Author: Kalantarian Kevo

Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
January 12, 2005, Wednesday

ARMENIA MEETS NEW DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE

Armenian President Robert Kocharyan has signed a decree to appoint
Grachya Arutyunyan as first deputy director of the National Security
Service.

The press service of the Armenian president stated that Kocharyan
dismissed his predecessor Grigory Grigoryan on a pension.

In Defense of Marxism, UK
Jan 10 2005

The 1905 Revolution – marking the centenary
By Rob Sewell

`In the history of revolutions there come to light contradictions
that have ripened for decades and centuries. Life becomes unusually
eventful. The masses, which have always stood in the shade and have
therefore often been ignored and even despised by superficial
observers, enter the political arena as active combatants. The masses
are learning in practice, and before the eyes of the world are taking
their first tentative steps, feeling their way, defining their
objectives, testing themselves and the theories of all their
ideologists. These masses are making heroic efforts to rise to the
occasion and cope with the gigantic tasks of world significance
imposed upon them by history.’ (Lenin, Revolutionary Days, January
1905)

The 9th January (22th January in the Gregorian calendar) marks the
centenary of one of the greatest events of the twentieth century. The
stormy events of 1905 formed the majestic prologue to the
revolutionary drama of 1917, and were described famously by Lenin, as
the `dress rehearsal’ for the October revolution. Revolution puts
parties and individuals to the acid test and clarifies programmes,
ideas and perspectives. In reality, the success of 1917 was due in
very large measure to the experience acquired by the generation in
the 1905 revolution.

The 1905 Revolution was no surprise to the Russian Marxists, who had
long predicted the revolutionary movement of the Russian masses. Yet
when revolution came, the sweep and scale of events was truly
historic.

`Events of the greatest historical importance are developing in
Russia’, wrote Lenin a few days after the massacre of Bloody Sunday.
`The proletariat has risen against Tsarism… Events are developing
with astonishing rapidity. The general strike in St. Petersburg is
spreading. All industrial, public, and political activities are
paralysed… The revolution is spreading.’

The 1905 Revolution was a product of the accumulation of
contradictions deep in Russian society. Tsarism was in a blind
impasse and could not develop society any further. The emergence of
the proletariat placed revolution on the order of the day. But there
were more immediate causes that produced the spark of revolution. The
events of 1905 grew directly out of the Russo-Japanese war, just as
the revolution of 1917 was the direct outcome of the First World War.
The military defeats of Tsarism, combined with the intolerable
burdens imposed by the regime on the backs of the masses, was the
final straw that broke the camel’s back.

Tsarist Russia had long been the most reactionary power in Europe.
Ruled by a feudal autocracy, capitalist development had come late to
Russia. Capitalism had been largely imported from the West and
artificially grafted onto backward economic and social relations.
Unlike its counterparts in the West, the Russian bourgeoisie was
extremely weak and incapable of carrying through a
bourgeois-democratic revolution that would create a modern democratic
republic. In fact, rather than play a revolutionary role, it played a
counter-revolutionary one. The bourgeoisie was terrified of the
masses, and while seeking `reforms’, it above all sought protection
from the Old Order. Everything fell to the newly-emerging Russian
proletariat to carry through a revolutionary struggle against
Tsarism. But the struggle would not end there. As Trotsky explained
in his brilliant theory of Permanent Revolution, which he developed
largely from the experience of 1905, the workers would fight to come
to power, carry through the bourgeois tasks and then proceed to the
socialist tasks. The revolution would inevitably break through
national confines and become part of the chain of world socialist
revolution.

The leading role of the proletariat in the coming revolution, as
explained by both Lenin and Trotsky, was confirmed in the events of
1905. It was the first time that the Russian working class had
decisively entered upon the stage of history and attempted to take
its destiny into its own hands.

`In the revolution whose beginning history will identify with the
year 1905′, wrote Trotsky, `the proletariat stepped forward for the
first time under its own banner in the name of its own objectives.’

Father Gapon
The tsarist dictatorship, the burden of war, as well as the harsh
conditions in the factories, drove discontent in the working class to
new levels. This reached its climax with the explosive strike at the
Putilov arms factory in December 1904. A sea change was taking place
in the working class, as strikes spread from industry to another. It
represented the ferment that preceded the explosion. However, the
1905 Revolution finally erupted over an incident: with the
presentation of a petition to the tsar on 9th January. Led by a
priest, Father Gapon, a peaceful demonstration of some 140,000
marched to the Winter Palace to appeal for help from the tsar, known
affectionately as the `Little Father’.

`Sire, our strength is at an end! The limit of our patience has been
reached; the terrible moment has come for us when it is better to die
than to continue suffering intolerable torment.’

But their pleas fell on deaf ears. Instead of sympathy, the
demonstration was faced with a massacre – some 4,600 people were
killed or wounded by government troops – and went down in history as
`Bloody Sunday’. The savage reaction of the regime transformed the
situation within 24 hours. The pent up revolutionary energy of the
masses finally exploded.

Marx explained that the revolution sometimes needs the whip of the
counterrevolution to drive it forward. The massacre of January 1905
acted as such a revolutionary catalyst. The cry went up everywhere:
`Arms! Arms!’

`The working class’, wrote Lenin from exile, `has received a
momentous lesson in civil war: the revolutionary education of the
proletariat made more progress in one day than it could have made in
months and years of drab, humdrum, wretched existence. The slogan of
the heroic St Petersburg proletariat, `Death or Freedom!’ is
reverberating throughout Russia.’

On 10th January barricades were erected in Petersburg. Within a week,
160,000 workers had struck work. Strikes quickly spread to other
areas. In January around 400,000 workers went on strike throughout
Russia. The revolutionary wave swept through Poland and the Baltic
states, Georgia, Armenia, and Central Russia.

The tsarist autocracy took fright. Rather than teaching the workers a
lesson, they had provoked a revolution! `The vast majority of people
seemed to go mad’, wrote Count Witte in his memoirs. But all
revolutions appear as madness to those it seeks to sweep aside. On
18th February, under pressure of a growing strike movement, the tsar
issued his first Manifesto, hinting at a constitution and reforms. Of
course, this concession `from above’ was simply a manoeuvre, aimed at
splitting the movement and defusing the situation. But the movement
continued and intensified.

The Russian social democracy – both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks –
originally met with hostility from the masses before 9th January.
Now, for the first time they connected with the mass movement and
their influence grew by leaps and bounds.

Conditioned by years of clandestinity, Lenin urged the Bolsheviks to
immediately open up their ranks. `We need young forces. I am for
shooting on the spot anyone who presumes to say that there are no
people to be had. The people in Russia are legion: all we have to do
is to recruit young people more widely and boldly, more boldly and
widely, and again more boldly without fearing them. This is a time of
war.’

He went on: `Get rid of all the old habits of immobility, of respect
for rank, and so on. Form hundreds of circles of Vperyod-ists [the
Bolshevik paper] from among the youth and encourage them to work at
full blast.’

`To sum up’, he said, `we must reckon with the growing movement,
which has increased a hundredfold, with the new tempo of the work,
with the freer atmosphere and the wider field of activity. The work
must be given an entirely different scope. Methods of training should
be refocused from peaceful instruction to military operations. Young
fighters should be recruited more boldly, widely, and rapidly into
the ranks of all and every kind of our organisations. Hundreds of new
organisations should be set up for the purpose without a moment’s
delay. Yes, hundreds; this is no hyperbole, and let no one tell me
that it is `too late’ now to tackle such a broad organisational job.
No, it is never too late to organise.’

These remarks were aimed at the `committee-men’, the professional
revolutionaries who ran the party and who had, in reality, a contempt
for its working-class followers. They wanted to continue the methods
of the underground period, which were now completely out of date.

How very different is this Lenin from the caricatures drawn by
bourgeois academics and Stalinist commentators alike, who portray him
as a ruthless party dictator, a conspirator, who, fearing the masses,
held on to power at all costs.

At the same time, Lenin poured scourn on the liberals with their
illusions in peaceful constitutional reform, as well as the
Mensheviks who clung to their coat-tails. The question was poised
point blank: to arm the workers and overthrow Tsarism. This was the
urgent task facing the revolutionary movement.

Throughout the spring and summer the pendulum swung continually to
the left. While the workers of Petersburg took a breather, the
provinces rose up in struggle. Strikes took on an increasingly
political character and there was mutiny in the Black Sea fleet. The
threat of revolution at home forced the regime to end the war with
Japan.

Alongside peace with Japan, the authorities announced a new Manifesto
in August, promising a new parliament, or Duma. However, the
proposals gave the vote to the landlords and urban middle class, but
disenfranchised the bulk of the population. Given the revolutionary
conditions, the Bolsheviks correctly came out for a boycott of the
elections. They explained only the overthrow of Tsarism by the
revolutionary actions of the masses could prepare the ground for
genuine democracy.

A new revolutionary impulse came in the autumn, beginning with a
print strike in Moscow that quickly spread to the railways. `This
small event’, wrote Trotsky, `set off nothing more or less than the
all-Russian political strike – the strike which started over
punctuation marks and ended by felling absolutism.’

By October, there was a general strike on the railways involving some
750,000 workers. The movement became generalised and again raised the
question of power. On 10th October, a political general strike was
proclaimed in Moscow, Kharkov, and Revel; the next day in Smolensk,
Kozlov, Yekaterinoslav and Lodz; in a few days the strike was
declared in Kursk, Byelgorod, Samara, Saratov, Poltava, Petersburg,
Orsha, Minsk, Odessa, Riga, Warsaw and elsewhere. `The October
strike’, noted Trotsky, `was a demonstration of the proletariat’s
hegemony in the bourgeois revolution and, at the same time, of the
hegemony of the towns in an agricultural country.’

`In its extent and acuteness,’ Lenin explained later, `the strike
struggle had no parallel anywhere in the world. The economic strike
developed into a political strike, and later into insurrection.’

Terrified of the revolution, `Nicholas the Bloody’ was forced to make
concessions and sign a new Manifesto on 17th October. `Herod’s got
his tail between his legs’, remarked a worker. But the Manifesto
solved nothing, only to detach the liberals from the tailcoat of the
revolution. However, with Tsarist concessions came bloody repression.
This was the time of General Trepov’s famous order: `No blank
volleys, and spare no bullets.’ An orgy of reaction was unleashed by
the Black Hundred gangs, resulting in up to 4,000 people murdered and
a further 10,000 injured in pogroms. The experience demonstrated,
above all, the need for the revolution to arm itself in its own
self-defence. In Petersburg, the Soviet organised the arming of the
proletariat and the setting up of workers’ militias.

The revolution brought the proletariat to its feet. It raised its
class-consciousness and self esteem. Above all, it gave rise to
self-organisation in the form of the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies,
established on 13th October.

`The Soviet came into being’, wrote Trotsky, `as a response to an
objective need – a need born out of the course of events. It was an
organisation which was authoritative and yet had no traditions; which
could immediately involve a scattered mass of hundreds of thousands
of people while having virtually no organisational machinery; which
united the revolutionary currents within the proletariat; which was
capable of initiative and spontaneous self-control – and most
important of all, which could be brought out from underground within
twenty-four hours.’

The initiative for the Soviet organisation came from the St
Petersburg Mensheviks. Trotsky had a similar idea when he arrived
from Finland. The general strike needed an extended strike committee
to coordinate things, and the Soviet played this key role by drawing
in delegates from the factories (one delegate for every 500 workers).
To have the necessary authority in the eyes of the masses, it had to
be based upon the broadest representation. Astonishingly, the Soviet
was rejected by a part of the Bolshevik leadership who were in
Petersburg, fearing it as a rival political organisation to the
party. They even went to the Soviet with a resolution: either accept
the full revolutionary programme of social democracy or disband! This
sectarian attitude towards the Soviet, which resulted in the
Bolshevik faction failing to gain a leading position in the events,
lasted until Lenin arrived in November.

Of all the revolutionary leaders of the social democracy, it was
Trotsky who played the most prominent role in 1905. By this time none
of the main leaders had returned from exile. Martov only returned to
Russia after 17th October; Lenin on 4th November. Trotsky, on the
other hand, had arrived in Kiev in February.

Lunacharsky, who was one of Lenin’s closest collaborators at the
time, recalled: `His [Trotsky’s] popularity among the Petersburg
proletariat at the time of his arrest [in December] was tremendous
and increased still more as a result of his picturesque and heroic
behaviour in court. I must say that of all the social democratic
leaders of 1905-6 Trotsky undoubtedly showed himself, despite his
youth, to be the best prepared. Less than any of them did he bear the
stamp of a certain kind of émigré narrowness of outlook which, as I
have said, even affected Lenin at that time. Trotsky understood
better than all the others what it means to conduct the political
struggle on a broad, national scale. He emerged from the revolution
having acquired an enormous degree of popularity, whereas neither
Lenin nor Martov had effectively gained any at all. Plekhanov had
lost a great deal, thanks to his display of quasi-Cadet tendencies.
Trotsky stood then in the very front rank.’

Since the split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in 1903, Trotsky
had broken with the Mensheviks and attempted to unite both factions.
On political questions, however, Trotsky was very close to Lenin. On
Lenin’s return to Russia, he took up the need for the re-unification
of the two wings of the social democracy – the RSDLP.

Undated poster on the 1905 revolution
Trotsky was only 26 when he became president of the St Petersburg
Soviet. The first brief chairman of the Soviet, the Menshevik
sympathiser G S Khrustalyov was an accidental figure, like Father
Gapon. Trotsky wrote the most important declarations and resolutions
of the Soviet, and was the natural replacement after Khrustaloyov’s
arrest. `Well, Trotsky has earned it by his brilliant and unflagging
work’, commented Lenin.

Trotsky thrived in the leadership of the St Petersburg proletariat.
He immediately connected with the revolution and threw himself into
its work. He took over the tiny Russian Gazette and transformed it
into a fighting organ. As a result, its circulation rose from 30,000
to 500,000. Closed down by the government, Trotsky put his efforts
into a new political organ, Nachalo (The Beginning), which was a
great success. He also wrote editorials for the Izvestia (The News),
the official organ of the Soviet, as well as its manifestos and
resolutions.

`The fifty-two days of the existence of the first Soviet’, wrote
Trotsky, `were filled to the brim with work – the Soviets, the
Executive Committee, endless meetings, and three papers. How we
managed to live in this whirlpool is still not clear, even to me.’

While the October manifesto produced concessions, they were of a
partial and temporary nature. The Soviet’s response was to continue
the general strike. However, the strike had lost its momentum and the
decision was made to end the strike on 21st October. But this was no
solemn act. Hundreds of thousands marched with the Soviet at its head
demanding amnesty, which was partially granted.

Once more, feeling the lull in the struggle, the counter-revolution
reared its ugly head. Pro-tsarist demonstrations were organised, led
by clergy and bishops. The bands played `God Save the Tsar’, the hymn
of the pogromists. Police directed crowds of hooligans in the
wrecking of Jewish homes and shops. Some 3,500-4,000 people were
killed and as many as 10,000 maimed in 100 towns. Thanks to the
workers no pogroms took place in St Petersburg, but workers’
detachments were steadily dispersed and arms confiscated. The
manifesto and amnesty concessions represented only a momentary truce,
nothing more.

In Kronstadt, on 26th and 27th October a mutiny flared up. Martial
law was declared a day later and the mutiny was crushed. Many
revolutionary soldiers and sailors were threatened with execution.
Pressure mounted on the Soviet to act against this open provocation.
The Soviet issued an appeal for a general strike on 2nd November,
under the slogans: `Down with court-martial! Down with the death
penalty! Down with martial law in Poland and throughout Russia!’

The success of the appeal surpassed all expectations. Once again the
authorities were wrong-footed and conceded that there would be no
court martial. Given that the struggles nationally were on the wane,
the leaders of the Soviet decided to end the strike on 7th November.
However, the return to work was undertaken with the same degree of
spirit and unity as when it began.

It was a turning-point for the revolution as a whole. The St
Petersburg proletariat after ten months of tremendous exertions were
finally exhausted. On 3rd December, the whole of the St Petersburg
Soviet was arrested. The life of the Petersburg Soviet had come to an
end.

Fifty-two members of the St Petersburg Soviet were finally placed on
trial in September 1906, on the charge of `preparing an armed
uprising’ against the existing `form of government’. From the dock,
Trotsky defiantly turned his speech into an attack on the autocracy
and a defence of the Soviet and the revolution. `The historical power
in whose name the prosecutor speaks in this court is the organised
violence of the minority over the majority! The new power, whose
precursor was the Soviet, represents the organised will of the
majority calling the minority to order. Because of this distinction
the revolutionary right of the Soviet to existence stands above all
juridical and moral speculations…’

For now, with the arrest of the Petersburg Soviet, the revolutionary
initiative moved to Moscow. On 2nd December a mutiny had broken out
in the Moscow Rostov regiment, but was suppressed. Nevertheless,
despite this setback, the mood in the factories was reaching fever
pitch. They were prepared for resolute action, even some layers
proposing armed insurrection. This mood affected the Moscow Soviet,
which declared a general strike on 7th December. But under the
circumstance, everyone knew this to be a vote for an insurrection.
The appeal for solidarity from Petersburg had partial success, with
83,000 coming out on strike.

The spark for the insurrection in Moscow was a government provocation
– troops were sent to disperse workers’ meetings. There were clashes
and barricades were thrown up as a general strike began to spread.
Despite this advance there was vacillation in the Soviet leadership
and the counter-revolution struck back. This provoked the masses
further and an armed uprising broke out. Barricades were thrown up
throughout the city and there was extensive street fighting.
Unfortunately, the government troops remained loyal and the
insurrection was eventually put down. The Moscow defeat constituted a
heavy blow to the revolution.

Although defeated, the struggle had not been in vain. Without this
experience, the October Revolution would not have been possible. The
experienced served to crystallise the political differences between
Bolshevism and Menshevism. Plekhanov’s famous remark that `they
should not have taken up arms!’ was the plea of one who was moving
away from revolution. Lenin in reply, stated that `On the contrary,
we should have taken up arms more resolutely, energetically and
aggressively; we should have explained to the masses that it was
impossible to confine ourselves to a peaceful strike, that a fearless
and relentless armed struggle was indispensable.’ The Mensheviks were
increasingly looking to the liberal bourgeoisie to lead the
(bourgeois) revolution, while Lenin, Trotsky and the Bolsheviks were
relying on the working class for leadership. Eventually, this would
place the Mensheviks on the wrong side of the barricades in the
October Revolution of 1917.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to finish with a quote from
Trotsky’s book, 1905: `In 1905, the working class was still too weak
to seize power, but subsequent events forced it to gain maturity and
strength, not in the environment of a bourgeois-democratic republic,
but in the underground of the Tsarism of 3rd June. The proletariat
came to power in 1917 with the help of the experience acquired by its
older generation in 1905. That is why young workers today must have
complete access to that experience and must, therefore, study the
history of 1905.’

January 10, 2005

Hold the Froth: Armenian-American Youth Revel in Café Culture

New California Media (San Francisco, CA)
(Reprinted from Asbarez Armenian Daily)
January 09, 2005

By Ishkhan Jinbashian

Hollywood might have its Little Armenia, but there’s no doubt that
Little Yerevan is by now firmly ensconced in what I like to call the
blessed city of Nagorno-Glendale.

Little Yerevan, and quite a bit of Little Tehran for sure. But
definitely not Little Beirut or Aleppo or Baghdad, as a good chunk of
the Western-Armenian contingent bolted years ago. As for the remnants,
sometimes it feels as though their glaring visibility more than makes up
for their diminishing numbers. Try Glendale watering holes like Sarkis
Pastry, Carousel Restaurant (a favorite with community movers and
shakers), or the editorial offices of Asbarez, and you’ll know what I mean.

What perhaps most palpably distinguishes Glendale’s sprawling Little
Yerevan from any number of cities with a large Armenian presence is its
kitschy ostentation. Here we don’t just drive late-model German and
Japanese cars, we insist on driving them extremely fast, wearing some
kind of determined malevolence as a badge of honor. And we don’t merely
put ululating rabiz music on in our apartments and souped-up road
machines; we make sure entire neighborhoods reverberate with the stuff.

Loud and obnoxious? You already gathered as much. Glad to suffer from a
pandemic case of narcissism? Yes, sir. And habitually confusing rudeness
with cool? Ditto.

Here’s a little clarification, before I get in too deep: The demographic
in question is between the ages of, say, 17 and 25, though to my
knowledge the next age bracket has so far shown no signs of significant
change.

Like one’s sun and rising signs, the youth is where the energies of a
community are at their most salient. And it’s where the cultural and
civic shape of things to come is molded (so help us God). In Little
Yerevan, you would be hard-pressed to ascribe a certain collective
character to the youth. By any standard, the young here seem to be a
normal bunch, despite a worrisome knack for white-collar and petty crime
in some quarters. But if you’re in the market for some naked sidewalk
truths based on casual observation, some signposts if you will, to gauge
the dynamic of the youth, then read on.

In Glendale today, by far the most public manifestation of Armenian
youth culture happens in coffee houses. And within the hierarchy of the
city’s cafés, no one has yet managed to dethrone La Goccia, Brand
Boulevard’s premier destination for ceremonious outdoor gathering. At La
Goccia, as throughout the city’s coffee houses (including some owned by
Armenians and the ubiquitous Starbuckses), Armenian dudes and dudettes
do what people the world over like doing in cafés: watch people, shoot
the breeze, court one another, catch up on gossip, watch people some
more, refill the spiritual batteries following the rigors of office or
school. But the vibe at La Goccia is in a league all its own.

Consider the location. On any given day or night, lounging around on the
massive sidewalk stretch that doubles as La Goccia’s patio, you’re sure
to be noticed from here to eternity–that is to say, from any vantage
point between Broadway and Wilson. You’ll be noticed by pedestrians. And
by people in the cars zooming through Brand. You’ll be plenty noticed by
other customers at the café. Plus, for the more romantically inclined
among us, La Goccia on clearer evenings is a wonderful spot for enjoying
the “magic hour,” that deep, achingly uniform blue that envelops the sky
right before the sun has finally set. But most importantly, La Goccia is
where you get pretty damn close to feeling something, at least
something, akin to a sense of community.

If this sounds a tad problematic, it’s because it is. As in any other
context, the sense of community experienced at a crowded Glendale café
can be fraught with provisos. For instance: you love the fact that a
throng of cappuccino sippers on either side of you happens to be of
Armenian descent. Yet you can get quickly annoyed by the impertinent and
lingering, sometimes lewd stares, the shouting that passes for benign
conversation, and the green house effect-inducing clouds of tobacco
smoke. You might also lure yourself into believing that a place like La
Goccia may well represent a microcosm of the Armenian world as we know
it. Yet such thoughts might quickly cede to the realization that that
microcosm has less and less space for anything Western-Armenian these
days, with entire dialects, literary and musical and theatrical
traditions dying off to our bemused helplessness, given the cultural
hegemony of Eastern-inflected Armenia.

This last point is thus very much the point of allowing that sense of
community to seep into you. Because La Goccia and similar coffee houses,
with their sheer volume of young Armenians teeming around you, may now
and again impel you to think about your own role in, and your own
position on, the larger patterns of our community.

Countless times I’ve caught myself vaguely musing on a smorgasbord of
questions, mostly rhetorical, while having business meetings or
tête-à-têtes with friends at La Goccia. Questions, in no particular
order, such as: How can we, as a community, be so industrious,
street-smart and resourceful, yet continue to be considerably lacking in
terms of artistic creativity–notwithstanding our output in the visual
arts? Why is it that I have yet to catch an Armenian youth engrossed in
a book (and not a textbook), at La Goccia or elsewhere in cafédom here
in Nagorno-Glendale? How come Armenian young men in general, who were
nurtured and reared by women (their mothers for Chrissake), end up
becoming misogynists of varying degrees? How does one explain the fact
that Hayastantsi guys, for all their unbending machismo, possess the
kind of mental athleticism that makes them so astonishingly witty? Are
we more like the Italians or the Jews? More “The Sopranos” or
“Seinfeld?” Why do so many Armenian young women unquestioningly
subscribe to mainstream conventions of desirability, allowing so much to
ride on physical appearance? Why do their male counterparts do the exact
same thing, only more damagingly? If young Armenians enjoy each other’s
company so much, why is it that they’re often gripped with panic by
Armenian-heavy stomping grounds, as though the plague were afoot? How is
this problem handled in Armenia, where compatriots are to be found
everywhere you look? Are the Armenians gathered at La Goccia ultimately
just another faceless crowd, or do these people have something
noteworthy to contribute to Glendale–something thoughtful, positive,
original, extraordinary even, in the spirit of building that’s supposed
to all but define us as a nation? And, all said, does anyone care about
any of this, when it’s time to go home because your friend has started
yawning like a debil and your bladder is about to burst as La Goccia has
no benefit of a restroom?

I’m inclined to say yes, absolutely, quite a few of us do care about
such matters – and then some. For one thing, Glendale is fast becoming
arguably the most important hub in the diaspora, and we better remember
that population growth has the danger of not automatically translating
to collective excellence. And also because rare is the Armenian
community, save the city of Yerevan, offering the kind of bustling café
culture that Glendale does, as both challenge and comfort.

NCM Online is sponsored by Pacific News Service in collaboration with
the Chinese American Voter Education Committee

Armenian leader replaces deputy security chief

Public Television of Armenia, Yerevan
8 Jan 05

Armenian President Robert Kocharyan signed a decree on 8 January
dismissing Grigoriy Grigoryan from the National Security Service and
from the post of first deputy chief of the National Security Service
of the Armenian government in connection with the expiry of his term
of service.

Under another presidential decree, Hrachya Arutyunyan has been
appointed to the post of first deputy chief of the National Security
Service of the Armenian government.

ASBAREZ ONLINE
TOP STORIES
01/04/2005
TO ACCESS PREVIOUS ASBAREZ ONLINE EDITIONS PLEASE VISIT OUR
WEBSITE AT <;HTTP://

1) Appeal to Community
2) New OSCE Chairman Headed to South Caucasus
3) Armenian Economy Again Rated Freest in CIS
4) Aliyev Says 2004 Marked Turning Point in Karabagh Negotiations
5) Prelate’s New Year’s and Christmas Message

1) Appeal to Community

ARF West Urges Assistance to Tsunami Victims

The December 26 natural disaster in Southwest Asia recognized no political
frontiers. The resulting death and destruction from that forceful tsunami once
again reveal that all of humanity belongs to one global family.
The entire world has rushed to provide aid to the victims of that disaster.
Approximately 15 years ago, at about the same time of the year, the world over
provided relief to Armenians when tragedy struck Armenia.
We believe that international peace and harmonious coexistence of nations are
permanent values, and mankind can overcome such calamities only through
cooperation.
We, therefore, appeal to all Armenians living in the Western region of the
United States, to follow the initiative taken by the Armenian Relief
Society as
well as the Diocese and Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic Church to provide
necessary assistance to the tsunami victims, and contribute to the
humanitarian
drive to provide comfort to them. As a member of the global family of nations,
we should take the opportunity to convey our gratitude and assist those in
need.

Armenian Revolutionary Federation
US Western Region Central Committee

2) New OSCE Chairman Headed to South Caucasus

YEREVAN (Armenpress)–The Azeri press reports that the new head of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Slovenian Foreign
Minister Dimitrij Rupel, will visit the South Caucasus in mid-January.
Rupel, who officially took over the OSCE chairmanship from Bulgaria on
January
1, will formally present the priorities of the new Chairmanship to the OSCE’s
55 participating States at its Permanent Council in Vienna on 13 January.
“The OSCE has always responded well to challenge and adversity,” Rupel
said at
the OSCE Ministerial Council in Sofia in 2004 December. “Its ability to adapt
has, over the years, become one of its greatest virtues and advantages.”
“The responsibility to make it stronger and more visible in the global arena
rests on us. Slovenia is resolute that the OSCE should have a strong role in
sowing the seeds of security and co-operation throughout its area and beyond,”
he said.

3) Armenian Economy Again Rated Freest in CIS

(Heritage Foundation, RFE/RL)–Armenia continues to boast the sole “mostly
free” economy in the ex-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States,
according to
The 2005 Index of Economic Freedom that was released on Tuesday.
The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation, a leading Washington, DC
think tank, publish the Index annually, with the most current data
available on
taxes, tariffs, banking regulations, monetary policies and other information
for 161 countries worldwide.
Armenia’s aggregate score of 2.58, measured on a 5-point negative scale,
represents a slight improvement over the previous year, putting it in 42nd
place in the WSJ/Heritage rankings–just ahead of economic powerhouses like
France and South Korea. Armenia was 44th in the 2004 index that covered 155
nations. Its indicator of economic freedom has steadily improved since 2000
when it stood at 3.21.
“The Republic of Armenia remained committed to the gradual pursuit of a
democratic society and free-market economy in 2004,” reads the WSJ/Heritage
report.
“Economic policy continues to be guided by the economic and fiscal policies
and the poverty-reduction strategy developed in cooperation with the World
Bank
and the International Monetary Fund. Reforms should provide improvements in
the
banking sector, transparency, and enforcement of anti-corruption measures.”
The survey primarily takes into account the legal environment for doing
business in a particular country, including tax rates, trade tariffs, and
government impact on prices.
The survey’s assessment of all other CIS countries is far more critical.
Neighboring Georgia and Azerbaijan, for example, were ranked 100th and 103rd
respectively, making their economies “mostly unfree.”
The US, for the first time ever, no longer ranks among the top 10 “free”
nations of the world, according to the 2005 Index that puts economic freedoms
in Estonia, Ireland, Chile, Denmark, and Iceland, ahead of those in the United
States.

4) Aliyev Says 2004 Marked Turning Point in Karabagh Negotiations

BAKU (Combined Sources)–President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev said in his New
Year address to the nation, that 2004 marked a turning point in negotiating a
settlement to the Karabagh conflict, noting that “considerable progress was
made during Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks. . . the international community
approaches the issue more seriously, and the OSCE Minsk Group has intensified
its activities.”
He emphasized that negotiations should be conducted in compliance with
international law, but stressed that Azerbaijan would liberate “native lands”
in any way possible. “I’ve stated more than once that Azerbaijan would never
compromise the issue of territorial integrity; we will never discuss the
issue,” Aliyev said, calling for the development of a strong army so as to
reach that goal.
He stressed that Azerbaijan would be able to resolve many of its economic and
social problems when the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline becomes operational in
2005, and when the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline is
finished.

5) Prelate’s New Year’s and Christmas Message

Following The Footsteps of The Good Shepherds

“And in that region there were shepherds out in the field, keeping watch over
their flock by night. And an angel of the Lord appeared to them, and the glory
of the Lord shone around them, and they were filled with fear.” (Luke 2:8-9)
On the threshold of the year 2005, as we exchange good wishes, once again the
feast of the Glorious Birth and Theophany of our Lord Jesus Christ invites us
to renew and reinvigorate our faith and brighten our spirits. During a holy
and
silent night in the open weather, the tidings of the birth of Jesus filled the
spirits of the good and humble shepherds and the glory of the Lord shone
around
them.
“And in that region there were shepherds out in the field, keeping watch over
their flock by night. And an angel of the Lord appeared to them, and the glory
of the Lord shone around them, and they were filled with fear.” (Luke 2:8-9)
What a blessed divine gift!
The shepherds in their solitude, while they were keeping watch over their
flock by night, they were blessed by the visit of the angel. They were greatly
afraid.

Dear beloved,

Lately, it seems, more and more people find themselves in the same
predicament
as those shepherds. We seem to take upon ourselves serious responsibilities to
keep watch over our families and properties, only to find ourselves exposed to
the open elements of life, oftentimes feeling cold and alone, groping in the
darkness. It begs the very basic question: `What am I doing here, in this
place, cold, alone, and in the dark, and why am I doing it?’
The answer is found in the Revelation of God.
When we take upon our shoulders the heavy responsibility of shepherding,
whether we shepherd our family, or our business, or our school, or our social
organization, or our political party, or our church, we also receive upon our
shoulders the gentle but guiding Arm of the Lord. Be assured, my faithful
flock, that even if you perceive that you are left out in the open, cold,
alone, or in the dark, that the Lord Himself is steadfastly beside you always.
Our Lord came down from heaven and became man so that mankind would never
abide
alone. Our Lord enkindled the flame of truth and righteousness in our
hearts so
that our love for one another might never grow cold. Indeed, the Glory of the
Lord has shone upon us, dispelling the darkness of gloom and directing our
ways
in faith and peace.
As we begin 2005, I wish to engage each and every one of you to be an active,
Christian shepherd.
We are so aware of people in our communities, even within our own families,
who are alone, who are infirm, who are despondent, who are searching for the
Light of God within their lives. I ask each of you: are you able to become a
shepherd to our people? Are you willing to respond to the needs and wants of
our community? Are you ready to join the active mission of the Church, to
serve
with righteousness, and to proffer spiritual and meaningful charity? The
shepherds responded to this same call by saying to one another, “Let us go
over
to Bethlehem and see this thing that has happened, which the Lord has made
known to us.” (Luke 2:15)
Come, now, dear shepherds of the Armenian Church, and let us go to Bethlehem,
and see this thing, this great gift of Grace and Hope and Joy which the Lord
shows us daily in our lives through the Holy Bible, the Holy Badarak, and the
Holy Sacraments.
Let us make a spiritual and charitable commitment to extend our love and
assistance to the Church, to our schools, to our organizations, to our
communities across the globe, and to our family and friends. In so doing, may
the Eternal Light, which pierced the darkness of Christmas night, enlighten
our
minds and enrapture our hearts.
Let the glad tidings to us and for you all be magnified through our joint
commitment to foster good works and to fortify our Christian fellowship. On
the
joyous occasion of the New Year and the Revelation of God, I extend to our
spiritual shepherds, the reverend clergy, and to our community shepherds,
Executive Council, parish boards, the school administrators, teachers, and to
our faithful, benefactors, supporters and the members of our Church, my
fatherly blessings and sincere wishes for the best of health and peace in your
lives, and I thank you for your continued charitable support of our Church,
our
Prelacy, our schools and institutions.
Let Christ be revealed in you, that Christ may be revealed through you.

Happy New Year to you all. Christ is born and revealed.

Prayerfully,
Archbishop Moushegh Mardirossian
Prelate of Western Prelacy

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The Jamestown Foundation
Tuesday, January 4, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 2
EURASIAN DAILY MONITOR

IN THIS ISSUE:

*Moscow scuttles OSCE border patrols in Georgia
*Georgian president reviews accomplishments of 2004
*New equipment won’t alleviate shortcomings of Russian air force
*”Year of Russia in Kazakhstan” ends with little fanfare

————————————————————————

AXING THE BMO, RUSSIA MENACES GEORGIA

Using its veto power in the OSCE, Russia has carried out its threat to
terminate the mandate of the organization’s Georgia Border Monitoring
Operation (BMO) as of December 31. This unarmed international mission,
patrolling the Georgia-Russia border on Georgian territory, has played
a key role in shielding Georgia against Russian threats to pursue
alleged “Chechen and international terrorists” into Georgian
territory, e.g. in Pankisi. Russia cast its veto on December 30 in
Vienna, at the OSCE Permanent Council’s last session of 2004 (RFE/RL,
December 30; Itar-Tass, December 31).

Moscow has long tried to build a case for military intervention in
Georgia, or at least for Russian deployment on the Georgian side of
the border, through those accusations. The BMO’s internal reports to
the OSCE helped to disprove the accusations; moreover, the monitors
reported on some of the Russian air raids over Georgian territory,
despite Russian denials. Consequently, Moscow wants to eliminate the
BMO and to exclude any international presence, so that Georgia would
be left to face Russia one-on-one.

Without an international presence, Russia would be emboldened to: a)
try to impose its own presence on the Georgian side of the border; b)
exert political and psychological pressure on the Georgian government,
so as to extract concessions on other issues, under the threat of
“anti-terrorist” action inside Georgia; c) divert attention from the
issue of Russian troops and bases in Georgia, as Moscow has already
done with some success by forcing the now-phony issue of “terrorists
in Pankisi” to the top of the agenda with Tbilisi and Washington.

Contrary to some ongoing speculation, Russia’s move to terminate the
BMO has nothing to do with Kremlin frustrations over its recent defeat
in Ukraine and a presumed quest for compensatory satisfaction on the
Georgia front. Russia had threatened to veto an extension of the BMO
throughout 2004. Analysts who interpret Russia’s move as an
understandable reaction to the Orange Revolution and recommend
demonstrating “goodwill” by giving in to Moscow on the Georgia border
monitoring issue miss this key point.

Moscow now proposes forming a purely bilateral Russian-Georgian
“border police” force, albeit with Western financing, in place of the
BMO. Inasmuch as the BMO operated by definition on Georgian territory,
the Russian-proposed substitute could be used for deploying Russians
on the Georgian side of the border.

For public consumption, Russia argued throughout the year that the BMO
has been “ineffective,” as well as too costly to the OSCE budget, and
must therefore cease. In reality, the BMO proved highly effective, and
its cost was borne by Western countries. Shortly before the OSCE’s
year-end conference, Moscow changed its argument. It now claims that
the BMO has fulfilled its tasks, managed to improve the situation on
the border, and is therefore no longer needed. In the latest twist to
its case, Moscow now contends that Russian and Georgian border guards
and intelligence services cooperate well with one another, and can
henceforth protect the common border on a bilateral basis, without an
international presence (Foreign Affairs Ministry statements,
Itar-Tass, December 30, 31; January 1).

Both sets of assertions contradict Moscow’s own propagandistic
accusations that Georgia tolerates “Chechen terrorists” crisscrossing
that border. Those accusations will probably continue as a means of
pressuring Georgia into accepting a Russian-Georgian operation,
instead of the BMO or some other international operation.

Moscow has repeatedly presented its key argument that it cannot
tolerate any international presence, even this unarmed one, near
Russia’s borders. This contention seems to impress the French and
German governments, whose position is now bringing confusion to the
European Union’s collective position on this and other issues.

Border security is one of the key dimensions to the EU’s evolving
security and neighborhood policies. Consequently, Georgia asked the EU
to undertake a border monitoring operation in Georgia, should Russia
kill the BMO. The consent of Georgia would be sufficient, and that of
Russia is not required for this. The U.S. State Department supports
the idea. The EU seemed to give it favorable consideration and held a
pre-Christmas meeting in Brussels to send a signal of intent to
Russia. However, the Franco-German position thwarted that signal and
emboldened Moscow. The issue remains under consideration in Brussels.

The OSCE’s outgoing Bulgarian and incoming Slovenian chairmanships
informally suggested a compromise with Russia, whereby the BMO’s
mandate would be extended for six months only, and its personnel and
funding deeply cut. The idea was designed to “save” not the BMO, but
the OSCE institutionally and politically through “consensus” with
Russia at the expense of Georgia, international security, and legal
principle. The BMO’s survival in a reduced form would have diminished
its effectiveness and credibility, robbing Georgia and its Western
friends of a crucial counter-argument to Moscow’s propaganda about
“Chechen terrorists” using Georgian territory. Moscow might then have
been justified in arguing that the BMO had become
ineffective. Moreover, Russia would almost certainly have reopened the
issue as a bargaining card at the six-month interval.

In Russia’s view, the BMO is obligated to stop its patrolling and
reporting as of January 1, 2005, start packing immediately, and phase
itself out within a few months. Meanwhile, Moscow seems to be hinting
that it might accept some compromise in return for Western concessions
on several of the following Russian demands: a) creating a common
OSCE-“CIS” [in fact, Russian-Belarusian-Central Asian] system of
monitoring and evaluating elections and setting up a joint working
group for that purpose; b) holding a high-level seminar on military
doctrines; and c) calling an international conference on energy
supplies and security. The United States and other Western countries,
unwilling to turn NATO and EU functions over to the OSCE, let alone to
abdicate from democratic standards, have until now resisted those
Russian initiatives in varying degrees.

Meanwhile, Russia continues to block the adoption of the OSCE’s 2005
budget, underscoring the OSCE’s vulnerability to Russian
blackmail. The organization maximizes its vulnerability by maintaining
secrecy, hoping at each step for backstage compromises with Russia,
thus encouraging the latter’s use of “salami tactics.” The OSCE would
be better placed to resist the blackmail by exposing it publicly. The
BMO was this organization’s one and only successful undertaking in the
security sphere. Without the BMO, or with an emasculated version of
it, the OSCE’s credibility as a security actor — already compromised
over Trans-Dniester, South Ossetia, Karabakh, the CFE Treaty, and
Istanbul Commitments — would descend to nil.

On the positive side, however, the BMO’s and indeed the OSCE’s demise
as a security actor can at last open the way for direct Western
involvement — in this case, a border monitoring mission in Georgia
under EU aegis. The United States can keep a low profile and
contribute a portion of the funding for such a mission. Russian
personnel can be invited to participate, as they did in the BMO. The
time for action is short: a substitute operation must be in place
before the ice and snow start melting in the high-altitude passes in
April. Given the EU’s characteristically slow decision-making process,
the United States could help jump-start a political initiative in
Brussels for a EU-sponsored border monitoring operation in Georgia.

At stake is not only Georgia’s security and sovereignty. The larger
issue is Russia’s behavior toward neighboring countries
generally. Giving in to Russia over a genuinely democratic,
pro-American, EU-aspirant country, and accepting a Russian veto over
its neighbor’s border security arrangements, would embolden Moscow
into pressuring other countries as well.

–Vladimir Socor

SAAKASHVILI RINGS IN NEW YEAR WITH YUSHCHENKO

Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili delivered his New Year’s
address to Georgia from the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, where he had
flown to congratulate Viktor Yushchenko on his victory in the
presidential elections. This step emphasizes the importance
Saakashvili gives to warm relations with a Yushchenko-governed
Ukraine.

Before his departure for Kyiv, Saakashvili convened a news conference
on December 29 to evaluate his government’s performance for 2004. He
called the year “the most successful in independent Georgia’s
history.”

As expected, Saakashvili named the restoration of control over the
Ajarian Autonomous Republic as the year’s most important
achievement. The president also enthusiastically spoke about increased
budgetary revenues and expenditures, adoption of a more liberal tax
code, the new tax law, and the program for financial amnesty.

Saakashvili declared that continued efforts to restore Georgia’s
territorial integrity would top his agenda for 2005. He said that
Georgia soon would submit new peace initiatives to settle the frozen
conflicts with the other breakaway regions: Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Two weeks earlier, Saakashvili had instructed leading
Georgian NGOs and think tanks to elaborate a new plan for resolving
the conflicts.

During his press conference, Saakashvili admitted that his initial
promises to resolve the country’s basic problems, including
territorial integrity, have become unrealistic, at least in the short
term. “Things cannot be settled so quickly, within five months. I
also thought so, but it is impossible,” he said. Saakashvili further
declared that under his governance Georgia has become a stronger
state.

Saakashvili is known to loath criticism and told reporters that he
“would not like to focus” on failures. He also slammed opposition
forces for criticizing him and his government for economic and
political underperformance.

Meanwhile the opposition, represented by political parties in and out
of parliament and several NGOs, has prepared a long list of mistakes
made by Saakashvili and his team during the past year. Shalva
Natelashvili, leader of the Labor Party, raised the issue of
Saakashvili’s mixed record during his three-week trip to the United
States in December. Reports that the U.S. Department of State invited
one of Saakashvili’s staunchest opponents to visit the United States
— simultaneously with Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania’s U.S. trip —
were evidently unpalatable to the ruling party.

The Georgian opposition charges that the constitutional amendments
made shortly after the Rose Revolution have completely destroyed the
notion of separation of powers. This assertion contains a grain of
truth. Georgia essentially has a one-party system and a “pocket”
parliament dominated by the ruling party majority. During the last
2004 plenary session, parliament passed more than hundred bills,
including tax and financial amnesty without proper scrutiny or outside
comment. The opposition also claims that the current Electoral Code
makes fair elections impossible. Several NGOs are ringing alarming
bells about declining media freedom and judicial independence, illegal
arrests, state extortion of private firms, and the reappearance of
political prisoners.

Saakashvili is also criticized for flip-flopping on Abkhazia and South
Ossetia and particularly for the failed military campaign against
South Ossetia last August, which the government still tries to hush
up. Moreover, the “power ministers” responsible for that failure
remain in the government.

Saakashvili’s personnel policy, namely rotating the same faces among
different posts, has disappointed even his followers. Despite the
government’s bombastic rhetoric, scandals still undermine the Georgian
army. On December 20, 70 soldiers based in Mukhrovani (eastern
Georgia) abandoned their barracks, which they said were unfit for
human habitation.

The recent reshuffle of the cabinet, conflict in the Tbilisi
government, parliamentary chairwoman Nino Burjanadze’s refusal to join
the ruling party, conflicts in regional branches, and division within
the ruling party’s parliamentary faction do not bode well for future
party unity. Even Saakashvili’s supporters have publicly noted
setbacks in conflict settlement, freedom of speech, local democracy,
and governance.

The government is trying to win the hearts and minds of the population
through a variety of popular measures. The government announces it
will raise pensions but remains tight-lipped about the lari’s
decreasing purchasing power and the significant increase in the cost
of living.

The coming year appears to be critical for Saakashvili and his team
because the people’s euphoria from the Rose Revolution has run its
course. Now the government will be judged by its deeds. According to a
nationwide poll commissioned by the GORBI sociological agency on the
anniversary of the Rose Revolution, the number of citizens who believe
that Georgia is heading in the wrong direction has doubled over the
last year.

(Akhali Taoba, December 29; 7 Dge, December 30; Week’s Palette,
December 26; Resonance, December 27; TV-Rustavi-2, TV-Imedi, December
29).

–Zaal Anjaparidze

RUSSIAN AIR FORCE PINS HOPES ON TECHNOLOGY

Russia’s top brass have decided that the best way to halt the decline
of Russian airpower capabilities is to upgrade equipment and transform
some air elements into effective anti-terrorist strike
forces. Therefore in 2005 the Russian air force will continue to rely
heavily upon extending the service life of its long-range bombers,
enhance its technological capabilities, and promote the work of its
defense industries on aviation equipment. Unfortunately, little
attention is given to morale, training, and professional standards.

Military transport aviation will see upgrades by the summer of 2005,
according to Viktor Livanov, Director-General of the Ilyushin Aircraft
Corporation. This will entail the installation of new avionics in the
cockpit of the IL-76MD-90, improving the current cockpit management
system with multi-function LCDs. If successful, the technology will be
introduced later in the year into other Russian military transport
aircraft.

Experimental technologies are also being prioritized in an effort to
strengthen the capabilities of the KA-52 (Alligator) helicopter. After
17 successful test flights in 2004, the first quarter of 2005 should
conclude the testing phase for the new Arbalet airborne radar
system. The radar system itself shows high-quality images with a wide
range of detection ranges, making its creators, Fazotron Research
Corporation, believe it superior to the radar system aboard the
U.S. AH-64 (Long Bow) in terms of detection range, precision, and
image quality (Interfax, December 21, 28). Such advances also enhance
the appeal of Russian aviation technology exports.

Moreover, a modernized Tu-160 (Blackjack) long-range bomber will also
be added to the inventory of long-range aircraft by April 2005. The
modernizing of this aircraft, carried out at the Kazan aircraft plant,
has included avionics upgrades, as well as weapons
capabilities. Lieutenant-General Igor Khvorov, commander of the 37th
Air Army, confirmed that work is continuing on upgrading precision
cruise missiles with a range of 3,000 km (Interfax, December 20).

The mainstay of Russian long-range aviation consists of the Tu-160
(Blackjack) supersonic strategic bombers and Tu-95MS (Bear) and
Tu-22M3 (Backfire) strategic bombers. Khvorov emphasized that only one
in three of these aircraft is used regularly, thus allowing many to
pass their service life of 25 years while remaining in good
condition. He therefore believes that the service lives of some
aircraft could be reasonably extended based on an assessment of their
actual state.

Such signs of progress in the Russian air force, placing its emphasis
on cost-cutting and greater reliance on technological upgrades, are
welcomed within the service itself. However, Khvorov also argues that
long-range aviation can be successfully used against Russia’s most
pressing security threat — terrorism. “Long-range aviation has not
been intended for combating terrorists, but times are changing,” he
observed. A feasibility study into the use of such airpower against
terrorist targets, conducted by the Russian air force in the aftermath
of Beslan, appears to signal the possible use of long-range aviation
as an option against terrorists. Although Khvorov readily admits that
it has no role to play in a Beslan type crisis, he equally discounted
the use of “carpet-bombing” during such an operation. Evidently the
Russian air force sees a need to justify the theoretical use of
long-range bombers in the context of international terrorism, though
it does not have any clear picture of what this may involve.

Existing manpower problems, budgeting, and overall standards within
the Russian air force give rise to serious concerns within the Russian
Ministry of Defense. A recent study into the causes of military air
accidents in Russia between 1992-2004 found that five percent of these
accidents resulted from the poor medical service and reduced
efficiency of pilots. According to Lieutenant-General Sergei Solntsev,
head of the armed forces flight safety service, around one-third of
such accidents have been caused by the failure of pilots to comply
with the pre-flight rest routine or even flying while drunk (Interfax,
December 27).

Underlying the publicly touted technical advances in some aspects of
the Russian air force or within army aviation, a culture of decline
persists, with failing pilot standards and little serious systemic
effort to reverse these trends. Yet more alarming is the notion that
long-range bombers may fly against “terrorist” targets, in an
unspecified operational tasking, while the terrorist threat facing
Russia is more likely to involve enemy action within population
centers, rather than insurgents out in the open presenting themselves
as a target for long-range aviation. In reality, as the Russian armed
forces are subjected to increasing political cliches about the need to
restructure into effective forces that can combat terrorism, many
elements within the existing system are promoting their own case for
greater funding on the basis of combating terrorism. At this time,
when there is arguably a greater need for raising the standards of
personnel within the air force, Solntsev observed that military
accident levels are surpassing civilian aviation accidents. Falling
standards among air force personnel cannot be replaced by technology,
but technology is a useful mechanism for deflecting attention from the
decline.

–Roger N. McDermott

ASTANA PONDERS KREMLIN’S “LOST OPPORTUNITIES” IN KAZAKHSTAN

Summing up the main events of the widely hyped “Year of Russia in
Kazakhstan,” policymakers on both sides of the border have good reason
to be disappointed. Even on the secondary level of inter-parliamentary
contacts, leaders are not pleased with the state of bilateral ties.

Speaking at a joint meeting of Russian and Kazakh parliament members
in Almaty, Kazakhstan Senate Chairman Nurtay Abikayev said that the
past decade was a time of “serious ordeals” for both states. “Since
the cornerstone of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s policy is
defending the interests of the Russians in the post-Soviet space, it
is natural that the attention of our neighbor is focused on
Kazakh-Russian relations. But what did we get from the Year of Russia
in Kazakhstan?” asks political analyst Gulbigash Omarova. To maintain
normal relations, Omarova says that first, Putin and his political
environment should stop calling ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan
“compatriots” and, second, Kazakhstan must effectively counter the
Russian media’s interference in Kazakhstan’s domestic
affairs. (Turkistan, December 16).

Some Russian analysts feel disillusioned by the unfulfilled aims of
the Year of Russia in Kazakhstan program, which was designed to draw
Kazakhstan closer to the Russian sphere of political and economic
influence. Political observer Andrei Kurtov notes with unconcealed
regret that Russia has missed many rare opportunities to reinstate its
superpower status in Central Asia. According to Kurtov, Western media
propaganda has significantly helped to smear Russia’s image in the
region by depicting it as an “evil power” and belittling the value of
the Russian language and culture in the face of the unrestrained
spread of American economic and political influence in the
region. Kurtov believes, “The sooner Russia becomes aware that the
position of an outside observer may in fact mean the catastrophic loss
of its influence in the region, the more realistic is the hope that
Moscow will, at least, manage to minimize these losses” (novopol.ru,
December 28).

Given Russia’s weakened position in Ukraine in the wake of
presidential elections there, Kazakhstan is increasingly regarded as
one of Russia’s last bastions in the CIS. While pursuing a
multi-vector policy in security and economic issues, Kazakh officials
always stress their country’s loyalty to Moscow. During his December
22 visit to Moscow, Kazakhstan Prime Minister Danial Akhmetov assured
his Russian counterparts that Russia, as before, is Kazakhstan’s top
foreign policy priority. Akhmetov and Russian officials discussed a
wide range of issues relating to space research, joint construction of
a fuel and energy complex, and joint development of the oil and gas
sector. The most important of these issues is the planned joined
development of the Kurmangazy oil field in West Kazakhstan on a
production-sharing basis, a lucrative deal long sought by
Russia. Government delegations also considered the possibility of
Kazakhstan’s state Kazmunaygaz company and Russia’s Gazprom setting up
a joint venture to process the Karachaganak gas from Kazakhstan at the
Russian gas processing plant in Orenburg (Panorama, December 24).

Many of the issues discussed in Moscow during Akhmetov’s visit,
however, contain nothing new. Talks on Caspian oil, construction of
new highways, and tariffs have dragged on for many years. It is hardly
surprising, given the bureaucratic machinery in both countries, why so
little has been achieved despite so much effort.

Kazakhstan sees economic and political integration with Russia as a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, it needs Russia as an economic
partner (Kazakhstan’s imports from Russia in 2003 totaled $3.27
billion) and security ally. On the other hand, it is reluctant to
sacrifice its economic independence for the sake of integration. One
illustration of this drive for greater independence from Russia is the
construction of the new railroad linking Altynsarino in Kostanai
region (North Kazakhstan) and Khromtau (in West
Kazakhstan). Previously Kazakh trains had to cross Russian territory
to use this route. At the same time, the Kazakh government severed the
1994 accord on the transit of Russian military cargo through
Kazakhstan, arguing that it was an economic burden for the country, as
the agreement allowed Russia to use the transit route without paying
customs duties (Interfax-AVN, December 10).

Russia’s interest in Kazakhstan is not limited to geopolitical and
economic considerations. Kazakhstan also plays a prominent role in
Moscow’s demographic policy. In the early 1990s thousands of ethnic
Russians from Kazakhstan flooded Russian cities, exacerbating the
already complicated housing and employment problems. But now the
process has reversed. In 2003 28,668 Russians from CIS countries
migrated to Kazakhstan for permanent residence. In 2004 the figure
rose to 32,228. Russians are flowing in mainly from Uzbekistan, where
they feel increasingly discriminated against on ethnic grounds
(Central Asian Monitor, December 24).

Despite contradictions and uneasy relations, Kazakhstan and Russia
need each other more than any other neighbors in the region. There is
no other alternative for them other than to build good neighborly
relations.

–Marat Yermukanov

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The Daily Star, Bangladesh
Jan 2 2005

Perspectives
Turkey’s rocky road to EU
M Abdul Hafiz

The Ottomans once entered Europe as conquerors causing a measure of
trepidation among the Europeans who cowered at the Ottomans’
triumphant advance into their continent, traditionally the abode of
Christendom. They could be repulsed from the gate of Vienna only in
1683. But for several centuries the ottomans were the virtual master
of Europe. It is an irony that their descendants today have been
knocking on EU’s door for last forty years to get an entry into
European Union — a regional forum for mutual benefit at the best.
The EU’s public and politicians both have made its membership
discriminatory and are uneasy about Turkey’s large population,
relative poverty and above all Islam, the religion of 70 million
Turks, even though the country has a secular constitution.

When compared with some of the new entrants of EU from former
communist block Turkey is much more deserving case in terms of its
socio-economic advancement. Not only the country has one of the
fastest growing economies of Europe its geographical location is a
strategic asset for Europe. Turkey’s membership of the EU will boost
EU’s global standing, infuse much needed dynamism into EU’ flagging
economy and help Europeans build bridge with the Islamic world as
well as 15 million Muslims living in Europe itself. Also by admitting
a country which has long been member of NATO military alliance but
kept out of EU for a host of political, social and religious reason
— the decision to open entry talks with Ankara — will set the EU on
course for even more significant transformation.

Yet the pronouncement of EU leaders meeting on December 16-17 fell
far short of expectation that they would signal a go-ahead for
membership talk. Instead they offered for talk with strict new
conditions which may indeed be difficult to meet. They want the Prime
Minister Recep Teyyip Erdogan to recognise Greek Cyprus, accept all
time restriction on labour migration to the EU and agree that entry
talks could be put on backburner any time if there is Turkish
slippage on political reforms.

The conditions are indeed disincentive considering that Turkey has
been waiting for the entry into Europe since 1963 when it was given
the associate membership of the European common market. In contrast
last May Slovakia and Estonia joined EU within only four years and
Poland within six years of the negotiation. Two Balkan countries,
Bulgaria and Romania are in the line and would most probably become
member by 2007. For Turkey the observers predict that the entry
negotiations may drag on till 2015. For Turks it is an insult upon
injury.

Although all leading European powers have supported Turkey’s
membership bid but those supports do not seem to be substantiated by
any active steps. Deep down there is a lot of reservations about the
very idea of a large Muslim country becoming the member of virtually
a Christian club. Turkey, it is feared, would overtake Germany, the
EU’ most populous country — a prospect which few Europeans entertain
charitably.

The EU and Turkey took a fateful decision weeks before on the
settlement over Cyprus — much as it is to be desired. But it could
not conceal the collisions between different values and between the
aims of the decision makers and the instinct of their people that lie
ahead. Nothing illustrated so well the disjunction between carefully
formulated common aspiration and the reality of divergent values. The
entry negotiation, if any, is likely to be tough as can be gauged
from the warnings of Romano

Pradi, the chairman of European Commission. He warned that the talks
would not be open-ended and the EU could call off the process if
Ankara did not continue to move forward on reforms. It is in spite of
Ankara staying firm in its drive to ease European concerns. Erdogan
and his ministers have in the mean time spent time sweet-talking EU
leaders and European big business while Turkish artists showcased the
country’s modern and traditional culture. Although Erdogan’s justice
party is also an Islamic party, but very significantly the prime
minister has shed the ex-prime minister Erbakan’s extremist pollicies
and took up a moderate policy which alone could lead to the
conditional ‘yes’ by the EU in October last.

Yet unfortunately many in the EU have, off late, put emotion and
prejudice ahead of rational debate on the pros and cons of Turkey’s
membership. Although Gerhard Schroeder is a supporter of Turkey’s
entry but the biggest opposition to Turkish membership is now found
in Germany where already more than 3m Turks live. The Germans fear
that their country will be

swamped by Turks once they are granted membership of EU which does
not impose any restriction on transborder movement of population.
French President Chirac, once willing to admit Turkey into EU is also
lukewarm now and his country demands that Turkey can at best be given
a privileged relationship with EU, but not membership.

EU fretting over relation with Turkey is not new. The current EU
discussions on the issue has become even more difficult because of
many Europeans’ post 9/11 weariness of Islam and Muslims. As a result
some of the arguments put forward by Turko-sceptics in Europe
illustrate an unabashed anti-Islam bias. At

times their demands almost border on claiming Turks to purge
themselves of past sins — their conduct of the imperial days with
regards to the Slavs or Armenians.

A former EU high-up Frit Bolkestin finds in Turkish entry into EU a
denial of its repulsion from the gate of Vienna. The French Prime
Minister Jean Pierre Raffarin warns against allowing the ‘river of
Islam’ to mingle with European secularism. Former French president
Valery Giscard d’Estaing cautioned that Turkey inside Europe will
mean the end of the bloc’s dream of ever closer union. The attitude
on both sides has recently hardened when Mr Ergodan, the Turkish
prime minister categorically said that Turkey has no intention of
trading its social and cultural values for EU membership.

There are however silver linings for Turkey because it can count on a
number of strong friends and allies, including Britain’s Tony Blair
and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder as well as the leaders of
Spain and Italy. The European Commission itself is on Turkey’s side,
announcing in October last that Ankara had met all the key
pro-democracy and human rights standard to join the EU. It will be
interesting to see whether basically an Asian country with barely 3
percent of its territory lying in Europe will at long last be the
proud member of EU for which it had to wait for 41 years and pass the
litmus test. Even if it does the road will remain rocky till the
last.

Brig ( retd) Hafiz is former DG of BIISS.

Portlan Press Herald
Saturday, January 1, 2005

Despatches

Portland: Orthodox Armenians plan Christmas Mass on Jan. 8

PORTLAND – The city’s Orthodox Armenian community will gather at the
Anglican Cathedral of St. Paul on Jan. 8 to celebrate Christmas Mass for its
traditional holiday, which is celebrated in the Orthodox and Apostolic
Armenian Church according to the Eastern Church calendar on Jan. 6.

The Mass, in Armenian and English, will be celebrated by Father Vartan
Kassabian of St. Gregory’s Armenian Apostolic Church in North Andover, Mass.
This is the second Christmas Mass held in Portland. Hundreds from all over
the state attended last year.

The effort to organize the Mass reflects a renewed interest in Portland’s
Armenian heritage.

Last year, the community dedicated a memorial to the Armenians who had
settled in Portland’s Bayside neighborhood. Last April, St. Paul’s Cathedral
hosted a special service marking the commemoration of the Armenian Genocide
by the Ottoman Empire between 1915 and 1923, when more than 1.5 million
Armenians died. Portland’s Armenian community dates back to the late 19th
century.

Azeri court convicts 21 over Nagorno-Karabakh guerrilla plot

Agence France Presse — English
December 22, 2004 Wednesday 3:52 PM GMT

BAKU Dec 22 — An Azeri court on Wednesday handed down jail sentences
to 21 men found guilty of trying to set up a guerrilla movement with
the aim of wresting the disputed enclave of Nagorno Karabakh from
Armenian control.

The group’s leader, Rovshan Badalov, was sentenced to 10 years
imprisonment on charges of creating an illegal armed group and
purchasing and carrying weapons, according to an AFP correspondent.

Five others, all of them Azeri nationals, were handed suspended
sentences ranging from two to four years. All five were allowed to
walk free at the end of the trial.

Several Azeri non-governmental organisations had urged Baku to release
the men, describing them as “fighters for the country’s sovereignty.”

Azerbaijan fought a war with Armenia in the early 1990s over
Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic Armenian enclave in the heart of
Azerbaijan, that left 35,000 people dead and a million civilians
displaced.

The conflict ended with a ceasefire in 1994 that kept the enclave
under de facto Armenian control. But Baku still claims the territory,
which is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan.

Peace talks have been taking place intermittently for 10 years, under
the mediation of the Minsk Group, to hammer out a permanent solution.

Iran seeking pact with Baku against US attack – Azeri daily

Ayna, Baku
22 Dec 04

Iran seeks to ensure Azerbaijan’s neutral stance in the event of a
US invasion, the Azerbaijani daily Ayna has quoted military sources
as saying. In return, Azerbaijan may receive credits, grants and
support in the settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, the paper
said. Commenting on the report, a military expert pointed out that
a deal with Iran will be of no benefit to Azerbaijan as the USA will
respond to Iran’s rapprochement with Azerbaijan and the country may
be cornered in the international arena. The following is an excerpt
from Sumarinli’s report by Azerbaijani newspaper Ayna on 22 December
headlined “Iran lures Azerbaijan into a secret military pact” and
subheaded “In return for some ‘services’, the Persian regime wants
Baku to take a neutral stance in America’s ‘Iran agenda'”. Subheadings
have been inserted editorially:

A “turn” in Iran’s policy

Iranian Defence Minister Adm Ali Shamkhani is paying a two-day visit
to Azerbaijan, a spokesman for the [Azerbaijani] Defence Ministry,
Capt Ilqar Verdiyev, has told Ayna newspaper.

Shamkhani is scheduled to have the following meetings during the
visit: with Defence Minister Safar Abiyev, with Foreign Minister
Elmar Mammadyarov and with President Ilham Aliyev. No documents are
expected to be signed during the visit, Verdiyev said.

This is the first visit of Shamkhani to Azerbaijan. So far, his
name has figured only in controversial statements aired against
Azerbaijan. He has threatened to carry out strikes on border
territories if there is any threat to Iran, and he has demanded that
Azerbaijan should not provide the military forces of a third country
with access to its territory or to the Caspian (Turan news agency).

Such a turn in the Tehran government’s policy can be explained by
Iran’s serious concerns about prospective US military pressure on the
mullah regime and by its attempts to prevent Azerbaijan’s participation
in the operation. To recap, Iranian Minister of Information
[Intelligence] Ali Yunesi visited Baku on 19 December. However,
Verdiyev said that he disagrees with such reports.

Mooted Iran-Azerbaijan agreements

During his meeting with Abiyev, Shamkhani will discuss a range of
“significant” military and political topics, Ayna has found out
from military sources. Some sources said that several agreements
may be signed during the meeting. Abiyev recently expressed his
concern that military cooperation between Iran and Azerbaijan is not
at the necessary level. During a meeting with the outgoing Iranian
ambassador to Azerbaijan, Ahad Qaza’i, Abiyev said he was dissatisfied
with the level of bilateral military cooperation. Abiyev said then
that Azerbaijan expects more from Iran in the resolution of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

When we consider all this, it becomes clear that Shamkhani’s visit
is not a “factfinding” one. Experts reckon that during the visit,
Iran will try to reach an agreement with the Azerbaijani leadership on
some issues. Certainly, they will clear up some issues regarding the
possibility of Azerbaijan’s participation in a US plan to attack Iran.

What can be promised to Baku in exchange for a neutral stance? Experts
believe that Tehran is ready to offer Azerbaijan cheap credits,
financial assistance grants and so on.

The most important aspect concerns the resolution of the Karabakh
conflict. Iran will announce at international organizations that
it completely supports the Baku government’s position on settling
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, and will restrict its economic,
military and political cooperation with Armenia. In return for these
“services”, Azerbaijan will take a neutral stance on the US plan to
attack Iran. However, will the West, especially the USA, accept such
an accord? The probable course of events is likely to become clear
in the coming months.

In addition to this, Shamkhani’s visit may serve to reinforce
Iran-Azerbaijan military cooperation. Verdiyev shares this view and
does not rule out that Abiyev may visit Iran in the future.

Expert says no benefits for Azerbaijan

“Shamkhani’s visit to Baku was unexpected. By sending its officials
one by one to Azerbaijan, Tehran is presenting Baku with a fait
accompli in the run-up to a US military attack against Iran,” Lt-Col
(retd) Uzeyir Cafarov has told Ayna in an interview. In his opinion,
Baku will come to feel the pain of such relations.

“Granted, Iran is our neighbour. But it is Armenia’s strategic
ally. Let me remind you that during the first Armenian-Azerbaijani
war Armenian servicemen adjusted their artillery from Iran,” Cafarov
said. In Cafarov’s view, the USA is bound to respond to Tehran’s
policy of getting closer with Baku. “The consequences will surface
later. Azerbaijan may be cornered in the international arena,” he said.

Since the South Caucasus is an extremely sensitive region, Azerbaijan’s
foreign policy must be balanced. “One could better see a balanced
policy under [the late president] Heydar Aliyev. However, now this
policy has been ruined,” Cafarov said. No military or political
agreement with Iran will benefit Azerbaijan, he said.

[Passage omitted: Iran’s reaction to statements by American officials]