HRACHIA SARKISSIAN PUNISHED
A1+
[05:46 pm] 12 September, 2008
Yesterday, on September 11, member of the Nor Zhamanakner Party
(NZhK) Hrachia Sarkissian voiced support for the Armenian National
Congress. Today the party convened a sitting to consider Hrachia
Sarkissian’s statement.
Under the NZhK regulations NZhK Leader Aram Karapetian suspended
Hrachia Sarkissian’s powers till the next session which is to decide
Sarkissian’s future political status, reports the NZhK press service.
TURKISH-ARMENIAN RELATIONS: WILL FOOTBALL DIPLOMACY WORK?
http://www.worldbulle tin.net/author_article_detail.php?id=1824
Sept 11 2008
Turkey
The Georgian-Russian crisis, the political and economic alienation
of Armenia in the Caucasus, Turkey’s new project to establish
the Caucasus Stability Platform, and the Turkish and Armenian
administrations’ willingness to normalize relations have created a
suitable atmosphere in which to put an end to the problems between
Turkey and Armenia. Turkish President Abdullah Gul accepted the
invitation of his counterpart, Armenian President Serge Sarkisian, to
watch the World Cupqualifying football match between Turkey and Armenia
in Yerevan. This visit was considered an important symbolic move. It
will be a matter of time to see whether this ‘football diplomacy’
will pave the way for the normalization of relations between Turkey
and Armenia.
In a historic gesture, Armenian President Serge Sarkisian recently
invited Turkish President Abdullah Gul to watch the World Cup
qualifying football match between the national teams of the two
countries. This invitation came amid hopes for a breakthrough in
relations between Turkey and Armenia. And President Gul did in fact
go to Armenia to watch the football match as a goodwill gesture on
6 September 2008. Diplomatic history suggests that détente and the
development of relations between countries may come through sports
events. The most famous form is known ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ which
paved the way for a détente between the U.S. and China during the
Cold War era, following China’s invitation of the U.S. table tennis
team to Beijing for a series of exhibition matches in 1971.
Although Sarkisian’s invitation was extended to Gul before the recent
conflict in Georgia, the move was nonetheless regarded as an important
step toward normalizing relations in its aftermath. It would be an
exaggeration to regard the football match as a historical turning
point. However, it will certainly have a symbolic influence on attempts
to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey. Interestingly,
it is a little known fact that Armenian football teams have for
some time organized their preparation camps in Antalya. They have
not encountered any difficulties. The football match and Turkey’s
Caucasian initiative have brought Turkish-Armenian relations to the
political agenda of the two countries and created renewed hope for
the normalization of relations both within Turkey and Armenia and in
international circles. Turkish-Armenian relations are shaped by the
wider framework of Turkey’s Caucasian policy and the binding impact
of the Armenian Diaspora. Armenia is a landlocked mountainous country
in Southern Caucasus, with a population of 3.3 million and an area
of roughly 30.000 square kilometers. It is bordered on the north and
south east by Georgia and Iran, and on the east and west by Azerbaijan
and Turkey. Ankara’s relations with Yerevan have struggled with the
same problem of normalization since its recognition of Armenia. Turkey
seems more active in seeking a solution for the problems between the
two countries while Armenia has historically pursued a consistently
uncooperative attitude in this problematic relationship. Turkey
recognized Armenia earlier than many states, and invited Armenia to
join the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization as a founding
member in 1993 despite the fact that Armenia has no shore on the Black
Sea. Turkey provided energy to Armenia when it faced serious energy
shortages in the 1990s. Turkey also donated one hundred thousand tons
of wheat to Armenia during those years, despite the negative image of
Armenia in Turkey. Yerevan-Istanbul flights are operational despite
the closure of the land borders. Turkey also tolerates thousands of
illegal Armenian workers in Turkey. Moreover, Turkish authorities
have renovated several Armenian cultural and artistic artifacts in
different places in Turkey.
In contrast, Armenia constantly voices allegations of genocide in
every possible international forum and aims to corner Turkey with
genocide blame in international circles. The Armenian parliament
referred to Turkey’s eastern provinces as "western Armenia" in its
declaration of independence dated 23 August 1990. This declaration
also calls international society to recognize Armenia’s genocide
allegations. The Yerevan administration does not recognize the Gumru
and Kars Agreements that established the Turkish-Armenian border in
1920 and 1921 respectively.
One major factor preventing the normalization of relations between
Turkey and Armenia is Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan. Armenia
occupies one fifth of Azerbaijani territory and ignores the UN
Security Council decisions against the occupation. Ankara has close
ties to Baku, and benefits from energy cooperation deals; Azerbaijan
thus closely follows developments in relations between Armenia and
Turkey. Azerbaijan is Turkey’s major partner in the region and will
continue to be the most important country for Turkey to take into
consideration. For its part, the Armenian state considers Turkey and
Azerbaijan as serious threats to its national security and territorial
integrity. The Armenian administration therefore pursues a balancing
policy through the maintenance of close relations with Russia and
Iran. Russian soldiers provide security for Armenian borders, and
Russia has military bases in Armenia. Russia is a strategic partner
and protector against potential Azerbaijani and Turkish aggression in
the eyes of the Armenian administration. Armenia’s balancing policy has
remained a major tenet of its foreign policy in the post-independence
period. A fear of encirclement lurks in the background of Armenia’s
domestic politics and foreign policy. The immediate effect of this
fear is an inward-oriented domestic policy and an insecure foreign
policy line. Armenia has problems with all of its neighbors except
Iran. Energy supply lines and new transportation networks have
excluded Armenia while generating considerable amounts of foreign
income for Azerbaijan as an energy-rich country and for Georgia and
Turkey as the hosts of pipelines extending to world markets. Armenia’s
difficulties with Georgia stem from the former’s close ties to Russia;
its clashes with Azerbaijan stem from the occupation and the Karabakh
question; and its relations with Turkey are uneasy due to territorial
demands and genocide allegations. In addition to this tense regional
situation, Armenia also feels the effects of an instable domestic
political environment, economic difficulties, and a rising level of
unemployment. Armenian foreign trade is overwhelmingly dependent on
Georgian ports; the recent bombing of Georgia’s Poti Port by Russia
during the August crisis will worsen the economic situation. Armenia
thus feels an urgent need to reconsider its regional relations;
Armenia’s economic and political alienation in the region creates an
impetus to normalize its relations with Turkey.
The Russian-Georgian crisis will likely have a devastating impact on
the already deteriorating Armenian economy. It will also complicate
Armenia’s problems with regional countries. From an international
perspective, the geopolitical necessity of normalizing Turkish-Armenian
relations is to loosen the Russian-Armenian-Iran axis, and even,
if possible, to pull Armenia from this axis altogether. Although
improving Turkish-Armenian relations would be certain to decrease
Russian influence in Armenia, the region-wide dialogue among countries
for regional stability and security need not aggravate Russia and
Iran. Turkey’s fresh approach of including both Azerbaijan and
Armenia in regional peace efforts may end the Cold War style binary
oppositions in the region. And the Armenian administration recognizes
the need to put an end to the inimical patterns that create cycles
of violence in the region. Although Turkey and Armenia do not have
diplomatic relations, behind-the-scene diplomacy continues between
both sides. Groups within the two states approve or oppose to these
secret talks. Turkey’s response to Iran’s mediation offer, i.e. that
"we already talk to Armenia," uncovered the hidden diplomacy. In
the wake of the Georgia-Russia crisis, moreover, Ankara treamlined a
multilateral diplomatic initiative, declaring that it wants Armenia
to join the new project: the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation
Platform. Turkey’s attitude shows that Ankara has an inclusionary
approach toward Armenia in the regional context. To date, the Armenian
administration has responded positively to the offer, and has indicated
that it considers it a constructive attempt.
However, there is not much change in the Armenian attitude overall. The
only tangible change is the mild tone of President Sarkisian, which
contrasts with the inflexible and harsh attitude of former President
Petrosyan, and Sarkisian’s expression of goodwill in regard to several
issues. Time will tell whether this rhetorical change will bring to
bear any positive influence on the normalization of Armenian-Turkish
relations. Turkey pursues a multi-dimensional foreign policy toward the
Caucasian region and endeavors to utilize any opportunities that arise
to include Armenia in regional cooperation projects. It is doubtful,
however, whether such an approach alone will solve the direct
problems between Turkey and Armenia. Armenian and Turkish publics
harbor mixed feelings toward President Gul’s visit to Armenia and
toward normalization of relations in general. The Armenian opposition
favors normalization, while the Armenian Tasnaksutyun Party opposes any
rapprochement. The latter party has strong economic and political links
with the Armenian Diaspora and acts as a strong anti-Turkish group in
Armenia. In Turkey, the major opposition parties, i.e. the Republican
People’s Party and the Nationalist Action Party, both criticized
President Gul’s visit to Armenia. Turkey’s Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdogan backed President Gul’s visit, considering it a constructive
step toward normalization of relations. The Azerbaijani government
refrains from commenting on Turkish-Armenian relations, although
some weak voices express hope that Turkey’s developing relations
with Armenia may serve as a prelude for freeing Azeri territories
under occupation. At the same time, there is strong criticism among
the Azerbaijani opposition against any progress in Turkish-Armenian
relations. Turkey’s moves for normalizing relations were faced with
the Armenian responses calling for "talks without any precondition"
and "opening borders."
While the Armenian administration opposed any precondition, it
also called upon Turkey not to emphasize the occupied territories,
to forget about the Karabakh issue and to accept the genocide
allegations. However, it is the Armenian side that desperately needs
the border to open. Now that Armenia has recognized this urgent need
and adopted a milder attitude, there may be chance to build trust,
in particular through economic and societal relations. There will be
substantial benefits on both sides of the long-sealed border in the
event of normalization.
Policy Recommendations
The recent Russia-Georgia crisis has shown regional countries the
importance of peace and stability. The regional status quo should
change, and the new regional order should be based on a novel rhetoric
and practice of economic interdependence, political cooperation,
regional stability and prosperity. Turkish-Armenian rapprochement would
be a necessary step toward this new regional order. The following
points may help to expedite the normalization of relations between
Turkey and Armenia.
1. The Armenian Diaspora and Armenia should be treated
differently. There is more room to maneuver with Armenia, while
the Diaspora is focused on genocide allegations. Moreover, Armenian
interests differ from the Diaspora’s priorities and Armenia needs
to normalize relations with Turkey to prosper economically. Careful
diplomacy is needed in order to limit the Diaspora’s influence on
the bilateral relations. It will be wise to postpone resolution
of the genocide issue so that other immediate problems impeding a
rapprochement can be addressed. There is an absolute need to put
history and emotions aside for some time, especially at a time when
Realpolitik forces the two countries to cooperate in the interest of
regional peace and security.
2. Turkey’s policy toward Armenia is to a large extent based on
countering the genocide allegations and isolating Yerevan in the
regional context. This defensive line should be replaced with a
proactive one that confidently states what Turkey expects Armenia to
do for normalization. The first demand may be Armenia’s recognition
of Turkey’s territorial integrity borders, which will prepare the
ground for opening the border.
3. Russia and Iran are key countries with an interest in
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. Their indirect support could serve
to accelerate the normalization process. Turkey’s ability to follow
an inclusive approach may prevent any concern in Tehran and Moscow
regarding normalization. Turkey and Armenia need to be on the same side
to secure the ground for peace and stability in the Caucasus. Turkish
policymakers should therefore pursue a multidimensional approach
to persuade Iran and Russia that a rapprochement will not threaten
Iranian and Russian interests. Rather, both stand to reap the benefits
of regional peace and stability.
4. The normalization of relations with Armenia would strengthen
Turkey’s regional profile in the Caucasus, and could open the way
for new mediator and facilitator positions for Turkey in several
Caucasian conflicts and problems. The Minsk initiative and UN-based
attempts did not produce any result in the quest to solve the
Karabakh question. Such attempts are not likely to solve other
problems either. There is thus a need for initiatives from within
the region. Turkey’s Caucasian initiative would be a likely starter.
5. Turkey should strengthen its inclusionary approach toward Armenia in
the regional context. This change of attitude would force Armenia to
drop its preconditions for normalizing relations, while strengthening
Turkey’s policy of zero-problems with its neighbors.
6. Turkey’s moves toward normalization will generate support from
the European Union, the U.S. and the international community. This
support should also be used to facilitate a change in Armenia to
respect Turkish borders. The U.S. and European administrations
need to re-evaluate the Diaspora’s policies, which have the effect
of disengaging Armenia from geopolitical reality in its region,
through utilization of American and European sources. Such a policy
of isolationism only strengthens Russian influence in the region. This
situation may not be exactly what the U.S. and European administrations
envision to see in the aftermath of the Georgian crisis.
7. Turkey should spend more energy on establishing a joint commission
of historians to undertake an objective and scientific study of the
genocide allegations. The Armenian Diaspora and the Tasnaksutyun Party
oppose this idea on the ground that it would amount to questioning
the authenticity of genocide allegations. However, it may be easier
to persuade the Armenian administration for the utility of such
an initiative.
8. Ankara needs to make sure that it pays attention to Azerbaijani
concerns while developing relations with Armenia. The only way to
wield any influence on Armenia is to keep a dialogue channel open. It
would be unfair to urge Turkey to close the doors to Armenia, while
Azerbaijani leaders are pursuing diplomatic activity with the Armenian
government. Turkish policymakers should continue to underline the need
for Armenia to put an end to its occupation of Azerbaijani territories
in the interest of regional peace and stability.
9. There is an urgent need for a region-wide initiative for
civil society dialogue. Inter-governmental measures may fail
without strong support for peace and dialogue from the societal
level. Turkish-Armenian civil society dialogue should be encouraged
and supported. Even a touristic visit to Yerevan may show that
the genocide issue is not central to the lives of Armenians. The
years-long gap between the two neighbors may be bridged through civil
society activities.
â~H- IÅ~_ık University, Ä°stanbul, [email protected] â~H-â~H-
Bilgesam, Ä°stanbul, [email protected]
–Boundary_(ID_9ZxPZm0DHnL4T j3A1/dKfg)–
NEW EDUCATION CENTER OF ARMENIAN ATOMIC PLANT OPENS
ARMENPRESS
Sep 10, 2008
YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 10, ARMENPRESS: The opening ceremony of the new
education center of the Armenian atomic power plant took place today
with the participation of Armenian Energy and Natural Resources
Minister Armen Movsisian, U.S. charge d’affaires Joseph Pennington
and other officials.
A. Movsisian underscored the necessity of high level of preparedness
of the staff of the plant and noted that preparing the staff in
the education center and their training will give an opportunity to
increase the level of security of the work of the plant. According
to him, the construction of the education center both financially
and technically was supported by the U.S. government.
On his part Joseph Pennington said he is proud that the U.S. side
managed to support in the establishment of the center. He highly
assessed the cooperation with the Armenian side, noting that
they expect new developments and wait construction of the new
plant. J. Pennington also expressed assurance that close cooperation
with the Armenian side in energy security sphere will continue.
Director of the atomic power plant Gagik Markosian noted that graduates
of Yerevan State University, Armenian State Architectural University
and other higher educational establishments may train in the center
and afterwards work in the plant.
TURKISH JUNIORS TO HOST ARMENIA
Turkish Daily News
Sept 9 2008
Three days after the Turkish national football team traveled to
Yerevan, Armenia for a World Cup qualifying game, it is now the turn
of young Armenians to visit Turkey.
Tonight the Turkish U-21 squad will host the Armenian U-21 team at
Istanbul’s Ali Sami Yen Stadium, in its last match of the 2009 U-21
European Championships qualifying campaign.
Turkey currently leads its group with 16 points, two points ahead of
second placed Czech Republic, and at least a draw against Armenia will
win Turkey a berth in the playoff games to be played on Nov. 11-15.
U-21 team coach Hami Mandıralı, a former Trabzonspor striker, spoke
hopefully about the Armenia game, buoyed by a 2-1 victory over the
Czech Republic on Saturday night in Bursa.
"I hope that we will continue our good from against Armenia," he told
a post-game press conference. "We lost the first game in Armenia,
and this creates pressure on us, but I think we compensated that loss
tonight and matched our goal."
The tickets for the game, scheduled to start 8 p.m., are available
at at YTL 7 each.
In the group’s other game, the Czech Republic hosts Ukraine.
–Boundary_(ID_yv3ulctr8bAXRITiXhJDyQ)–
POST-WAR THEATER OF OPERATIONS
Professor Aleksei Malashenko (Supreme School of Economics)
WPS Agency
What the Papers Say Weekly Review (Russia)
September 8, 2008 Monday
Russia
THE FUTURE OF THE FORMERLY NON-RECOGNIZED REPUBLICS: OPTIONS; The
Kremlin should start thinking about to do with South Ossetia and
Abkhazia now.
Recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia inevitably raises
the following question: what next? What is to be done about or with
the formerly non-recognized republics now?
Our congratulations to South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the long-awaited
recognition. While they are celebrating, however, Moscow should
already start thinking about the future. Shall the Kremlin leave them
eternally independent and recognized by Russia, HAMAS, perhaps Belarus,
and a couple of other analogous regimes or accept them in the Russian
Federation at some later date?
Variant A: Independence
Independence for South Ossetia is made impossible by its size (much
smaller than the Moscow region, it has only between 70,000 and 100,000
in terms of population), irreducible economic inadequacy, and, finally,
by the inevitable pull of North Ossetia.
For Abkhazia on the other hand, official independence may evolve
into something wholly different – at least in theory. Some idealists
in it even now believe that bona fide independence may bring bona
fide dividends one fine day – something like a free economic zone,
tourists and capitals from abroad, and so on.
As for the Caucasus in general, it cannot expect anything good to stem
from sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This sovereignty sets a
precedent. There is Chechnya nearby. The chain of questions to be asked
is quite predictable: all right for Kosovo but not for Abkhazia? All
right for Abkhazia but not for Chechnya? This mentality is too deeply
rooted in some politicians in the Caucasus, even though they themselves
never miss a chance to reassure Moscow of their loyalty.
Borders were violated. Georgian borders, this time. There is, however,
a similar chain of questions that may be applied. If the Georgian
borders were revised, why not revise some others as well? Say, the
borders between Chechnya and Ingushetia (the Malgobek district),
Ossetia and Ingushetia (Prigorodny), borders between Dagestan,
Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia… They are internal borders,
but regional mentality makes these moot issues a permanent source
of conflicts.
Variant B: Membership in the Russian Federation
Certain problems are encountered with it. De facto, the self-proclaimed
republics are already in Russia. South Ossetia is being restored with
Russian tax-payers’ money. Russian businesses run whatever there is
to be run in Abkhazia – land itself, resorts, spas, beaches… In a
word, both territories are part of Russia economically and from the
standpoint of citizenship. What if their membership is formalized,
though?
Appearance of the two new subjects will alter the situation in the
Caucasus. Moreover, these changes are impossible to predict – and
therefore to draw contingency plans for.
For example, it will change the "format" of the dispute between
the Ingushetians and Ossetians over the Prigorodny district. It
will be no longer North Ossetia as one of the concerned parties,
it will be larger Ossetia. South Ossetians’ short tempers meanwhile
are recognized everywhere, even in North Ossetia itself. Ingushetia
is unlikely to be overly happy.
Deterioration of the Ossetian-Ingushetian discord may result in a
situation where the Ingushetians facing Christian Ossetians will
start getting help from nearby Moslem enclaves in the Russian
Federation. Moreover, this help will be both official and informal.
The new Federation subjects are not going to be prosperous at all (that
much is clear). It is their own internal problems that they will bring
to Russia and that means ethnic clashes and clannish discord. Small
as it is, Abkhazia is a cauldron of Abkhazian, Russian, and Armenian
ethnic groups. Fighting for sovereignty, they have been standing by
each other so far. Absence of a common enemy, however, will rekindle
the existing conflicts. The authorities will keep the problem under a
lid at first, but it cannot be contained there for long. The Southern
Federal Region in the meantime has problems even without anything new
added to its plate. It won’t take Abkhazia long to learn the difference
between the title of "freedom fighters" and Federation subjects.
There are the Olympic Games in Sochi to be considered as well. Should
the International Olympic Committee decide to deprive Russia of the
right to host the Winter Olympics in 2014, it will become a bona fide
tragedy for all of the Southern Federal Region.
Can Russia expect any benefits from absorption of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia? What South Ossetia is needed for is clear. Russia needs it
as a site for a fully-fledged military base against NATO approaching
its southern borders. As for Abkhazia, it will probably regain its
status of the Russian spa region (unless clannish wars and strife
make the Black Sea coast in Abkhazia too "hot" a spot even for
Russian tourists).
There is of course a roundabout way – South Ossetia and Abkhazia may
join the Russian-Belarussian union… but that is too fantastic an
option to ponder. The Kremlin will never be able to up gas prices for
Belarus in this case. On the other hand, it will deprive the Western
community of the chance to accuse Russia of annexation.
Variant C: Back into Georgia
That’s a sheer impossibility. But what about conquest of the wayward
territories by sheer strength of arms? Say, with help from NATO? Even
that is unlikely.
Everyone in the region appears to be mesmerized by Russia’s military
feat. By its unprecedented resolve and determination to take its
chances. Had the Kremlin failed to move in, all of the Caucasus would
have branded it as a weakling never to be taken seriously again. And
yet, battles are over. Time to go back to life in peace… but how can
it be accomplished if this "time of peace" never ends in Ingushetia,
Chechnya, or Dagestan?
RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN STABILITY
THE KOREA HERALD
September 8, 2008 Monday
KIEV – Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has seemed that
new rules were being established for the conduct of international
relations in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The
watchwords were independence and interdependence; sovereignty and
mutual responsibility; cooperation and common interests. They are
good words that need to be defended.
But the Georgia crisis provided a rude awakening. The sight of Russian
tanks in a neighboring country on the 40th anniversary of the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia has shown that the temptations of power
politics remain. The old sores and divisions fester. Russia remains
unreconciled to the new map of Europe. Russia’s unilateral attempt
to redraw that map by recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia marks not just the end of the post-Cold War period;
it is also a moment that requires countries to set out where they
stand on the significant issues of nationhood and international law.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev says that he is not afraid of a
new Cold War. We don’t want one. He has a big responsibility not to
start one.
Ukraine is a leading example of the benefits that accrue when a
country takes charge of its own destiny, and seeks alliances with
other countries. Its choices should not be seen as a threat to Russia,
but its independence does demand a new relationship with Russia –
one of equals, not that of master and servant.
Russia must not learn the wrong lessons from the Georgia crisis:
there can be no going back on fundamental principles of territorial
integrity, democratic governance, and international law. It has shown
that it can defeat Georgia’s army. But today Russia is more isolated,
less trusted, and less respected than it was a month ago. It has
made short-term military gains, but over time it will feel economic
and political losses. If Russia truly wants respect and influence,
it must change course.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has described the Soviet Union’s collapse
as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century. But
most people of the former Soviet bloc don’t see it that way. It will
be a tragedy for Russia if it spends the next 20 years believing it
to be the case.
Indeed, since 1991, the West has offered Russia extensive co-operation
with the European Union and NATO, as well as membership of the Council
of Europe and the G8. Summits, mechanisms, and meetings have been
developed not to humiliate or threaten Russia, but to engage it. The
EU and the United States provided critical support for the Russian
economy when it was needed, Western companies have invested heavily,
and Russia has benefited significantly from its reintegration into
the global economy.
But Russia has recently met our efforts with scorn, from suspension of
its participation in the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty to harassment
of business people and cyber attacks on neighbors. Now we have Georgia.
Of course, Russia can and should have interests in its neighbors,
but, like everyone else, it must earn that influence. Indeed, these
countries do not make up some "post-Soviet space" to which Putin
often refers. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a new reality –
sovereign, independent countries with their own rights and interests.
Russia also needs to clarify its attitude about the use of force to
solve disputes. Some argue that Russia has done nothing not previously
done by NATO in Kosovo in 1999. But this comparison does not bear
serious examination.
NATO’s actions in Kosovo followed dramatic and systematic abuse
of human rights, culminating in ethnic cleansing on a scale not
seen in Europe since World War II. NATO acted only after intensive
negotiations in the United Nations Security Council and determined
efforts at peace talks. Special Envoys were sent to warn then-Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic of the consequences of his actions.
None of this can be said for Russia’s use of force in Georgia.
Likewise, the decision to recognize Kosovo’s independence came only
after Russia made clear that it would veto the deal proposed by the
U.N. secretary general’s special envoy, former Finnish President
Martii Ahtisaari. Even then we agreed to a further four months of
EU-U.S.-Russia negotiations in order to ensure that no stone was left
unturned in the search for a mutually acceptable compromise.
By contrast, in Georgia, Russia moved from support for territorial
integrity to breaking up the country in three weeks and relied entirely
on military force to do so.
Russia must now ask itself about the relationship between short
term military victories and long-term economic prosperity. The
conflict in Georgia has been followed by a sharp decline in investor
confidence. Russia’s foreign-exchange reserves fell by $16 billion in
one week, and Gazprom’s value fell by the same amount in one day. Risk
premia in Russia have skyrocketed.
Isolating Russia would be counter-productive, because its international
economic integration is the best discipline on its politics. Moreover,
isolation would only strengthen the sense of victimhood that fuels
intolerant Russian nationalism, and it would compromise the world’s
interests in tackling nuclear proliferation, addressing climate change,
or stabilizing Afghanistan.
But the international community is not impotent. Europeans need
Russian gas, but Gazprom needs European markets and investment. Our
approach must be hard-headed-engagement. That means bolstering allies,
rebalancing the energy relationship with Russia, defending the
rules of international institutions, and renewing efforts to tackle
"unresolved conflicts," not only in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but
also in Transdniestria and Nagorno Karabakh. Each has its roots in
longstanding ethnic tensions, exacerbated by economic and political
underdevelopment.
Here, Ukraine, with its eight million ethnic Russians – many of them
in Crimea – is key. Its strong links to Russia are firmly in both
countries’ interests. But Ukraine is also a European country, which
gives it the right to apply for EU membership – an aspiration voiced
by Ukraine’s leaders. The prospect and reality of EU membership has
been a force for stability, prosperity, and democracy across Eastern
Europe. Once Ukraine fulfills the EU’s criteria, it should be accepted
as a full member.
Nor does Ukraine’s relationship with NATO pose a threat to Russia. The
strengthening of Ukraine’s democratic institutions and independence
that will result from it will benefit Russia in the long term.
Europe also must re-balance its energy relationship with Russia by
investing in gas storage to deal with interruptions, diversifying
supplies, and establishing a properly functioning internal market,
with more interconnections between countries. We must also reduce
our dependence on gas altogether by increasing energy efficiency,
and by investing in carbon capture and storage technology for coal,
and in renewable resources and nuclear power.
In all international institutions, we must review our relations with
Russia. I do not apologize for rejecting knee-jerk calls for Russia’s
expulsion from the G8, or for EU-Russia or NATO-Russia relations to
be broken. But we do need to examine the nature, depth, and breadth
of relations with Russia. And we will stand by our commitments to
existing NATO members, while renewing our determination that Russia
will have no veto over its future direction.
The choice today is clear. No one wants a new cold war, but we must
be clear about the foundations of lasting peace.
David Miliband is Britain’s foreign minister. – Ed.
Interfax, Russia
Sept 4 2008
ARMENIA EXPLAINS NONRECOGNITION OF S. OSSETIA, ABKHAZIA
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan said his country cannot recognize
the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia because the Nagorno-
Karabakh problem remains unsolved.
"Why does Armenia not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia? For the reason it has not recognized the independence of
Kosovo. Because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia cannot
recognize an entity that is in the same situation before Nagorno-
Karabakh is recognized," Sargsyan said at a meeting of ambassadors and
other senior Armenian diplomats posted abroad.
"We must convince Azerbaijan in a peaceful way that recognition of the
right of peoples to self-determination is inevitable," he said.
The president also said the conflict in Georgia had dealt a blow to
the Armenian economy.
"We have repeatedly stressed that the Armenian economy vitally needs a
peaceful region for its development," he said.
Armenian Foreign Minister Edvard Nalbandian told reporters that
"conflicts must be resolved in a peaceful way" and that "in conflicts
of this kind the right of peoples and nations to self-determination
must be respected unconditionally."
There are an increasing number of exceptions, which are not defined as
international precedents, in the settlement of regional conflicts,
Sargsyan told foreign diplomats.
"Let them say that Kosovo is not a precedent. Some may say that
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not a precedent either. However, the
increasing number of exceptions, which are not defined as
international precedents, is a fact," he said.
"Just recall the events, which have taken place over a brief period of
time, – East Timor, Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. I could
certainly add more names to this list, but short as it is, this list
is enough. The will of people expressed at a referendum becomes the
main factor, the final circumstance everywhere," Sargsyan said.
6 EX-SOVIET NEIGHBORS BACK RUSSIA OVER GEORGIA
The Associated Press
September 5, 2008
MOSCOW: Russia has scored a key diplomatic victory by securing support
for its war in Georgia from six other ex-Soviet nations.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev says he and other leaders of nations
belonging to the Collective Security Treaty Organization signed a
declaration Friday condemning Georgia’s attempt to regain control of
its province of South Ossetia.
The war in Georgia has plunged Russia’s relations with the West
to their post-Cold War low. Only few countries, including Cuba and
Venezuela, have backed Russia’s action so far.
The Russian-led security grouping also includes Armenia, Belarus
and four Central Asian nations: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan.
ARMTECH CONGRESS-08 SECOND EXPO TO PROVIDE GROUNDS FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN ARMENIA
ARKA
September 5, 2008
YEREVAN, September 5. /ARKA/. The second IT expo ArmTech Congress-08
will provide grounds for Armenia’s economic development, said Rich
Goldman, general director of Synoposys Armenia.
He believes the new Armenian government is a reformer, the Ministry
of Economy trying to make a better use of the country’s IT potential.
Goldman said ArmTech is a bridge linking the private sector and
the government.
The first Armenian Technology Congress that took place in San
Francisco, in California on July 4-7, 2007, was designed to promote
both professional networking and valuable connections for operating
companies and entrepreneurs, according to Goldman.
The second IT congress will be held in Yerevan on October 4-5,
2008. The high-tech-focused event is designed for professionals
interested in engaging in the global Armenian community and the
rapidly rising technology sector of Armenia. Representatives from
European, Asian countries, as well as a number of leading Russian,
French and U.S companies will participate in the congress.
The initiator of the event, Synopsys, Inc, established its presence
in Armenia in 2004, shortly after Armenia’s declaration of IT as
a priority sector. Since then, the company has become one of the
largest Synopsys sites outside of the United States providing R&D
and product support in the areas of EDA, Design for Manufacturing
and development of semiconductor IP.
AVET ADONTS MEETS WITH EUROPEAN JOURNALISTS
armradio.am
04.09.2008 17:12
On September 4 the Chairman of the National Assembly’s Standing
Committee on European Integration Avet Adonts met with representatives
of popular mass media of 15 EU member states.
At the beginning of the meeting Mr. Adonts presented the composition
of the National Assembly, the activity of the committee headed by him,
and later responded to the journalists’ questions.
German journalist Barbara Gruberie asked what can be expected from
Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s visit. Mr. Adonts said he welcomes
Gul’s visit. This is the first ever visit of the Turkish leader to
Armenia. He expressed hope that it will mark the start of a dialogue
between Armenia and Turkey. The zero agenda that exists between
Armenia and Turkey does not correspond to the logic of the 21st
century. Armenia has declared many times that it is ready to launch
dialogue with Turkey without any preconditions.
He expressed the opinion that it’s high time for the two countries to
speak without the mediation of third parties. Nevertheless, Mr. Adonts
noted that Guls’s visit will take place under the conditions of
Armenia’s blockade, closed Armenian-Turkish border and absence of
diplomatic relations between the two countries.
In response to a question from Czech reporter Lyubos Palata whether
Armenia will recognize the independence of Abkhazia a nd South Ossetia,
Mr. Adonts said Armenia has not even recognized the independence
of Nagorno Karabakh. Nether it has recognized the independence of
Kosovo, and in these circumstances the recognition of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia would be illogical.
During the meeting the foreign journalists asked questions
about Armenia-NATO cooperation and the Karabakh conflict
settlement. According to Mr. Adonts, Armenia-NATO cooperation is
on a very high level, but the question of joining NATO is not on
Armenia’s agenda. Armenia is a member of the CSTO. Armenia tries to
combine the active cooperation with NATO and the membership in the
Collective Security Treaty Organization.
Turning to the Karabakh issue, Mr. Adonts noted that unlike
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transniestria, the Karabakh issue
is unique. It differs with both its essence and the technology of
settlement. Attempts are made to resolve the Karabakh conflict through
cooperation. Russia, the US and France are cooperating to help settle
the issue. This is the main difference from the processes that were
taking place in case of the other conflicts. The developments in South
Ossetia showed that the resolution of conflicts in a military way is
unacceptable and there is no alternative to peaceful solution.