Politkom.ru , Russia
Oct 11 2011
Nicolas Sarkozy’s Caucasus Tour
by Sergey Markedonov, visiting associate of the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington, USA
French President Nicolas Sarkozy visited countries of the South
Caucasus on 6-7 October 2011. The French leader’s two-day tour was
saturated both with weighty expectations and grandiloquent
pronouncements. All of this requires more detailed scrutiny…
We begin with the fact that France is far more actively involved in
geopolitics of the Caucasus than other countries of the European
Union. Along with Washington and Moscow, Paris is co-chair of the
Minsk Group of OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe] for attainment of a settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. Over the
past three years this format was supplemented (and even supplanted to
some degree) by another. I am referring to the trilateral summit
meetings of the presidents of the Russian Federation, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan, with Moscow playing a deciding role. But when the meeting
in Kazan of the presidents of the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, and
Armenia failed to reach a successful conclusion, many political
figures and experts began to address a crisis of effectiveness of this
format. Words resounded to the effect that France, backed up by a
“united Europe,” should now assume a leading role in the process.
Moreover, the factor of the Armenian diaspora (in France this segment
numbers almost half a million people who are voters, first of all, and
secondly – influential lobbyists) should not be dismissed from
consideration when discussing Karabakh mediation. During the course of
his Caucasus tour, however, Sarkozy attempted to position himself
primarily as an intermediary in efforts to resolve the deep-rooted
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
For the European Union, resolution of this conflict has its own
special significance, primarily in the context of energy security. For
this reason, unlike the situation concerning Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, interests surrounding this conflict are more pragmatically
expressed. Cooperating with the post-Soviet states, Europe is devoting
exceedingly great attention to “energy alternatives” and reduced
dependence on Russian energy shipments. In this regard, the role
played by Azerbaijan is extremely significant. It is so significant
that in accepting Baku as a participant in the “Eastern Partnership,”
the EU, normally extremely critical when it comes to democratic
standards, assigned Azerbaijan no “homework” aimed at improving the
rights and freedoms of its citizens. As opposed to Belarus, for
example. Literally on the eve of Sarkozy’s visit to the South
Caucasus, the European Union issued a mandate for the conduct of
negotiations on an agreement between the EU, Azerbaijan, and
Turkmenistan, for construction of the Trans-Caspian pipeline system.
The European Commission published the pertinent document on this
subject three days prior to the visit. In this manner, a twofold
expectation was placed on France by its European partners on the eve
of Sarkozy’s visit. On the one hand, to sound out possibilities for
the acceleration of conflict resolution, and on the other – to probe
the position of Azerbaijan as an important energy partner.
But the proposition of Paris involvement in processes dealing with the
Caucasus relates not only to France’s policies in general, but also to
the current president of the French Fifth Republic. The name of
Nicolas Sarkozy is readily associated with the August 2008 war. France
chaired the EU at that time, and the French president attempted to
take advantage of the moment to build up his political capital (and
that of Europe in general) in Eurasia. The United States discredited
itself (not only in the eyes of Putin and Medvedev, but of Western
businessmen, political figures, and experts as well) by virtue of its
unilateral support, not really for Georgia, but for the Mikheil
Saakashvili regime. As far as Russia is concerned, Moscow’s position
was perceived as pandering to the Abkhazian and South Ossetian
separatists. In this scenario, the EU was perceived as being less
engaged. Thus, as correctly noted by Silvia Serrano, expert of the
Centre for Russian, Caucasus, and Central European Studies in Paris,
“the political context at that time provided Sarkozy a window of
opportunities for playing a significant role in the achievement of
agreements on a ceasefire.” And the new status quo that emerged in the
South Caucasus after August 2008, although not completely formed until
now, exists to a great extent thanks to the current president of
France. He is the one who signed the agreements known today as the
Medvedev-Sarkozy Agreements. This involvement of the French president
had a very strong mediating influence on the ethno-political crisis
itself. It was in fact favourable PR. It appeared especially effective
given the background of perception of the United States and the
Russian Federation as involved supporters of certain parties to the
conflict. And no better solutions were offered by EU partners,
although there were many (in particular, representatives of “the new
Europe” were dissatisfied with the behaviour of the French president
at that time). All this just about made the French president the main
player in the Caucasus narrative. And now whoever says anything about
the relationship between Russia and Georgia begins his argument, as a
rule, with the Medvedev-Sarkozy Agreements. The Geneva consultations,
which constitute the only format in which Moscow, Tbilisi, Sukhumi,
and Tskhinvali are conducting direct negotiations, also exist on the
basis of agreements between the French and Russian presidents (17
rounds of negotiations have already been held to date).
However, in the opinion of Silvia Serrano, Sarkozy “was required to
pay a great price. He accepted the majority of Russian terms, and many
provisions of the agreement on a ceasefire itself were ambiguous,
including the aspect of the territorial integrity of Georgia. This
opened up the opportunity for Russia to recognize the independence of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” For many political figures of Europe (not
only the “new,” but the “old Europe” as well), Sarkozy began to be
perceived as a politician under the Kremlin’s thumb who was
contributing, willingly or unwillingly, to the debilitation of
Georgia. This reputation has pursued the French leader since that time
and continues to this day. The criticality of the situation is
augmented by two factors. The first is the arms deal between Moscow
and Paris respecting the sale to Russia of Mistral-class
helicopter-carrying ships. These ships are capable of executing four
missions simultaneously: deploying military units to dry land,
receiving helicopters, operating as a command centre, and functioning
as a hospital ship. The ship can simultaneously accommodate an assault
force of helicopters and 450 men. The second factor is the French
president’s lack of resources for exerting effective pressure on
Moscow. What is this about? We are primarily referring to the EU’s
monitoring mission, which remains the only international format in
Georgia engaged in observation of the ceasefire, following termination
of the OSCE and UN missions. Consisting of almost 300 people, this
mission operates along the lines separating the parties in conflict
(for some these are administrative boundaries, for others -borders
between foreign states). But Russia does not permit observers from the
EU to enter the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the
opinion of the European Union and United States, this is a violation
of the Medvedev-Sarkozy Agreements (upon which basis, incidentally,
the monitoring mission is based). Thus, the French leader is deprived
of any opportunity to intervene in the situation and secure the result
necessary for the West. This gives rise to yet another pretext for
criticism and discontent.
It is no accident in this regard that the “Georgian portion” of
Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit occupies the centre of attention in the
information sphere. On 7 October the French president delivered a
rousing speech in the centre of Tbilisi, in which he expressed his
support for the territorial integrity of Georgia. At times it seemed
that this was not the president of France (an important partner of
Moscow and leader of a country which fervently opposed Georgia’s entry
into NATO on the eve of the Bucharest summit meeting of the alliance
and the “five-day war”) who had arrived in Tbilisi, but rather the
leader of one of the Baltic republics. But let us not make unfounded
allegations. According to Sarkozy, “territory was taken from Georgia,
causing the kind of burning pain one would experience from an
unattended amputated limb.” “Against all strategic logic and in
defiance of assumed obligations, significant military forces not only
remain at your door, on the other side of the line of separation, but
have grown more powerful still” the French leader stated, intensifying
the effect. He also promised to monitor the implementation of those
agreements which he himself initiated three years ago. Sarkozy’s
speech in Tbilisi generated just as much emotional approval from
representatives of the Georgian political class. Giga Bokeriya,
secretary of the Georgian Security Council (and a member of President
Mikheil Saakashvili’s “inner circle”), stated: “We need an ally, and
this strong ally has today appeared before the Georgian nation.” Does
this signal a geopolitical turnabout in approaches made by Sarkozy,
who until now has often been criticized precisely for inadequate
attention devoted to Georgian interests and “pro-Russian positions”?
It is felt that this would be too hasty a conclusion. Both in 2008
(when the French president was reproached for ingratiating himself
with Moscow) and today (when he is called a defender of Georgia),
Sarkozy has been pursuing totally different interests. In the first
instance he was strengthening the position of his country in the EU,
turning it into an important partner both for Tbilisi (helping Georgia
to save face) and for Moscow (unwittingly helping Russia to strengthen
its presence in the Caucasus). In the second instance, matters of
reputation and image were paramount. We should not forget that the
first round of a presidential election is scheduled to take place in
April 2012. A second round (if the need arises) would take place in
May that same year. Unlike Russia, France will be required to solve an
equation containing many unknowns. In the meantime, Sarkozy’s standing
today is a quantity all too generally well known, and the parameters
of the equation do not change preelection sentiment in his favour. In
this regard, it is the president’s job to correct, to the best of his
ability, those mistakes for which he has been sharply criticized in
the recent past. Or at least create the impression that some kind of
correction has been made. The French president has been criticized for
making too many concessions to Moscow. So here we have an emotional
speech in defence of Georgian territorial integrity. French diplomacy
has been considered not very effective in the efforts to achieve a
Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. It has also been criticized for an
excessively pro-Armenian bias. Sarkozy attempted during the course of
two October days to show that he has his finger on the pulse of
things, but not everything depends on him alone. In negotiations with
Baku, he is also striving to present himself as the champion of
general European energy interests. Understandably, the topic of
Eurasia will not be uppermost on the election campaign agenda. France
has a great many domestic problems. The role played by Paris in
resolving the perplexing situation in the Middle East is also viewed
with great ambiguity. But be that as it may, post-Soviet subject
matter has a definite place and significance in forming the
preelection setting. So we need not give way to euphoria on the basis
of the Tbilisi speech. Just as this was not appropriate following the
Mistral transaction. Regardless of everything else, any partner will
always work to pursue the fulfilment of his own interests, not yours.
In this manner, Sarkozy was able to accomplish several objectives over
the course of his two-day tour. He reminded everyone of the exclusive
peacekeeping role he played in August 2008 -on this occasion emerging
as a “Georgia-phile.” In addition, Sarkozy succeeded in positioning
himself as a defender of common European interests and a political
figure prepared to find peace in Nagornyy Karabakh. In this regard,
everyone found what he wanted to find in his words. Even Moscow could
do so if it had any particular desire, since during his speech in
Tbilisi Sarkozy recalled the tense relationship between France and
Germany and appealed to the parties to seek peace and compromise. He
even mentioned briefly the friendly nature of Russian-French
relations. As far as the conflicts are concerned, breakthroughs in
efforts to resolve them in a format of two-day tours are impossible by
definition.
[translated from Russian]