YOU CANNOT UNDERSTAND RUSSIA WITH YOUR MIND. QUOD LICET JOVI NON LICET BOVI”
Hayots Ashkharh [in Armenian], Armenia
July 3 2013
by Lilit Poghosyan
[Correspondent] Do you agree that the Russia-Azerbaijan deal on the
sales of about one-billion-dollar worth weapons does not threaten
to upset the balance of forces in the region? Russia is following
the developments closely and will not allow for the violation of the
balance of forces to the detriment of the Armenian side?
[Atanesyan] I am not a military expert but I do not agree with those
Armenian political and military experts who say that the balance
[of forces] will not be upset because of that. It is one thing
when we speak about general criteria and quite another when we see a
concrete move, as a result of which the opponent [Azerbaijan] acquires
ultra-modern offensive weapons and military equipment of Russian make.
I tend to think that the Russian side was guided by its business
interests. However, in that case it is unclear what the expression
means. Does it mean Russia is watching Azerbaijan getting armed?
Weapons sale deal Russia’s “gift” to Azeri leader ahead of vote
It is certainly a matter of the relations between two sovereign states
– Russia and Azerbaijan. However, here a question emerges. Why is
this being discussed now despite the fact that the deal was concluded
in 2012 and its provisions have not been fulfilled yet? Judging from
Azerbaijani press reports, the weapons have not been supplied yet.
[Correspondent] Do you have an answer to this question?
[Atanesyan] I believe it is Russia’s “gift” to Ilham Aliyev.
Azerbaijan is on the threshold of [the presidential] election and the
Russian side provides a political cart blanche to the Azerbaijani
president through publicising this deal or allowing Azerbaijan to
publicise it – in order that Aliyev is portrayed as an influential
political figure, who is ready to settle the Karabakh issue in a
military way.
It is up to diplomats to discuss whether this is a message to the
Armenian sides as well [Armenia and Karabakh] – a message that
Azerbaijan may use weapons.
[Correspondent] There is an opinion that the Russian side does this to
hinder Armenia’s European integration process – warning Armenia that,
mildly speaking, it does not approve of the forthcoming signing of
the association agreement with the EU.
[Atanesyan] If that logic were behind Russia’s moves, it would not
be selling weapons to Azerbaijan at all. Yesterday, rather high
level meetings and discussions were held as part of the visit of
the US assistant secretary of defence in Baku. As far as I know, the
female official [US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Russia,
Ukraine and Eurasia Ms. Evelyn N. Farkas] was received by Aliyev.
Moreover, it was announced a few days ago that the Sah Daniz [Shah
Deniz] consortium finally selected the trans-Adriatic pipeline for
exports of natural gas from the Caspian basin. This is a serious
competitive challenge for [Russia’s gas supply company] Gazprom,
which is the monopolist in the European gas market.
At this point it is appropriate to recall the words of the Russian
poet: “You cannot understand Russia with your mind.”
[Correspondent] Do you agree that everything was clear with Azerbaijan
anyway, and Russia did not pin any special hopes on Azerbaijan,
whereas in the case of “losing” Armenia Russia may lose its last
loyal ally in the South Caucasus.
[Atanesyan] I said in this respect that this could have been Russia’s
message to the Armenian sides.
However, I do not know how fair it is. I understand that this statement
may sound politically naive but the factor of honesty and gallantry
should be present in relations between Russia and Armenia.
In this regard Russia’s move [selling weapons to Azerbaijan] is not
understandable. This deal seems very dubious to me.
Russia cannot control use of weapons it sold to Azerbaijan
[Correspondent] Some experts mention, as a “mitigating circumstance”,
that Azerbaijan would purchase those weapons anyway and that we should
be happy that out strategic ally [Russia], as a supplier country,
has the opportunity to control the arms race.
[Atanesyan] I do not agree with this opinion. How can Russia control?
Could it, let us say, potentially use T-90 tanks during hostilities?
[Could it exercise control] by means of a remote control? Is Azerbaijan
a fool to buy weapons and military equipment to the tune of one
billion dollars not to be able to use it?
If this is about mechanisms of political restraint, then Russia as
a co-chair country in the OSCE Minsk Group already has levers to
restrain Azerbaijan.
However, the most efficient lever of political restraint would be
not selling weapons to the side of the conflict which permanently
threatens the two other sides with resumption of hostilities.
Russia’s “policy of double standards”
[Correspondent] Moreover, the Russian president at one point deplored
the fact that Georgia was getting armaments, saying that supply of
weapons to a conflict zone is a crime.
[Atanesyan] Under the circumstances, it is probably appropriate to
use the expression, Quod licet Jovi non licet bovi .[Latin for what is
allowed for Jupiter, is not allowed for a bull – reference to double
standards policy].
However, this does not fit into healthy logics. Anyway, weapons are
not jewellery and Aliyev did not spend one billion dollars to buy
jewellery for his wife. If the deal was about jewellery one could
say easily that this deal was business.
However, when offensive military equipment is sold, especially in
the quantity which breaks all limits set for Azerbaijan under the
[Treaty on Conventional Weapons in Europe], it only remains to guess
the purpose behind this move.
Russia seeking to maintain influence in region
[Correspondent] The possibility of the resumption of hostilities
is seriously discussed by Russian politicians and experts. They say
that Azerbaijan is getting ready for a war. Do you think the risk of
resumption of hostilities has increased?
[Atanesyan] If we put aside our national pre-disposition towards Russia
– essentially the last possibility for Russia to maintain influence
in the Caucasus and, especially, South Caucasus, is a force majeure.
Unfortunately, since it became independent, Russia has failed to
manage separatist sentiments in the North Caucasus or to propose its
close neighbours such models of development which may be acceptable
and appealing to all sides.
As a nuclear superpower Russia seeks to maintain zones of influence
and the only way to solve the matter is through a force majeure.
The five-day war in 2008 [Russian-Georgian war] was a vivid example
of that. Unfortunately, the Russian-Azerbaijani military-technical
cooperation fits into this context.
Armenia to withstand challenges through national consensus on Karabakh,
security
[Correspondent] What should Armenia do in order to counteract these
threats?
[Atanesyan] I do not want to portray the situation as tragic, but it
is necessary to make more pragmatic decisions and counteract potential
challenges in a practical and efficient way.
This may be done, in the first place, through modernization [as given]
of the domestic situation in Armenia and Nagornyy Karabakh and the
reaching of a national consensus on most important issues, such as
security and the Karabakh settlement.
Another way, is, of course, the declaration of the political
perspective of searching alternatives or orienting oneself towards
an alternative in the political field [as given].
This may become an important counterbalance, a serious external
political resource for withstanding threats.
[Translated from Armenian]