Foreign Policy Blogs
Sept 5 2014
The Russia-Ukraine conflict: lessons for Europeans
By Dominik P. Jankowski and Col. Dr. Tomasz K. Kowalik
The current Russian-Ukrainian conflict is a game changer for European
security. The entire European security architecture has trembled as
the eastern flank of the continent has been destabilized. From a
European perspective, four fundamental lessons-learned can already be
drawn.
Firstly, this conflict has confirmed that Eastern Europe remains a
volatile space. In fact, Europe received its first wake-up call in
2008 during the Russian-Georgian war. However, the negative trends
stemming from the Middle East and North Africa – being both direct and
indirect consequences of the Arab Spring – have led many Western
countries to simply forget about Eastern Europe. In reality, the belt
of instability stretching from the Caucasus to Transnistria never
disappeared. The protracted conflicts in Georgia (the Russian
occupation of about one-fifth of Georgian territory), Azerbaijan and
Armenia (the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region), as well as Moldova –
the illegal stationing of a Russian contingent in Transnistria with
neither a United Nations mandate nor Moldovan consent – render the
current strategic situation even more fragile.
Secondly, Russia has unfortunately confirmed its status of a
revisionist power. Its principal foreign policy goal is to maintain
Eastern Europe in Russia’s sphere of influence by stopping, or at
least hampering, the political aspirations of Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine to strengthen their ties with both the European Union (EU) and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The other goal is to
influence or even intimidate some EU and NATO members and to put into
question the Western political system based on democracy and the rule
of law. To reach these ends, Moscow has reached for hybrid warfare. In
fact, the tools thus far applied by Russia in its conflict with
Ukraine come from different centuries: the use of pure military force:
the nineteenth century; breach of international law and the use of
propaganda: the twentieth century; and, finally, political and
economic pressure, combined with new instruments such as
cyber-attacks: twenty-first century.
The Russian hybrid approach to conflicts has become even more
prominent with an extensive use of their special operations forces
(“little green men”), security forces and intelligence agencies, as
well as Russian-speaking minorities, as tools. Furthermore, Russia as
a revisionist power, seeks to secure its military might and signals
its readiness to use conventional forces just as easily as it does
other, softer means. In the past decade its military capability
significantly rose and its defense budget is to grow even further. A
creeping militarization of the Kaliningrad Oblast, the Crimean
Peninsula and areas near the borders of the Baltic states, as well as
forward basing in Belarus, poses a major threat to the stability of
the vicinity of the EU and NATO. Finally, in recent years, Russia has
constantly challenged the West’s global geopolitical interests by
establishing a close cooperation with other authoritarian regimes
(especially Syria and Belarus) and therefore further destabilizing the
world order (e.g., by fueling the war in Syria).
Thirdly, defense still matters. Until very recently, one of the best
deterrents for small- and medium-sized states – provided they could
not join NATO, the EU, or both – was embedded in international law and
diplomatic tools. However, the erosion or even the blatant breach of
international legal commitments (the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the 1997
NATO-Russia Founding Act, the 1999 adapted CFE Treaty) has severely
undermined their deterrent character. Therefore, military instruments
still remain valid in the twenty-first century and the effective
diplomatic tools that European countries have had at their disposal
need to be strengthened by necessary military potential. Europe should
once-again be able to negotiate out of a position of strength. The
well-known phrase “trust but verify” needs to apply again.
Fourthly, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict created a pivotal moment for
European security. The security conditions in Central and Eastern
Europe have considerably worsened. The European security architecture,
which was inclusive and in fact co-created by Russia, has been
changed. Therefore, a revisionist Russia can hardly be treated as a
“strategic partner” anymore, at least for the foreseeable future. This
privilege should be reserved only for those countries which do not put
at risk the health of the liberal international order based on
democracy, self-determination, the rule of law, market economy, free
trade, respect for human rights and effectively on mutual trust. In
fact, over the next months and years the West’s unity will likely be
tested and undermined by Russia. Only by holding the line in this test
can Europeans protect their vision of world order.
At this stage, and in response to the current crisis, four
recommendations for Europeans come to the fore:
1) Europeans must embrace a “Ukraine first” policy. The stabilization
of eastern and southern Ukraine, based on the fifteen-point plan for
the peaceful settlement of the crisis presented by President Petro
Poroshenko, remains a prerequisite for any further steps. Russia must
stop fueling the conflict by withdrawing its forces from Ukraine and
from the Russian-Ukrainian border, as well as by stopping financial
and military support to the separatists. Simultaneously, the EU and
the United States, along with the International Monetary Fund, should
continue to support Ukraine economically, which could constitute the
best incentive for Kyiv to implement the necessary reforms (monetary
and fiscal policy, energy market, financial and security sectors).
Moreover, the importance of the driving force that could change the
long-term fate of Ukraine – its politically conscious and proactive
civil society – should not be overlooked. Finally, Crimea needs to be
returned to Ukraine. Some may argue that this geographic peninsula is
practically gone, but not by international legal standards. If it is
not returned, the Ukrainian government – with the necessary support
from the West – should prepare a detailed account of what property has
been seized and present this case at an international court (e.g. the
International Court of Justice; the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea). Individual Ukrainians, who lost their property in Crimea,
should also go to the court. In fact, a creation of a special tribunal
– based on the experiences gathered by the still existing Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal – should also not be excluded.
2) Europeans must understand that there can be “no business as usual”
with Russia. Should this lesson already have not been learnt following
the Russia-Georgia war in 2008? Russia has become an unreliable,
irresponsible and a revisionist power. Therefore, the Western
community should be ready to impose additional sanctions if further
destabilization occurs. Furthermore, the European countries should
stop all transfer of military technology to Russia, including those
ongoing, as well as reduce Russian dominance over European energy
markets. Finally, as in the Ukrainian case, the prime mover of the
necessary transformation of Russia might stem from its civil society.
Therefore, its strength could be reinvigorated by promoting an
independent Russian-speaking media.
3) NATO must be strategically enhanced: This could be reached both by
conducting regular military exercises, which encompass all possible
scenarios, as well as by transforming the NATO Response Force into a
more accessible and agile instrument with a robust delivery
capability. Moreover, a credible allied response to the
Russian-Ukrainian conflict should include a strategic reinforcement of
NATO’s eastern flank. In practice, it should cover both infrastructure
(including a proper high readiness command) as well as “boots on the
ground.” Finally, European should be more responsive to the ongoing
U.S. requests to reverse the negative trends in military spending.
(Two percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) needs to remain not only
a rule of thumb, but stricter roadmaps to reach that should be
developed.)
4) Europeans need to consider rearmament. And luckily there seem to be
a few good harbingers on the horizon with Estonia, Lithuania, Poland
or Norway, to name a few, where military expenditures are set to grow.
Particularly Poland, being a responsible ally, has recently given a
constructive example. Based on a solid financial foundation, i.e. a
legal obligation to spend 1.95 percent of GDP on defense, Poland has
paved the way towards a robust modernization program, with particular
emphasis on air and missile defense, naval forces, information
technology and helicopters. Indeed, with an objective to spend at
least twenty percent of its growing budget on procurements, and thanks
to the recent announcement of its military budget increase to at least
two percent of GDP in 2015-16, Poland is fast becoming one of the
frontrunners of European military strength.
In conclusion, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has proven that most
Europeans have been proven wrong in their assessments as they have
become intellectually and emotionally dependent on wishful thinking,
namely that they no longer had to worry about their own security and
Moscow’s actions, even if Russia fell far short of European democratic
standards. In 2014, Europe received a second wake-up call – a chance
that must not be missed. Anyone who fails to see this is strategically
blind.
This article was originally published by European Geostrategy.
Dominik P. Jankowski is Head of the International Analyses Division at
the National Security Bureau in Poland. Col. Dr. Tomasz K. Kowalik is
Special Assistant to the Chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation’s Military Committee.
The opinions, findings and conclusions expressed herein are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the National
Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland or NATO.
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2014/09/05/the-russia-ukraine-conflict-lessons-for-europeans/