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- Monday, 4 October 2021
Varazdat Lalayan highlighted Armenia’s prowess in the heavier categories of men’s weightlifting by rounding off the European Junior and Under-23 Championships in Rovaniemi in Finland with three continental records.
The 22-year-old missed his final two attempts but by then he had already bettered the European under-23 super-heavyweight records across the board with a snatch of 206 kilograms, a clean and jerk of 241kg and a phenomenal total of 447kg.
That was 6kg more than Ali Davoudi of Iran made in taking silver at the Tokyo Olympic Games in August.
Second-placed Eduard Ziaziulin of Belarus, who holds two European junior records, was 16kg behind Lalayan and the bronze medallist Oleh Hanzenko of Ukraine was beaten by 69kg.
Hanzenko’s team mate Bohdan Hoza had arguably the outstanding single performance of the week when he broke his own junior world record for the 109kg snatch, making 190kg on his way to victory.
Ukraine’s junior world champion Kamila Konotop, who was fifth in Tokyo, made 95-114-209 in winning the women’s 55kg.
Ukraine finished third in the combined junior and under-23 medals table behind Russia and Armenia, with the ever-improving Italian team fourth.
Armenia won the men’s 81kg, 89kg, 109kg and over-109kg in the under-23 event.
Gor Minasyan, Lalayan’s 26-year-old national team mate, would be the best super-heavyweight in the world but for the presence of Lasha Talakhadze, the unstoppable multiple champion and world record-holder from Georgia.
Lasha was in Finland to train and as a special guest of the organisers, but he was not there to see Lalayan’s effort as he was being taken on a visit around “the official hometown of Santa Claus”, as Rovaniemi sells itself.
In the junior super-heavyweights Enzo Kuworge of The Netherlands made it look easy with six from six.
Kuworge, who totalled 409kg when he finished sixth in Tokyo, did not need to lift anywhere near as much as he comfortably added the European title to the world junior title he won in May.
The 20-year-old made 175-210-385.
There were rare gold medals for Serbia, via Radmila Zagorac in the junior women’s 45kg, and Norway, whose Solfrid Koanda took the under-23 women’s super-heavyweights.
Athletes from Israel, Czech Republic, Finland, Denmark and Slovakia made rare visits to the podium through the week and Britain took gold and bronze in the under-23 women’s 55kg through Fraer Morrow and Catrin Jones.
But apart from Italy – which has improved from ninth to fifth to fourth in the past three Junior and Under-23 Championships – the dominant nations were from eastern Europe.
Armenia had five winners in the juniors, three men and two women, while Russia had four.
Artur Babayan, with a 365kg total in the junior men’s 96kg, Evgeniia Guseva with 103-127-230 in the junior women’s 71kg, and Daria Akhmerova, with 245kg in the under-23 women’s 87kg, were arguably the top performers for Russia.
For Italy, Giulia Imperio set a clean and jerk continental junior record of 101kg as she won the junior women’s 49kg with 82-101-183, and Giulia Miserendino took the Junior 64kg with 100-120-220.
Their junior men’s winners were Sergio Massida at 61kg with 126-154-280 and Cristiano Ficco at 89kg with 158-196-348.
There was a poignant victory for the Romanian Bianca Dumitrescu, who was presented with a unique Fair Play Award by Lasha and Santa.
Dumitrescu should have competed in the under-23 women’s 45kg, where she was a strong medal contender, but was temporarily in isolation with the entire Romanian team after a false COViD-19 positive for a team mate.
The amended result of the false positive was not provided in time for her to make the official weigh-in.
Instead she lifted alone between sessions, but her results could not count.
Milan Mihajlovic, secretary general of the European Weightlifting Federation, praised the “correct and impeccable behaviour in the spirit of the sport” of Dumitrescu and the Romanian Weightlifting Federation.
Armenia, Azerbaijan mark one-year anniversary of war
Moscow sees Yerevan’s, Baku’s positive mindset towards package agreements, Russian diplomat says
Russia sees Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s positive mindset towards mutually acceptable package agreements on Nagorno-Karabakh, Russian Foreign Ministry Deputy Spokesperson Alexei Zaitsev said on Thursday, according to TASS news agency.
“It is very important to ensure possibilities for finding mutually acceptable solutions” on the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement, he said. “The readiness for opening a new page in relations and their gradual normalization expressed at the top level both by Baku and Yerevan is a confirmation of the objective need for such a mindset. We focus our efforts on such positive things.”
“On our part, we see Yerevan’s and Baku’s positive mindset towards reaching mutually acceptable package agreements, which will make it possible to bring the joint work up to the level of project cooperation,” he said.
According to the Russian diplomat, Moscow sees a “lasting and sustainable solution” to the “problem of incidents at certain sections of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border” in the establishment of a commission on the state border delimitation with its subsequent demarcation. “The Russian side outlined and referred to Yerevan’s and Baku’s consideration proposals on the launch of a corresponding negotiating process. We are waiting for a response from the partners,” he added.
Russian analyst predicts granting of special status to Karabakh and "eternal" presence of Russian peacekeepers
If Azerbaijan doesn’t change its behavior, Russian peacekeepers will stay in Nagorno-Karabakh forever. This is what Russian political scientist, expert on the Middle East and the Caucasus Stanislav Tarasov said during a conversation with Armenian News-NEWS.am.
Tarasov liked this to the fact that Russian peacekeepers act as the guarantors of security of the Armenians of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh). “On the one hand, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan meet in New York and Aliyev announces his willingness to meet with Pashinyan. On the other hand, the President of Azerbaijan is having trouble letting go of the rhetoric of confrontation and is showing the country’s force. The question is whether Azerbaijan will be able to do it Besides, taking into consideration the fact that the OSCE Minsk Group is becoming active, a special status will be granted to the sector of Nagorno-Karabakh that is not under the control of Baku. It is still difficult to say what the status will be,” the analyst stated.
International institutional dimensions of the Artsakh issue
14:04,
YEREVAN, 30 SEPTEMBER, ARMENPRESS: The aspirations of the people of Artsakh were and are still challenged by Azerbaijan. The military solution was chosen as an option to solve the conflict both in the brief period of existence of two small Caucasian republics and after the fall of the Soviet Union. After the fall of the Soviet Union the parties again resorted to the military solution which was ended by the 1994 armistice agreement signed in Bishkek by the representatives of Artsakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Artsakh and seven other districts that surround it fell under the effective control of Armenian forces. On 27 September, 2020 Azerbaijan unleashed a war in an attempt to have full control over the territory of Artsakh. The outcome was that a significant part of Artsakh as well as all the surrounding territories fell under the Azerbaijani control.
The legal aspects of the Artsakh conflict were silenced by emotional discussions and irredentist hue and cry. In the present article I will try to shed light on the conflict from the legal perspective which is indeed a novel approach to narrating the story of the conflict. In particular, I will discuss whether and to what extent it is possible to use the international legal mechanisms and institutions for the solution and transformation of conflict.
The four resolutions of the UN Security Council and the obligations of Armenia: is Armenia an aggressor?
The UN Security Council adopted four resolutions (822; 853; 874 and 884) that refer to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The resolution N822 was adopted immediately after Kelbajar district became under effective control of Armenian forces during the First Karabakh War. The UN SC notes with alarm ‘’the escalation in armed hostilities and, in particular, the latest invasion of the Kelbajar (the Armenian endonym is Qarvajar) district of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the local Armenian forces’’ (United Nations, 1993). In this resolution, the Republic of Armenia was never mentioned as an occupying power by the UN SC and the subject that was referred were the local Armenian forces. Furthermore, in resolution N884, which was adopted after the Zangelan (the Armenian endonym is Kovsakan) district and the city of Horadiz fell under the effective control of the local Armenian forces, the UN SC called upon the Government of Armenia ‘’to use its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic with resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993) and 874 (1993), and to ensure that the forces involved are not provided with the means to extend their military campaign further’’ (United Nations, 1993). This is the only specific mention of the Republic of Armenia indicated in the four UN resolutions. It should also be mentioned that the wording of the UN SC could have been stricter and it does not always use such restrained wording. For instance, in resolution N216 which was adopted regarding the situation in Southern Rhodesia the UN SC labels the local authorities as ‘’illegal racist minority regime’’ (United Nations, 1965). On the other hand, no strong wording was used by the UN SC with regard to the local Armenian forces of Artsakh.
A mention must be made that except UN SC resolution N874, each and every resolution was adopted when new territories fell under the effective control of local Armenian forces. For example, as mentioned, resolution N882 was adopted when Qelbajar district (the Armenian endonym is Qarvajar) fell under the effective control of the local Armenian forces; resolution N853 is about Aghdam (the Armenian endonym is Akna) and finally resolution N884 is about Zangelan district (the Amrnian endonym is Kovsakan) and city of Horadiz. At the same time, the UN SC has never adopted any resolution that anyhow condemns the presence of the local Armenian forces in the territory that was part of Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of Soviet Azerbaijan or demands the withdrawal of the forces. Therefore, one may infer that the UN SC has no reservation with the deployment of the local Armenian forces in the territory that used to be part of Oblast.
Now another question may arise: are the aforementioned four resolutions binding and, if yes, to what extent? According to the ICJ it might be determined based on the wording used in the resolutions. Normally, if strong words such as ‘’demands’’, ‘’decides’’, ‘’under Chapter VII’’ signal that the UN SC intends its resolution to be binding. One might claim that the binding decision is supplemented with the power of use of force when the UN SC uses ‘’by all necessary means’’ wording (Henriksen, 2019, 264). However, in non-binding resolutions the Council frequently uses less strict wording such as ‘’recommends’’, ‘’calls for’’ or ‘’appeals’’ (Henriksen, 2019, 264). As for the resolutions concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict both strong and relatively softening vocabulary is used, however the close observation proves that the strong wording clearly does not outweigh. It is worth noting that in resolution N884 it called upon the Republic of Armenia and did not demand anything from it.
Currently, against the background of the heightened tension in the region there are more and more voices exhorting the government to bring the issue before the Security Council. However, the necessity of consensus among the permanent five members (China, France, Russia, The United Kingdom and The United States) as well as the agreement of at least 8 members (out of 15) might make it impractical. Therefore, the efforts to raise the issue before the Security Council shall be paralleled with the quest of other appropriate institutional dimensions and legal mechanisms.
In quest of appropriate legal mechanisms
First of all, let us discuss all the international courts where the case might theoretically be heard. It is both logical and natural to start with the ICJ. All the UN members are ipso facto members of the ICJ and the statute of the latter is annexed to the UN Charter (UN Charter, Article 92 and Article 93). The ICJ (aka the World Court) has jurisdiction to hear the case in the following cases:
- The parties to conflict sign an agreement enabling the ICJ to hear the case (also known as compromise)
- It is envisaged under the international treaty such as for example under Article 30 of 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
- Under the Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ the state declared that it recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
- the interpretation of a treaty;
- any question of international law;
- the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
- the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation
However, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan did not make the aforementioned declaration under the Statute of the ICJ. Hence, the ICJ may have a jurisdiction over any legal dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan only when both parties agree to submit the matter to the Court. Under such circumstance to enter the World Court Armenia has no choice but to find to a convention or equivalent legal instrument also ratified by Azerbaijan which envisages bringing the issue before the ICJ in case of the possible dispute. Recently, Armenia lodged such application against Azerbaijan arguing that the latter violated its obligations under International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (ICJ, 2021).
Another international legal forum is the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), which shares the same premises with the ICJ in the Hague. In short, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan signed the PCA founding documents (the Conventions on Pacific Settlement of International Disputes). It is interesting to note that in the China v. Philippines case, which involved a territorial dispute in South China Sea, the PCA ruled in favor of the Philippines, however China refused to comply with the decision of the Arbitration (PCA, 2016). Moreover, the Vice Foreign Minister of China stated that China does not recognize and implement the award as the decision of the Arbitration is ‘’just a piece of waste paper’’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2016).
The OSCE enables its member states to solve their issues peacefully through the arbitration court. However, unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan did not sign the Stockholm Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE (OSCE, 2020). In addition, it is interesting to note that since 1994 when the Convention entered into force the Court, the annual budget of which is 95000 Swiss Frank did not here any single case (OSCE, 2021)!
Besides the Arbitration Court the OSCE also possesses a number of political mechanisms aimed to prevent the conflict or to curtail the threat posed to the regional security. It has established a number of tools to monitor the implementation of commitments that participating states have undertaken within the human dimension (OSCE, 2011, 10). One of those mechanisms – the so-called “Berlin Mechanism” was adopted in June 1991 at the Berlin Meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers. The Mechanism outlines measures that can be applied in the case of serious emergency situations that may arise from a violation of one of the Principles of the Helsinki Final Act or as the result of major disruptions endangering peace, security or stability. It foresees that, if any participating State concludes that such an emergency situation is developing, it may seek clarification from the State or the States involved (OSCE, 2011, 22). It should be noted that unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan has once availed itself of the opportunities enshrined in the Berlin Mechanism. On 6 April 1993, Azerbaijan requested an emergency meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials in regard to the situation in Nagorno Karabakh. Two weeks later, the Armenian Delegation presented clarifications under point 1 of the Mechanism, which was met with a renewed request for holding an Emergency Meeting formulated by Azerbaijan (OSCE, 2011, 25). However, the OSCE mechanisms, although being invoked by numerous states in different situations, are political rather than legal, thus they are in no way legally binding. Nevertheless, considering the big resonance of the OSCE mechanisms, Armenia may consider availing itself of the privileges of invoking them in case to deter the further escalation in the region.
The Hague, which is considered to be a town of international courts, is also the home for the International Criminal Court (ICC) which is in charge of hearing the cases involving crimes of aggression, crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide and war crimes. In short, Azerbaijan did not sign the Rome Statute of ICC and Armenia signed it, but did not ratify. Therefore, under Article 13 of the Rome Statute of ICC, the Court will have power to investigate the alleged criminal crimes only when it is referred to by the UN SC (ICC, 1998).
The only Court before which Armenia and Azerbaijan may bring cases against each other is the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). However, the power of the ECtHR is limited to the scope of the European Convention of Human Rights (Ratione materiae principle). In principle, it may render decisions only regarding cases that involve human rights violations in accordance with the Convention and is not competent to solve territorial disputes, for example.
Conclusion
The analysis shows how difficult it is to legally substantiate and justify that Armenia was or is an occupying power and it has committed its only obligation under the four resolutions of the UN Security Council. However, taking into account all the possible hurdles associated with bringing a case before the Security Council, Armenia shall also seek alternative institutional dimensions and legal remedies. ICJ can be among those alternatives , though only in limited cases when it is envisaged in the legal instrument. ICC and PCA along with the OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration can hardly be an option. ECtHR can probably be the most competent court, where Armenia may sue Azerbaijan without the consent of the latter, however, its power is limited to the scope of the European Convention of Human Rights. Armenia may also consider availing itself of the remedies enshrined in the mechanisms and procedures of the OSCE.
By Albert Hayrapetyan
Albert Hayrapetyan holds a PhD in Economics. He also holds MA degrees from College of Europe and American University of Armenia. He is a Senior researcher in ‘Amberd’ Research Center of Armenian State University of Economics and also an Lecturer at Chair of International Economic Relations in Armenian State University of Economics. Mr. Hayrapetyan is also a Visiting Lecturer in the Southern Federal University. His main areas of interest include economic integrations, regionalism and international legal disputes.
Funding acknowledgement
The article is part of academic commitments under the grant agreement between the author and Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. The author was funded a research grant by Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. The purpose of the grant is to enable author’s research entitled “The Legal Aspect of Nagorno-Karabakh Issue”.
REFERENCES
- Henriksen, Anders. 2019, International Law, Oxford University Press.
- International Court of Justice, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey), Judgement [1978], ICJ Report 3.
- International Court of Justice, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgement [1994] ICJ Report 112․
- International Court of Justice, Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for Provisional Measures Republic of Armenia V. Republic of Azerbaijan, 16 September 2021, available at https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/180/180-20210916-APP-01-00-EN.pdf
- International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf
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AW: The Mess along the Goris – Kapan Highway: Reasons and Implications
September 2020 in Syunik, the road between Kapan and Kajaran (Photo: Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan)
In mid-December 2020, Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan ordered troops to withdraw to the territory of former Soviet Armenia in the Syunik province. This decision was made after the Armenian government reached an oral agreement with Azerbaijan. Interestingly, this decision violated Article 1 of the November 10, 2020, trilateral Armenia – Azerbaijan – Russia statement, according to which Armenian and Azerbaijani forces should stay in their positions held as of early morning November 10. As a result of this decision, up to a 21 kilometer section of the interstate Armenia–Iran highway passing from Goris to Kapan fell under Azerbaijani control, alongside some roads connecting several Armenian villages to Goris and Kapan. The Armenian PM stated that this was done to increase the security of Syunik province, as hopefully, after receiving all territories around Syunik that were part of Soviet Azerbaijan, the current Azerbaijani leadership would calm down and pursue a cooperative approach towards Armenia. Meanwhile, according to the Armenian government, both sides agreed that Azerbaijan would allow the free flow of Armenian cars from Goris to Kapan and vice versa without any passport or customs control.
However, this appeasement policy toward Azerbaijan did not work. On May 12-13, 2021, without any resistance, Azerbaijani troops encroached into Armenian territory in Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces, occupying approximately 60 square kilometers Later, President Aliyev stated that these territories are part of Azerbaijan, and therefore, Azerbaijani troops will not withdraw even a centimeter. Simultaneously, the Azerbaijani army launched subversive actions along different sections of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, including in Yeraskh, located only 60 kilometers from Yerevan.
On August 25, 2021, Azerbaijan’s Armed Forces closed the Goris–Kapan highway, thus cutting off Armenia from Iran. After two days of negotiations they opened the road, but this is a clear sign that Azerbaijan has zero intentions of respecting oral agreements reached with Armenia in mid-December 2020. After the road reopening, many in Armenia hoped that the situation in Syunik would be normalized. However, after a few days, Azerbaijan established a police checkpoint along the highway and, since September 12, has started to check Iranian trucks and buses and charge money from drivers. The Armenian National Security Service stated that it would take steps alongside the Russian side to solve the issue, but nothing changed. On September 15, Azerbaijani police arrested two Iranian drivers who entered Artsakh, accusing them of illegally crossing the Azerbaijan border.
Currently, Syunik presents an interesting situation. It hosts armed forces and police units of three countries – Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia. A traveler in Syunik may perceive that it is a contested area with a lack of understanding of which state is responsible for what. Armenian flags were followed by Russian, which then turned Azerbaijani before coming back to Armenian ones. At first, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia were mainly part of this spectacle; now Iran has been dragged in. The Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan twice met Hikmet Hajiev, foreign relations assistant to President Aliyev, in recent days to better understand the reasons behind Azerbaijani actions against Iranian vehicles. It is not easy to decipher its motives, but Azerbaijan probably has several goals.
First of all, it wants to send a clear message to Armenia that it will do whatever it wants, and Armenia has no option but to keep silent and accept the facts. The statements of the Armenian government that Azerbaijan has established a police checkpoint along the Goris–Kaplan highway in its territory and therefore may do whatever it wants, indicate that Armenia accepts these rules. The second target is Iranian vehicles entering Artsakh. Azerbaijan sends a clear signal that it will not tolerate any Iranian vehicle entering Artsakh through the Lachin corridor by arresting two Iranian drivers. However, these are mainly tactical targets.
The strategic goal is to signal Iran and India that Armenian territory is not safe enough to be viewed as a potential alternative route for the North–South International Transport Corridor. Launched in 2002 by India, Iran and Russia, it envisages the transportation of goods between India and Northern Europe by the new route, avoiding the Red Sea, Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean. According to the initial plan, the goods should travel from Mumbai to the Iranian Bandar Abbas and Chabahar ports by sea, then by railway reach Iranian ports in the Caspian Sea, then to Russian port Astrakhan and further by railway to Northern Europe. Then, the Iran – Azerbaijan – Russia railway route emerged, which should directly connect Iranian Persian Gulf ports to Northern Europe via railroad. Azerbaijan connected its railway system with Iran reaching the Iranian town of Astara located near the Azerbaijan–Iran border. However, Iranian Astara lacks a railway connection to the Iranian internal network, and the missing Rasht–Astara line still waits for construction.
Meanwhile, another potential route for this corridor to connect India with Northern Europe circumventing the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean may pass via Iran, Armenia, Georgia, the Black Sea and Bulgaria. In 2016, these countries launched a dialogue to establish a “Persian Gulf–Black Sea” multimodal transportation corridor connecting Iran with Europe via Armenia, Georgia, the Black Sea, Bulgaria and Greece. The “Persian Gulf–Black Sea” route may fit quite well in the North–South International Corridor. There is no direct railway connection between Armenia and Iran, but the countries share a land border. Thus, goods may reach Georgian Black Sea ports via the Iran – Armenia – Georgia highway, which passes through the cities of Goris and Kapan in Armenia. Closing the Armenia–Iran international highway in the section of Goris–Kapan and then creating problems for Iranian vehicles, Azerbaijan seeks to delegitimize this potential alternative route for the North–South International Corridor. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan may push forward the Iran – Nakhichevan – Armenia – Georgia railway connection as another alternative route for the North–South corridor to link India with Europe via Iran, the Black Sea and Bulgaria. In this case, both wings of the North–South International Corridor will pass through Azerbaijan (Iran – Azerbaijan – Russia – Northern Europe and Iran – Azerbaijan – Armenia – Georgia – Black Sea – Bulgaria).
Regardless of Azerbaijan’s real intentions, the current mess in the Syunik province proves that hopes to secure Armenia through an appeasement policy towards Azerbaijan are unrealistic. The Armenian government made a strategic blunder by ceding parts of the Goris-Kapan highway to Azerbaijan. The permanent statements by Armenian leaders about the peace agenda and their intention to usher in an era of regional peace and prosperity are perceived as a sign of weakness and make Azerbaijan and Turkey more aggressive and bold.
Advocate: Baku is keeping Armenian captives hostage in order to achieve political goals
The Armenian captives serve as an additional leverage for Azerbaijan to achieve its political goals. This is what advocate Siranush Sahakyan, who represents the interests of Armenian prisoners of war in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), said during the Armenian News-NEWS.am’s TALK TIME show.
According to her, the complete solution to the issue of return of Armenian captives is linked to political issues. “Based on the example of exchange of captives for mine maps and the conversation between Aliyev and Erdogan’s wife, it is clear that Azerbaijan is keeping the Armenians as hostages. Since there are political issues that remain unresolved, the Azerbaijani side is delaying their repatriation because there are still issues related to borders, demarcation, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and other issues,” she said, adding that the Armenian authorities aren’t making serious allegations against Azerbaijan on international platforms.
Gennady Anashkin appointed commander of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Artsakh
Armenian Defense Minister Arshak Karapetyan received on Saturday lieutenant general Rustam Muradov, lieutenant general Gennady Anashkin and major general Mikhail Kosobokov, press service at the ministry reported.
During the meeting, deputy commander of the Southern Military District of Russia, lieutenant general Rustam Muradov introduced the newly appointed commander of the peacekeeping forces of the Russian Federation in Artsakh, national hero of the Russian Federation, lieutenant general Gennady Anashkin.
Minister Karapetyan congratulated lieutenant general Gennady Anashkin on assuming the new post and wished him success in the implementation of the peacekeeping mission. He also thanked the former commander of the peacekeeping forces, major general Mikhail Kosobokov, for the proper service during his tenure, and wished him success in his future activities.
The parties praised the efforts of the Russian Federation to stabilize the military-political situation in the region and expressed satisfaction with the effectiveness of the Russian peacekeeping mission in Artsakh. They also exchanged views on regional security issues.
Armenian-born artist Kristina Oganezz to present ‘Bird of the Holy Spirit’ art project
From September 30 to October 4, the Yerevan Museum of Contemporary Art will host artist Kristina Oganezz’s “The Bird of the Holy Spirit” art project. ‘’The Bird of the Holy Spirit” is a unique exhibition-gospel, which makes this event even more special, the museum reported.
This unique project aims to encourage every Christian to get acquainted with God through the Bible and make the New Testament his table book by reading, studying, and building faith in God.
‘’Once I asked God: “What do you want me to do for you? How can I serve You with the gift you have blessed me with?” And in prayers and in conversation with the Holy Spirit, the idea of this art project, exhibition and new collection of paintings was born.
Only the titles of chapters and lines from the Bible are depicted on black canvas in gold colors with Armenian birdletters. The letters and elements were be used from the old Armenian alphabet and ornaments- birdletters’’,-the painter noted.
Armenian birdletters and its cultural expressions Inscribed in 2019 on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity by UNESCO. For the first time, the public will see not only the “birdletters”, but also the “birdnumbers”. It is worth noting that Kristina Oganezz is the author of the idea of creating bird numbers. Birdnumbers will be presented for the first time within the framework of this art project, becoming the unique part of Armenian culture.
Famous art curator, art critic Giuseppe Ussani d’Escobar is the curator of the art project “Bird of the Holy Spirit”.
The Armenian-born artist Kristina Oganezz started her practice in the art world at the age of 3 attending Henrik Igityan National Centre for Aesthetics. In childhood, she participated in many exhibitions as a talented child.
In her teenage years, she continued to draw paintings, and later on, she also learned graphic design and photography. She took private art classes from famous Armenian artists to master her painting skills. She also has 2 degrees in linguistics and economics.
Kristina Oganezz is a member of the International Union of Artists (Estonia) and an honorary member of the Union of Artists of Armenia.
The Armenian artist has had a solo, group exhibitions in Armenia and abroad. Her works are housed in private, state-museum collections. In particular, one of Oganezz’s works can be found in the Yerevan History Museum.
In 2020 Oganezz was awarded the Frida Kahlo Prize in Milan for her painting – Charles Aznavour’s portrait.
The official opening ceremony of the exhibition will take place on September 30, at 6:30pm.
First batch of 25,000 doses of AstraZeneca vaccine sent by France arrives in Armenia
13:04, 14 September, 2021
YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 14, ARMENPRESS. The first batch of 25,000 doses of AstraZeneca vaccine sent by France has arrived at the Zvartnots International Airport of Armenia in the morning of September 14, the French Embassy in Armenia said.
Chargé d’affaires of the French Embassy in Armenia Christophe Katsahian and representatives of the Armenian Ministries of Healthcare and Foreign Affairs were at the airport.
The rest of the deliveries will continue tomorrow and in coming weeks in coordination with the Armenian authorities.
Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan