Author: Jidarian Alex

SECOND VOLUME OF THE SCHOOL ENCYCLOPEDIA ISSUED
Sona Hakobyan

"Radiolur"
15.01.2009 15:53

"The interest in encyclopedic literature has been growing in our
country over the past years, which is very joyful," said Hovhannes
Ayvazyan, director and editor-in-chief of the Armenian Encyclopedia
publishing house.

The publishing house issued the 2nd volume of the first book of
the Big School Encyclopedia, which sums up the spheres of exact and
natural sciences, geography, healthcare and ecology.

Today the editor-in-chief of the encyclopedia spoke about the
importance and necessity of the encyclopedia.

WHAT IS THE ISRAEL LOBBY?

Atlantic Online
/01/what_is_the_israel_lobby.php
Jan 13 2009

Stephen Walt, of The Israel Lobby fame, launches into the blogosphere
with a bang:

Here’s a thought experiment:

Imagine that Egypt, Jordan, and Syria had won the Six Day War, leading
to a massive exodus of Jews from the territory of Israel. Imagine
that the victorious Arab states had eventually decided to permit the
Palestinians to establish a state of their own on the territory of
the former Jewish state. (That’s unlikely, of course, but this is a
thought experiment). Imagine that a million or so Jews had ended up as
stateless refugees confined to that narrow enclave known as the Gaza
Strip. Then imagine that a group of hardline Orthodox Jews took over
control of that territory and organized a resistance movement. They
also steadfastly refused to recognize the new Palestinian state,
arguing that its creation was illegal and that their expulsion from
Israel was unjust. Imagine that they obtained backing from sympathizers
around the world and that they began to smuggle weapons into the
territory. Then imagine that they started firing at Palestinian
towns and villages and refused to stop despite continued reprisals
and civilian casualties.

Here’s the question: would the United States be denouncing those Jews
in Gaza as "terrorists" and encouraging the Palestinian state to use
overwhelming force against them?

Ross replies:

The odd thing is that by Walt’s own account, the answer would seem to
be "Yes," since presumably the rump Orthodox Gaza – run, perhaps, by
Verbover Jews – wouldn’t have an all-powerful lobby shaping U.S. policy
and public opinion to its specifications. Or am I missing something?

If the implication is that minus the current state of Israel, there
would be no "Israel lobby", then yes, I think Ross is missing quite
a lot. There managed to be an "Irish lobby" for decades in this
country which survived not on the support of the Republic of Ireland,
but on the support of Irish politicians, and Irish voters in heavily
populated areas. The lobby existed independent of the state itself,
and indeed kept right on going on Northern Irish issues even though
the territory was part of Great Britain. As long as there is a largish
population with a strong desire for a state, and an interest in the
fate of that state’s nationals, there will be a lobby for it.

I share the discomfort with noting the obvious fact that Jewish
Americans, like every other hyphenated-american, actively seek the
benefit of their ethnic compatriots by influencing US policy. Other
hyphenated Americans don’t have the same history of accusations that
they are engaged in a virulent conspiracy to run the world for their
benefit, and thus we have no need to pretend that all the Turks just
happen to take a different position on the Armenian genocide than all
the Armenians do–nay, not even the Turks and Armenians themselves
bother to claim this. For that matter, I’ve spent a fair amount of
time around members of organizations like the ADC, and I’ve never
encountered any particular hostility when pointing out the obvious
fact that their members identify with the Palestinians in part because
the Palestinians are Arabs.

But though I understand why statements like this have to be made very
carefully, if at all, the strenuous efforts to avoid making them
have become cancerous. The reluctance to state the obvious allows
Israel’s partisans to duck the undeniable fact that AIPAC and so forth
do actively attempt to influence American policy, and frequently
succeed. Questions about whether this is really best for America,
or the world, can be countered with more-or-less sly insinuations of
anti-semitism. In part because almost the only people who will state
the obvious are looney-tunes anti-semites who think that there’s a
Jewish conspiracy, rather than . . . Jews acting boringly just like
every other ethnic group to ever hit our shores. Or Arabs with tin
ears who come off as mostly mad because they’re way behind in the
ethnic lobbying sweepstakes.

It will not do my career much good to say it, but here goes. America
has an influential Israel lobby in large part because of ethnic
affinity. Not just Jewish ethnic affinity, I hasten to point out. Yes,
we have a large number of Jewish people–many more than we have
Arabs. And those Jewish people mostly strongly identify with Israel
in the conflict. Europe, which has more Arabs, and decimated its
Jewish population 60 years ago, has more natural sympathizers with
the Palestinians, and this probably influences their political and
media coverage quite a lot.

But America also has an influential Israel lobby because it has a much
larger group of people who identify, quasi-ethnically, with Israel:
evangelical Christians who think of themselves as in some way descended
from the ten tribes of Israel. (Not to mention the lunatic fringe who
hopes that the Israelis can in some way hasten the End Times. As if
God could be influenced by a sufficiently robust foreign policy.)

And then most of the rest of us, because almost all Americans see
Israelis as sharing a common European cultural heritage that the
Palestinians do not. (I believe Al-Qaeda agrees.)

Such identifications are, I’d wager, rooted deeply in our genes–our
selfish alleles want to advance alleles more similar to them, which
is why we tend to side with our family against our nation, our nation
against foreigners, and foreigners against sabre-toothed tigers. Those
ties are not all-powerful, of course, which is why mothers don’t let
their children kill all the other children on the block. But they
are often decisive in complicated situations like the one in Gaza.

So we are the Israel lobby, to a greater or a lesser extent–all
Americans who think of themselves as more like the Israelis than the
Palestinians. If the state of Israel were to vanish tomorrow, the
lobby would remain. It might not be as vigorous as it is now–the
peace accords in Northern Ireland (and the Republic’s prosperity)
have left the Irish groups with a lot less to do. But where issues
concerning that territory, and those people, came up, that lobby
would still spring into action.

I think there is nothing wrong with having an Israel lobby. In a
multiethnic society, there needs to be a great deal of tolerance for
the fact that various ethnicities will still care about what happens
in the Old Country. And even if I did think ethnic lobbies were evil,
I’d be out of luck, because they’re inevitable. If your relatives are
in a country, you are going to care what happens to that country. Until
we allow unlimited robot immigration, we’re stuck.

What’s wrong isn’t the Israel lobby, but the attempt to pretend that
there isn’t an Israel lobby, or that it consists of the nice folks
at the Israeli embassy.

One of the great strengths of conservatism is the recognition that
all politics is interest-group politics, and all interest groups have
more or less explicit ulterior motives. It’s not an insult to farmers
to note that there is a powerful farm lobby–and we’re not going to
get good farm policy if we deny this obvious fact, much less demand
that anyone who points it out prove that they don’t hate farmers.

DENNIS SAMMUT: "WE ARE ENTERING A VERY DECISIVE PERIOD IN THE KARABAKH CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESS"

Today.Az
olitics/50043.html
Jan 12 2009
Azerbaijan

Day.Az interview with Dennis Sammut, Executive Director.

– How do you see the economic outlook for the South Caucasus in 2009?

The world is passing through the most severe economic crisis
for the last seventy years. Because of globalisation and growing
inter-dependence the economic downturn has spread across all continents
in a very short time. In 2009 the countries of the South Caucasus will
also feel the impact of the global economic crisis. This is likely
to take the form of reduced property prices, less foreign investment,
less remittances from overseas, particularly Russia and slower growth
than we have seen so far. There is not at the moment any real risk that
any of the three South Caucasus countries will collapse economically,
but governments need to be ready to be flexible with their policies
and swift in their responses to ensure that their countries come out of
the economic crisis not only intact, but actually stronger than before.

For Azerbaijan much also depends on the world energy markets. The
volatility of the oil prices in 2008 should teach Azerbaijan the need
to be cautious in how it spends its oil revenues. I do not see oil
prices falling much more than their present levels, but even if they
increase again the Azerbaijan government must have a strict fiscal
policy that will ensure economic stability. In all three countries
the governments must take steps to protect the most vulnerable parts
of society against the economic downturn. Otherwise social tensions
will quickly translate into political problems.

– Are the prospects any better as regards conflict resolution in the
region in 2009? Does the fact that Russia has recognised Abkhazia
and South Ossetia make the settlement of the Karabakh conflict easier
than the others?

The Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has not changed
the reality that has existed for more than fifteen years, namely
that these territories were outside the control of Tbilisi. For the
moment the change is more symbolic than real. However the dynamic
of the conflict resolution process has changed and we have yet to
see if the new dynamic will help the resolution of the conflict or
not. With regards to Karabakh the major development in 2008 has been
the Moscow Declaration between the two Presidents in November. This is
also a symbolic gesture. It will be meaningless unless it is followed
soon by a change in the dynamic of the conflict resolution process
leading to early changes on the ground. This is the challenge that
the Minsk Group co-Chair have in front of them at the moment. Like
them I am cautiously optimistic for 2009. I think we are entering a
very decisive period in the Karabakh conflict resolution process and
the leaderships of the two countries need to remain focused on this
issue in 2009. The Karabakh situation is also linked to the economic
crisis. A lot of the economic potential of the region remains unused
because of the Karabakh conflict. Armenia and Azerbaijan should cash
in the peace dividend.

– The United States and Georgia have signed a joined declaration on
security co-operation. Will this make it easier for Georgia and other
former Soviet Republics to join NATO? Will this declaration contribute
towards peace in the South Caucasus?

The declaration is a bilateral statement between the US and Georgia. It
seems that both countries felt that after the August War, and the
slowing down of the process of NATO membership for Georgia, that such
a declaration was necessary. Georgia and any other European country
should join NATO when it is ready and if that is what its people
want. However NATO membership is not some panacea. It also brings
with it a lot of obligations which is why this is a step that needs
to be taken carefully. The US-Georgia declaration sends a message of
continued American interest in the South Caucasus. I think this is
a reality and it is good that we are sometimes reminded of it.

– The year also started with another energy crisis in Europe as a
result of the continuing dispute between Russia and Ukraine on gas
supplies. Will this dispute strengthen the position of Azerbaijan
vis-a-vis the western countries?

I think it will certainly help to remind everybody of the importance of
Azerbaijan as an energy producer and energy transit country. However
this is only one side of the coin. The other side of the coin is that
it should also remind Azerbaijan of the importance of being a reliable,
predictable and stable partner in the energy sector. This goes for
all the other countries on the Caucasus-Caspian energy corridor as
well. If Azerbaijan plays its cards well, and up to know it has, than
it should expect to reap the benefit of its increasing importance
for Europe. I hope this dividend will be increased integration of
Azerbaijan in the European family of nations.

ARMENIA MUST LOSE VOTING RIGHTS AT PACE: MEMBER
E. Rustamov

Trend News Agency
Jan 12, 2009
Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan will support rescinding Armenia’s voting rights at the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)."Whether or
not to rescind Armenia’s voting rights at PACE’s January session
is an issue of human rights," member of Azerbaijan’s parliamentary
delegation to PACE Gultekin Hajibeyli told TrendNews. "If human rights
are violated and there are victims, then Azerbaijan will act according
to European values."

"If we support punishing those who infringe human rights, then
Armenia must lose its vote," Hajibeyli said.On Dec. 17, PACE proposed
rescinding Armenia’s voting rights due to a biased investigation
into a criminal case in Yerevan on March 1-2. The Armenian delegation
consists of 8 members of parliament.

The Armenian opposition protested the results of the presidential
elections in the center of Yerevan after Feb. 20. Law enforcement
agencies attacked protesters on March 1 – killing 10 and wounding 265.

In the aftermath, Armenia was told to follow two basic requirements –
to free political prisoners and investigate the incident.

According to Hajibeyli, the Armenian delegation will lose voting
rights at the session, even though the Armenian lobby is known to
help the country out of such difficult situations.

"I believe PACE will adhere strongly to its principles and prove that
it’s a real organization that protects democracy and human rights,"
said Hajibeyli.

RUSSIA DIDN’T SUPPLY ARMENIA WITH MILITARY HARDWARE, RA DEFENSE MINISTRY SAYS

PanARMENIAN.Net
12.01.2009 15:50 GMT+04:00

The Armenian Defense Ministry refuted Azeri media reports that Russia
supplied Armenia with military hardware to the amount of $800 million.

The reports are absolutely false, the RA Defense Minister’s spokesman,
colonel Seyran Shahsuvaryan told a PanARMENIAN.Net reporter.

Earlier, Azeri ANS TV quoted Russian Defense Ministry’s spokesman
Alexander Petrunin as saying that Russia delivered military hardware
to Armenia in the framework of a transnational agreement.

c-rei010609.php

Public release date: 11-Jan-2009
Contact: Ana Godinho
[email protected]
35-121-440-7959
Instituto Gulbenkian de Ciencia

Reverse evolution in real-time

Instituto Gulbenkian de Ciencia scientists turn back clock on
evolution in fruit fly to provide key insights into basic mechanisms
of evolution In his book, Wonderful World, Stephen Jay Gould writes
about an experiment of ‘replaying life’s tape’, wherein one could go
back in time, let the tape of life play again and see if ‘the
repetition looks at all like the original’. Evolutionary biology tells
us that it wouldn’t look the same – the outcome of evolution is
contingent on everything that came before. Now, scientists at the
Instituto Gulbenkian de Ciência (IGC) in Portugal, New York
University and the University of California Irvine, provide the first
quantitative genetic evidence of why this is so.

In this study, to be published online this week in the journal Nature
Genetics, Henrique Teotónio and his colleagues recreated natural
selection in real-time, in the laboratory (rather than based on
inferences from fossil records or from comparing existing natural
populations) and provide the first quantitative evidence for natural
selection on so-called standing genetic variation – a process long
thought to be operating in natural populations that reproduce sexually
but which, until now, had never been demonstrated.

The researchers used laboratory-grown populations of fruit fly
(Drosophila melanogaster), derived from an original group of flies,
harvested from the wild back in 1975. These ancestral flies were grown
in the laboratory, for two decades, under different environmental
conditions, (such as starvation and longer life-cycles) so that each
population was selected for specific characteristics. Henrique
Teotónio and his colleagues placed these populations back in the
ancestral environment, for 50 generations, to impose reverse evolution
on the flies, and then looked at the genetic changes in certain areas
of chromosome 3 of these flies.

Says Henrique, ‘In 2001 we showed that evolution is reversible in as
far as phenotypes are concerned, but even then, only to a
point. Indeed, not all the characteristics evolved back to the
ancestral state. Furthermore, some characteristics reverse-evolved
rapidly, while others took longer. Reverse evolution seems to stop
when the populations of flies achieve adaptation to the ancestral
environment, which may not coincide with the ancestral state. In this
study, we have shown that underlying these phenomena is the fact that,
at the genetic level, convergence to the ancestral state is on the
order of 50%, that is, on average, only half of the gene frequencies
revert to the ancestral gene frequencies – evolution is contingent
upon history at the genetic level too’.

These findings provide further insights into the basic understanding
of how evolution and diversity are generated and maintained. On the
one hand, it provides evidence for evolution happening through changes
in the distribution of alleles in a population (so-called standing
genetic variation), from generation to generation, rather than the
appearance of mutations, from one generation to the next. On the other
hand, as Henrique notes, ‘It has implications for the definition of
biodiversity: some of the ‘reversed’ flies may be phenotypically
identical to the ancestral flies, but they are genetically
different. How then do we define biodiversity?’

This study was funded by a Fundação para a Ciência e a
Tecnologia grant awarded to Henrique Teotónio, who joined the IGC
in 2003 as a group leader and currently heads the Evolutionary
Genetics group and the in-house PhD Programme in Life Sciences.

Notes for Editors:

The Instituto Gulbenkian de Ciência (IGC) is one of the leading
life science research centres in Portugal. Founded by the Calouste
Gulbenkian Foundation, the IGC´s mission is to carry out biomedical
research and training. The IGC currently acts as a host institution to
international research groups, providing state-of-the-art research
facilities in a stimulating and autonomous environment. The IGC runs
several ambitious graduate training programmes and a dedicated
outreach and public engagement in science programme. More information
is available at

Glossary:

Allele – one member of a pair or series of different forms of a gene.
Phenotype – any observable characteristic of a living organism, such
as shape, size, physical features and behaviour. An organism’s
phenotype is a result of the activities of several of its genes, the
environment or interactions between genes and the environment.

ARMENPRESS

`ECOGLOBE’ COMPANY TO BE HANDED DAP ACCREDITATION CERTIFICATE

YEREVAN, JANUARY 10, ARMENPRESS: Armenian `Ecoglobe’ company has been
recognized competent in the field of organic and food certification by
EU accreditation body DAP which has granted accreditation certificate
to the company.
For official DAP accreditation certificate handover ceremony,
Dr. Jochen Neuendorff, the DAP representative, guests from German
agricultural authorities and EU importers will arrive in Armenia
January 18. During the handover ceremony, which will take place
January 19 in Yerevan Golden Tulip Hotel, Armenian producers will have
an opportunity to present their products certified by `Ecoglobe’ as
well as to serve tasting for the guests.
General director of the company Nune Darbinyan told Armenpress that
the fact of recognition of `Ecoglobe’ company competent in the field
of organic and food certification gives the Armenian producers an
opportunity to enter EU bio food market.

355,900 TONS OF MILK AND DAIRY PRODUCE MADE IN ARMENIA IN JAN-NOV 2008

ARKA
Jan 9, 2008

YEREVAN, January 9. /ARKA/. Production of milk and dairy products
grew by 4.2% or 14,300 tons up to 355,900 tons in Armenia in
January-November (including processing by farms, without local
consumption).

The RA National Statistical Service reported that 17,200 tons of milk
and dairy products were produced in the country in November only.

A total of 16,200 tons of cheese was produced in Armenia in the
reporting period, which is a 2.2% increase against the same period
of 2007. 1,100 tons of cheese was produced in November only.

According to the statistical information, 2,100 tons of ice-cream
was produced in the period under review against 2,500 tons in
January-November 2007 (a reduction of 15.7% or 391.8 tons).

MARANI VODKA SPONSORS PHOTO L.A. AND ART LA

PR-Inside.com (Pressemitteilung)
Jan 8 2009
Austria

Marani Brands Inc. (OTCBB:MRIB) has begun partnering with Art Fairs,
Inc. (artfairsinc.com) organizers of photo MIAMI, photo l.a. and ART
LA, as part of its ongoing events strategy that positions the brand as
the ultra-premium vodka of choice to tastemakers in the worlds of art,
fashion and entertainment. Through its relationship with Art Fairs,
Inc., Marani Vodka has become the exclusive spirits sponsor of this
year’s photo l.a. and ART LA expositions.

The 18th Annual photo l.a. exposition begins on January 8th and is
an international fine art photography exhibition and sale. Opening
night proceeds benefit the photography department at Los Angeles
County Museum of Art (LACMA). Marani will be hosting the opening night
reception at the Barker Hangar at the Santa Monica airport from 6-9 pm
(PST).

Shortly thereafter Marani will be sponsoring ART LA, the New Los
Angeles International Contemporary Art Fair. The fair presents a
select roster of 60 top international and Los Angeles based galleries
representing an informed cross-section of today’s contemporary art
trends and directions. Marani is proud to host the Preview Reception on
January 22nd at the Barker Hangar at the Santa Monica Airport. Opening
night reception benefits the Museum of Contemporary Art (MOCA).

"As we continue our mission to provide an ultra-premium vodka that
represent quality and authenticity, we are proud to begin working with
Art Fairs, Inc. through sponsorships like those with photo l.a. and
ART LA which help to benefit the creative community and showcase up
and coming cultural leaders in the art world," said company chief
marketing executive Paul Fuegner. "Working directly within the social
environment where these art lovers are most comfortable allows them
to enjoy the unparalleled quality and distinctive taste of Marani
Vodka in a genuine and unobtrusive manner," added Fuegner.

About Marani Brands Inc.

Marani Brands, Inc. develops, positions, markets and distributes fine
wine and spirit products in the United States. Its signature product,
"Marani Vodka," is an ultra-premium vodka manufactured exclusively
for Marani in Armenia. It is made from late-harvest Armenian winter
wheat, distilled three times, filtered twenty-five times and then,
through a proprietary process, is aged in oak barrels lined with
honey and skimmed dried milk to give it its unique taste. Marani
Vodka was awarded the Gold Medal in the prestigious International
Spirit Competition, held in San Francisco, California, in both 2004
and 2007 and the coveted Star Diamond Award by the American Academy of
Hospitality Sciences in 2008. Please enjoy Marani brands responsibly
and in moderation.

Forward-looking Statements

Certain statements made in this press release contain forward-looking
statements that involve a number of risks and uncertainties. This
forward-looking information is based on certain assumptions,
including, among others, presently known physical data concerning
size and character of reservoirs and economic recoverability. Some
of these expectations may be based upon assumptions or judgments that
prove to be incorrect. In addition, operations involve numerous risks
and uncertainties, many of which are beyond Marani Brands’ control,
which could result in expectations not be realized or otherwise
materially affect the financial condition, results of operation and
cash flows. Additional information regarding these and other risks
are contained in Marani Brands’ filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.

Today’s Zaman, Turkey
Jan 4 2009

Saakashvili pulled the trigger: Turkey between Russia and Georgia

Turkey has been involved, historically and demographically, with many
of the regions of `frozen conflict’ in post-Soviet space. At this
point, one might consider the position of Turkey as being at the
epicenter of Euro-Atlantic and Russian extremes concerning the frozen
conflicts.

Georgia, since 1991, has been considered a valuable `strategic
partner’ by Turkey for several reasons. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip
ErdoÄ?an’s Caucasus Pact idea is a good opportunity to create an
inclusive (Russia, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) new
foreign policy approach at this stage. This approach should be merged
with the representation of all the frozen or unfrozen conflict areas,
peoples, ethnic groups and regions included under the roof of such an
alliance.

Turkey and the `frozen conflicts’ in former Soviet space

Turkey has been involved, historically and demographically, with many
of the regions of `frozen conflict’ in post-Soviet space. The Gagauz
question in Moldova, the status of Crimea and the resettlement of
Crimean Tatars to their homeland in today’s Ukraine, the Chechen
problem, the Abkhazian and South Osetian questions, the issue of
Ajarian autonomy, the relocation of Ahıska Turks in Georgia,
the problems of Borchali Azeris in Georgia, the dispute over Nagorno
Karabakh, and many other frozen conflicts concern not only the
representatives of these ethnic groups within Turkey but also Turkish
governments, due to the activities of lobbyists acting on these ethnic
groups’ behalf. In Turkey, many such lobbyists are well organized
around advocacy and civil society organizations. They usually have a
direct influence on both the Turkish public and on Turkey’s
administrations. Beyond the agitations of the lobbyists, the frozen
conflicts themselves represent potential instability in the region, as
was recently seen in the latest South Osetia (5 Days) War. The status
of these regions as `instabilizers’ is one of the reasons why Turkey,
and probably the rest of the world, has had difficulty engaging in the
economics and politics of the region. Another issue that characterizes
the frozen conflicts is the existence of the former hegemon, Russia,
as an integral part of all of them. This latter point is the reason
why all these frozen conflicts have long been considered the major
obstacle to Euro-Atlantic interests in post-Soviet space.[1] At this
point, one might consider the position of Turkey as being at the
epicenter of Euro-Atlantic and Russian extremes concerning the frozen
conflicts.

Turkey and Georgia

Georgia, since 1991, has been considered a valuable `strategic
partner’ by Turkey for several reasons. The first reason really is
strategic; having a weaker, friendly country between gigantic Russia
and Turkey as a `buffer zone’ makes good tactical sense. It is assumed
that to be a neighbor of a superpower, old, new or reborn, is
risky. Second, especially after the invasion of Azerbaijani
territories by Armenia, and in the wake of the Nagorno Karabakh
problem, Georgia was valued again as the only direct corridor by which
Turkey could reach Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, and the rest of the
Turkic republics. Thirdly, Georgia provides the best option for the
transportation of Caspian energy riches to international markets via
Turkey, bypassing both Russia and Iran. For a good part of the 1990s,
the Georgian economy survived thanks to shuttle trade between Turkey’s
Black Sea provinces and its own. The Turkish military helped its
Georgian counterparts in their ambitious effort to meet NATO standards
in their military and defense infrastructure. In some cases, Turkey
trained Georgian military officials, and some basic, non-sophisticated
equipment was transferred by Turkey to Georgia. The
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural
gas pipeline, and Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway projects were all aimed to
strengthen Turkey’s ties with the Caucasus and the Caspian
Basin. Georgia was seen as a key player in all these projects; the
need to support Georgia has thus rarely been questioned, even during
the Georgian civil war and the Abkhazian and South Osetian wars.

The Ajaria Experience and Osetia Fiasco

The general perception in the Turkish press is that Georgia’s
Saakashvili administration has failed to calculate the extent of the
Russian reaction to its attempt to crack the self-declared South
Osetian Republic.[2] But before considering the reverberations of
Saakashvili’s present actions, it may prove important to consider
their political precedent. Many Turks have not even heard about
Saakashvili’s similar actions in Ajaria a couple of years ago. Ajaria
was given to the Soviets in 1921 by the Kars Treaty between the
Turkish Grand National Assembly and Soviet representatives from
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Article 6 of the treaty explicitly
guaranteed the autonomy of the Muslim majority in Ajaria, which is why
an Ajarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established in
1921. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ajaria was ruled by
an authoritarian former communist, Aslan Abashidze. Although Abashidze
was not a separatist, he achieved a high degree of autonomy from
Tbilisi, especially after the Georgian Civil War of 1992-1993.

One of the first consolidation attempts on the part of Saakashvili
administration in the spring of 2004 was to liquidate Ajaria by
military means and force Abashidze to flee Moscow via the Turkish town
of Trabzon. Although this development agitated some discussion among
the Turkish intelligentsia about the rights of ` and guaranteurship of
Turkey over ` the autonomy of Ajaria, Turkey took no steps and raised
no vocal criticism of the issue. Since then, it is a well known fact
that the Georgian cross was inserted into Ajaria’s sovereign
flag. Some might consider the success of the Saakashvili
administration in `re-uniting Ajaria’ with Georgia as an inspiration `
or view it as a model for the current attempt to liquidate Osetian
defacto independence.

On the present occasion, Saakashvili’s timing was quite perfect. The
international arena was full of other matters. The very opening of the
Olympics was a showcase for world leaders to meet each other and to
appear before world public opinion. Unable to understand the timing
and the use-of-force motives of Saakashvili, some major columnists in
the Turkish media have started to make some analogies. One of them was
quite extreme indeed. Ferai Tınç, in her column in
Turkish daily Hurriyet asked Saakashvili: `Have the ones who shed a
green light to Saddam for the invasion of Kuwait said to you that the
Olympics are excellent timing?’3 The US and its allies were quite busy
in Afghanistan in their search for more military manpower from NATO
allies. They have asked Turkey repeatedly to increase the number of
Turkish forces in Afghanistan and to send some major combat
troops. Iraq still poses a major challenge for the US and her allies,
including Georgia, a former troop contributor. The Georgian attack on
Tskhinvali comes at a time when Iran-US nuclear disaccord is obvious
and the international community is on the verge of taking new
sanctions to force Iranians to give up their current position. The
Georgian leadership might have calculated their attack against the
separatist South Osetia as a new fait accompli just like their
experience in Ajaria.

Ahıska (Meskhetian) Turks and Turkey

Quite unknown to the international public, the situation of the
Ahıska Turks has been one of Turkey’s major concerns in its
relations with Georgia since 1991. The Ahıska Turks were one of
several ethnic groups subjected to mass (and in some cases quite
murderous) exile/deportation to Central Asia in 1944. Along with
Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, and Chechens, they were exiled to
Central Asia and dispersed to more than four thousand locations in the
former Soviet Union. In 1989 and 1990 the Ahıska Turks were
targets of local ethnic violence in Central Asia and many of them left
Uzbekistan for Azerbaijan, Kazakstan and Russia.[4] Vatan Society, the
only representative institution of this very widely dispersed and
impoverished population, spent a good deal of the 1990s and 2000s
searching for ways to resettle the Ahıska Turks in their
homeland in Georgia. Georgian authorities had one condition for this:
Ahıska Turks were required to declare that they were ethnic
Georgians.

After 2003-2004, with the Saakashvili administration in power, there
appeared to be new hope for the Ahıska Turks. Turkey had
already received minor numbers of Ahıska Turk refugees since
1991. However, the major point for Turkey was to assure over half a
million Ahıska Turks that Turkey would help finance their
relocation. In due course, numerous conferences and official
gatherings were held concerning the situation of the Ahıska
Turks. Saakashvili, during his May 2004 visit to Turkey, accordingly
met with most of the representatives of the Ahıska Turks and
promised to do everything possible in order to secure their
resettlement.[5] Since then almost nothing has been achieved and no
steps have been taken by the Georgian administration on the part of
the proposed resettlement, a situation which continues to cause
resentment in Turkey. Moreover, in accordance with Georgia’s
commitments to the European Union, the Ahıska Turks were
obliged to apply for resettlement by the end of 2008. There have been
very few applications to date, due both to the bureaucratic
difficulties imposed by the Georgian administration and also to
uncertainties regarding the recognition of the ethnic and religious
identities of the applicants. Especially after the August 2008 South
Osetia war, the near future appears to hold few prospects of any
progress toward the resettlement of Ahıska Turks in their
homeland.[6] This gridlock naturally places further anti-Georgian
pressure on Turkish governments domestically through the mobilization
of civil society organizations working on behalf of the Ahıska
Turks.

The Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey

Both Abkhazians and Osetians are a part of greater
Causasian/Circassian diaspora in Turkey. Circassians in particular are
quite famous for their solidarity and public spirit. After fighting
against the Tsarist armies for a century, they found refuge in the
Ottoman Empire throughout the 1900s in several waves of immigration,
and were settled in disparate regions all over the Empire. The
descendants of the Ottoman Circassians are to be found in Israel,
Jordan, Syria, Greece, Macedonia, and even Bulgaria. But the bulks of
the Circassians have remained within the borders of Anatolia and have
taken important initiatives throughout the republican era.

Especially during the first Chechen War (1994-1996) the Circassians
showed their solidarity to a great extent. Immense aid and media
campaigns bombarded the Turkish public. Governments during this period
felt the pressure of this public barrage acutely, and took action both
by accepting Chechen refugees and by declining to impose strict
control over the type of `aid’ going through Turkey to Chechnya. But,
during the second Chechen War, with multiple factors (i.e., the
appearance of a visible `Jihadist’ influence there, changes in the
international dynamiycs, and the different governments both in Russia
and Turkey), Circassian solidarity with Chechnya waned. In contrast,
the solidarity concerning Abkhazian and South Osetian causes has
maintained its strength since the beginning of the 1990s. One of the
major civil societal platforms of the Circassian diaspora in Turkey is
called as the Federation of Caucasian Associations. The memorandum
this group published on the 9th of August concerning the South Osetia
war was entitled `Memorandum Concerning the Invasion of South Osetia
by Georgia’. The title alone serves to explain the stance of the
Turkish Circassian community on the issue. A similar protest was
published by another group, the Friends of Abkhazia in Turkey. Of
course, the stance reflected in these documents is expected to have an
impact on the government and political parties; it should also be
expected that Turkish public opinion will be shaped in part by the
lenses of such an approach.[7]

Georgians in Turkey

There is a tiny Georgian minority in Turkey. Although politically
quite active over the years, it is difficult to argue that they have
shown a similar solidarity to that enjoyed by the Circassians. Turkish
Georgians are Muslim descendants of Ajarians who stayed or preferred
to stay on this side of the border during and after the 1921
delimitation. Probably for the first time in Turkish history, Turkish
Georgians have organized a protest meeting in Istanbul in support of
Georgia. Although outnumbered by the Circassians, they are expected to
have an influence over politicians of Black Sea origin, probably
including the prime minister himself. Given the long-standing
historical and demographic concerns raised by both sides, Turkey needs
an approach that will satisfy Turkish Georgians as well as the
Ahıska Turks.

Kosovo’s Impact and Saakashvili as a Leader

Although Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the
independence of Kosovo, none of the Turkic republics followed suit. In
this respect they have chosen to stick with Russia. Both the Kosovo
War of 1999 and Kosovo’s independence in 2008 were considered
important backlashes against Russian diplomacy and power politics. If
one includes Tbilisi’s `unequivocal geopolitical choice in favor of
the West’ and NATO[8] it might be easier to understand how Georgia
could become the very fragile target of Russian `diplomacy.’
Saakashvili has given the best opportunity to Russia for challenging
the new world order.[9] Without any short-term prospects for EU
membership, decorating or furnishing almost all state institutions in
Georgia with EU flags not only demonstrates Georgian leadership’s
commitment to this cause: it sends a message to Russia. But this
gesture is tragicomic as well. The author, just a couple of months
ago, saw many ruined schools and hospitals in the Georgian countryside
with brand new Georgian and EU flags in front of them. Russia is
exactly ready to do anything possible to see a more pro-Russian or a
more `independent’ administration in Georgia.

The Turkish media, especially those sources closest to the government,
are full of accusations against Saakashvili. There is almost no doubt
among the Turkish public that he is responsible for all these
messes. One writer queries, `Do you see how an irresponsible,
ambitious, hasty [person], no statesmen at all, employing nationalism
and religious symbols without any control, a clamorous leader, has
forced his country, his allies and his enemies into huge turmoil? He
has taken one of the most sensitive regions of the world to the brink
of a major war.’ [10]

These accusations are not without basis in fact. Moreover,
Saakashvili’s chauvinistic policy against the Muslim population
(Ajaras, Azeris, Ahıska Turks and others), Abkhazians and
Osetians also raises concerns in Turkey.[11] The one major promise
made by the Saakashvili administration to the Georgian people was to
enter into the EU and NATO quickly. For this purpose, Saakashvili
needed to eliminate South Osetian and Abkhazian demands and he was
also asked by the EU to help the Ahıska Turks resettle their
homeland. But he preferred to allocate approximately 70% of the
national budget to military build-up. While the countryside was quite
miserable economically, Tbilisi started to look like a surreally
reborn historic city. Perhaps even more troubling, Saakashvili did not
hesitate to use disproportionate police force against democratically
demonstrating opposition members last year. Saakashvili has failed to
create civilian jobs, preferring to invest in the military and the
state. Not surprisingly, Saakashvili lost support from his people
during last winter’s presidential elections and during the May 2008
parliamentary elections. It was the Saakashvili administration that
opened Pandora’s Box by beginning to bomb South Osetia as a result of
a search for a fait accompli or a miscalculation.

Saakashvili, until now, has not behaved with the dignity of a
president of a great people but rather has acted as a war
correspondent for CNN. One day sees him declaring war, the other
declaring ceasefire, and the following day begging the international
community for help. He might once have secured the full-fledged
support of poor Georgians in this catastrophe by employing his
extremely religious and nationalistic slogans. He is a caricature
now. Failing to consult his allies, his neighbors and his own domestic
opposition, Saakashvili is now the target of nearly everyone. This
situation marks a total discreditation of his leadership qualities. It
should not be forgotten that it was Saakashvili who pulled the
trigger.

Turkey in this Equation

Turkey has close historical, strategic, economic and ethnic linkages
to all parties in the confrontation. Therefore, Turkey has to take all
of these into consideration. The following points could be relevant
for Turkish crisis management and the reformulation of Turkish foreign
policy concerning the region:

Turkey should refrain from taking the initiative or in fact any direct
action toward mediating the conflict. Any involvement stands to have
important results in both the domestic and international politics of
the country. A Turkish initiative might alienate Russia, an important
economic and energy partner internationally. It would definitely
alienate members of the domestic Circassian diaspora and the political
elites in the country who support their cause. Any expression of open
political sympathy with the Georgian administration would alienate the
nationalist civil society and political powers in Turkey that are in
close contact with the Ahıska Turks and Borchali Azeris in
Georgia.

Turkey should bring the humanitarian side of the current catastrophe
to the forefront. War-torn Georgian regions, devastated South Osetia,
and economically backward Abkhazia should be the direct recipients of
Turkish aid campaigns and investment. Humanitarian support would
satisfy domestic lobbies and Russia alike. Turkey should accept
refugees from Georgia’s war-torn regions in the short run and should
establish direct economic relations with Abkhazia and South
Osetia. This should include direct flights from Istanbul to Sokhumi
and Tskhinvali. The future of these regions should be liberated from
the decisions of chauvinistic and irresponsible parties’ personal
decisions.

In the medium and long term, Turkey should take the initiative to
re-build Georgia with huge grants. However this time the grants should
concentrate on building the country’s civilian infrastructure, such as
schools, hospitals, and electricity and water investments. The
humanitarian-centered approach should also be valid for this
re-building attempt. Within this context, Turkey and Western allies
should allocate funds to invite thousands of Georgian, Abkhazian,
Osetian, Azeri, Ahıska, Mingrealian all other ethnic students
to complete their higher education in the liberal democracies of the
West.

In the post-war re-formulation of Turkish foreign policy, the
Tbilisicentered approach should be replaced by a multi-faceted
approach, including the creation of political ties with Abkhazia,
South Osetia and Ajaria. If Turkey fails to make such connections,
those regions are destined to establish ties only with the Russian
Federation, currently the only country in the world struggling to
explain the problems of the region’s people. This burden should be
lifted from the shoulders of Russia. Power politics and Russia’s
ambitions for hegemony arguable shadow Russia’s humanitarian aid to
those regions.

Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip ErdoÄ?an’s Caucasus Pact idea is a
good opportunity to create an inclusive (Russia, Turkey, Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan) new foreign policy approach at this
stage. This approach should be merged with the representation of all
the frozen or unfrozen conflict areas, peoples, ethnic groups and
regions included under the roof of such an alliance. ErdoÄ?an’s
approach could be productively supported by economic and energy
concerns and, perhaps more importantly, with more humanitarian and
inter-ethnic dialogue patterns.

If Turkey could develop such an inclusive approach, not only
establishing relations with the `centers’ of the nation states but
also with the `problematic regions’ by capitalizing on its historical
and ethnic heritage, it would succeed in establishing secure links
between its allies in the West and those regions without alienating
any regional power.

—————————————— ———————-

SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
[1]Vladimir Socor, `The Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge to Euro-Atlantic
Interests,’ Report prepared by the German Marshall Fund of the United
States, on the occasion of the NATO Summit 2004.

[2] Semih Ä°diz, `Türkiye’yi Batı’ya iten
Rusya’dır,’ Milliyet, 11 August 2008.

[3] Ferai Tınç, `Gürcü Lideri Kim
Ä°tti?’ Hürriyet, 11.8.2008.

[4] Calep Daniloff, `The Exile of the Meskheti Turks: Still Homesick
Half a Century Later,’ Azerbaijan International, Spring 1997, (5.1)
pp. 12-16.

[5] The speech of Turkish MP Ensar Ã-Ä?üt at the
Turkish Grand National Assembly, 22nd term, 2nd legislative year,
110th session, July 6, 2004.

[6] Ã?aÄ?rı Erhan, `Gürcistan’daki Durum
Ahıska Türklerinin
Dönü& #xC5;?ünü İmkansız
Kıl&#xC4 ;±yor,’ ASAM Analysis, 11 August 2008.

[7] This point of view has a long precedent: the Federation has
declared that the inclusion of South Osetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in
the first place were criminal acts on the part of Stalin, who acted in
order to promote his home country Georgia within the Soviet Union. See
Kafkas Dernekleri Federasyonu, `Gürcistan’ın
Gün ey Osetya’yı Ä°Å?gali Nedeni Ä°le
Yayınladı&#xC 4;?ımız Bidiridir,’
9.8.2008. However the historical background of the inclusion of these
two regions into the lands of Georgia is a bit different.

[8] Igor Torbakov, `New Caucasus War: All Sides are Likely to Lose,’
Upcoming article by Dr. Torbakov sent to the author in 11.8.2008.

[9] Fehmi Koru, `Dikkatle ve Ä°htiyatla,’ Yeni Å?afak, 12
August 2008.

[10] İbrahim Karagül, `Bir Delinin
BaÅ?ımıza AçtıÄ?ı
Bela ya Bakın,’ Yeni Å?afak, 12 August 2008.

[11] Hakan Albayrak, `SaakaÅ?vili ve Å?ovenist Siyasetin
Ä°flası,’ Yeni Å?afak, 11 August 2008.

[*] PhD International Relations, Bilkent University,
Ankara. [email protected]

26 August 2008, Tuesday
HASAN ALI KARASAR