financial amnesty.
Saakashvili declared that continued efforts to restore Georgia’s
territorial integrity would top his agenda for 2005. He said that
Georgia soon would submit new peace initiatives to settle the frozen
conflicts with the other breakaway regions: Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Two weeks earlier, Saakashvili had instructed leading
Georgian NGOs and think tanks to elaborate a new plan for resolving
the conflicts.
During his press conference, Saakashvili admitted that his initial
promises to resolve the country’s basic problems, including
territorial integrity, have become unrealistic, at least in the short
term. “Things cannot be settled so quickly, within five months. I
also thought so, but it is impossible,” he said. Saakashvili further
declared that under his governance Georgia has become a stronger
state.
Saakashvili is known to loath criticism and told reporters that he
“would not like to focus” on failures. He also slammed opposition
forces for criticizing him and his government for economic and
political underperformance.
Meanwhile the opposition, represented by political parties in and out
of parliament and several NGOs, has prepared a long list of mistakes
made by Saakashvili and his team during the past year. Shalva
Natelashvili, leader of the Labor Party, raised the issue of
Saakashvili’s mixed record during his three-week trip to the United
States in December. Reports that the U.S. Department of State invited
one of Saakashvili’s staunchest opponents to visit the United States
— simultaneously with Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania’s U.S. trip —
were evidently unpalatable to the ruling party.
The Georgian opposition charges that the constitutional amendments
made shortly after the Rose Revolution have completely destroyed the
notion of separation of powers. This assertion contains a grain of
truth. Georgia essentially has a one-party system and a “pocket”
parliament dominated by the ruling party majority. During the last
2004 plenary session, parliament passed more than hundred bills,
including tax and financial amnesty without proper scrutiny or outside
comment. The opposition also claims that the current Electoral Code
makes fair elections impossible. Several NGOs are ringing alarming
bells about declining media freedom and judicial independence, illegal
arrests, state extortion of private firms, and the reappearance of
political prisoners.
Saakashvili is also criticized for flip-flopping on Abkhazia and South
Ossetia and particularly for the failed military campaign against
South Ossetia last August, which the government still tries to hush
up. Moreover, the “power ministers” responsible for that failure
remain in the government.
Saakashvili’s personnel policy, namely rotating the same faces among
different posts, has disappointed even his followers. Despite the
government’s bombastic rhetoric, scandals still undermine the Georgian
army. On December 20, 70 soldiers based in Mukhrovani (eastern
Georgia) abandoned their barracks, which they said were unfit for
human habitation.
The recent reshuffle of the cabinet, conflict in the Tbilisi
government, parliamentary chairwoman Nino Burjanadze’s refusal to join
the ruling party, conflicts in regional branches, and division within
the ruling party’s parliamentary faction do not bode well for future
party unity. Even Saakashvili’s supporters have publicly noted
setbacks in conflict settlement, freedom of speech, local democracy,
and governance.
The government is trying to win the hearts and minds of the population
through a variety of popular measures. The government announces it
will raise pensions but remains tight-lipped about the lari’s
decreasing purchasing power and the significant increase in the cost
of living.
The coming year appears to be critical for Saakashvili and his team
because the people’s euphoria from the Rose Revolution has run its
course. Now the government will be judged by its deeds. According to a
nationwide poll commissioned by the GORBI sociological agency on the
anniversary of the Rose Revolution, the number of citizens who believe
that Georgia is heading in the wrong direction has doubled over the
last year.
(Akhali Taoba, December 29; 7 Dge, December 30; Week’s Palette,
December 26; Resonance, December 27; TV-Rustavi-2, TV-Imedi, December
29).
–Zaal Anjaparidze
RUSSIAN AIR FORCE PINS HOPES ON TECHNOLOGY
Russia’s top brass have decided that the best way to halt the decline
of Russian airpower capabilities is to upgrade equipment and transform
some air elements into effective anti-terrorist strike
forces. Therefore in 2005 the Russian air force will continue to rely
heavily upon extending the service life of its long-range bombers,
enhance its technological capabilities, and promote the work of its
defense industries on aviation equipment. Unfortunately, little
attention is given to morale, training, and professional standards.
Military transport aviation will see upgrades by the summer of 2005,
according to Viktor Livanov, Director-General of the Ilyushin Aircraft
Corporation. This will entail the installation of new avionics in the
cockpit of the IL-76MD-90, improving the current cockpit management
system with multi-function LCDs. If successful, the technology will be
introduced later in the year into other Russian military transport
aircraft.
Experimental technologies are also being prioritized in an effort to
strengthen the capabilities of the KA-52 (Alligator) helicopter. After
17 successful test flights in 2004, the first quarter of 2005 should
conclude the testing phase for the new Arbalet airborne radar
system. The radar system itself shows high-quality images with a wide
range of detection ranges, making its creators, Fazotron Research
Corporation, believe it superior to the radar system aboard the
U.S. AH-64 (Long Bow) in terms of detection range, precision, and
image quality (Interfax, December 21, 28). Such advances also enhance
the appeal of Russian aviation technology exports.
Moreover, a modernized Tu-160 (Blackjack) long-range bomber will also
be added to the inventory of long-range aircraft by April 2005. The
modernizing of this aircraft, carried out at the Kazan aircraft plant,
has included avionics upgrades, as well as weapons
capabilities. Lieutenant-General Igor Khvorov, commander of the 37th
Air Army, confirmed that work is continuing on upgrading precision
cruise missiles with a range of 3,000 km (Interfax, December 20).
The mainstay of Russian long-range aviation consists of the Tu-160
(Blackjack) supersonic strategic bombers and Tu-95MS (Bear) and
Tu-22M3 (Backfire) strategic bombers. Khvorov emphasized that only one
in three of these aircraft is used regularly, thus allowing many to
pass their service life of 25 years while remaining in good
condition. He therefore believes that the service lives of some
aircraft could be reasonably extended based on an assessment of their
actual state.
Such signs of progress in the Russian air force, placing its emphasis
on cost-cutting and greater reliance on technological upgrades, are
welcomed within the service itself. However, Khvorov also argues that
long-range aviation can be successfully used against Russia’s most
pressing security threat — terrorism. “Long-range aviation has not
been intended for combating terrorists, but times are changing,” he
observed. A feasibility study into the use of such airpower against
terrorist targets, conducted by the Russian air force in the aftermath
of Beslan, appears to signal the possible use of long-range aviation
as an option against terrorists. Although Khvorov readily admits that
it has no role to play in a Beslan type crisis, he equally discounted
the use of “carpet-bombing” during such an operation. Evidently the
Russian air force sees a need to justify the theoretical use of
long-range bombers in the context of international terrorism, though
it does not have any clear picture of what this may involve.
Existing manpower problems, budgeting, and overall standards within
the Russian air force give rise to serious concerns within the Russian
Ministry of Defense. A recent study into the causes of military air
accidents in Russia between 1992-2004 found that five percent of these
accidents resulted from the poor medical service and reduced
efficiency of pilots. According to Lieutenant-General Sergei Solntsev,
head of the armed forces flight safety service, around one-third of
such accidents have been caused by the failure of pilots to comply
with the pre-flight rest routine or even flying while drunk (Interfax,
December 27).
Underlying the publicly touted technical advances in some aspects of
the Russian air force or within army aviation, a culture of decline
persists, with failing pilot standards and little serious systemic
effort to reverse these trends. Yet more alarming is the notion that
long-range bombers may fly against “terrorist” targets, in an
unspecified operational tasking, while the terrorist threat facing
Russia is more likely to involve enemy action within population
centers, rather than insurgents out in the open presenting themselves
as a target for long-range aviation. In reality, as the Russian armed
forces are subjected to increasing political cliches about the need to
restructure into effective forces that can combat terrorism, many
elements within the existing system are promoting their own case for
greater funding on the basis of combating terrorism. At this time,
when there is arguably a greater need for raising the standards of
personnel within the air force, Solntsev observed that military
accident levels are surpassing civilian aviation accidents. Falling
standards among air force personnel cannot be replaced by technology,
but technology is a useful mechanism for deflecting attention from the
decline.
–Roger N. McDermott
ASTANA PONDERS KREMLIN’S “LOST OPPORTUNITIES” IN KAZAKHSTAN
Summing up the main events of the widely hyped “Year of Russia in
Kazakhstan,” policymakers on both sides of the border have good reason
to be disappointed. Even on the secondary level of inter-parliamentary
contacts, leaders are not pleased with the state of bilateral ties.
Speaking at a joint meeting of Russian and Kazakh parliament members
in Almaty, Kazakhstan Senate Chairman Nurtay Abikayev said that the
past decade was a time of “serious ordeals” for both states. “Since
the cornerstone of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s policy is
defending the interests of the Russians in the post-Soviet space, it
is natural that the attention of our neighbor is focused on
Kazakh-Russian relations. But what did we get from the Year of Russia
in Kazakhstan?” asks political analyst Gulbigash Omarova. To maintain
normal relations, Omarova says that first, Putin and his political
environment should stop calling ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan
“compatriots” and, second, Kazakhstan must effectively counter the
Russian media’s interference in Kazakhstan’s domestic
affairs. (Turkistan, December 16).
Some Russian analysts feel disillusioned by the unfulfilled aims of
the Year of Russia in Kazakhstan program, which was designed to draw
Kazakhstan closer to the Russian sphere of political and economic
influence. Political observer Andrei Kurtov notes with unconcealed
regret that Russia has missed many rare opportunities to reinstate its
superpower status in Central Asia. According to Kurtov, Western media
propaganda has significantly helped to smear Russia’s image in the
region by depicting it as an “evil power” and belittling the value of
the Russian language and culture in the face of the unrestrained
spread of American economic and political influence in the
region. Kurtov believes, “The sooner Russia becomes aware that the
position of an outside observer may in fact mean the catastrophic loss
of its influence in the region, the more realistic is the hope that
Moscow will, at least, manage to minimize these losses” (novopol.ru,
December 28).
Given Russia’s weakened position in Ukraine in the wake of
presidential elections there, Kazakhstan is increasingly regarded as
one of Russia’s last bastions in the CIS. While pursuing a
multi-vector policy in security and economic issues, Kazakh officials
always stress their country’s loyalty to Moscow. During his December
22 visit to Moscow, Kazakhstan Prime Minister Danial Akhmetov assured
his Russian counterparts that Russia, as before, is Kazakhstan’s top
foreign policy priority. Akhmetov and Russian officials discussed a
wide range of issues relating to space research, joint construction of
a fuel and energy complex, and joint development of the oil and gas
sector. The most important of these issues is the planned joined
development of the Kurmangazy oil field in West Kazakhstan on a
production-sharing basis, a lucrative deal long sought by
Russia. Government delegations also considered the possibility of
Kazakhstan’s state Kazmunaygaz company and Russia’s Gazprom setting up
a joint venture to process the Karachaganak gas from Kazakhstan at the
Russian gas processing plant in Orenburg (Panorama, December 24).
Many of the issues discussed in Moscow during Akhmetov’s visit,
however, contain nothing new. Talks on Caspian oil, construction of
new highways, and tariffs have dragged on for many years. It is hardly
surprising, given the bureaucratic machinery in both countries, why so
little has been achieved despite so much effort.
Kazakhstan sees economic and political integration with Russia as a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, it needs Russia as an economic
partner (Kazakhstan’s imports from Russia in 2003 totaled $3.27
billion) and security ally. On the other hand, it is reluctant to
sacrifice its economic independence for the sake of integration. One
illustration of this drive for greater independence from Russia is the
construction of the new railroad linking Altynsarino in Kostanai
region (North Kazakhstan) and Khromtau (in West
Kazakhstan). Previously Kazakh trains had to cross Russian territory
to use this route. At the same time, the Kazakh government severed the
1994 accord on the transit of Russian military cargo through
Kazakhstan, arguing that it was an economic burden for the country, as
the agreement allowed Russia to use the transit route without paying
customs duties (Interfax-AVN, December 10).
Russia’s interest in Kazakhstan is not limited to geopolitical and
economic considerations. Kazakhstan also plays a prominent role in
Moscow’s demographic policy. In the early 1990s thousands of ethnic
Russians from Kazakhstan flooded Russian cities, exacerbating the
already complicated housing and employment problems. But now the
process has reversed. In 2003 28,668 Russians from CIS countries
migrated to Kazakhstan for permanent residence. In 2004 the figure
rose to 32,228. Russians are flowing in mainly from Uzbekistan, where
they feel increasingly discriminated against on ethnic grounds
(Central Asian Monitor, December 24).
Despite contradictions and uneasy relations, Kazakhstan and Russia
need each other more than any other neighbors in the region. There is
no other alternative for them other than to build good neighborly
relations.
–Marat Yermukanov
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