Today’s Zaman, Turkey
Aug 19 2012
Waiting for a success story: Eastern partnership
AMANDA PAUL
The EU began to strengthen its policies towards its eastern neighbors
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) following
the 2004 enlargement.
Not wanting to create a new Iron Curtain, the European Neighbourhood
Policy aimed to create an area of stability, security and prosperity
embedded in EU values. Then-European Commission President Romano Prodi
had pointed to a ring of well governed countries and a community of
values where fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are respected.
This was never going to be easy. All six countries face serious
challenges ranging from weak governance and rule of law to pandemic
corruption, unresolved conflicts and economic underdevelopment. The
fact that a number of the countries remained entrenched to different
degrees in a Soviet style of thinking has also been a considerable
obstacle for their transformation. Throwing off this legacy has proven
difficult and been exacerbated by meddling from Russia in an effort to
keep these nations in its sphere of influence.
The EU has become more of a factor in all these countries. It has
become the biggest trading partner of a number of the states including
Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Georgia. The EU has taken on a more active
role in the resolution of the four protracted conflicts in the region
(Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia), while
Moldova and Ukraine have joined the EU’s Energy Community.
Yet at the same time the EU has been unable to make progress in
bringing about greater levels of democracy and adherence to EU values
and in some cases some states have backtracked. This led to the
introduction of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009. The EaP was
enriched with the new instruments aimed at accelerating political
association and economic integration between the EU and partner
countries. Association Agreements and, for those countries that were
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) were put on the table. The EU introduced its
`more for more’ or `less for less’ approach, and it created a
structure for comprehensive bilateral and multilateral cooperation
that includes the involvement of the EaP states, the EU institutions
and member states, as well as non-governmental actors including civil
society and structures such as EURONEST and the Local Authorities and
Business Forum.
Unfortunately, the EU is still waiting for a success story. Ukraine,
which is the most important country in the EaP, has been the biggest
disappointment. While Ukraine has finalized an Association Agreement
and DCFTA, signing has been held up due to concerns regarding the rule
of law, backsliding in democracy and selective justice. Belarus also
represents a big failure, with the country stuck in authoritarianism.
Paradoxically, while the EU has placed sanctions on the county —
because the oil and gas sector has not been included — trade with the
EU has increased.
More positively, Moldova and Georgia have made progress. However, in
Moldova the reluctance of coalition partners to cooperate with the
opposition, and sometimes with each other, on policymaking has
compromised effective governance and reform. While Georgia’s
leadership has been accused of centralizing power, this power has been
used to push through reforms. Still the upcoming October 1
parliamentary elections will be a crucial test.
This is a disappointing outcome and seems to be a consequence of two
things: The costs of reforms promoted by the EU in neighboring
countries proved to be too high, while the incentives provided by the
ENP were too weak. The EaP has also proven to be quite a weak
instrument for transformation, as it relies on enlargement policy
tools without offering a prospect of accession. Furthermore, while the
EaP is built on conditionality, its incentives and financial support
are often viewed as not being sufficient to compensate stakeholders
for what they feel would be lost through reforms. For example, while
the benefits of a DCTFA may be good in the long term, in the short
term they represent an economic loss. Furthermore, where tangible
benefits can be derived, for example, on the easing of visas, the EU
has often been slow in delivering. Furthermore, the EU’s preoccupation
with its internal agenda, the global economic crisis and the Arab
Spring has impacted on its foreign policy outreach and thinking.
Moreover, the EU’s insipid approach also reflects divisions among
member states over what the ultimate objective is for these countries.
For countries such as the Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, their
geostrategic choice is the EU, yet the EU has been unwilling to
recognize this, let alone consider putting the much-longed-for
membership perspective on the table. The EU needs a success story, yet
this is going to require a `rethink.’ More so because other players
are strengthening their hands in the region bringing with them
enticing projects: including Turkey, China and an increasingly
assertive Russia with its Eurasian Union.