SYRIAN QUESTION: CAUCASUS ECHO
Politkom.ru, Russia
Sept 9 2013
by Sergey Markedonov, visiting fellow of the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies (Washington, United States)
[Translated from Russian]
The Syria situation has today moved to the top of the international
agenda. International military intervention in the civil conflict
in this Middle East country led by the United States could have
consequences that go far beyond the confines of one individual region
of the world. What sort of influence have the events in Syria already
exerted and could yet exert on the countries of the Greater Caucasus?
The republics of the Transcaucasus and also the Russian North Caucasus
(nine components in the Russian Federation if we count the national
republics together with Stavropol and Krasnodar krays) have no common
borders with Syria. But many threads connect them with this Middle
East country. First, states of the South Caucasus directly border Iran
and Turkey. Iran has a border with Armenia and Azerbaijan (including
an outlet to the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) over 660
km long. The total length of Turkey’s borders with Transcaucasus
formations is more than 500 km. It is variously estimated that from
2.5 million to 7 million natives of the Caucasus region reside today
on the territory of the Turkish Republic. Both Tehran and Ankara are
most active participants in the events in Syria here. And whereas Iran
consistently supports Bashar al-Assad, Turkey just as insistently
advocates his ouster and is expressing its readiness to support
military intervention on the part of the United States and its allies.
Second, the Caucasus states have their own complex dynamics of
bilateral relations with their neighbours. Turkey is a strategic
ally of Azerbaijan supporting Baku’s position on a Nagorno-Karabakh
settlement and has no diplomatic relations with Armenia. The process
of Armenian-Turkish normalization, which began intensively with the
so-called soccer diplomacy (September 2008) and which continued with
the signing of the Zurich Protocols (October 2009), had by the spring
of 2010 entered a state of “stagnation”. It is in this state today
also. Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan are developing in complex
fashion, despite the factor of religious affinity, also. There are in
the world just four countries in which Shi’ite Muslims constitute the
majority, and two of them are Iran and Azerbaijan (it is variously
estimated that the number of Shi’ites in Azerbaijan constitutes 65
per cent). Tehran is extremely sensitive to the appearance in the
vicinity of this external actor or the other. It reacts most jealously
and critically to the presence of the Americans and their allies in
the Caspian or the South Caucasus. Whence also the scepticism which
Iranian politicians and diplomats display in regard to the updated
Madrid Principles of a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Tehran is extremely unhappy also with the military-technical
cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel, particularly in the light
of the possible use of Azerbaijani territory for strikes against Iran
and Syria.
Third, an important topic linking the Greater Caucasus and the Middle
East is the cooperation between the Transcaucasus republics and the
United States, which is today most actively championing the idea
not only of military intervention in the Syrian crisis but also of
intervention as an all-purpose resource for supporting its interests
(or what is understood as a strategic interest). Particular mention
should be made in this context of the allied relationship between
Georgia and the United States. The military contingent from Georgia
(just over 1,500 men) is to date the numerically strongest force of a
US ally that is not a member of NATO. Tbilisi earlier also took part
in the operation in Iraq. In 2008 the strength level of the Georgian
military in the Iraq operation amounted to 10 per cent of the entire
personnel of this country’s armed forces. Azerbaijan also is playing
its part (although in a somewhat different format) in the Afghan
operation. James Appathurai, special representative of the alliance’s
secretary general, says that almost one-third of all NATO goods
passes through Azerbaijan. In December 2011 Azerbaijan replaced the
Georgian Sky Georgia airline in the process of freight transportation
for the alliance from Europe. And although Armenia positions itself
as Russia’s strategic ally (it is a member of the CSTO, and on 3
September President Serzh Sargsyan spoke of his country’s intention
to join the Customs Union), Yerevan is attempting to preserve balanced
relations with the West, including partner programmes with NATO.
All the facts cited above help us understand today’s opinions of the
Caucasus countries concerning the situation in Syria. Georgia, perhaps,
expressed its attitude towards possible military intervention the
most clearly. President Mikheil Saakashvili spoke about the need for
a more assertive policy of the West in the Syrian sector back in May
2013. But today his role both within the country and internationally
is not as great as that of Bidzina Ivanishvili, head of the Georgian
Government. And despite the fact that the president and prime minister
harbour “great personal dislike” of each other, they both advocate
pursuit of a pro-West foreign policy course.
Ivanishvili said at a news conference on 4 September 2013: “I am very
concerned at what is happening in Syria, and it is a great pity that
chemical weapons were employed there, and there is proof of this. I
have great confidence in the United States, this is our strategic
partner. When I speak of confidence, I mean that it conducted an
expert evaluation, which confirmed that chemical weapons were employed
against the peaceful population.”
The Georgian Foreign Ministry had shortly before this through its
director Maia Panjikidze said that Tbilisi condemned “the violence
against peaceful citizens” and “supports the readiness of the
international community to perform a more active role in resolving
the humanitarian catastrophe.” What is meant by “international
community,” if positions even within the UN Security Council are
divided, is not an idle question. Never mind the Security Council,
if even the parliament of Britain, Washington’s most consistent and
dependable ally, refused to give its own government the go-ahead for
intervention! But politicians in office are not experts and are not
required to see logically contradictory pictures.
Speaking of Tbilisi’s Syria position, it should be noted that there
was a cooling of bilateral relations between Georgia and Iran in
June-July 2013 and, on the contrary, a normalization of relations with
Israel. A paradoxical situation! Largely thanks to the endeavours of
pro-American President Mikheil Saakashvili, Tbilisi and Tehran had
moved to establish visa-free procedures. Relations between Georgia and
Israel, which had up to a certain time appeared unshakable, began as
of 2010 (after the so-called Fuchs-Frenkel affair), to reveal cracks.
The Ivanishvili government attempted to rectify this situation. In
June 2013 the head of the Georgian Government visited Israel, calling
his trip the “most successful” of his overseas trips and expressing
the hope for a cancellation of visas and the restoration of strategic
partnership. In July 2013 opponents of the sitting president from
the Georgian Dream government cancelled visa-free procedures with Iran.
Provisos concerning the temporary nature of this initiative and
analogous Iranian experience (2012) were made here. Be that as it
may, this step gave rise to unhappiness in Tehran. In the opinion
of a deputy chairman of the international affairs committee of the
Iranian parliament (Majlis), “the Georgian authorities are currying
favour with their Western and American masters.”
Azerbaijan’s Syria position appears far more guarded. Evidence of this
are the recent comments of Novruz Mamedov, head of the administration’s
international relations department, during the “South Caucasus in a
Changing World” representative forum: “It would be better were we to
express our own opinion after they (the United States and its allies,
that is -S.M.) have specified this opinion.
Were we to express our own opinion now, this would contribute neither
to political nor diplomatic logic.” Despite the fact that Baku is
a strategic ally of Ankara, Azerbaijan’s authorities are afraid of
direct or indirect involvement in the dangerous Syrian crisis. Two
well-known orientalists, Kenan Rovshenoglu and Bayram Balchi, who
specially analysed Baku’s reaction, rightly remark that, as in Syria,
Islamic diversity is a serious problem in Azerbaijan. On the one hand
the numerical domination of the Shi’ites, on the other, the growing
ties (not only political but also cultural in the broadest meaning
of the word) to Sunni Turkey. And this is why the adoption of an
unequivocal decision would create additional domestic risks for Baku.
Not to mention the direct proximity to Iran, which, apparently, is
not prepared to play the part of silent contemplator of events. And
although it is customary to exaggerate the Russian factor on the
post-Soviet territory, there is concern at possible fissures with
Moscow on account of the Syria position also.
Yerevan also has its own particular arguments on the Syria question.
Speaking at a meeting of the government back on 15 September 2012,
President Serzh Sargsyan said that the events in the Middle East were
directly linked with Armenia’s security. “This really is a time of
trials for Syria’s Armenians. This situation is our open wound and
No 1 daily concern,” the Armenian head of state summed up. And, in
actual fact, President Sargsyan’s fears did not appear then and do
not appear now simply routine words. They are borne out by numerous
press agency reports. On 12 September 2012 the influential British
Daily Telegraph carried an article with the “talking headline” “Syria:
Christians Taking Up Weapons for the First Time”. The authors quote
an Armenian, a resident of the city of Aleppo: “Everyone is fighting
everyone here”. Armenians are fighting because they consider the Free
Syrian Army linked with Turkey, which is specially directing this
force against them. The Christians want to defend their dwellings.” But
many of them prefer emigration to resistance. Military intervention,
though, would increase many times over the chances of victory not of
the moderate forces but of the radicals. And although the government
of Armenia has no interest in the encouragement and mass influx of
immigrants, it cannot ignore this factor. Another important topic is
the readiness of Turkey to take part in an intervention in Syria. Such
participation would set a precedent, which Armenia, involved in a
conflict with Azerbaijan and having no diplomatic relations with
the Turkish Republic, fears. It would be no exaggeration to consider
this topic a factor which influenced Armenia’s readiness to join the
Customs Union and demonstrate the unity of its views with Moscow.
Russia’s role is a special subject. Considering the dimensions of
the country, the Syrian question is not for Moscow confined merely
to the Caucasus factor, of course. The problem is far broader. The
Russian Federation, like China also, is opposed to foreign military
interventions and sees continuance of the status quo as the better
option if there is no better-quality proposal for a settlement of
this conflict or the other. The Russian leadership has not always in
this position been consistent in the Caucasus field (we may recall
the intervention in the 1993 intra-Georgian civil conflict or the
“five-day war” of 2008). But we should note in the situation of five
years ago that it was not a question of intervention in pure form.
Moscow was responding to the “unfreezing of the conflict” and attempts
at a unilateral revision of the 1992 Dagomys agreements, which
alienated part of Georgian sovereignty over South Ossetia in favour
of the Mixed Control Commission composed of the Russian Federation,
Georgia, North Ossetia, and the unrecognized republic itself. And,
nonetheless, the Caucasus is an important part of Russia’s Syria
motivation. Moscow fears that the fall of the secular Bashar al-Assad
regime and the consolidation of the positions of the Islamist radicals
and also of Saudi Arabia and Qatar in the Middle East could have
negative consequences in the form of a growing destabilization of
the most turbulent Russian region. Qatar, which is so strongly and
decidedly supporting the present Syrian opposition, in 2003 made
its territory available for the residence of Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev,
a leader of the Chechen separatists, who lived there as the “personal
guest of the emir”. Nor should we overlook the fact that the ruling
regime in Syria is represented by the Alawite minority, which has
for many years countered by “fire and sword” many of its opponents,
including radical Islamists of the Salafi school (they are called
“Wahhabis” in Russia’s news media). It was by no means accidental,
therefore, that Grigoriy Karasin, deputy head of the Russian Federation
Foreign Ministry, emphasized particularly the significance of the
Caucasus in his recent commentary for the Russia Direct Internet
publication (a joint project of Rossiyskaya Gazeta and the American
Foreign Policy publication).
Who in Syria is the more to blame and more responsible for the
escalation of the violence could be a point of dispute today. It is
obvious also that a return to the situation before 2011 is impossible.
But state collapse in a Mideast country would create at the distant
approaches to the Greater Caucasus, a region which has more than
its fill of unresolved and latent conflicts, new risks and serious
threats. And the definition “distant” perhaps requires a certain
correction, considering the direct proximity of the Transcaucasus
republics to such important participants in the “Syria game” as Iran,
Turkey, and Russia.