GEORGIA, NATO, THE EU AND TURKEY
By Ala° Yurttagul*
Today’s Zaman
Sept 10 2008
Turkey
"War" is probably the most accurate word to describe the ongoing
Georgian crisis. The clashes, which started as part of an internal war,
took on an international dimension with the advance of the Russian
army into Georgian territories.
The recent war took the Caucasian region to the heart of world
politics. Initial observations showed that Russia was well prepared
for the crisis and that it implemented its policies decisively. The
conflict also demonstrated that, despite their advanced institutional
structures, actors of the Western establishment, like the EU and NATO,
performed like an orchestra where everybody spoke with different
voice. It could be said that Russia confidently proceeded with its
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia because it predicted that
the West would not be able to act collectively. Unfortunately, amid
these developments, Turkey is seeking to hide its despair through
a proactive diplomacy, adding a new dimension to the division by
offering alternatives like a "Caucasian Pact." Turkey would become more
influential if, instead of relying on vague and imprecise attempts,
it carried out a struggle against Russia within NATO and the EU. Even
inaction would be a better option. If it had done so, Turkey would
not have encouraged Russia further and created a naïve image. Let
us review the international dimension of the issue before examining
Turkey’s stance.
Recently, it has been fashionable to criticize Georgia and hold it
responsible for the crisis. Undoubtedly, some of these criticisms
have a legitimate base; Georgia’s resorting to armed resolution
exacerbated the crisis. But even though Georgia is the straw that
broke the camel’s back, it cannot be held responsible for the entire
crisis. It was Russia that supported the breakaway regions and prepared
the groundwork for the subsequent developments. To this end, comments
by some analysts who underline that Georgia was actually trapped by
Russia should be taken into consideration. Russia is achieving more
than one goal by entering Georgian territories. Above all, Russia
seeks to reinstate its influence and dominance in the region and
become a global power like the classical Russian Empire. Russia’s
reference to its responsibility to protect "sister nations" in other
regions and its constitution serves as a message to the countries
hosting Russian populations, including Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan
and even Baltic countries.
Russia’s second goal concerns the Caucasus, Central Asia and energy
corridors. The latest developments bear important messages for Armenia
and Azerbaijan. Russia has declared the Caucasus, strategically
important for energy corridors, as part of its sphere of influence,
extending political messages to countries and corporations eager
to make investments in the energy sector through projects like
Nabucco. For this reason, bombings over the railway lines and bridges
in regions deep within Georgia were not a coincidence. Russia’s
invasion of major communication lines shows that it is determined to
stay in the deep regions of Georgia for a long time. Azerbaijan was
forced to sustain its oil exports through Russian ports. Discussions
in the European media suggesting that the Nabucco project was no
longer viable prove that Russia is marching toward the fulfillment
of its objectives.
Russia’s initiative
Russia bypassed Eastern Europe and built an important strategic web
in the northern line of energy corridors with a natural gas pipeline
that crosses the Baltic Sea and extends through Germany. The decision
on the second alternative corridor crossing Turkey will be made in the
Caucasus. The transport of Central Asian energy resources to Western
Europe through the Caucasus and Turkey limits Russia’s capabilities
of strategic pressure and restricts its political influence. For
this reason, Russia made its stance clear by entering Georgian
territories, forcing the West and Turkey to make a choice. The issue
basically concerns a choice to be made between putting emphasis upon
the independence of the former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and
Central Asia and adopting a lenient approach toward Russia’s pursuit
of influence in the region. The West had to make a choice between
these two options and, unfortunately, it was eventually divided. If
this state of division persists and Russia becomes more influential
in the Caucasus, Turkey, as well as Georgia and Azerbaijan, will have
to suffer the biggest losses.
NATO does not have a unified approach vis-a-vis the Georgian
crisis. The Eastern European, Scandinavian and Baltic countries,
directly affected by the recent developments, as well as England and
the US, are asking for harsh measures and sanctions against Russia
and the admission of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO, whereas countries
like Germany, France, Italy and Spain insist that dialogue should
be sustained with Russia, stressing that isolating this big power
would be perilous. It is possible to encounter comments in Spanish,
Italian and French media outlets approving of Russia’s long-lasting
influence in the Caucasus and implying that the problem was exacerbated
by the failure of Western countries to honor this influence. No need
to stress that this stance, in which economic interests and energy
policies are visible factors, has a negative effect on common defense
policy and NATO’s credibility. Germany formed a strategic partnership
with Russia by supporting an undersea pipeline project despite the
fact that it meant bypassing Poland and Baltic countries, members in
both the EU and NATO. Italy is investing in a Russian line that will
cross the Black Sea. It is normal that France, excluded from Nabucco
by Turkey, makes investments in this line. These countries do not
want to sacrifice close cooperation with Russia for Georgia for an
alternative energy line. Russia is aware of this, forcing NATO members
economically dependent on its resources, like Germany and Turkey,
to act cautiously. If the West fails to develop a common and decisive
approach vis-a-vis Russian policies, NATO’s credibility will be further
injured and Russia will make great advances and progress in maintaining
its domination and influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
EU suffering from lack of action
Even though it is different from NATO in terms of its institutional
structure, goals and objectives, the EU is also suffering from a
lack of concerted action. The delayed meeting of the extraordinary EU
summit in Brussels on Sept. 1 was not a coincidence. The EU-Russian
summit scheduled to take place in November shows that supporters of
dialogue with Russia are influential. Postponement of negotiations on
a partnership agreement with Russia pending the complete withdrawal of
Russian troops from Georgia should not be considered a sanction. Such
negotiations inherently take a long time. Besides, the negotiations
were postponed, not suspended. No additional council decision is
required to resume the negotiation process. Russia’s satisfaction
with the decisions made at the EU summit also shows that supporters
of dialogue are influential within the EU. In any case, though modest,
the EU summit produced two positive decisions. Its decision to observe
the developments in Georgia is important for the future. The second
decision concerns implementation of a new visa policy for Georgian
citizens. While this does not mean the EU has opened its doors to
Georgians, the decision addresses an unfair situation.
Sadly enough, the EU which, as opposed to NATO, enjoys greater
economic and commercial assets and opportunities, failed to act
determinatively. Improving ties with Georgia without upsetting Russia
and contributing to the economic and political stability of this
small country is not a difficult job for the EU. Russia will not be
able to do anything in response to such an action; besides, it will
not be perceived as a threat. For this reason, the most important
step that the EU needs to take is to initiate the process by which
Georgia is aligned with the EU and NATO, even though its admission
into either of these organizations is impossible. Postponing this
process to another time after Georgia resolves its domestic problems
will mean that the decision is left to Russia. Such an action will
not be convincing. If such a move was appropriate, "West Germany’s"
admission into NATO or Cyprus’ EU membership would not be possible. It
is hard to understand the hesitant stance of the politicians vis-a-vis
Georgian issue while they promoted Cyprus’ membership in the EU. This
stance is important for Turkey in two respects.
Possible NATO inaction
The first issue concerns common defense policy within NATO, which may
show reluctance in the future when Turkey faces a security challenge,
as it did in the Georgian case. If NATO fails to implement a common
defense policy, Turkey may be left alone in its confrontation with
Russia for the sake of preserving economic interests. Secondly,
if it is not stopped through serious resistance, Russia may get
ready to take additional steps to reinstate its influence in Central
Asia and the Caucasus. This will mean the end of Turkey’s presence
in the region. Regrettably, instead of a consistent common policy
that takes current economic and commercial interests into account,
Turkey is pursuing a cautious policy vis-a-vis Russia that exacerbates
the divisions within NATO. Under this policy, Turkey wants to look
impartial and neutral to both sides — Russia and the West — as if
it is not a NATO member.
Even though it is an attractive idea, a superficial review of the
"Caucasus Pact" will show that such a project will require a long
time to evolve and needs to start with small steps. For the success
of such a project, the first step should be taken in politically
uncontroversial fields and at the best time. This attempt cannot be
successful in wartime, when the political climate is most tense. In
such an environment, this offer cannot be taken seriously. Besides,
it is not surprising that only Russia is warm to this initiative
because Turkey’s image as a country that is eager to maintain dialogue
with Russia and detach from the EU and NATO in the Georgian crisis
relieves Russia and exacerbates the state of division and disagreement
within NATO.
Turkey is endangering the independence of young republics like Georgia
by putting emphasis on short term economic and commercial interests
and remaining silent vis-a-vis strategic losses, also failing to
support the emergence of international pressure that would deter
Russia. Nobody is asking Turkey to have tense relations with Russia;
the international community is also aware that Turkey is not capable
of convincing Russia all by itself. Being supportive of decisive
initiatives by countries like the US and Britain, whose losses would be
smaller than those of Turkey, would be the most appropriate approach
to ensure the emergence of international pressure against Russia’s
aggressive policies. Turkey has to act like a NATO member and drop its
policy of neutrality if it wants to be taken seriously by both sides.
*Ali Yurttagul is a political advisor for the Greens in the European
Parliament.
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