ANALYST GIRAGOSIAN: LEVEL OF DISCONTENT NOT UNDERSTOOD BY ARMENIAN GOVERNMENT
Today’s Zaman
Feb 24 2013
Turkey
The recent re-election of Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan has seen
large protests in the South Caucasus country, and this week’s guest
for Monday Talk says the opposition to Sarksyan is growing.
“The official election results are challenged by many, but more
importantly, the current political struggle is less about the specific
results, and more about the opposition to the current government,”
said Richard Giragosian, founding director of the Regional Studies
Center (RSC), an independent think tank located in Armenia’s capital
of Yerevan.
Last Friday, thousands of people protested in Yerevan against the
re-election of Sarksyan, asserting that the opposition party leader,
Raffi Hovhannisian, was the real winner.
Answering our questions, Giragosian elaborated on the issue.
First of all, I’d like to hear your comments in regards to Armenia’s
presidential election. International observers are saying it was an
improvement on recent elections but was not genuinely competitive. Do
you agree?
Despite another lost opportunity for significantly better, improved
and freer and fair elections, Armenia’s incumbent president, Serzh
Sarksyan, was re-elected. According to the official results, which are
disputed and criticized by many in Armenia, Sarksyan reportedly secured
58.6 percent of the vote, with his main challenger, Raffi Hovhannisian
garnering 36.7 percent of the vote. Most significantly, Hovhannisian
won a decisive 70 percent of the vote in the country’s second-largest
city, Gyumri, and also won in Vanadzor, the third-largest city,
as well as in significant sections of the capital Yerevan.
But in many ways, for the Armenian president, his re-election may be
the easier part, especially as the opposition is now uniting behind
Hovhannisian and as protests mount. Over the longer term as well,
for the next Armenian president, no matter who it is, the real
challenge now is to address the pressing policy challenges that
continue to hinder the country. Although these issues were missing
from the presidential campaign, the combination of economic crisis
and insufficient political reform present serious challenges. And
although many expected President Sarksyan to be re-elected, that
prediction does not infer support, and the government needs to regain
public trust and restore confidence.
What was the reason behind his re-election if he has been losing
public trust? Do you think Mr. Sarksyan has a plan to regain public’s
confidence?
Sarksyan’s victory was due in large part to two main factors. First,
through the campaign, an open division between prominent opposition
figures, whose inability to unite, prevented the opposition from
coalescing and uniting behind any one personality or consensus
candidate. In this way, the division of the opposition only helped
Sarksyan. Nevertheless, more interestingly, the opposition is now
uniting behind Hovhannisian and, although it is a belated post-election
move, it does reflect a new trend of momentum among the anti-Sarksyan
camp, now transforming into a dynamic opposition movement standing
behind Hovhannisian.
The second reason for the outcome was the factor of incumbency. More
specifically, Sarksyan benefited from both the natural advantage
of incumbency, whereby the president could rely on the trappings of
office and leverage his position and obvious name recognition, and by
the unnatural advantage of incumbency, involving the use of so-called
“administrative resources,” with pressure on teachers, civil servants
and others to support him. At the same time, the now well-documented
behavior of local and regional officials, who generally know no better
than to “fix” or “rig” an election by intimidating voters, interfered
in the vote and, as in the cases of past elections, engaged in voting
irregularities and violations.
‘One-third of the Armenian population lives in poverty’ The
proportion of people living below the poverty line has been growing
in Armenia. How would you describe Armenia’s current economic
situation? Why have serious economic and political reforms been
delayed?
With roughly one-third of the Armenian population now living
in poverty, widening disparities in wealth and income and with
little progress in terms of job creation, the main challenge for
any government will be in managing the mounting economic pressure,
which is only exacerbated by the entrenched power and position of the
country’s so-called “oligarchs.” Moreover, the Armenian government will
be hard pressed to overcome the structural impediments of corruption
and the low level of tax collection. And as the imperative for
second-generation reforms mounts, Armenia will have to both deepen and
accelerate economic reforms, thereby tackling and taking on powerful
vested interests. But the inherent promise of Armenia’s ongoing
negotiations with the European Union over a Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Agreement [DCFTA] offers a new opportunity to overcome the
peril of economic stagnation and isolation. Yet, the danger for Armenia
is that its potential only continues to far outweigh its real success.
The attempted assassination of one candidate and another’s hunger
strike dominated news from Armenia before the election? What should
we read from all this? What does it reflect about politics in Armenia?
The shooting of Armenian presidential candidate Paruyr Hayrikyan
obviously disrupted the course and the discourse of the campaign,
demonstrated by a shift in both public attention and political
debate away from policy issues to an intense focus on speculation
and conspiracy theories related to the assault. As the campaign
was already flawed by a pronounced absence of more serious policy
issues or real political debate, the impact of the shooting was only
a further erosion of the content of the campaign.
Despite the impact on the campaign, the shooting actually had no
real impact on the election itself. In political terms, although the
shooting of the candidate triggered a natural surge in media coverage,
Hayrikyan remained a marginal candidate, as the greater public
attention did not translate into any larger political standing. But
the incident also tended to embarrass the government, even though it
is now seen as an isolated and a more personal than political act.
Mr. Hovhannisian came a distant second place in the election. And
he called himself the real winner and called on Sarksyan to concede
defeat. What do you think about Hovhannisian’s claim?
The level of discontent has not been understood by the Armenian
government, and the level of political activism is increasing, as
much of the country’s various opposition forces are now standing
behind Hovhannisian. But they are more significantly uniting against
the government.
Are the election results certain now?
The official election results are challenged by many, but more
importantly, the current political struggle is less about the specific
results and more about the opposition to the current government. In
this way, the campaign is continuing, even beyond the election itself.
Has Hovhannisian announced any plans about what he will do if Sarksyan
ignores his ultimatum?
The opposition to Sarksyan is only growing, with both a more dynamic
scale and an expanding scope, which means that it is too soon to
assess strategy as events remain too fluid, at least at this point.
But yes, there is a general, and perhaps dangerous, lack of clear
or coherent strategy behind this newfound momentum of opposition to
the government. But in order to succeed, there must be a strategic
articulation of more concrete demands and more precise political goals.
‘Ter-Petrosyan now seems to be leaning toward Hovhannisian’ Why did
Sarksyan’s most serious potential rivals — former President Levon
Ter-Petrosyan and Prosperous Armenia party leader Gagik Tsarukyan
— announce in December that they would not participate in the
election? Have they commented on the results?
Ironically, this election was also defined by who chose not to
run. In December 2012, millionaire businessman Gagik Tsarukyan, the
leader of the country’s second-largest Prosperous Armenia political
party, disappointed many of his supporters by deciding not to stand
as a candidate, explaining that his party would neither field nor
support a candidate. That decision, only days after a rare meeting
with President Sarksyan, ended months of speculation over what was
perceived as the most serious challenge to the incumbent president.
Although stemming from the fact that Prosperous Armenia was never able
to fully present itself as a true opposition party after serving as
such an integral part of the first Sarksyan administration, the move
also reflects the decline of the power and standing of the party, which
never seemed able to recover from a disappointing, less-than-expected
performance in the May 2012 parliamentary elections.
Only weeks after the decision by the Prosperous Armenia Party to
withhold its participation in the election, Armenia’s first president,
68-year-old Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the leader of the opposition ANC
(Armenian National Congress) and the 2008 challenger to Sarksyan,
also announced that he would not stand for the presidency. For its
part, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) also failed to
field a candidate, breaking with the party’s past practice of nearly
always putting forward a presidential candidate, no matter how weak
or marginal the candidate.
More importantly, through this new post-election political crisis,
the Prosperous Armenia Party is predictably silent, as they are a
declining, and even questionable or dubious “opposition.” But more
surprisingly, former President Ter-Petrosyan now seems to be leaning
toward Hovhannisian.
Do you expect conflict in Armenia because of public discontent, similar
to what was seen in the deadly post-election confrontations in 2008,
between Ter-Petrosyan supporters and security forces?
Given the broader situation and underling discontent, the situation
may be moving toward a more heated and intense conflict, similar
to 2008, which was never fully resolved. It is simply too early
to say, however, and depends more on the government’s reaction,
or overreaction, to this mounting crisis.
‘Turkey-Armenia normalization depends on Ankara as Armenia is ready,
willing’
As President Sarksyan has won a new five-year term, what should we
expect in regards to dormant Turkey-Armenia relations especially
as 2015, the centennial of the events of 1915, is approaching? Some
observers see it as an opportunity for Turkey to improve Turkey-Armenia
relations, but others do not agree with this. What is your opinion?
In terms of foreign policy, a second, final term may also further
allow President Sarksyan to look for new, bold ideas or initiatives in
foreign policy, similar to his politically risky but bold initiative in
Armenian-Turkish normalization, thereby presenting an opportune time
for crafting a real and lasting legacy. Thus, from this perspective,
the re-election of Sarksyan to a second term may actually represent
more of a first term, as a fresh start. And the imperative now is to
tackle a litany of serious and unresolved strategic challenges that
have gone largely unaddressed during this presidential campaign.
Why do you think this issue was not addressed during this presidential
campaign? Is there now less public support for Turkey-Armenia
normalization? Do you think the Armenian government is willing to
get back on track with normalization with Turkey?
The issue of normalization is now widely and correctly seen as a
non-issue, until and only when Turkey decides to return. Armenia is
ready and willing, but Armenian patience is not without limits.
Do you think the Turkish government is willing to get back on track
with normalization with Turkey?
This is a good question but needs to be directed to officials in
Ankara. But I can say that since the launch of the so-called “football
diplomacy” over the “normalization” process between Armenia and Turkey,
official, state-level engagement has been suspended, with the issue
now a hostage to internal domestic Turkish politics. But there are
renewed signs of optimism, as several factors are now may drive Turkey
to re-engage and return to negotiations. First, as Turkey feels under
mounting pressure over the Armenian genocide, which will only peak
in 2015, as commemorations mark the 100th anniversary of the 1915
genocide, Ankara may be motivated to seek a “restart” in efforts to
normalize relations with Armenia.
Second, more broadly, in terms of the outlook for Armenian-Turkish
normalization, however, the situation remains largely dependent on
Turkey. In this way, the general perception and policy in Armenia is
one of waiting for Turkey to make the first move. But the danger, in a
broader context, is that if Turkey does not return to the normalization
process soon, Armenian patience will lessen, and it may actually make
the next stage of diplomacy even harder and more difficult.
Would you elaborate on this idea? What can Armenia do?
For its part, beyond waiting for Turkey, Armenia can better leverage
those venues where Armenia and Turkey regularly engage and enjoy
unofficial diplomatic relations, most notably within the Organization
of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), for example, an
institution where both Armenia and Turkey are founding members.
PROFILE: Richard Giragosian Giragosian is the founding director of
the Regional Studies Center (RSC), an independent think tank located
in Yerevan, Armenia. He also serves as both a visiting professor
and senior expert at Yerevan State University’s Centre for European
Studies (CES) and is a contributing analyst for Oxford Analytica,
a London-based global analysis and advisory firm.
Giragosian was previously a regular contributor to Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) publications, from 1999-2008, and
also served as a contributing analyst for the London-based Jane’s
Information Group, covering political, economic and security issues
in the South Caucasus, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region,
from 2003-2010. For nine years, Giragosian served as a professional
staff member of the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) of the US Congress.