All American Patriots (press release), Sweden
World : Iraq: International Religious Freedom Report 2006
Posted by Patriot on 2006/9/17 8:01:16 (22 reads)
Released by the US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department of State in
compliance with Section 102(b) of the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA) of 1998. The law provides that the secretary of state, with
the assistance of the ambassador at large for international religious
freedom, shall transmit to Congress "an Annual Report on International
Religious Freedom supplementing the most recent Human Rights Reports
by providing additional detailed information with respect to matters
involving international religious freedom."
Iraq: During the reporting period, unsettled conditions prevented
effective governance in parts of the country, and the Government’s
ability to protect religious freedoms was handicapped by insurgency,
terrorism, and sectarian violence. Following the U.S.-led coalition’s
removal of the Ba’athist regime in April 2003, the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council
administered the country pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions
1483, 1500, and 1511, until the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) was
appointed on June 28, 2004. In January 2005, the country held its
first free election, leading to the transitional government led by
former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’afari in May 2005. During the
October 15, 2005 referendum, voters adopted a constitution and, in a
first step toward establishing a permanent government, elected members
of the country’s new legislature on December 15, 2005. The permanent
government, led by Prime Minister Noori al-Maliki and the
constitution, came into office May 20, 2006.
The Law for the Administration of the State of Iraq for the
Transitional Period (TAL) was adopted on March 8, 2004, and was the
operative law in the country until May 20, 2006 when the constitution
came into effect. The TAL and the constitution established a
republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic system with powers
shared among the federal and regional governments, including eighteen
governorates. The TAL and constitution also guarantee freedom of
thought, conscience, religious belief and practice.
Both the TAL and the constitution recognize Islam as the official
religion and state that no law may be enacted that contradicts the
established provisions of Islam. While the Government generally
endorsed these rights, its efforts to prevent or remedy violations
were hampered by substantial political and religious violence between
Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and by harassment of non-Muslims.
There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom
during the period covered by this report. Since 2003, the Government
has not engaged in the persecution of any religious group, calling
instead for tolerance and acceptance of all religious
minorities. However, long-standing discriminatory practices against
the Baha’i and Wahabbi Sunni Muslims continued by some government
institutions.
While the Government generally respected the right of the individual
to worship according to thought, conscience, and belief, private
conservative and radical Islamic elements continued to exert
tremendous pressure on other groups to conform to extremist
interpretations of Islam’s precepts. In addition, frequent attacks on
religious places of worship, as well as sectarian violence, hampered
the ability to freely practice religion. This sectarian violence was
heightened by the February 22, 2006, attack on the al-Askariya Mosque
in Samarra, one of the most significant Shi’a mosques in the world
containing the mausoleums of the tenth and eleventh imams.
The U.S. government discusses religious freedom problems with the
Government as part of its overall policy to promote human
rights. Senior U.S. administration and embassy officials called for
unity in the face of sectarian violence, supported the inclusion of
religious minorities in the political and constitution drafting
processes, and facilitated interfaith discussion with all members of
the country’s diverse religious communities.
Section I. Religious Demography
The country has an area of 437,072 square miles and a population of 26
million. An estimated 97 percent of the population is Muslim. Shi’a
Muslims–predominantly Arab, but also including Turkmen, Faili Kurds,
and other groups–constitute a 60 to 65 percent majority. Sunni
Muslims make up 32 to 37 percent of the population, of whom
approximately 18 to 20 percent are Sunni Kurds, 12 to 16 percent Sunni
Arabs, and the remainder Sunni Turkmen. The remaining 3 percent
comprises Chaldean (an eastern rite of the Catholic Church), Assyrian
(Church of the East), Syriac (Eastern Orthodox), Armenian (Roman
Catholic and Eastern Orthodox), and Protestant Christians, as well as
Yazidi, Sabean, Baha’i, Kaka’i (a small, syncretic religious group
located in and around Kirkuk), and a small number of Jewish
believers. Shi’a, although predominantly located in the south, were
also a majority in Baghdad and had communities in most parts of the
country. Sunnis formed the majority in the center and the north of the
country.
According to official estimates, the number of Christians decreased
from 1.4 million in 1987 to fewer than 1 million, with Catholics
(Chaldeans) comprising the majority. Christian leaders estimated that
approximately 700,000 Iraqi Christians lived abroad.
Four of the five largest Christian communities were located in Mosul
(150,000), Erbil (20,000-25,000), Dohuk (13,000), and Kirkuk
(12,000). According to church leaders in Erbil and Mosul, Christians
in the north accounted for roughly 30 percent of the country’s
Christian population.
The Primate of the Armenian Diocese reported that approximately 20,000
Armenian Christians remained in the country, primarily in the cities
of Baghdad (12,000), Basrah, Kirkuk, and Mosul.
There were approximately 225,000 Assyrian Christians and an estimated
750,000 Chaldeans (Eastern Rite Catholics). The Chaldean and Assyrian
Christians are descendants of the earliest Christian communities, and
they share a similar cultural and linguistic background. Both
communities speak the same ancient language (Syriac); however, they
are considered by many to be distinct ethnic groups. Chaldeans
recognize the primacy of the Roman Catholic Pope, while the Assyrians,
who are not Catholic, do not. While some Chaldeans and Assyrians
considered themselves Arab, the majority, as well as the Government,
considered both groups as ethnically distinct from Arabs and Kurds.
The Yazidi are a religious group with ancient origins that encompass
several different religious traditions comprising elements of
Zoroastrianism, Manicheism, Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Gnostic
beliefs and traditions. Yazidi do not intermarry with outsiders or
accept converts. Defined by the former regime as Arabs, some Yazidi
considered themselves to be Kurds, while others defined themselves as
both religiously and ethnically distinct from Muslim Kurds. Most of
the 650,000 Yazidi resided in the North.
Sabeans are an ancient religious group dating from the first three
centuries and reflect numerous religious influences, including ancient
Gnostic, Jewish, and Christian beliefs. The Sabean community continued
to decline; according to Sabean leaders, an estimated 10,000 remained
in the country. While some Sabeans fled the tyranny of the former
regime, this decline could also be attributed to the fact that
converts are not accepted, and those Sabeans who marry Christians or
Muslims are no longer regarded as Sabean. The Kaka’i, sometimes
referred to as Ahl-e-Haqq, resided primarily in Kirkuk, Mosul, and
Kankeen in the Diyala Province. Most are ethnic Kurds.
There was no data available on active participation in religious
services or rituals; however, terrorist attacks rendered many mosques,
churches, and other holy sites unusable. Many worshippers reportedly
did not attend religious services or participate in religious events
because of the threat of violence. There were numerous reports of
places of worship closing due to those threats.
The Government provided significant support for the Hajj. The Sunni
and Shi’a waqfs, or religious endowments, accepted applications from
the public and submitted them to the Supreme Council for the Hajj.
Section II. Status of Religious Freedom
Legal/Policy Framework
The constitution mirrors many of the same religious freedoms provided
when the TAL was in effect. Both provide for freedom of religion, and
the Government generally respected this right in practice. While the
Government endorsed this right, its efforts to prevent or remedy
violations were hampered by substantial political and religious
violence between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and by harassment of
non-Muslims.
It is the Government’s policy to protect the right of all religious
groups to gather and worship freely; however, in practice, the ongoing
insurgency impeded the ability of many citizens to exercise that
right. Article 43 states that the followers of all religious groups
and sects are free in the practice of religious rites, and in the
management of religious endowments, their affairs, and their religious
institutions. Article 10 of the constitution establishes the state’s
commitment to assuring and maintaining the sanctity of holy shrines
and religious sites, and to guaranteeing the free practice of rituals
in them. The second clause of Article 43 of the constitution
reiterates this by explicitly guaranteeing the freedom of worship and
the protection of places of worship.
Deficiencies in security force capabilities and in the rule of law
made it difficult for the justice system to investigate or address
violations. Furthermore, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) did not
operate at full capability during the reporting period and were unable
to prevent or remedy violations of these rights.
Although the constitution generally provided for full religious
freedom, it was heavily focused on the nation’s Islamic
identity. Article 2, which recognizes Islam as the country’s official
religion, mandates that Islam be considered a source of legislation
and that no law be enacted which contradicts the faith’s universally
agreed tenets. On June 14, 2006, the Council of Representatives
implemented bylaws requiring that a verse from the Qur’an be read
before each session.
The second clause of Article 2, however, stipulates that no law be
enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy, or basic
freedoms, which include the right to freedom of thought, conscience,
and religious belief and practice. Article 14 of the constitution
establishes that citizens are equal before the law without
discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, origin,
color, religion, sect, belief, opinion, or economic or social
status. Article 41 provides that citizens are free in their
commitments to their personal status according to their religious
groups, sects, beliefs, or choices.
Many Muslim holy days are also national holidays, including, Ashura,
Arbai’n, Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, and the Birth of the Prophet
Muhammad. Although some non-Muslim holy days are recognized, such as
Christmas, only Muslim holy days are officially recognized as national
holidays.
Non-Muslims complained that although the Government recognizes their
religious holidays by law, in practice they were generally
disregarded. Schools routinely scheduled examinations during
non-Muslim holy days, and no special dispensation was given to
students wishing to observe them.
Religious groups are required to register with the
Government. According to the Christian and Other Religions Endowment,
approximately twenty foreign missionaries have applied to operate in
the country since 2003; however, only ten remain in the country.
After learning of the registration requirements, which include having
at least 500 followers, none of the organizations returned to complete
the registration process.
The Government permits religious instruction in public schools. In
most areas of the country, students in both primary and secondary
school must study Islam for approximately three hours daily as a
requirement for graduation. Religious study is not mandatory in the
north. Non-Muslim students are not required to participate in Islamic
studies; however, some non-Muslim students reported that they felt
pressure to do so. Alternative religious study is provided for in the
curriculum of non-Muslim schools.
Under civil law there is no penalty for conversion. Under Islamic
law, conversion from Islam to another religion is a criminal offense
subject to the death penalty. Article 1 of the Penal Code No. 111 of
1969, however, mandates that criminal penalties can be imposed only by
civil law. Despite the Shari’a punishment for conversion, the penal
code does not import the Shari’a penalty, nor does it contain a
similar penalty. The Law of Civil Affairs No. 65 of 1972 explicitly
allows non-Muslims to convert to Islam. The constitution provides that
citizens are to be free in their commitment to their personal status
according to their religious groups, sects, beliefs, or choices, as
regulated by law.
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) Resolution 201 of 2001, prohibits
the Wahhabi branch of Islam and mandates the death penalty for
adherents if the charge is proved. Law No. 105 of 1970, prohibits the
Baha’i faith. Both are still part of the law.
Provisions in the TAL and the constitution provide for religious
freedom. However, at the end of the reporting period, the Ministry of
Interior’s Nationality and Passport Section continued to follow the
provisions of Regulation 358 of 1975 which prohibits the issuance of a
nationality identity card to those claiming the Baha’i faith. Without
this official citizenship card, Baha’i experienced difficulty
registering their children in school and applying for passports.
Although the constitution, as well as the TAL before it, provides that
any person who had his citizenship withdrawn shall have the right to
demand its reinstatement, the Transitional National Assembly (TNA)
passed a citizenship law on November 15, 2005, that, among other
things, specifically precludes local Jews from regaining
citizenship. The Presidency Council (the president and the two deputy
presidents) sent a notice to the TNA that it was vetoing this
legislation, but the TNA challenged the legal effectiveness of the
notice. The law came into effect in March 2006, when it was published
in the Official Gazette.
Although the Personal Status Law of 1959 calls for incorporation of
Shari’a into the law in the absence of legislative text on a matter,
Article 2(1) expressly exempts from its application, individuals
covered by special law. Such special law includes British Proclamation
No. 6 of 1917 and the Personal Status Law of Foreigners, No. 38 of
1931. Proclamation No. 6 provides that the civil courts consult the
religious authority of the non-Muslim parties for its opinion under
the applicable religious law and apply this opinion in court. The
Personal Status Law of Foreigners requires that courts apply the
municipal law of the foreign litigants to resolve their domestic law
matters.
Article 92 (Second) of the constitution provides that the Federal
Supreme Court shall be made up of a number of judges, experts in
Islamic jurisprudence, and legal scholars. The law is supposed to
regulate the number, method of selection, and work of the Court. At
the end of the period covered by this report, the law had not been
enacted, leaving unsettled the question of whether Islamic
jurisprudence experts would serve as consultants and advisors to the
judges or as members of the court.
Restrictions on Religious Freedom
Government policy and practices generally did not interfere with the
free practice of religion; however, the ongoing insurgency
significantly harmed the ability of all religious believers to
practice their faith. Additionally, sectarian misappropriation of
official authority within the security apparatus impeded the right of
citizens to worship freely.
All political parties participated in the December 15, 2005, election,
including the Sunni Arab parties that had boycotted the January
elections. The two Sunni Arab coalitions won a total of fifty-five
seats in the Council of Representatives (COR). Sunni Arabs held the
positions of vice president and speaker of the COR, as well as several
ministerial positions.
The Government did not restrict the formation of political parties
based on religious beliefs, or interpretations of religious
doctrine. Although the political coalitions competing in the December
elections were based predominantly on religion or ethnicity, religious
belief or ethnicity was not a requirement for participation in all
cases. For example, the Kurdish List, which won 21 percent of the
seats in the COR, included Sunnis, Shi’a, Christians, and Yazidi; the
Iraqiyun List also included a variety of ethnicities and religious
groups. Likewise, the winning Shi’a Coalition, although predominantly
Shi’a Islamists, also included religious and ethnic minorities, such
as Sunnis, Yazidi, Kurds, Turkmen, and Shabak. The United Iraqi
Alliance also included secular Shi’a and political independents not
associated with any religious party.
Although the transitional government publicly supported the freedom of
all individuals to worship as they chose, there were some reports of
discrimination by Shi’a elements in the Government against Sunni and
non-Muslim minorities. The Wahhabi branch of Islam and the Baha’i
faith are prohibited by law; however, the respective provisions of the
TAL and provisions within the constitution on freedom of religion may
supercede these laws. Nonetheless, by the end of the reporting period,
no court had ruled on these laws as no challenges had been brought.
The Personal Status Law of Foreigners requires that courts apply the
municipal law of the foreign litigants to resolve their domestic law
matters. Despite this exception in the 1959 Personal Status Law,
there are instances in which this law, based on Shari’a principles,
applies to non-Muslims, thereby overriding rules particular to their
religion. For instance, the law forbids the marriage of a Muslim woman
to a non-Muslim; also, in the distribution of inheritance, a female
receives one-half of what a male receives. These provisions could be
considered inconsistent with Article 14 of the constitution, which
guarantees equal protection under the law without discrimination based
on gender or religion. No court has yet ruled on this issue.
Many residents on the Ninewah Plain, who are mostly non-Muslim, were
better able to participate in the October 2005 constitutional
referendum and December 2005 national election. Although the Chaldean
and Assyrian Christian communities were anticipating barriers to
voting–similar to those in January 2005–there were few documented
cases of voter intimidation according to the Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq (IECI).
Passports do not indicate an individual’s religion; however, religion
is explicitly noted on the national identity card.
Government employees were not prohibited from displaying elements of
their religion.
Students generally were not prohibited from practicing elements of
their faith in school; however, during the reporting period,
non-Muslim minorities and secular Arabs in some schools were
increasingly forced, often under the threat of violence, to adhere to
conservative Islamic practices. During the reporting period, Basrah’s
education director instituted a policy requiring all females in the
schools to cover their heads and all female university students in
Mosul, even non-Muslims, were required to wear the hijab, or
headscarf.
Abuses of Religious Freedom
The Government does not officially engage in or tolerate abuses of an
individual’s right to religious freedom. However, the Government
focused most of its resources and attention on the ongoing insurgency
and reconstruction efforts during the reporting period; thus, it did
not have the capacity to address issues relating to abuses of freedom
of religion.
Many attributed the escalating violence in the country, especially the
tremendous upsurge in sectarian violence following the February 22,
2006, bombing of the al- Askariya Shrine "Golden Mosque" in Samarra to
terrorists attempting to sow sectarian strife. Sectarian attacks and
reprisals following the Samarra bombing, were estimated to have
claimed more than one thousand lives and damaged more than sixty
mosques across the country. In the aftermath of the Samarra bombing,
it became increasingly difficult to determine how much of the violence
was based on religious affiliations rather than criminal elements.
The Sunni Arab community often cited police raids of its mosques and
religious sites as an example of targeting by the Shi’a-dominated
government.
On May 19, 2005, for example, security forces raided Baghdad’s
prominent Sunni Abu Hanifa Mosque as Friday prayers were ending,
reportedly to detain alleged terrorists. Local leaders complained that
security forces used tear gas and abused women. The prime minister
subsequently provided compensation for damages to the Sunni religious
endowment office and promised a full investigation of the incident.
On June 9, 2005, police broke into Amarra’s Sunni Hetteen Mosque in
the south charging that it harbored terrorists. Subsequently, the
police turned the mosque over to the Shi’a Endowment Office, which
changed its name to Fatima Al Zahraa Mosque.
There were allegations that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
engaged in discriminatory behavior against religious
minorities. Christians living north of Mosul claimed that the KRG
confiscated their property without compensation and began building
settlements on their land. Assyrian Christians also alleged that the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-dominated judiciary routinely
discriminated against non-Muslims and failed to enforce judgments in
their favor. Despite the allegations of KRG discrimination against
religious minorities, many non-Muslims fled north from the more
volatile areas in the middle and southern parts of the country where
pressures to conform publicly to narrow interpretations of Islamic
teaching were greater.
Sunni Arab leaders accused the Badr Organization, an armed militia of
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and
the Jaysh al-Mehdi Shi’a militia, of assassinating Sunni clerics. The
Badr Organization group claimed it had relinquished its weaponry and
become a strictly political organization. However, by the end of the
reporting period, reports of Jaysh al-Mehdi militia attacks on Sunni
residents and places of worship were increasing.
The Armenian Church of Iraq was working with government officials to
regain properties that the former regime forced it to sell. Although
the Church was paid fair market value for six properties in Mosul,
Basrah, Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Dohuk, it was forced to sell the
properties under pressure. Church officials stated that discussions
with the Government yielded no results during the reporting period;
however, they were optimistic about the KRG’s return of property in
the north.
There were no reports of religious prisoners or detainees in the
country.
Forced Religious Conversions
There were no reports of forced religious conversion, including of
minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from
the United States, or of the refusal to allow such citizens to be
returned to the United States. However, there were reports that
Islamic extremists threatened, kidnapped, and killed Mandaeans for
refusing to convert to Islam.
Abuses by Terrorist Organizations
While the general lawlessness that permitted criminal gangs,
terrorists, and insurgents to victimize citizens with impunity
affected persons of all ethnicities and religious groups, many
individuals were targeted because of their religious identity or
secular leanings. Individuals were victims of not only harassment and
intimidation but also kidnapping and even killings. Women and girls
were often threatened, assaulted with acid, and killed for refusing to
wear the hijab or for dressing in western-style clothing. On August
5, 2005, Assyrian college student Anita Tyadors was killed in the
Zohoor region of Mosul. She was reportedly targeted for her modern
lifestyle, including speaking English and wearing Western
clothing. Some women claimed they were denied employment and
educational opportunities because they were non-Muslim, did not dress
in accordance with conservative Islamic norms, or did not sufficiently
adhere to strict interpretations of religious rules governing public
behavior.
On March 15, 2005, Muqtada al-Sadr loyalists attacked picnicking
Basrah University students, claiming they were violating the
principles of Islam with their western-style clothing, and by singing,
and dancing. The Sadrists fired guns at the students and beat them
with sticks. Police were present during the incident but did not
intervene. University officials reported that at least fifteen
students were hospitalized, many with serious injuries. One student
reportedly died in the incident.
Islamist militants harassed shopkeepers for providing goods or
services they considered to be inconsistent with Islam and sometimes
killed them for failing to comply with warnings to stop such
activity. Liquor storeowners, primarily Christians and Yazidi, were
especially targeted. Liquor stores in Baghdad, Mosul, and Basrah were
bombed, looted, and defaced. More than fifty liquor stores operated by
Assyrians in Baghdad were closed during the reporting period due to
threats by Islamic extremists.
The Christian and Other Religions Endowment reported that, after a
series of church bombings and incidents of violence targeting
Christians over the past two years, more than 200,000 non-Muslims left
the country or fled to the North. Many remained in Jordan or Syria
awaiting improvement in the security situation.
A succession of car bombs on January 29, 2006, targeted Christian
churches in Baghdad and Mosul. Attacks on the Catholic Church of the
Virgin Mary and the Orthodox Church in Kirkuk, and Saint Joseph’s
Catholic Church and an Anglican Church in Baghdad killed at least
three persons and injured nine. The same day, a car bomb also exploded
outside the residence of the Apostolic Nuncio (also referred to as the
Vatican Embassy).
Christian leaders inside and outside of the country reported that
members of their Baghdad community received threat letters demanding
that Christians leave or be killed. Thousands of Christians reportedly
left their neighborhoods to live with family either in other
neighborhoods, or outside of Baghdad.
Both Shi’a and Sunni Muslims reported receiving death threat letters
demanding that they leave their neighborhoods following the attack on
the al-Askiriya mosque. More than 100,000 Shi’a and Sunnis reportedly
left their homes to avoid these threats. Some were living in
internally displaced camps, while the majority sought refuge with
families or through religious community support systems.
During the reporting period, Sabean leaders reported that their
community was increasingly targeted. In the spring of 2006, Sabeans
began to receive death threat letters accusing them of practicing
sorcery and urging them to leave the country. According to estimates,
more than ten Sabaeans were killed and ten to fifteen Sabaeans were
kidnapped for ransom during the reporting period. There were also
reports that Islamic extremists threatened, kidnapped, and killed
Sabaeans for refusing to convert to Islam.
The Yazidi community reported that eleven Yazidis were killed during
the reporting period, including Ninewa Provincial Council member Hasan
Nermo, who was assassinated on April 20, 2006.
In addition to targeting non-Muslims, terrorists continued to attack
both Sunni and Shi’a communities during the reporting
period. Insurgents attacked mosques in Sunni and Shi’a neighborhoods
and killed clerics, other religious leaders, and private citizens of
both sects. There were also accusations that both insurgents and
militia wore police uniforms to incite sectarian violence and
discredit the Government in the eyes of the public.
On July 16, 2005, a suicide bomber killed more than ninty-eight people
and injured more than 130 in a suicide attack in front of a Shi’a
mosque in Musayyab. The explosion occurred as worshipers were
emerging from evening prayers. The same mosque was also targeted in a
suicide attack on November 2, 2006, which killed at least twenty
persons. In that attack, a bomber exploded on a minibus in front of
the mosque as persons were arriving for sunset prayers.
On September 14, 2005, Baghdad was hit by at least a dozen attacks
that appeared to target Shi’a civilians. Violence continued two days
later, with an attack on a Shi’a mosque in Tuz Khurmatu in Salah ad
Din province that killed fourteen, and assassinations of Shi’a clerics
in Mosul and the Sadr City neighborhood of Baghdad. In an internet
posting, Al Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for the series of
attacks and declared an "all out war" on Shi’a in the country.
On October 5, 2005, a bomb planted in the doorway of a Shi’a mosque in
Hilla killed at least twenty-five and injured more than
eighty-seven. The bomb at the Ibn al-Nama mosque exploded as
worshippers gathered for prayers on the first day of Ramadan.
On November 18, suicide bombers struck two Shi’a mosques in the town
of Khanaqin, near the Iranian border. More than ninety persons were
killed in the midday attacks, as worshippers gathered for Friday
prayers. Both the Greater and Smaller Khanaqin mosques were destroyed
in the attacks.
The February 22, 2006, bombing of the Askariya Shrine in Samarra led
to an increase in sectarian violence. Those who attacked the Golden
Mosque sought to exploit divisions among the population and the
political leadership. The Government and religious leaders alike, in a
demonstration of national unity, condemned the attacks and called for
an end to sectarian unrest. Many families fled mixed neighborhoods
for fear of attack, and estimates indicated that between 50,000 and
80,000 persons were internally displaced. Although the majority of the
displaced were Shi’a, almost 25 percent of the families were
Sunni. Reports also indicated that as many as one thousand Christians
were also displaced due to threats and intimidation.
On March 24, 2006, a bomb planted outside a Sunni mosque in the town
of Khalis killed five persons and injured seventeen others. The
explosion at the Sunni Saad Bin Abi Waqqas mosque occurred as
worshippers were leaving from Friday prayers.
On April 6, 2006, a car bomb exploded approximately 300 meters from
the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf. At least thirteen persons were killed in
the attack against the most revered holy site for Shi’a Muslims in the
country.
On April 7, 2006, three suicide bombers attacked a Shi’a mosque in
Baghdad, killing at least seventy-nine persons. The attack on the
Baratha mosque, which is affiliated with the largest Shi’a political
party, occurred as Friday prayers were ending. Two of the bombers
detonated in the crowded courtyard, while the third exploded at the
main exit. The Baratha mosque was again attacked on June 16, 2006.
Improvements and Positive Developments in Respect for Religious
Freedom
Despite the tenuous security environment and the Government’s
preoccupation with fighting the insurgency and rebuilding the
country’s infrastructure, significant improvements were made with
respect for religious freedom during the reporting period.
While the Sunni minority did not broadly participate in the January
elections, resulting in only nominal representation in the TNA, the
transitional government made some efforts to encourage Sunni
participation in the political and constitutional development
processes. Members of all minority and religious groups participated
in the October constitutional referendum, approving a constitution
that protects the rights of all citizens, regardless of religious
affiliation. Although there was some initial concern from minority
leaders, especially Christians, about the extensive role of Islam in
the constitution, the Government has reached out to these leaders to
assure them that their rights as minorities are protected. During the
transitional government administration, both President Talabani and
Prime Minister Jafari met with Chaldean (Catholic) Patriarch Emmanuel
III Delly in September 2005 to discuss constitutional concerns.
Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari met with Pope Benedict XVI in Rome on
August 26, 2005, to discuss religious freedom and legal rights for
Christians in the country. Zebari attended a Catholic Church sponsored
conference in Italy. Later, in November 2005, President Talabani also
discussed religious freedom with the Pope.
Despite violence against Christian communities, fifteen new
evangelical Christian congregations have reportedly been established
in Baghdad since April 2003. Under the previous regime, only two
evangelical churches–both Presbyterian and led by Egyptian
nationals–were allowed to exist. At the end of the period covered by
this report, Baptists, Methodists, and other Christian congregations
emerged, all led by local clergy.
During the reporting period, Government leaders repeatedly spoke of
the need for all citizens to unite–regardless of religious
orientation–to confront terrorism. Government leaders often
emphasized their commitment to equal treatment for all religious
groups and ethnicities. Former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari
frequently expressed his concern over implications of Government
involvement in violence against the Sunni Arab minority. By the end of
the reporting period, no information regarding investigations into
alleged ISF abuses or punishment of perpetrators had been released to
the public. The Government also made clear it would not exempt mosques
and homes of religious leaders from assault if they were being used as
insurgent strongholds.
The Government publicly denounced all incidents of sectarian violence
and, as such violence escalated in late February, repeatedly
encouraged unity among the county’s religious sects. Both President
Jalal Talabani and former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari immediately
condemned the bombing of the Askariya Shrine in Samarra and called for
calm as sectarian tensions flared.
Religious leaders reported that they generally had good relations and
worked together to promote interfaith understanding. The Sabeans
sought the assistance of the Grand Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI’s Hakim,
Prime Minister Jafari, and Muqtada al-Sadr in supporting minority
rights.
Religious leaders of all religious groups condemned the terrorist acts
committed by the insurgency and urged the country’s religious
communities to refrain from retaliation and join together to end the
violence.
After the Samarra bombing, Sunni and Shi’a religious leaders in cities
across the country joined together for joint prayer services in
protest of sectarian violence. In early March 2006, representatives of
the Sunni Muslims Scholars Association visited Grand Ayatollah Al
Sistani and the Marjaiya, or the Shi’a supreme religious authorities,
in Najaf to discuss ways to calm the sectarian violence and unite the
population.
Section III. Societal Abuses and Discrimination
The country’s cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity is far
better reflected in its political and economic structure than prior to
the 2003 liberation. Shi’a Arabs, the religious majority of the
population, were long disadvantaged economically, politically, and
socially but now constitute the majority in the Government.
Despite these changes, conservative and extremist Islamic elements
continued to exert tremendous pressure on society to conform to their
interpretations of Islam’s precepts. Although this impacted both the
Sunni and Shi’a secular Muslim population, non-Muslims were especially
vulnerable to the pressure and violence because of their minority
status and the lack of protection provided by a tribal structure.
Sunni Muslims claimed general discrimination, alleging revenge by the
Shi’a majority for the Sunnis’ presumed favored status under the
former regime, but also because of the public’s perception that the
insurgency was composed primarily of Sunni extremists and former
regime elements with whom the majority of the Sunni population
supposedly sympathized. While some within the Sunni community
supported and even assisted the insurgency, many denounced the
terrorism as vocally as their non-Sunni counterparts.
Non-Muslims, particularly Christians, complained of being isolated by
the Muslim majority because of their religious differences. Despite
their statistically proportional representation in the National
Assembly, many non-Muslims said they were disenfranchised and their
interests not adequately represented.
The combination of discriminatory hiring practices, attacks against
non-Muslim businesses, and the overall lack of rule of law, have also
had a detrimental economic impact on the non-Muslim community and
contributed to the significant numbers of non-Muslims who left the
country. The Armenian Diocese estimated that the number of destitute
Armenian Christians, for example, had grown by 50 percent since 2003,
a condition exacerbated by the inadequate security environment, which
hampers Armenian Christians’ ability to find employment. Terrorist
threats have compelled tens of thousands of Christians, including
Armenian Orthodox and Chaldean Catholics, to leave the country in the
wake of church bombings in 2004 and early 2006.
Terrorist threats also caused thousands of Sunni and Shi’a to leave
their homes and flee to more tolerant neighborhoods or leave the
country altogether. The magnitude of sectarian attacks on both Sunnis
and Shi’a was extremely high, albeit difficult to track.
Anti-Semitic feeling remained a strong undercurrent during the
reporting year. According to the head of the Christian and Other
Religions Endowment, the country’s 2,700-year-old Jewish population
had dwindled to less than fifteen persons in the Baghdad area.
Section IV. U.S. Government Policy
The U.S. government is committed to promoting religious freedom and
continues to work closely with the Government on this as part of its
overall policy to promote human rights. U.S. officials at all levels,
including the secretary of state, regularly engaged the Government on
problems relating to freedom of religion. This took the form of public
statements calling for unity in the face of sectarian violence,
high-level meetings with government officials and religious leaders,
and working-level interaction urging representatives of the Government
and religious organizations to include minorities. The embassy also
facilitated interfaith discussion by hosting meetings, roundtables,
and other events with all member religious groups of the country’s
diverse religious communities and funded training, seminars,
conferences, and exchange programs to promote religious understanding
and tolerance.
The embassy’s primary focus during the reporting period was on
reducing sectarian violence, increasing Sunni and non-Muslim inclusion
in the political and constitutional development processes, and
increasing interfaith understanding. The United States worked to
increase Sunni inclusion in the political process by providing
technical assistance to Sunni leaders. U.S.-funded projects worked
with religious minorities by bringing together members of different
religious and ethnic backgrounds to discuss common problems. The
United States also conducted a significant amount of conflict
mitigation at the local level through its Community Action Program
(CAP). Under the CAP, community groups were formed with diverse
membership, including women and youth, in an effort to promote
reconciliation. In ethnically or religiously mixed communities, these
community groups included representatives from all segments of
society. These groups identified and prioritized their needs and
developed projects to address those needs. The projects did not
specifically target any one ethnic or religious group for
assistance. Rather, they sought opportunities to bridge differences.
The Iraqi Institute of Peace (IIP), an interfaith dialogue center
established with financial and organizational support from the U.S
Institute of Peace, continued to focus on mitigating conflict and
building peace primarily through its forum work. IIP forums target
specific groups such as women, youth, and the media, and focus on key
topics such as human rights and religious dialogue.
IIP forums have promoted tolerance and peace through democracy
building. They played a critical role in the drafting of the
constitution by educating the public about the process and made a
concerted effort to encourage Sunnis, who had boycotted the January
2005 elections, to participate in the process. Conferences and forums
educating citizens about the constitutional referendum and the
national election were also held.
In addition to promoting peace through democratic reform, IIP
regularly meets with tribal leaders, senior clerics and community
leaders in tension-filled areas to improve dialogue and mitigate
conflict. IIP, along with a network of affiliated NGOs, also organized
Brotherhood Day events during Ramadan in assorted cities. These events
were attended by clerics of different religious sects, tribal sheiks,
and other notables who held common prayers and signed declarations of
brotherhood.
Released on September 15, 2006
Source: US State Dept.