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YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 25, ARMENPRESS. The EU has agreed on the toughest package in the history of sanctions against Russia, ARMENPRESS reports, citing “RIA Novosti”, the Chancellor of Austria Karl Nehammer said, adding that the sanctions against Russia will be painful for the European Union.

The sanctions will also affect Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

At the same time, the entry of the Russian President and Foreign Minister into the European Union will not be banned.

F18News Summary: Uzbekistan; Azerbaijan

FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway
The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one's belief or religion
The right to join together and express one's belief
=================================================
UZBEKISTAN: New trial imminent for Muslim prisoner of conscience?
Muslim prisoner of conscience Khasan Abdirakhimov, jailed since November
2021, awaits a new criminal trial for allegedly distributing Islamic
material that the authorities claim constitutes "a threat to public
security and public order". Police completed the investigation on 16
February. Abdirakhimov faces up to a further eight years' jail if
convicted. Police Investigator Nurullo Norkulov, who leads the case,
refused to discuss it. Abdirakhimov's wife Iroda Nekboyeva says he did not
appeal against the court verdict that sent him to prison as police said he
would be released soon if he did not "make a noise". "But apparently we
were all deceived and now they opened a new case and want to give him a
long sentence."
* See full article below. *
16 February 2022
AZERBAIJAN: Imam's pre-trial imprisonment extended in treason case
A Baku court has extended pre-trial imprisonment for Shia imam Sardar
Babayev until April. The secret police arrested the former prisoner of
conscience in October 2021 and is investigating him on criminal charges of
treason. Six other arrested Shia preachers were freed and criminal cases
dropped. "It's a question of relations between Azerbaijan and Iran," a
commentator noted, but insists charges of treason are unfounded. "If
someone has sympathy for Iran, does it make them an Iranian agent?" A Baku
mosque police closed in October 2021 on alleged coronavirus grounds remains
closed. A spokesperson said police close mosques, "but we do so when we get
a request from the State Committee for Work with Religious Organisations".
UZBEKISTAN: New trial imminent for Muslim prisoner of conscience?
By Mushfig Bayram, Forum 18
A jailed Muslim from the southern Kashkadarya Region, Khasan Abdirakhimov,
is facing a new trial for allegedly distributing Islamic material that the
authorities claim constitutes "a threat to public security and public
order". Police completed the criminal investigation on 16 February. Once
the Regional Prosecutor endorses the indictment, expected in the next week,
the case seems set to go to trial, possibly at Karshi City Criminal Court.
Kashkadarya CID's Police Investigator Captain Nurullo Norkulov confirmed
that he leads the criminal case against Abdirakhimov but refused to discuss
it. "I don't know you, so I can't say anything to you about the case," he
told Forum 18 (see below).
Police took the 40-year old Khasan Abdirakhimov into police custody on 22
November 2021. Three days later, a court changed his sentence in an earlier
criminal conviction for listening to and sharing Islamic sermons from a
restricted freedom sentence, where he lived at home under a curfew, to a
prison term. Police claimed he had violated his curfew terms. He was sent
to a prison in Bukhara Region (see below).
Abdirakhimov's wife Iroda Nekboyeva explained that the family did not
arrange an appeal against the 25 November 2021 Court verdict that sent him
to prison. "Khasan was deceived by the Kashkadarya Police that he would be
released soon if he did not make a noise about his sentence and did not
appeal," she told Forum 18. "But apparently we were all deceived and now
they opened a new case and want to give him a long sentence" (see below).
Abdirakhimov's jailing in November 2021 has left his family in financial
difficulties. He is the sole breadwinner for his wife and their five
children (see below).
Abdirakhimov's detention and transfer to prison came as Police in
Kashkadarya Region between 25 and 26 November 2021 detained and questioned
some hundred Muslim men, including three former prisoners of conscience,
Gaybullo Jalilov, Khayrullo Tursunov, and Laziz Vokhidov (see forthcoming
F18News article).
After their initial questioning on 25 November 2021, the three former
prisoners of conscience were questioned about Abdirakhimov several times
between then and January 2022 by Kashkadaraya regional Police Investigator
Nurullo Norkulov, who leads Abdirakhimov's case.
Abdirakhimov's Lawyer Mumin Lutfulloyev told Forum 18 that "I do not agree
with the notion [the authorities employ in similar cases] that receiving a
message to one's phone from a suspected terrorist or reading or listening
to Islamic materials or even extremist materials makes one an extremist or
a terrorist" (see below).
Late 2021 crackdown on Muslims
For many years the regime has imposed tight control over all exercise of
freedom of religion or belief
(
 ), but particularly of
Muslims.
Several human rights defenders, who asked not to be named for fear of state
reprisals, told Forum 18 that in November-December 2021, police across
Uzbekistan carried out a massive campaign against Muslims. The campaign
targeted those wearing the hijab or beards, as well as arrests and
imprisonments of Muslims
(
 ).
One human rights defender told Forum 18 that the authorities "want to keep
Islam on a level of state-controlled Islam". Another told Forum 18 that the
authorities launched the crackdown "because every once in a while, the
regime wants to give a lesson to the Muslims nationwide that they should
not stick their heads out, keep their faith to themselves. This was the
next campaign in this series."
Abdirakhimov's new criminal case
In late January, Kashkadarya Regional Police opened a new criminal case
against Khasan Doniyorovich Abdirakhimov (born 18 October 1981), two months
after he had been handed a prison term in the earlier criminal case. "I
guess they were not satisfied with the length of sentence and want to give
him a lengthy sentence," Abdirakhimov's lawyer Mumin Lutfullayev told Forum
18.
Judge Fakhriddin Choriyev of Karshi City Criminal Court – who convicted
Abdirakhimov in January 2021 and, in November 2021 changed the sentence to
a prison term - confirmed to Forum 18 on 8 February that a new criminal
case had been opened against him. However, he declined to discuss it.
Abdirakhimov is facing prosecution under Criminal Code Article 244-1, Part
3, Point (d) ("Production, storage, distribution or display of materials
containing a threat to public security and public order" "using the mass
media or telecommunication networks, as well as the world wide web").
Punishment is a jail term of five to eight years.
Police completed the investigation on 16 February. "After the Regional
Prosecutor endorses the indictment in the next week, the case will be
referred to the Court," Lutfulloyev said. It is yet not known which Court
will hear the case, the family and Lawyer Lutfulloyev told Forum 18.
"I cannot comment more at the moment," Lutfulloyev added. "But already I
can say that I do not agree with the notion [the authorities employ in
similar cases] that receiving a message to one's phone from a suspected
terrorist or reading or listening to Islamic materials or even extremist
materials makes one an extremist or a terrorist."
Investigation Prison in Karshi
Under the new case, Abdirakhimov was transferred in late January from
prison in Bukhara Region to Investigation Prison No. 5 in Karshi, known
locally as Shaykhali prison after the village where it is located. He will
be kept there until any trial in the new case and any appeal.
Furkat Umarov, Chief of Investigation Prison No. 5, refused to talk about
Abdirakhimov's health or prison conditions. After greeting Forum 18 on 18
February, he put the phone down as soon as Forum 18 asked the question.
Umarov did not answer subsequent calls.
The address of the Investigation Prison is:
Uzbekistan
Kashkadarya viloyati
Karshi tumani
Shayxali qurqoni
IIB JIEB 5-sonli tergov xibisxonasi
Why the new criminal case against Abdirakhimov?
Gaybullo Jalilov is among those Police Investigator Nurullo Norkulov
questioned in the new criminal case against Abdirakhimov, together with
Tursunov and Validov.
"Norkulov questioned all three of us whether we had a connection with Syria
and Islamic extremists and terrorists there," Jalilov told Forum 18 on 16
February. "He told us that Khasan [Abdirakhimov] had shared Islamic
materials with us through his mobile phone on the Telegram messaging
platform. Allegedly the Police found out that Khasan was messaged by an
Uzbek man, his former classmate from school, who currently resides in
Syria."
In objection to the Police allegations, Jalilov stated that "neither Khasan
nor any of us have anything to do with what is going on in Syria".
Jalilov told Forum 18 that when Investigator Norkulov asked him why he had
not opened Telegram messages sent from Abdirakhimov to him, he responded:
"I do not use the Telegram messaging app exactly for this reason in order
not to be blamed by the authorities and made responsible." He added: "I do
not even use a smartphone, just an old analogue mobile phone so the
authorities cannot download onto my phone anything to accuse me of
extremism or terrorism."
Jalilov explained that "many Muslims nowadays are afraid to use smartphones
and have switched to analogue phones".
Iroda Nekboyeva, Abdirakhimov's wife, told Forum 18 on 15 February that
Abdirakhimov was indeed messaged by his former classmate from Syria "a
couple of years ago but there was no discussion of religion or politics. We
do not know how he found Khasan's phone number. He wrote that he is in
Syria with his family and that he is doing well and asked Khasan to give
his greetings to his elderly parents."
Nekboyeva asked: "How could he not promise him that he would give his
greetings to his parents? Khasan was sorry for him that he was in Syria and
that he could not even see or say hello to his parents."
Nekboyeva explained that the authorities are trying to use that message on
his phone against her husband, in addition to the sermons he listened to in
previous years, for which he had received a restricted freedom term in
January 2021.
Asked about Abdirakhimov's case, Kashkadarya Regional Police CID referred
Forum 18 to Nurullo Norkulov. Kashkadarya CID's Police Investigator Captain
Nurullo Norkulov confirmed that he leads the case but refused to discuss
it. "I don't know you, so I can't say anything to you about the case," he
told Forum 18 on 18 February.
Asked why Kashkadarya Police targeted some hundred Muslim men, including
Jalilov, Tursunov and Vokhidov, in November 2021 and why Muslims cannot
talk to or share their faith or religious materials with each other to
learn about their faith and why should it be such a serious crime, Norkulov
tried to avoid the question. "I do not know what they have told you, but
the investigation is still going on."
Asked when Abdirakhimov's case will be referred to Court, and which Court
will hear it, he repeated his previous answer and declined to talk further.
Kashkadarya Police CID officials (who did not give their names) refused to
put Forum 18 through on 18 February to Lieutenant Colonel Khurshid
Atanazarov, Chief of the CID.
Calls to Colonel Shuratjon Satvoldiyev, Chief of Kashkadarya Police, and
Major Javlon Bakhtiyev, Press Secretary of the Police, went unanswered on
17 and 18 February.
Abdirakhimov's previous criminal case
Judge Fakhriddin Choriyev of Karshi City Criminal Court convicted
Abdirakhimov on 12 January 2021 under Criminal Code Article 244-2, Part 3
(creation of, leadership, participation in extremist religious, separatist,
fundamentalist, or another banned organisation) for listening to and
sharing with others the sermons of Imams banned in Uzbekistan, according to
the verdict seen by Forum 18.
Part 1 of Article 244-2 allows a possible maximum penalty of fifteen years'
imprisonment. However, Part 3 allows individuals to "be freed from
responsibility, for the crime foreseen in Part 1 of this Article, in case,
on their own free will, they informed the authorities about the existence
of a banned organization and helped the authorities to solve the crime".
Judge Choriyev handed Abdirakhimov a restricted freedom sentence of four
years. However, the Judge reduced the term by just over three months
because Abdirakhimov had signed a pledge not to leave the Region in October
2020 while his case was under investigation.
Abdirakhimov's only "crime" was to download to his mobile phone, listen to
and share with others on social media between 2017 and November 2020 the
sermons of Uzbek Imams which are banned in the country.
These banned sermons included: "If you want to know who is lost, you need
to know on whose side they are" – Imam Abdulloh Zufar; "Know Allah" –
Imam Sodik Samarkandiy; "Those who are slaves to their lusts" – Imam
Abdullokkh Bukhoriy; and "Those who are believers only in words" – the
Andijan Imam Abduvali Mirzayev.
Imam Mirzayev "disappeared" at Tashkent Airport in 1995
(
 ) with his assistant and
was never seen again.
The Court decision mentions Abdirakhimov's wife, as well as unknown Uzbeks
who were fellow labour migrants with Abdirakhimov in Russia in 2017. It
claimed they were part of a group which shared these sermons with each
other. It does not say whether cases were opened against the other
individuals or whether they were punished in any way.
Curfew regime given to Abdirakhimov under restricted freedom sentence
Under the 12 January 2021 restricted freedom sentence, Abdirakhimov was
obliged to observe a curfew regime, which included that he:
- "must be inside his flat in Karshi District, where he is registered,
between 10 pm and 6 am the next morning each day";
- "must not attend night clubs, discotheques, bars and other similar public
places";
- "must not change his place of residence without endorsement from the
Probation Police";
- "must inform the Probation Police his new address of residence or work
place, if he changes them";
Why was Abdirakhimov sentenced to prison in November 2021?
Judge Fakhriddin Choriyev of Karshi District Criminal Court with a decision
of 25 November 2021, seen by Forum 18, changed the restricted freedom
sentence he had given Abdirakhimov to a labour camp sentence. His prison
term was set at three years eight months and 22 days, counting from 25
November 2021, the day of the decision.
Asked on 8 February 2022 why he changed Abdirakhimov's sentence to a prison
term, Judge Choriyev replied: "Abdirakhimov violated the curfew regime
given to him previously."
Asked why he gave Abdirakhimov a restricted freedom sentence initially,
Judge Choriyev replied: "Because he read and shared materials banned in
Uzbekistan." Told that reading or sharing religious materials does not make
one an extremist or terrorist, Judge Choriyev paused for a moment and then
put the phone down. Subsequent calls to him on the same day went
unanswered.
Following the new sentence, the authorities sent Abdirakhimov to a prison
in Bukhara Region.
Nekboyeva explained that the family did not arrange an appeal against the
25 November 2021 Court verdict that sent him to prison. "Khasan was
deceived by the Kashkadarya Police that he would be released soon if he did
not make a noise about his sentence and did not appeal," she told Forum 18.
"But apparently we were all deceived and now they opened a new case and
want to give him a long sentence."
Nekboyeva told Forum 18 that while in prison in Bukhara between November
2021 and January 2022, Abdirakhimov "was warned by the Investigators that
he should tell us that we stop complaining to President [of Uzbekistan,
Shavkat] Mirziyoyev and the foreign media, that otherwise he will be
punished for it."
Why did Judge Choriyev change restricted freedom sentence to prison term?
Late in the evening of 22 November 2021, police detained Abdirakhimov and
put him in Police custody, and three days later the Court handed down the
prison verdict. 
According to Judge Choriyev's decision, the prison sentence was given to
him because of Abdirakhimov's absence from home during curfew hours.
"Abdirakhimov was not found in his home when Karshi District Police's
probation Inspector went to check up on him in 2021 on 15 and 16 July, 21
and 22 November after 10 pm each time," it reads.
Nekboyeva, Abdirakhimov's wife, told Forum 18 that her husband indeed "was
not at home on those dates. On 15 July we visited his family in Syrdarya
region, when his grandmother died. We were there between 15 and 16 July. He
just did not have time to inform the Police about it before leaving. And on
21 November, he received a late private order to transport vegetables in
his car for payment and went out at late hours. And on 22 November he was
detained by the Police on the street after 10 pm."
Nekboyeva told Forum 18 that the Police "actually did not visit their home
to check up on Khasan but we suspect one of our neighbours, who cooperates
with the Police reported on him".
Nekboyeva explained that "Khasan transports goods in his car to earn a
living. He is the only provider of the family, and we have no other source
of income. All of us, including our five children [three underage] depend
on these orders." She lamented that her husband "did not deserve to be put
in prison in the first place just because he did not inform the Police
about it." 
"Can you imagine, our stress knowing that Khasan will be given a long
prison sentence, our situation with the five children without food every
day?" she cried. (END)
Full reports on freedom of thought, conscience and belief in Uzbekistan
(
 ).
For more background, see Forum 18's Uzbekistan religious freedom survey
(
 ).
Forum 18's compilation of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) freedom of religion or belief commitments
(
 ).
Follow us on Twitter @Forum_18 
(
 )
Follow us on Facebook @Forum18NewsService
(
 )
All Forum 18 text may be referred to, quoted from, or republished in full,
if Forum 18 is credited as the source.
All photographs that are not Forum 18's copyright are attributed to the
copyright owner. If you reuse any photographs from Forum 18's website, you
must seek permission for any reuse from the copyright owner or abide by the
copyright terms the copyright owner has chosen.
© Forum 18 News Service. All rights reserved. ISSN 1504-2855.
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Fitch Downgrades Turkey to ‘B+’; Outlook Negative

Fitch Ratings
Feb. 11, 2022
Fitch Ratings - London - 11 Feb 2022: Fitch Ratings has downgraded
Turkey's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
'B+' from 'BB-'. The Outlook is Negative.
The downgrade of Turkey's IDRs and the Negative Outlook reflects the
following key rating drivers and their relative weights:
High
Policy-driven financial stress episodes of higher frequency and
intensity have increased Turkey's vulnerabilities in terms of high
inflation, low external liquidity and weak policy credibility. Fitch
does not expect the authorities' policy response to reduce inflation,
including FX-protected deposits, targeted credit and capital flow
measures, will sustainably ease macroeconomic and financial stability
risks.
Moreover, Turkey's expansionary policy mix (including deeply negative
real rates) could entrench inflation at high levels, increase the
exposure of public finances to exchange rate depreciation and
inflation, and eventually weigh on domestic confidence and reignite
pressures on international reserves. The risk of additional
destabilising monetary policy easing or stimulus policies ahead of the
2023 general elections is high, and there is an elevated degree of
uncertainty about the authorities' policy reaction function in the
event of another episode of financial stress, as political
considerations limit the central bank's ability to raise its policy
rate.
Authorities expect that the introduction of FX-protected deposits
combined with a broader strategy to encourage 'liraisation' of the
financial system will support exchange rate stability and in turn
facilitate a reduction in inflationary pressures. The new mechanism,
expanded from retail depositors to corporates, non-residents and
Turkish citizens abroad, will compensate term deposit holders if the
lira depreciation is greater than the nominal interest rate. As of 9
February, FX-protected deposits were TRY313 billion (5.8% of total
deposits), and corporates are expected to increase participation due
to tax benefits.
In Fitch's view, the new instrument's capacity to sustainably improve
confidence is limited in an environment of high and rising inflation,
as well as unanchored expectations. Moreover, if the instrument fails
to reduce domestic demand for FX, preserving a stable exchange rate
without the use of interest rates would require renewed FX
intervention or additional capital flow measures similar to those
recently introduced requiring the sale of 25% of exporters' revenues,
as well as tighter controls to monitor that credit allocations do not
add to FX demand. This policy response could in turn have a negative
effect on domestic confidence.
Inflation rose to 48% in January and price pressures remain high, with
PPI close to 94% (partly reflecting international commodity prices and
supply chain disruptions), continued exchange rate pass-through,
rising inflation expectations and utility price and wage hikes. We
forecast inflation to reach 38% by the end of the year and average 41%
in 2022 and 28% in 2023, the second highest among all Fitch-rated
sovereigns. Backward indexation, failure of the authorities to rein in
expectations and additional exchange rate volatility represent upside
risks to our inflation forecasts.
Medium
Turkish FX liquidity buffers are low relative to peers and risks
derived from high financial dollarisation, the vulnerable structure of
international reserves and significant exposure to changing investor
sentiment. After coming under pressures in November-December, recent
figures show an increase in gross (USD114.7 billion) and net (USD16.3
billion) reserves but the net foreign asset position of the central
bank (excluding FX swaps) remains negative.
We expect gross reserves to increase to USD118 billion in 2022 (4.2
months of current external payments), as export rediscount credits, FX
conversion of deposits, a new FX swap with the UAE (equivalent to USD5
billion) and EUR1 billion deposit from Azerbaijan's Sofaz at the
Central Bank will more than offset continued current account deficits
and domestic FX demand, and limited portfolio inflows.
Although we expect the current account deficit to narrow further to
1.7% of GDP in 2022 from an estimated 2.2% in 2021 and 4.9% in 2020,
external financing needs will remain high. External debt maturing over
the next 12 months (end-November) amounts to USD167 billion. Access to
external financing for the sovereign and private sector has been
resilient to previous episodes of stress, but is vulnerable to changes
in investor sentiment.
Reduced FX volatility in recent weeks and the introduction of the
FX-protected deposits have allowed lira deposits to partially recover
and driven some reversal in dollarisation. The scheme could mitigate
near-term risks to the stability of bank funding, improve sentiment in
the near term and alleviate pressure on capital ratios. Nevertheless,
the combination of deeply negative real policy rates and rising
inflation creates risks for financial stability, for example if
depositor confidence is shaken, and could potentially jeopardise the
until now resilient access of banks and corporates to external
financing. In this negative scenario, official international reserves
would come under pressure, as a significant portion of banks foreign
currency assets is held in the central bank including FX swaps and
reserve requirements.
Turkish banks are vulnerable to FX volatility due to high external
debt payments, the impact on asset quality (41% of loans denominated
in foreign currency) and high deposit dollarisation (61.5%). In
addition, Fitch estimates that 10% depreciation erodes the sector
common equity Tier 1 ratio by about 50bp, although the regulator has
extended regulatory forbearance to cushion the impact of depreciation
on capital ratios.
Turkey's 'B+' IDRs also reflect the following key rating drivers:
Turkey's ratings reflect weak policy credibility and predictability,
high inflation, low external liquidity relative to high external
financing requirements and dollarisation, and geopolitical risks.
These credit weaknesses are set against low government debt and
deficits, manageable sovereign financing needs, high growth and
structural indicators, such as GDP per capita and Human Development,
relative to rating peers.
Public finances are a strength relative to peers. Fitch estimates that
general government debt increased to 42% of GDP at end-2021, below the
'B' median of 68%, as the depreciation of the lira was balanced by
lower financing needs and net repayments of domestic foreign currency
debt. Debt dynamics will remain vulnerable to increased currency
risks, as 66% of central government debt was foreign currency-linked
or denominated at end-2021, up from 39% in 2017.
Fitch estimates that Turkey's fiscal deficit declined to 3% of GDP at
the general government level and 2.9% at the central government level
in 2021, the latter below the revised 3.5% fiscal target. We forecast
that the general government deficit will widen to 4.2% in 2022 and
4.5% in 2023. Fiscal risks stem from potential payments related to the
FX protected deposit scheme, fiscal measures to cushion the impact of
inflation on the economy, rising interest payments and expenditure
linked to inflation such as wages and pension transfers. Government
debt amortisations are manageable, averaging 3.5% of GDP in 2022-2023
and our baseline assumption is that the sovereign will maintain access
to external markets based on the record of regular external bond
issuance, despite repeated periods of stress in recent years.
We expect the Turkish economy to slow to 3.2% in 2022 from 11% in
2021, balancing still favourable external demand dynamics, recovery in
the tourism sector and an accommodative policy stance against tighter
financing conditions, deterioration in consumer sentiment, and the
negative impact of a weaker exchange rate and high inflation. Despite
growth resilience, GDP per capita in US dollar terms has deteriorated
since 2013, falling by almost USD4,000 to an estimated USD8,633 in
2021, due to the multi-year weakening of the currency.
On the domestic front, the support for the government continues to be
under pressure as a result of rising inflation and the sharp
depreciation of the lira in 2021. We expect the proximity of general
elections, due by June 2023, to heavily influence policy in the
direction of supporting growth.
Geopolitical tensions have eased over the past year and Turkey has
sought to rebuild relations with countries in the region.
Nevertheless, key foreign policy issues remain unresolved such as
Turkey's 2019 purchase of the S-400 Russian missile system, US
cooperation with the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in Syria
or the maritime disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. The evolution
of relations with Russia is uncertain due to Turkey's support and arms
sales to Ukraine.
ESG - Governance: Turkey has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of '5' for
both Political Stability and Rights and for the Rule of Law,
Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption. Theses
scores reflect the high weight that the World Bank Governance
Indicators (WBGI) have in our proprietary Sovereign Rating Model.
Turkey has a medium WBGI ranking at 37 reflecting a recent track
record of peaceful political transitions, a moderate level of rights
for participation in the political process, moderate but deteriorating
institutional capacity due to increased centralisation of power in the
office of the president and weakened checks and balances, uneven
application of the rule of law and a moderate level of corruption.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:
-Macro: Policy initiatives that exacerbate macroeconomic and financial
stability risks, for example an inflation-exchange rate depreciation
spiral or weaker depositor confidence.
-External Finances: Signs of reduced access to external financing for
the sovereign or the private sector, for example due to further
deterioration of investor confidence, that would lead to balance of
payments pressures including sustained reduction in international
reserves.
-Structural features: A serious deterioration in the domestic
political or security situation or international relations that
severely affects the economy and external finances.
Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:
- Macro: A credible and consistent policy mix that stabilises
confidence and reduces macroeconomic and financial stability risks,
for example by reigning in inflationary pressures.
-External Finances: A reduction in external vulnerabilities, for
example due to a sustained improvement in terms of the level and
composition of international reserves, reduced dollarisation and
sustained improvement in the current account balance.
Sovereign Rating Model (SRM) and Qualitative Overlay (QO)
Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Turkey a score equivalent to a rating
of 'BB+' on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency (LT FC) IDR scale.
Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the SRM to
arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative to SRM data
and output, as follows:
- Structural: -1 notch, to reflect vulnerabilities in the banking
sector due to the significant reliance on foreign financing and high
financial dollarization, and the risk that developments in geopolitics
and foreign relations, including sanctions, could impact economic
stability.
- Macro: -1 notch, to reflect that risks to macroeconomic and
financial stability are not fully captured by the SRM, as the current
policy mix and potential reaction to shocks could further weaken
domestic confidence, reduce reserves and lead to external financing
and domestic liquidity pressures. Policy uncertainty also remains
elevated due to the risk of additional monetary policy easing and
other stimulus measures due the proximity of general elections due by
June 2023.
- External Finances: -1 notch, to reflect a very high gross external
financing requirement, low international liquidity ratio, a weak
central bank net foreign asset position, and risks of renewed balance
of payments pressure in the event of changes in investor sentiment.
Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred averages,
including one year of forecasts, to produce a score equivalent to a LT
FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking qualitative framework designed
to allow for adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating,
reflecting factors within our criteria that are not fully quantifiable
and/or not fully reflected in the SRM.
Best/Worst Case Rating Scenario
International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance and
Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a
positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon;
and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction) of
three notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance. For more information about the
methodology used to determine sector-specific best- and worst-case
scenario credit ratings, visit
 .
REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF RATING
The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.
ESG Considerations
Turkey has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Political Stability and
Rights as World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight in
Fitch's SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and a key
rating driver with a high weight. As Turkey has a percentile rank
below 50 for the respective Governance Indicator, this has a negative
impact on the credit profile.
Turkey has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Rule of Law,
Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as World
Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and
are therefore highly relevant to the rating and are a key rating
driver with a high weight. As Turkey has a percentile rank below 50
for the respective Governance Indicators, this has a negative impact
on the credit profile.
Turkey has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Human Rights and
Political Freedoms as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the World
Bank Governance Indicators is relevant to the rating and a rating
driver. As Turkey has a percentile rank below 50 for the respective
Governance Indicator, this has a negative impact on the credit
profile.
Turkey has an ESG Relevance Score of '4[+]' for Creditor Rights as
willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating and is
a rating driver for Turkey, as for all sovereigns. As Turkey has track
record of 20+ years without a restructuring of public debt and
captured in our SRM variable, this has a positive impact on the credit
profile.
Except for the matters discussed above, the highest level of ESG
credit relevance, if present, is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues
are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or to the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.
 

Armenian opposition boycotts parliamentary commission to investigate 2020 war circumstances


Feb 11 2022


  • JAMnews
  • Yerevan

Сommission to investigate 2020 Karabakh war

A commission has been created in the parliament of Armenia to investigate the circumstances of the 44-day war in 2020 in Karabakh. 11 members of the parliamentary commission on defense and security are expected to take part in its work. Of these, seven, including the head of the commission, are representatives of the ruling Civil Contract faction.

The two opposition parties represented in the National Assembly have already issued a joint statement and refused to participate in the work of the commission set up by the authorities.


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After the second Karabakh war, the creation of an investigative commission was repeatedly discussed. However, the final decision was made almost a year and a half after the end of hostilities. Prior to this, the authorities stated that the creation of such a commission would be politicized.

Members of the committee on defense and security, most of whom are representatives of the ruling faction, are declared to be its backbone. The opposition “Hayastan” (Armenia) faction is represented in it by three people, “I have the honor” – by one deputy. However, the oppositionists, as it became known on February 11, will not participate in the investigation, which will be conducted by the parliamentary commission.

Meanwhile, representatives of extra-parliamentary forces will take part in the work of the commission and their status in it will be determined at the first committee meeting, which will also set up the regulations for its work.

It is announced that the commission will investigate all the circumstances of the war – from the beginning of hostilities, the details of how they went, the productivity of intelligence work to the reasons for the defeat.

Members of the commission will have access to secret documents and any confidential information. They will be able to request and receive information from all officials, anyone who can give any information. Moreover, officials will be required to appear and give evidence to the commission, the presence of other invitees is desirable, but they will have the right to refuse.

The “I have the honor” faction initially announced that it would not participate in the work of the commission of inquiry. Another opposition force, the Hayastan faction, apparently initially considered this possibility.

The final decision of the oppositionists became known the day after the creation of the commission when both factions issued a joint statement. Their position is that a committee cannot be impartial if the vast majority of its members are members of the ruling party.

The opposition believes the commission will do everything not to reveal the true circumstances, at the same time, it will make efforts to justify Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his team, shifting all the blame on the “former” leaderships (the current leaders of both opposition factions are the former presidents of Armenia – Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan).

“The authorities cannot objectively investigate their own actions. The proof of this impossibility is the fact that law enforcement agencies, which follow its direct instructions and are part of the executive branch, take a unified position”, the statement says.

The oppositionists announced that the investigative commission would eventually be engaged in “establishing the innocence of the authorities”.

“The authorities will try to remove the issue of responsibility from the upper echelons of power, they will try to shift it to the armed forces, its individual links, to everyone, except for representatives of the political elite”, said opposition MP Tigran Abrahamyan.

Meanwhile, representatives of both opposition factions claim that a real investigation and identification of those responsible for the results of the 44-day war remains a priority for them.

The ruling power regarded the opposition’s approach as sabotage, once again assuring that it has the political will to reveal the truth, even if questions arise that affect the political leadership of the country.

This is not the first attempt by the Armenian government to create a commission of inquiry to investigate the circumstances of the hostilities. A commission was also created in parliament to study the circumstances of the so-called “April war” in 2016.

In the course of its work, it was said more than once that after the end of the investigation, sensational revelations would be published. However, so far society has not received information about the results of its work, the conclusion of the commission has not been published.

According to political scientist Tevan Poghosyan, the work of the commission will be very important, if only because the facts will be collected, there is simply a problem of trust in itself:

“Another question is how they will use these materials. Will the commission really follow the path of revealing the truth, or will it become a politicized institution?”

The political scientist himself has many questions for the authorities. In particular, he wonders why the commission has only been formed now, even though the government has been talking about it since July last year.

Tevan Poghosyan hopes that doubts about the objectivity of the commission will be dispelled during its work. However, he emphasizes that it will work amid the power crisis that has not been overcome in the country. And this is confirmed by the fact that laws in parliament are adopted with the approval of only one political force.

The political scientist does not rule out that this commission may become an instrument in the hands of the government for solving political problems.

 

Biden’s National Security Adviser discusses Armenia-Turkey relations with Erdogan’s Spokesperson

Public Radio of Armenia
Feb 2 2022

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan spoke by phone with Dr. Ibrahim Kalin, Spokesperson and Chief Advisor to the President of Turkey, NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne said in a statement.

She said the parties discussed the tension on Russian-Ukrainian border and referred to regional issues, including efforts by Turkey and Armenia to normalize relations.

Armenia and Turkey have appointed special representatives for normalization of relations. Serdar Kilic and Ruben Rubinyan held the first meeting in Moscow on January 14.

Azerbaijani press: Armenian anti-Azerbaijan provocation foiled in Russian game show [VIDEO]

By Sabina Mammadli

Armenia’s provocation has been thwarted by the fact that Azerbaijan’s Club of Fun and Resourceful will continue to play in the league in Russia’s St Petersburg under its old name “Shusha”, Baku-based news website Day.az has reported. 

Azerbaijan’s “Shusha” team producer Mushvig Abbasov stated this in a video message on his Instagram page.

It should be noted that the team, which had previously passed the first round of a festival in Sochi, was forced to change its name in the second round.

This news sparked outrage on social media among Azerbaijanis. They stated that it would be better for the team to leave the competition entirely rather than change the name in this case.

According to the producer, Azerbaijan imposed a condition on the competition organizers that either the team’s name be returned or the “Shusha” team leave the competition.

Earlier, Russian television game show host Alexander Maslyakov’s deputy, Ruben Jaghinyan, an Armenian by nationality, demanded that the name of the Azerbaijani team be changed. Jaghinyan’s provocation failed as a result of Azerbaijan’s intervention.

On November 8, 2020, Azerbaijan liberated from Armenia’s almost three-decade occupation Shusha, known as the crown of Karabakh.

In November 2020, Armenia accepted its defeat and Azerbaijan’s historic victory ended six weeks of fighting in Karabakh.

In all, 2,908 Azerbaijani soldiers got martyred in the war and six servicemen are still missing. During the legendary battle of Shusha, highly trained and skilled Azerbaijani special forces servicemen scaled cliffs and liberated Shusha from a brutal occupation. 

As a result of the successful continuation of the victory march, the state flag of Azerbaijan was hoisted on November 8 in Shusha for the first time in 28 years. Despite efforts to Armenianize Shusha, the latter protected its dignity and the national spirit of Azerbaijan.

Satik Seyranyan reelected as chairwoman of the Union of Journalists of Armenia

panorama.am
Armenia – Jan 29 2022

Chairwoman of the Union of Journalists of Armenia Satik Seyranyan has reelected to her post at the 13th  congress of the union on Saturday. 

The elections of the chair, board members and the members of the Overseeing commission were on the agenda of the 13th Congress. 

To note, the Union of Journalists of Armenia was founded in 1959. The organization is a member of the International Confederation of Journalist Unions and which unites around 1,500 journalists and media NGOs.

Armenian Army is always necessary for ensuring physical existence of Armenian people – Artsakh’s State Minister

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 15:14,

STEPANAKERT, JANUARY 28, ARMENPRESS. State Minister of Artsakh Artak Beglaryan addressed a congratulatory message on the Homeland Defender’s Day.

“The powerful Armenian Army is always necessary for guaranteeing the physical existence, sovereignty, dignity, rights and freedoms of the Armenian people in their own homeland”, he said in his address. “I bow before the memory of all those fallen for the defense of the Homeland. Brotherly hugs and congratulations to the defenders of the Homeland”.

Central Bank of Armenia: exchange rates and prices of precious metals – 19-01-22

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 17:35,

YEREVAN, 19 JANUARY, ARMENPRESS. The Central Bank of Armenia informs “Armenpress” that today, 19 January, USD exchange rate up by 0.13 drams to 481.65 drams. EUR exchange rate down by 2.60 drams to 546.14 drams. Russian Ruble exchange rate up by 0.02 drams to 6.30 drams. GBP exchange rate down by 0.35 drams to 655.67 drams.

The Central Bank has set the following prices for precious metals.

Gold price down by 1.70 drams to 28140.85 drams. Silver price down by 1.45 drams to 354.85 drams. Platinum price up by 112.47 drams to 15206.67 drams.

Armenia’s principle of normalizing relations without preconditions is acceptable for Turkey

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 10:57,

YEREVAN, JANUARY 15, ARMENPRESS. Special Representatives for the normalization process between Armenia and Turkey, respectively, the Deputy Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Mr. Ruben Rubinyan and Ambassador Serdar Kılıç met on , in Moscow.

The Armenian Foreign Ministry said that during their first meeting, conducted in a positive and constructive atmosphere, the Special Representatives exchanged their preliminary views regarding the normalization process through dialogue between Armenia and Turkey. 

“Parties agreed to continue negotiations without preconditions aiming at full normalization,” the Armenian Foreign Ministry said.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry issued an identical statement, saying: “During their first meeting, conducted in a positive and constructive atmosphere, the Special Representatives exchanged their preliminary views regarding the normalization process through dialogue between Türkiye and Armenia. Parties agreed to continue negotiations without preconditions aiming at full normalization.”

More importantly, both statements clearly state that the principle of continuing dialogue without preconditions is the basis for the full normalization process between the two countries.

Normalizing relations with Turkey without preconditions has always been the key principle of Armenia.

Armenia’s expectations in the last 30 years haven’t changed: establishment of diplomatic relations without preconditions and opening of the Armenian-Turkish border. In this context it is important that Ankara is also expressing a similar approach, and the approach of continuing negotiations without preconditions was enshrined in the statements of the foreign ministries of both countries.

Essentially, this shows that there is mutual-understanding over continuing the talks without preconditions, and this itself is a positive start for having constructive discussions in the future.