KARABAKH ONE OF RUSSIA’S ‘FEW DIPLOMATIC TOOLS OF INFLUENCE’ IN CAUCASUS
news.az
Sept 1 2011
Azerbaijan
News.Az interviews Dr Neil Melvin, programme director at the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
How do you assess the security situation in the South Caucasus,
especially over the past three years since the five-day war between
Russia and Georgia?
The war between Russia and Georgia marked a shift in relations between
the West and Russia, although the roots of the shift predated the war
itself. Nonetheless the war made clear to many in Europe and North
America that any further enlargement east of the Western model of
relations would be met with all instruments by Russia, including
force. This has been a key element that has informed the US reset
policy with Russia and the EU’s own efforts to promote a modernization
partnership with Moscow.
The conflict also marked a further weakening of the OSCE as a security
framework and laid bare the incompatibility of Russian-led security
and political aims and those of the EU and USA in much of the region.
The war also brought into focus the shift of the Russian Federation on
policies of sovereignty, which in the case of Kosovo it had trumpeted
on the international stage, to embrace redrawing borders ~V the
effective annexation of South Ossetia and to a lesser degree Abkhazia.
This is clearly alarming for many of Russia’s neighbours.
How did this war affect the resolution of the conflict between the
two other Caucasian states – Azerbaijan and Armenia?
The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has not been directly affected
by the Russia-Georgia war, except in two main dimensions. The war
highlighted the fragility of the Caucasus region as a whole with
conflict raging in the North Caucasus, the situation in Georgia and
the tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Second, the Russia-Georgia war made apparent the weakening role of
Russia in the region – short of the exercise of absolute force – and
the growing instability over great power relations in the region –
the US, EU, Turkey, Russia and to a much lesser degree Iran.
It is this difficult position for Russia that has in large part lain
behind the efforts of President Medvedev to position Russia as the key
mediator of the NK conflict – so far unsuccessfully. This role is one
of the few diplomatic tools of influence left to Russia in the region.
The United States have seemingly taken a lesson from the August war.
Do you share the view that Russia’s tough action weakened US activeness
in the region? What can the Americans do today to offset Russian
influence in this region?
The Russia-Georgia war and the election of President Obama have seen
a shift in US policy in Eurasia and globally. President Obama drew
the lessons from the war of the risks that would be involved in a
further deterioration of relations with Putin’s Russia.
Moreover, Eurasia – or indeed Europe – is not a priority region for
the US as its strategic interests have shifted to the Middle East,
Afghanistan and Asia – except where the countries of the region can
assist Washington in achieving its aims in other parts of the world.
This is the essence of the reset policy; the US seeks Russian
cooperation on the Iranian nuclear issues, Afghanistan and so forth.
The US will likely seek to balance Russian policy in the South Caucasus
but will not aim to challenge directly Moscow’s position.