About Karabakh conflict

Modern Diplomacy
Dec 7 2020
 
 
 
 
 
December 7, 2020
 
By 
Alexander Ananiev
 
It is more of a job to interpret interpretations than to interpret the things M.Montaigne «The Complete Essays Опыты»
 
The fast pace of a settlement process in Nagorno-Karabakh and the arrival of Russian peace-keepers in the conflict zone took those Russian and foreign ”experts” that cashed in on the one-sided presentation of Russia’s policy, by surprise. Their interpretations of events while they were hot smack of confusion and mutually exclusive conclusions. The impression is that a guidebook for the “analysis” of the situation and “interpretation of interpretations” has yet to be written, so they interpret things at will, thereby creating their own “plausible” myths. Such free judgements range from the allegedly well-planned winning operation by “intriguing” Moscow in Nagorno-Karabakh to V.Putin’s 10 defeats in Trans-Caucasus. What comes to one’s mind in connection with Moscow’s so-called “wicked games” to incite the conflict, is the parable about a man who saws a tree he is sitting on. A passerby tells him: «Don’t cut it – you will fall down», but the man continues to cut the tree. As he falls, at last, he exclaims: «Was it witchcraft that did it?». This can easily be applied to Armenia. It was Y.M.Primakov who warned the Armenians years ago that in the absence of a compromise deal the armed conflict in Karabakh was bound to erupt anew sooner or later: «Azerbaijan can work and wait. And it has the resources. 10, 20, 30 years, and they will gain strength and will grab EVERYTHING from you». The same warning came from Armenia’s first President Levon Ter-Petrosyan in 1997, and in 2011.
 
The Armenians, while fully aware of the impending war, demonstrated inability to collect themselves to counteract the threat. They did not boost their defenses or purchased the required armaments. The country’s combat readiness decreased as well: the new government, fearing a military coup, opted for the support of the army and replaced professional commanders with government-loyal laymen who had no links to the previous top brass. Moreover, the government, which came to power as a result of a color revolution and consisted of officials who used to work for Soros organizations, began to gradually distance itself from its only true ally – Russia, closing Russian-language schools, launching ungrounded persecutions of Russian companies, imposing restrictions on pro-Russian media, think tanks, politicians and civil campaigners. All these measures were presented under the slogan of the versatility of foreign policy and the need to fight against corruption. The versatility of Armenian policy led to an equally versatile attitude on the part of Moscow: it demonstrated the same policy with regard to Armenian allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and Azerbaijani partners. Thus, considering the suicidal can’t-care-less approach on the part of the Armenian leadership, it would be absurd to talk about the wicked intrigues of Moscow, which allegedly orchestrated the capitulation of Armenia with a view to “punish” its “democratic” leadership. Armenia orchestrated its own defeat (see below).
 
A common stance in favor of an immediate end to the bloodshed and a ceasefire control mechanism was repeatedly discussed with countries co-chairing the OSCE’s Minsk Group (the United States, France) at the presidential level, at the level of ministers, and by special envoys. But the formulation of a final three-party statement  did not appear possible – a delay was out of the question as it would jeopardize thousands of lives.
 
Russia, which put an end to the senseless slaughter while other members of the Minsk Group chose to keep a low profile, could hardly be blamed for ill-doing. Nevertheless, the ardent opponents of the “criminal regime” are set on presenting the entire conflict as a number of V.Putin’s defeats. А. Illarionov argues that there were exactly 10.
 
 Firstly, the Kremlin’s former economic adviser blames the Russian president for being unable to prevent and stop Azerbaijan’s aggression in the initial stage, and for failing to prevent the capitulation of Armenia. These are presented as V.Putin’s first three defeats.
 
What became a target for using force is Karabakh – an unrecognized republic, which received no recognition even from Armenia proper after nearly thirty years of its independence. Under UN resolutions, Nagorno-Karabakh is an integral part of Azerbaijan, which is particularly relevant speaking of territories, occupied by the Artsakh Defense Army in the 1990s and comparable in size to the unrecognized republic itself. The problem is that since then Armenia has done nothing to legalize its paternalism in relation to Nagorno-Karabakh. The uncertainty of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status for Armenia, Russia’s ally in the CSTO, prevented Moscow from coming out in defense of this territory. Technically, the conflict was Azerbaijan’s internal affair: it did not attack Armenia’s territory, carried out military operations against separatists on its own territory. The Artsakh Defense Army was a good deterrent. Even Armenia chose not to deploy its army units in Karabakh but dispatch volunteer corps instead.
 
Given the situation, deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces was possible only on condition of approval from both parties. The negotiations were under way from the very first day of the conflict but N.Pashinyan, who counted on western assistance, would not agree to the conditions proposed after consultations with western curators. As military operations continued, the terms for a peace settlement became less attractive until on November 9th the situation grew critical with possibilities for a ceasefire deteriorating further.
 
Undoubtedly, co-chairing countries of the Minsk Group could have stepped in to guarantee an earlier ceasefire, by introducing a balance of strength, by imposing a strict ban on Turkey’s attempts at intervention in the conflict. This could have been secured within NATO, or by threatening with UN Security Council sanctions. However, in early November, one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (needless to guess, it was Britain) blocked a draft resolution proposed by three co-chairing members of the CSTO’s Minsk Group to ensure an immediate ceasefire and prevent third countries from meddling in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, while NATO did not even raise such an issue. Given the situation, the Kremlin could not prevent an attack and neither could it force N.Pashinyan to sign a statement earlier, as the latter, until the very last moment, hoped that “the West will help us”. Therefore, it is the West that should be blamed for being unable to prevent military operations and to nip the conflict in the bud. Meanwhile, if we follow A.Illarionov’s logic, we must ascertain the defeat of the USA in 2008, when Washington proved unable to prevent M.Saakashvili’s attack on South Ossetia.
 
Russia entered Georgia after M.Saakashvili attacked Tskhinval from Grad multiple rocket launchers killing Russian peacekeepers who were deployed there on the basis of an official agreement signed by both sides. The fact that M.Saakashvili was the first to start the war (having more than 100 military advisers from the USA and more of them in Georgia’s government agencies) – was pointed out in a EU report. This report, compiled by the EU independent panel, was ready in spring 2009 but was published only in the autumn, after the western media celebrated one year to RUSSIA’s attack on “small” “democratic” Georgia. The report by the EU panel was mentioned in passing. What will be the case this time? If Russian peacekeepers come under attack from either of the parties involved and Russia takes retaliatory action, what will be the reaction of well-wishers, like A.Illarionov?
 
The war was stopped thanks to intensive peace-keeping activity by V.Putin personally, while Armenia’s capitulation was the result of its “versatile foreign policy” and assistance of western advisers (capitulation can be described as partial, since except Shusha and Hadrut, Karabakh remained under peacekeepers; the other, earlier occupied areas would have surrendered anyway sooner or later – in general, Armenians did not settle there).
 
As the fourth defeat, A.Illarionov cites the fact that Turkey’s assistance to Azerbaijan proved more effective than Russia’s aid to Armenia, which is rendered in full compliance with Moscow’s commitments as an ally.
 
An economist by qualifications, A.Illarionov could compare the budgets of the two countries and the oil money on which Azerbaijan for 26 years purchased cutting-edge weapons. Armenia has neither oil, nor the oil money, and the diaspora are not quick to loosen their purse-strings. According to experts, it would cost Armenia 10 yearly budgets to mount an appropriate defense of Karabakh, which, of course, was unaffordable, considering that even the available resources were spent irrationally. For example, Armenia chose to buy the old Osa missile systems from Jordan, though it could have bought ultramodern systems from Russia at prime cost or on credit. It was unclear why Armenia purchased Russian fighter jets which were absolutely superfluous for the country’s military needs and did not make a single flight in the course of military operations. A report to this effect was made a few days ago by an Armenian general, who serves in the capacity of chief military inspector of Armenia.
 
As it happens, it is not enough to have the resources – it is also vital to have competent military experts. But the incumbent Armenian prime minister, as was said above, got them out of the way as he fought for power.
 
It is not Russia’s fault that Armenia could not use the opportunity of getting the assistance it needed. It was only after the start of military operations that the Armenian leadership became aware of the shortages of military hardware. Russia was quick to offer assistance but this aid took long to be delivered as it was transported via Iran after Georgia had shut the land and air border with Armenia because of the conflict. Georgia opened the air corridor for Russian peacekeepers alone after the signing of the statement.
 
V.Putin’s fifth defeat in the interpretation of A.Illarionov is (and this is strange for a liberal) the Russian president’s mediation in talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan instead of “dictating their will to smaller nations”.
 
As far as the Russian mediation is concerned, it would be more appropriate to blame co-chairing countries of the Minsk Group – the USA and France, which failed to act on their commitments to establish peace. They thus tend to shift responsibility from the guilty to the innocent. Should they have followed what Aliyev “dictated” (A.Illarionov writes this about the three-party statement), Azerbaijan would have captured the entire Karabakh, there would be no Russian peacekeepers there, and the observer center would have been opened without Russia. Armenia wouldn’t have welcomed it.
 
What A.Illarionov also blames the Russian president for is the absence in the final document of any mention of the status of Karabakh.
 
In the early days of the war, when the terms of peace were much more favorable for Armenia, N.Pashinyan, assisted by western advisers, missed the chance of reaching agreement on the status of Karabakh. After the defense crumbled and Shusha surrendered, this chance was lost altogether – status was not on the agenda, what was necessary was to keep what remained. V.Putin’s hint: talks on the status could be on the agenda in the future, at the moment the most important thing is to put an end to military operations.
 
In addition, A.Illarionov cites V/Putin out of context, by selecting some words and leaving out the main idea: “Speaking about recognition-unrecognition of Karabakh as an independent state, there can be different opinions to this effect, but what proved essential was that the mere position of non-recognition of Karabakh, including on the part of Armenia, left a visible footprint on the course of events and on how these events were perceived».
 
V.Putin continued: «We must say about it openly: after the criminal, without doubt, activities of the former Georgian leadership, namely the strikes against our peacekeepers in South Ossetia, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We acknowledged as fair the wish of Crimean people to become part of Russia, we acknowledged their free will, we did it openly. Some may be in favor, some may be against, but we did it in the interests of people who live there, in the interests of entire Russia, and we do not hesitate to openly say so. This was not done with regard to Karabakh, which made a tangible impact on what has been happening there».
 
While taking for granted the presence of NATO military contingents from Britain, Canada and Germany in the Baltic countries in 2017, А. Illarionov lashes at V.Putin for voicing no objections to the dispatch of Turkish military to Azerbaijan and their participation in the peace-keeping operation. This suggests a selective approach, a kind of “liberal logic”, under which the presence of NATO military in some former Soviet republics should be seen as appropriate while the presence of NATO servicemen in other former Soviet republics should be seen by Russia as inappropriate. The disfavored liberal economist is also indignant over V.Putin’s recognition of the sovereignty of Azerbaijan and his consent to the presence of observer centers consisting of Russian and Turkish experts on the territory of Azerbaijan.
 
The Turkish influence on Azerbaijan became reality in the 1990s, as a result of the irresponsible policies of Yeltsin/Kozyrev. While we are allies with Armenia, we are only partners with Azerbaijan, so the latter’s desire to win the support of one more guarantor is quite understandable. Had the co-chairing countries of the peace process – the USA and France – not withdrawn from the scene at a critical moment, they could have taken Turkey’s place. Now, instead of demanding, within NATO, that Turkey account for its actions to incite conflict in Southern Caucasus, which were perpetrated in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, western partners in the Minsk Group require Russia to account for the role of Turkey in the Karabakh conflict. They ought to ask themselves first.
 
About the peace-keepers, A.Illarionov distorts the facts: the statement envisages the presence of only Russian peace-keepers in Karabakh and empowers Turkey to establish a Turkish-Russian ceasefire monitoring center on the territory of Azerbaijan.
 
For an even score, A.Illarionov argues that among V.Putin’s other defeats is the use of drones in an online regime to monitor the situation along the division line, as the drones, he says, caused the death of Armenians. Does it need to explain that technical means can both carry death and control the peace process, depending on the set purposes.
 
What A.Illarionov disliked was V.Putin’s support of N.Pashinyan, who opted for putting an end to the bloodshed, eventually. Nevertheless, it would be naïve to assume that the interview by an initiator and mediator in the peace settlement was designed to obtain all but backing the Armenian prime minister, though at the present, his resignation could take place only as a result of an anti-constitutional coup. Deputies from the ruling My Step bloc, who control two thirds of seats in parliament, made it clear that they want N.Pashinyan to stay. So much public disappointment means that there is a chance that radical groups may come to power in Armenia, such as terrorist organization «Sasiatser», and these groups may disrupt all the agreements and unleash a war to a complete self-destruction of Armenia.
 
Considering an overwhelming public support (over 70%) for N.Pashinyan’s bloc My Step at parliamentary elections in December 2018 and in the absence of any alternative leader or party that would be equally popular, Moscow exerted every effort for 2,5 years to hit it off with N.Pashinyan, despite his apparent tilt towards the West.
 
When still in opposition, N.Pashinyan called for withdrawing from the CIS, from the Eurasian Economic Union, to join the EU and NATO, and for removing a Russian military base from the territory of Armenia. The “street” were hilarious. After becoming prime minister and waking up to the Armenian reality, N.Pashinyan stopped calling for an immediate breakaway from all integrational Eurasian organizations. Instead, he proclaimed versatility of the country’s foreign policy. In domestic policy he introduced the doctrine of so-called “transitional justice”, which enabled him to get rid of political adversaries under the pretext of fighting against corruption and without any legal instruments. He gave top government posts to a bunch of non-professionals who used to work in Soros organizations and had no experience of public administration.
 
The Armenians were either hilarious about what was happening, or condescending. For 2,5 years government-supporting media cultivated Russophobic attitudes among the public. It got so bad that some Yerevan residents complained that they found it “unpleasant” to see Russian border guards at Yerevan Airport, or Russian servicemen moving to Erebuni Airport via Yerevan (but there is no other way) – and all this instead of thanking their defenders with flowers. Russian border guards have been protecting Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran under a bilateral agreement of 1992, since Armenia lacks the resources to secure the protection of its borders on its own.
 
Even now, after a crushing military defeat, n.Pashinyan’s supporters tend to distort the course of talks on a statement signed on November 9th . As it seems, V.Putin gave an interview which is being “analyzed” by A.Illarionov for the purpose of providing undistorted account of the course of the negotiations. As for accusations of backing the Armenian prime minister, it’s either that the author knows nothing and is absolutely unaware of V.Putin’s manner of allegorically ironizing over political opponents, or he is set on deliberately misleading the reader. For example, as the Russian president spoke about the closeness between the US Democratic Party’’s slogans (BLM support) and the CPSU, he definitely spoke with tongue in cheek. In the case of Pashinyan the support by V.Putin of the Armenian prime minister made it possible for the Russian president to inform the people of Armenia about progress at talks with N.Pashinyan and the proposals made in the course of these talks (the latter would spread misinformation on the talks to justify his actions). In addition, Russia’s President “is defending” the Armenian prime minister because for V.Putin, what matters is not the person but the policy he pursues, which at the present stage meets the interests of Armenia and Russia – the national interests of BOTH countries.
 
If we are to examine the outcome of the conflict from the point of view of the “zero sum” (victory-defeat), I recall an interview of one year ago with one of the commanders of the Artsakh Army, a hero of the first Karabakh war. Asked about the future of the unrecognized republic he said that the best solution would be to deploy Russian peace-keepers in Karabakh, while for the republic itself the best option would be the status of a mandate territory like Palestinian Autonomy (until 1948) or Cyprus (until 1974). At that time I found it utopic as neither the co-chairing countries in the Minsk Group (the USA and France), nor Azerbaijan would never agree to such an option. Life, however, (or our diplomacy?) has made the impossible possible. Residents of Nagorno-Karabakh have got protection, Russia – the possibility of controlling both parties in the conflict. Of course, the peace-keepers’ mission is dangerous as there could be provocations on the part of the conflicting parties and on the part of the “co-chairs” as they run trying to jump on the step of a leaving train.
 
Many interpreters will try to compromise the Russian foreign policy, including those in the West who describe the successful establishment of peace in Karabakh on the principle of “a game with a zero sum” as a defeat of their countries.
 
Peace has come, but history does not stop there.
 
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Deputy PM discusses exchange of POWs with ICRC executive

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 16:43, 2 December, 2020

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 2, ARMENPRESS. Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Avinyan held a meeting with the International Committee of the Red Cross Eurasia Regional Director Martin Schuepp.

Schuepp noted that an effective dialogue has been established between the ICRC and Armenia. He also highlighted the cooperation with the inter-departmental commission on POWs, detainees and missing persons.

Issues related to the ongoing work for exchange of prisoners of war and discovering the missing persons and the bodies of the victims were discussed. Avinyan said that everything should be done to accelerate this process.

The Deputy PM said that Armenia is proposing the “all for all” principle in the exchange of prisoners. In addition, a mechanism is proposed which envisages the unconditional return of any other prisoners who could be discovered afterwards.

The sides also addressed the humanitarian situation in Artsakh and the issues of providing necessary assistance to the affected people.

Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan

Armenian president calls for amending constitution, forming new government

TASS, Russia
Nov 29 2020
Armen Sarkissian stressed that neither the president nor the prime minister should not be allowed to take decisions on vital matters at their own discretion

YEREVAN, November 29. /TASS/. Armenian President Armen Sarkissian has called for forming a government of national accord, new elections and a constitutional referendum, the presidential website reported on Sunday.

“After such a bog tragedy, any country decides that the government that has let it happen must resign,” he said at a meeting with delegates from the Armenian diaspora during his private visit to Russia, commenting on the outcome of the outbreak of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. “If a politician is strong enough he may be back again later. The previous elections took place two and a half years ago, when the country was absolutely different. Now we are living in a different country.”

“There is a civilized way – early elections, an interim government of national accord. It doesn’t mean that each party is not have a minister, it means that a politician who enjoys general respect forms a government, preferably, a technocratic one,” he said, adding that a government of national accord should work for six to twelve months, until new elections, after which a new cabinet will be formed by the winning political force.

The Armenian president said also that it would be necessary to organize a constitutional referendum before the new elections. “Any constitution, both in a presidential and in a parliamentary system, must have checks and balances, mechanisms of containment,” he said.

He stressed that neither the president nor the prime minister should not be allowed to take decisions on vital matters at their own discretion. “These things should be balanced. Our constitution is not. There should be balance between the parliament, the government and the presidential authority,” Sarkissian said, adding that the president should be elected in a nationwide vote, not by the parliament, as it is practiced in Armenia now.


​​​Armenia’s ombudsman: Offensive assessments in social networks about Artsakh compatriots are completely unacceptable

News.am, Armenia
Nov 29 2020
 
 
Armenia’s ombudsman: Offensive assessments in social networks about Artsakh compatriots are completely unacceptable
13:30, 29.11.2020
 
Offensive assessments in social networks about Artsakh compatriots are completely unacceptable, the Ombudsman of Armenia Arman Tatoyan wrote on his Facebook.
 
“The high dignity and honor of the Armenians of Artsakh are one of the bright symbols of the unity of all Armenians,” he said. “We now more than need to achieve solidarity and be united. And the aforementioned perverse phenomena only increase the tension, create obstacles for the urgent solution of existing issues.”
 
“I ask you not to get involved in such “discussions”, regardless of who does it or in what groups it is done or what issues are being discussed (social, political, etc.),” the Ombudsman wrote.
 
 
 
 

Armenian government to adopt new assistance program for Artsakh people soon

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 12:12,

YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 26, ARMENPRESS. On the sidelines of the Armenian government’s measure on providing a lump sum of 68,000 drams in aid to the citizens of Artsakh affected from the recent war, 30,000 citizens have already submitted applications, Armenia’s Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Mesrop Arakelyan said at the Cabinet meeting today, adding that up to 94,000 citizens can be considered as program beneficiaries.

The minister stated that according to the second assistance program, the residents of the settlements of Artsakh which have come under the Azerbaijani control will receive a lump sum of 300,000 drams.

In addition, compensation for some expenditures will be provided in coming months aimed at ensuring the livelihood of those who have lost their homes.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in his turn noted that the program beneficiaries are not the families, but individuals and several members of one family can be considered as program beneficiaries. “We will soon discuss and adopt a measure for the citizens who have been left without homes, and not the families, but the individuals will be a beneficiary, I hope the registration will be quickly carried out in joint cooperation with the government of Artsakh so that program will work right”, he said, adding that the purpose of these projects is for the citizens of Artsakh to return to their settlements as soon as possible.

Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan

Putin discusses work of Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh during phone conversations with Pashinyan and Aliyev

Aysor, Armenia
Nov 24 2020

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin had phone conversations with Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev and discussed the work of the Russian peacekeepers and further steps of providing humanitarian aid to the population, Kremlin press service reported.

“Reference was also made on economic partnership in the region and issues on de-blockading transport communication,” Kremlin said in a press release.

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Armenia’s ‘Velvet Revolution’ Betrayed By Shame And Loss

World Crunch
Nov 24 2020
                       
A young man visits the grave of an Armenian serviceman killed during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Yerevan – Alexander Ryumin/TASS/ZUMA      

YEREVAN — Clad still in their fatigues, two haggard soldiers returning from the front wander around the streets of Yerevan, the Armenian capital. Barely 18, they’ve just buried their friend. Farther on, a refugee couple from the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, in neighboring Azerbaijan, rings the bell at the gate of the French embassy, hoping it will bring them help.

“We know that France is a friendly country to Armenia,” the woman says. “Maybe it will help us?”

A few hundred meters away, an elderly woman is crying for her godson. “A very patriotic boy,” she says. The young man is one of the soldiers missing in the war that pitted Armenia against Azerbaijan, with backing from Turkey. For 45 days they fought in Nagorno-Karabakh, home to a large population of ethnic Armenians and supported by Yerevan.

The euphoria of Armenia’s so-called “Velvet Revolution” is a distant memory. Everywhere it has given way to sorrow and desolation.

Still, one doesn’t have to go back very far to remember the immense hope generated by the popular, youth-driven uprising that began in the spring of 2018, when Nikol Pachinian, a deputy and former journalist, undertook a long walk across the country to drive out the corrupt, autocratic, post-Soviet regime of Prime Minister Serge Sarkissian, a close ally of the Kremlin.

Hundreds of thousands of people soon joined him. In the streets, crowds of people sang and danced. Citizens began to dream of the “new Armenia” promised to them by the hero of this peaceful and joyful revolution. Pashinyan was elected prime minister and enjoyed unprecedented legitimacy and popularity, the promise of a new era.

Two and a half years later, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh shattered these hopes and plunged Armenia into a state of shock. Suddenly people don’t care what’ll become of the reforms that were initiated or whether, after having suppressed the small, endemic corruption, Pashinyan will finally attack that of the big oligarchs. Priorities have changed radically.

The country is instead having to grapple with a crushing defeat that left at least 2,300 people dead, absorb an influx of some 100,000 refugees, and deal with an explosion of COVID-19 cases (with one of the highest per-capita contamination rates in the world) as hospitals are overwhelmed. On top of all that, a major economic crisis looms.

Armenians feel like they are in the middle of a nightmare. “It wasn’t until 2018 that they finally had a glimmer of hope. But it lasted just two years,” says Jonathan Lacôte, French ambassador to Armenia. “Today the country has his hit rock bottom. It’s a kind of year zero for Armenia.”

Deep disappointment

Yesterday a hero of the revolution, Prime Minister Pashinyan is now seen as a “traitor” in the eyes of part of the population since signing the ceasefire agreement on Nov. 9, consecrating Azerbaijan’s victory. The news, announced in the middle of the night on his Facebook account, took Armenians by surprise. They were unprepared for defeat, and since then, the opposition has ratcheted up calls for Pashinyan’s resignation.

“Today the country has his hit rock bottom. It’s a kind of year zero for Armenia.”

The government, in the meantime, has suffered a cascade of departures, and the president, Armen Sarkissian, whose role is essentially a formal title, has himself called for early legislative elections. The prime minister is nevertheless clinging to his post and just presented a “roadmap” for the next six months. But many of those who brought him to power are today dubious, if not hostile.

Gagik Hakobyan, a 38-year-old professor, was one of those who took part in all the demonstrations during the revolution. “I went with my students. It was something extraordinary for me,” says Hakobyan, who teaches at the French University of Armenia. Today, he cannot forgive the prime minister for describing Shushi, the political and religious symbol of Nagorno-Karabakh, as “a sad and colorless little town,” and for spreading victorious messages that bear no relation to the reality on the ground.

“We have been deluged with lies,” says Hakobyan. “It’s a betrayal.”

The old regime, for its part, believes it can now take revenge and is trying to exploit the situation make its political comeback. In Yerevan, opposition demonstrations close to the former government are calling for Pashinyan’s resignation.

At nightfall on Nov. 18, hundreds of people converge once again on Freedom Square. Approximately 20 opposition representatives harangue the crowd under the pale light of the floodlights.

Pashinyan arriving to hold talks with Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs — Photo: Russian Foreign Ministry Press O/TASS/ZUMA

“Whoever signed this [ceasefire] agreement should not be alive,” shouts a man into the microphone, his eyes bulging out. “He promised to rebuild Armenia and fight corruption, not to give away our land!”

“Nikol, resign!” shouts the crowd.

A looming economic crisis

These speeches make Nancy Mkrtchian wince as she sits in a café on the edge of the square. The 23-year-old is one of the many students who took part in the revolution. “It’s horrible to hear that. It makes me feel ashamed,” says Mkrtchian, now a parliamentary assistant. “After 2018, we were considered a democratic country. During those two and a half years, I was proud to say that we had caused the ‘Velvet Revolution’ and chased away the old regime. But today, I have to admit that it is back.”

“The economic crisis will be much more serious and destructive.”

The strength of the opposition is very weak, nevertheless, compared to the mobilization that brought about the revolution in 2018. Its demonstrations bring together little more than 2,000 people, and this number is steadily decreasing. Many Armenians prefer not to participate for fear of being assimilated into supporters of the old regime.

People were also shocked by the violence that erupted in the aftermath of the ceasefire agreement, when demonstrators stormed the government building and beat up the speaker of parliament. “Hatred of the former regime and the fear of its return to power are stronger than disapproval of Nikol Pashinyan,” says a witness.

If, in other words, the prime minister is able to save his job at this time, it’s because of this massive rejection of the former regime, coupled with the lack of a credible alternative. Still, there’s is no shortage of disgruntled people. The Armenian youth who carried the revolution are today feeling torn. For them too, the defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh is a tragedy. They are strongly attached to this land, as they grew up with the idea that it was an integral part of Armenia.

“From the first days of the war, my students were extremely worried,” says Hakobyan. “Today I lost four of them: They volunteered and died at the front.”

Those who believe that the battle over Nagorno-Karabakh does not deserve so many sacrifices are in the minority. “Artsakh is the homeland,” says Rafik Rotsanian, a 23-year-old medical student.

Rotsanian, a fervent supporter of the revolution, had confidence in Pashinyan before the conflict. “But with the war, I discovered negative aspects in him that I had refused to see,” he says. “At the moment, we have no alternative, but if we did I would prefer him to leave.”

The next few months promise to be more difficult than ever for the prime minister. Richard Giragosian, a political analyst at the Yerevan-based Center for Regional Studies, says that even more than politics, what really threatens Pashinyan is the economic situation. “The economic crisis will be much more serious and destructive,” he says.

Even before the war, a third of the population lived below the poverty line. With the arrival of refugees and a shortage of employment opportunities, the situation is now expected to worsen. Several observers expect massive emigration when border restrictions, linked to the pandemic, are lifted.

With the revolution, Armenians had dreamed of a new future. But now, deflated after the victory of their Azerbaijani and Turkish enemies, and haunted still by the memory of the 1915 genocide, they wonder how they’ll even move forward.


                                                               

Pashinyan Says He Won’t Resign Shunning Calls by Opposition, President

November 19,  2020



Opposition protesters demanded Nikol Pashinyan’s resignation on Nov. 18

Armenia’s embattled and increasingly combative prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, said on Wednesday that he had no intentions to resign and instead proposed what he called a 15-point roadmap to confront the challenges facing post-war Armenia.

A roadmap was precisely what President Armen Sarkissian called for on Monday, when, in an address to the nation, he proposed that the government and the ruling party present such a document that would ensure a smooth transition of power through snap elections pursuant to Armenia’s Constitution.

Sarkissian said that early elections were inevitable given that an absolute majority of the political forces, civic organizations representatives and Diaspora structures, with which he held consultations, agreed that a change in government was necessary at this juncture in Armenia.

Defying the president, as well as opposition forces, thousands of whose supporters have been protesting on the streets of Yerevan since last week, Pashinyan said he needed six months to carry out the his 15-point plan and would report to the people in June 2021 of his achievements.

The roadmap resembles a vague wish list and lacks details about critical issues such as confronting the humanitarian crisis facing Armenia and Artsakh as a result of tens of thousands of displaced persons from the war. The first seven points of the proposal address—with no specifics—the humanitarian challenges. The remaining eight point are a laundry list of tasks that signal Pashinyan’s intention to consolidate power by making changes to election and political party laws all under the cover of proposed substantive talks with political forces and Diaspora organizations.

Pashinyan announced that his roadmap would be implemented through significant changes in his government, promising to present a “progress report” in June.

Armenian, Russian defense ministers discuss operation of peacekeeping troops in Nagorno Karabakh

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 12:13,

YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 18, ARMENPRESS. Minister of Defense of Armenia Davit Tonoyan held telephone conversations with Defense Minister of Russia, Army General Sergei Shoigu, the Armenian defense ministry told Armenpress.

During the phone talks the ministers discussed the operative situation in the territory of Nagorno Karabakh, as well as issues relating to the activities of the Russian peacekeeping troops. The Armenian defense minister thanked his Russian counterpart for the effective and quick deployment of peacekeeping units, as well as for organizing the works of finding and exchanging the killed soldiers, prisoners of war and those missing in action.

A special focus was paid on the current humanitarian situation in Nagorno Karabakh.

The Armenian defense minister has expressed its support over the creation of a Russian inter-agency humanitarian response center in the territory of Nagorno Karabakh which should deal with the return of refugees, restoration of political infrastructure, search operations for killed soldiers, missing in action and combination of activities of various organizations in the humanitarian sector.

An agreement has been reached to sign a trilateral document in this field between Armenian, Russian and Azerbaijani defense ministries if necessary.

Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan speaks about the Fall of Shushi

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 12:42,

YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 16, ARMENPRESS. The Defense Army of Artsakh fought heroically until the last second, but the town of Shushi fell because the Azeri sabotage teams succeeded in invading the city, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said during an online news conference.

“Many are alleging that Shushi was surrendered. I read the statement made by the President of Artsakh that more than 100 bodies have been retrieved from the outskirts of Shushi. If Shushi was surrendered, then under whose orders were these soldiers fighting? Moreover, let me tell you that there was some statement alleging that there are concrete data, names, who made conspiracies around Shushi. Law enforcement agencies have summoned the authors of this statement and tried to obtain concrete information on these conspirators and what conspiracy they are talking about. As far as I know the author of this statement avoided to give an answer. If someone announces that treason has happened and they have information, but then refuse to give concrete information to law enforcement it turns out to be participation in treason. If someone says they don’t trust the law enforcement, let them publicly announce what happened in reality. And what happened in reality is what has been officially stated, unfortunately there were Azeri sabotage team invasions into the city, and we lost Shushi,” the PM said.

Pashinyan reminded an earlier statement of his, when he said that in the past whenever any compromise option was becoming acceptable for the Armenian side, the Azeri side was rejecting it momentarily.

“It is very important to understand whether or not we could’ve avoided war, yes, if we were to agree to surrender 7 territories including Shushi to Azerbaijan, but was this the policy we wanted to pursue? No, it wasn’t. The Defense Army of Artsakh and the government of Armenia, our military decided to accept this challenge. Unfortunately it didn’t bring the desired results. From the first day many figures were calling for surrendering territories at the cost of stopping the war, but today they are accusing us in treason for doing the very same thing. One thing needs to be realized here, there wasn’t a substantial difference of early or late, essentially. Yes, the condition of surrendering Shushi was brought forward, if not from the beginning then in the preliminary period. The Artsakh authorities, the Defense Army took this path, as long as there was a change to defend and fight until the end. They fought heroically until the last second. Unfortunately the task wasn’t solved. Yes, we are responsible for not being able in two years to fill what wasn’t filled for decades,” he said.

Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan