IS IT TIME FOR AN ANTI-TURKEY COALITION?
By Michael Rubin
American Enterprise Institute
Oct 27 2011
Kurds and Kurdistan have never felt so much promise. Federalism
in Iraq is secure. Iraqi Kurdistan attracts billions of dollars in
investment, Masud Barzani no longer needs a borrowed Turkish passport
to travel abroad, and the Kurdistan Regional Government has offices
which act as virtual embassies in Washington, London, and other major
capitals. It is ironic, therefore, that against this progress, Kurds
wield so little influence over the issues about which Kurds inside
and outside Iraqi Kurdistan most care.
After Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK] members attacked Turkish military
outposts in the early morning hours of October 19, Nechirvan Barzani,
a former prime minister who retains the power of that post, rushed
to Ankara to try to defuse any retaliation. He failed. So too did
regional president Masud Barzani, who placed an emergency phone call
to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Turkish President Abdullah Gul
vowed revenge and dispensed with the notion for proportionality that
Turkey demands from others. “No one should forget that those who are
inflicting this pain upon us will suffer in multitudes,” Gul declared.
Thereafter, Turkish jets bombed targets in Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkish
tanks reportedly crossed the border. While Turkish officials say they
have killed several hundred PKK members, such declarations cannot
be taken at face value. Turkish authorities label any Kurd killed
in such bombardment as a terrorist, regardless of reality. Civilians
often pay the price. Turkey has yet to apologize or pay compensation,
for example, to the families of the seven Kurdish civilians killed
in an August strike. Nor has the Kurdish government forced Turkey to
provide proof the any recent attacks inside Turkey had a cross-border
component.
The failure of Kurdish leaders to fulfill their diplomatic agenda
extends beyond the latest Turkish incursion. After all, even before
the Hakari attacks, the Turkish Army stationed more than 1,000 troops
stationed on mountains and around villages several kilometers across
the Iraqi and Iraqi Kurdish border. Indeed, as much as Turkey’s Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu frames his country’s foreign policy as seeking
good relations with all its neighbors, the fact remains that Turkey
is the only aspirant to the European Union that unabashedly occupies
other countries. Turkish occupation in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan,
as well as in Cyprus suggests the true meaning of neo-Ottomanism.
Turkey’s occupations, however, provide the Kurdistan Regional
Government with an opportunity. On September 2, 2011, Egemen BagıÅ~_,
Turkey’s Minister for European Union Affairs, threatened Cyprus with
military action. Should that European Union member not stop oil
exploration in international waters off its coast, BagıÅ~_ said,
that Turkey might respond militarily. “That’s what a navy is for,”
he quipped.
While Arab states focused on the simultaneous rupture in the
Israel-Turkey partnership, Turkey’s bellicosity toward Cyprus was the
subject of greater concern not only in Nicosia and Athens, but also
in many other European capitals. Apart, neither Cyprus nor Kurdistan
has much leverage. Turkey’s 37-year occupation of Cyprus is seldom
front page news in Washington, London, or any other country. While
former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer tries to broker
an agreement, and occasionally UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
makes statements about the need to resolve the conflict, lack of
international interest condemns Cyprus to continued division.
Of all Turkey’s neighbors, it is the Armenians who have the greatest
influence in Washington. Corollary Armenian Diaspora groups are also
influential in London, Paris, and across Europe. In the United States,
at least, the Armenian lobby has failed repeatedly in its principle
goal to win American recognition of Armenian genocide by Ottoman
Turks in World War I.
Alas, the Armenians can join the Kurds, Cypriots, and perhaps Greeks
as well in eschewing coalitions in a failed attempt to go it alone. If
those victimized or threatened by Turkey, however, would pool their
resources and demands, each group may find its influence amplified
exponentially. Kurds who seek recognition of the Anfal as genocide
might solicit the support of Armenian counterparts, but also must
be willing to offer support as well. Kurdish officials should be
outspoken in support of Greek Cyprus, and should leverage Cypriot
and Greek influence to ensure that a Turkish withdrawal from Iraq
and Kurdistan becomes a European Union platform.
In mature diplomacy, coalitions are essential. The Kurdish Caucus in
Congress is more symbolic than effective. True diplomacy should extend
beyond wining and dining congressmen whose concern about Kurdistan
is fleeting and limited by the next election. With the Americans
withdrawing from Iraq–a milestone that should evoke memories of 1975
in Kurdistan and 1991 in Iraq–it is essential that Kurdistan’s rulers
understand their limitations. There are issues more important than oil
deals and real estate. While it is natural that rulers inexperienced
on the world stage fret more about the intricacies of protocol than
broader issues, it is time the Kurdish representatives stationed abroad
are able to talk fluently about broader issues. Kurdish communities
should lend their support to Greek Cypriots, and demand that they,
in exchange, make clear that Turkish policy has gone awry not only
in the Eastern Mediterranean, but in other areas as well.
Kurds should be proud of their achievements, but they are not as solid
as they once were. That the Kurds have no friends but the mountains
will simply be an epitaph unless Kurdish leaders become far more apt
at building alliances than they are now.
Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at AEI
http://www.aei.org/article/104340