GOOD GUYS, BAD GUYS: SO WHAT KIND OF GUYS ARE WE?
by Svyatoslav Kaspe
Politkom.ru
Aug 29 2008
Russia
It is this bizarre-sounding question that seems to have become
central to Russian foreign policy (and actually to domestic policy
too) today. However, before trying to substantiate its validity we
should clearly indicate one point that must be taken into account if
the subsequent discussion is to be correctly interpreted.
It is this: There is no doubt that all the outrages that are currently
taking place were initiated by Saakashvili. Of course the bomb was
planted long ago, and moreover by the joint efforts of all the parties
involved; however, it was set off by those who started the assault
on Tskhinvali, that is to say, the Georgian Government. Incidentally,
in the first days of the conflict Georgian officials not only did not
deny, as they do now, the very fact of their massive attack on the
capital of South Ossetia, they actually announced it with unconcealed
pride. Provoking a global crisis in order to resolve problems that
are, in fact, rather minor and partly personal shows an excessive
level of irresponsibility on the part of a political leader.
All of this is beyond dispute. But Saakashvili is the president
of another country, and it is the Georgians who must now live with
what he did and deal with it. It is Russia that should interest us –
and the decisions made by our own authorities.
In fact, as of now, the number of crucial decisions is, strictly
speaking, two. It is too late now to discuss the first one, dated 8
August – the decision on the immediate armed intervention – especially
since it was enforced by the speed of the development of the situation
and with hindsight even seems the only possible decision. The second
is the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. I
think this is a step in the wrong direction. Because it is illogical.
In fact this entire episode is ideally suited to being described in the
well-known terms "good guys" – "bad guys." These terms are generally
used ironically, but without good reason – this is a totally accurate
system of ethical coordinates. The "good guys" do good, the "bad guys"
correspondingly do evil – what could be clearer and, incidentally, more
useful for the needs of the legitimization of political action? So,
in the first days of the development of the crisis a very promising
line could be observed in the associated publicity: We are the
"good guys"; for that reason, and only that reason, we could not
have acted otherwise. I am not saying that it would have been easy to
maintain this line – but we should have tried, with, moreover, a strong
chance of success. It would have been possible to inundate the media
sphere with evidence of the Georgian Army’s crimes; it would have
been possible to flood the conflict zone with Western journalists,
politicians, and experts, rather than being limited to lightning
visits by Hammarberg [EU commissioner for human rights] and Guterres
[UN high commissioner for refugees]; it would have been possible to
express regret and offer apologies for the outrages that occurred,
for instance the deaths of civilians during the bombings of Gori,
rather than issuing stony-faced denials that such instances had ever
happened – ultimately, in war, people make mistakes; that is terrible,
but it is common knowledge. But most importantly, it should have been
stated that Russia remains the guarantor of Georgia’s territorial
integrity even against the will of its own leadership – that is, the
"bad guys" on that side. That the Russian intervention was motivated by
precisely this – first, of course, by the categorical moral imperative
speedily to save civilian lives, and second, by the desire not to allow
Georgia, through its own crazy actions, to close off forever its own
path to reconciliation with the rebel provinces. I repeat – it would
not have been easy; but it would have been possible, given sufficient
patience and the desire. But either one or the other was lacking.
Another, directly opposite line prevailed – we decided to show that
we are real "bad guys." That we are willing to ignore the opinion
of our partners in global cooperation and structures, to ignore the
UN Security Council resolutions that we ourselves signed, and so
forth. That we can act crudely and comment even more crudely on our
actions, presenting the world with a fait accompli. We wanted to be
seen in that way, and we succeeded. Enjoy [word published in English].
But then legitimate suspicions arose that Russia wanted nothing else
from the outset. There is a paradox here: Hitherto we had reproached
the West in general and America in particular for precisely that
kind of behaviour, but now it turns out that Russia regards that
behaviour as normal for itself. And therefore for everyone else too,
thereby repudiating all its recent appeals to international law
and consenting to the irreversibility of its further erosion. The
ambiguity lies in the fact that attempts to follow the first line of
conduct are still continuing in parallel – only now they are becoming
totally unconvincing, and everything useful that was done along those
lines is being devalued. You can be either the "good guys" or the
"bad guys," but not both at once. So, prior to the recognition of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia we had a chance of convincing the world
that there really was genocide taking place in the former. Who will
believe that now? It is now very difficult, if not impossible, to
reverse the general conviction that Russia’s aim from the outset
was precisely and exclusively the dismemberment of Georgia. That,
incidentally, is a bad thing in relation to those who were killed,
whose killers are now hardly likely to be called to account.
However, what is done is done – decisions on such a scale and with
such repercussions cannot be revised. What next? Reassuring parallels
are already being drawn with the Turkish recognition of the Republic
of North Cyprus – there is nothing so terrible about it, people say,
nobody is expelling Turkey from NATO, and the sluggish settlement
process is no particular problem for anyone… The analogy is valid,
but not in that superficial form. Yes, the West has become reconciled
to this case; but only because Turkey provided convincing grounds
to regard it as a case that was not subject to replication in any
circumstances. If it could, for instance, have been placed in the
context of imagined "imperial revanchism," if fears had arisen for the
fate of other territories and peoples that once belonged to the Ottoman
state, if those fears had been extended to, for instance, the Armenians
– then the perception of the Cyprus problem would have been entirely
different. Turkey totally ruled out all such assumptions. Similar
tactics would appear the most productive for Russia today.
What does this require? In general terms – it is necessary to stop
all the frenzied campaigns to the effect that Russia has only "two
allies – the Army and Navy." That was said in the 19th century,
in entirely different historical conditions (and incidentally,
like almost every bon mot, it is factually inaccurate – it was under
[Czar] Alexander III, in 1891, that the Russian-French alliance from
which the Entente eventually grew was concluded). Of course, it is
wittily expressed – however, people should think about what it means
to apply this vision to ourselves in today’s realities. What, in the
21st century, do people usually call a country that nobody loves,
that nobody trusts, that is feared and which really does have no
allies (and the restrained – to put it mildly – atmosphere in which
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit took place shows that we
might even come to that)? Rogue state [preceding two words published
in English and then in Russian]. Who could want that for their country?
Really – very few people, no doubt; with the exception, of course,
of a few ardent campaigners and propagandists who were stunned in
their childhood by A.V. Mityayev’s Book of Future Commanders [Soviet
children’s military encyclopedia] (which in itself is not such a
terrible thing – it is a good book) and preserved their ideas of
war all their lives at approximately the same level and within the
framework of the same colourful, cheerful aesthetics, concealing the
blood and mud of real war (and that is a terrible thing). In their
longed-for isolation they would enjoy unhindered the erotic tremors
that the very word "war" provokes in them. There have already been
fairly convincing diagnoses of Saakashvili’s psychological condition,
based on his publicly eating his own necktie and other striking
scenes involving him; I think many of the texts that have generously
fertilized our public space in recent days could also provide valuable
clinical material. But these are ultimately only the publicists; where
the decisions are made, the situation is, as far as one can tell,
different. Also, admittedly, dangerous.
War, as the Greatest Game of all games devised by mankind, grips people
for real. Moreover, it really is possible to win; in particular,
practically all the players directly or indirectly involved have
gained significant bonuses from the South Ossetian war (analyses to
that effect have already appeared in abundance). The only losers are
the dead; they are always the losers. For those who remain at the
table and fling down more and more chips that turn into corpses, it
is psychologically difficult to stop – even the growing sense that
"something terrible is coming" is stifled by the desire to remain
just a little longer out in the open, to be in the Game if only for a
little while more. But the good player is the one to take his profit
in good time. Prior to the de jure recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia (incidentally, de facto recognition could have been developed
without hindrance and to any convenient extent), Russia could have
done this and both remained in credit and retained its reputation as
the "good guy." The moment was lost. Now there is still a chance to
withdraw completely and finish the game at zero – but with every day
that the standoff with the West escalates, that chance fades and the
game begins to slip below zero. And the risks increase, because then
what is left is the desperate hope of regaining ground by raising
the stakes, even if the game is played with borrowed funds and for
the shirt on your back. We all know how that ends. You should wind
up the game quickly, leave the casino, and get your breath back,
before the losses become catastrophic.
What might this advice mean, not metaphorically, but in more concrete
terms? Here is a snapshot of a few points:
– it should be made quite definitely clear that the aims that Russia
was pursuing when it entered into the conflict have in general
been achieved and that there is not and never was any of the alleged
crypto-politics behind it, such as the total occupation of Georgia and
the overthrow of its president (which certainly does not mean that we
should start talking to Saakashvili again as if nothing had happened);
– it should be made quite definitely clear that Russia is not planning
any similar operations with regard to its other neighbours or their
territories, first and foremost Ukraine and Crimea (because wild
fantasies to that effect have already begun to proliferate);
– the plan prepared a long time ago by Russia for a Moldovan-Dniester
Region settlement should be brought into operation quickly and even
at an accelerated pace – this plan is based on a principle that
is diametrically opposed to what happened in Georgia, that of the
restoration of the territorial integrity of Moldova as an independent
state. If somebody in the Dniester Region has decided to torpedo the
plan and warm their hands on the fire in Tskhinvali, those hands
should be cut off, which, fortunately, there is every opportunity
to do. This – that is, an entirely different kind of "coercion to
peace" – would be a very strong move, since it would block or at
least radically deaden talk of the Russian-Georgian situation being
a potential precedent, letting it remain as merely an isolated case.
– Russia should declare its readiness to restore cooperation with
the West in full at any moment and call for joint efforts to bring
that moment closer;
– the cursing and insults should stop. Nothing else was to be
expected of Rogozin [Russian representative to NATO); but the highly
intellectual foreign minister could have expressed himself a little
more elegantly (not about Saakashvili – here it really is difficult
to restrain oneself, nor is it particularly necessary – but about
his G8 colleagues).
"That seems simple." Not at all, in fact – the inertia is building,
the next step into the abyss appears necessary simply because it flows
logically from the growing sum of the steps already taken. With every
day it becomes increasingly difficult to turn aside from the road,
to leave the game, to think things over and begin a new game. This
applies to all those involved in the events – but we should think about
our own measure of responsibility, and that is very great. Certain
historical analogies can impose themselves very forcefully. Once,
under very similar circumstances, all the players in the "European
casino" committed collective suicide simultaneously, and each of them
individually, until the last moment, seemed to be an intelligent,
rational being. That was also in August. August 1914. God forbid.