Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Tuesday, April 25, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 80
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Belarus prepares for grim Chernobyl anniversary
*Ukraine’s MFA steps into regional leadership’s role at CIS conference
*Bakiyev seeks Russian advice on foreign policy
POLITICAL CONFRONTATION DETRACTS FROM ACUTE CHERNOBYL PROBLEMS IN
BELARUS
As the 20th anniversary of Chernobyl approaches in Belarus, and the
opposition forces plan a final protest march on April 26 in the
aftermath of the presidential elections, there is no sign that the
country has come close to overcoming the profound health, social, and
environmental problems caused by the 1986 nuclear accident.
The issue has been clouded by two factors. First, there is the
politicization of the Chernobyl event as a symbol of the confrontation
between the president and the opposition, particularly the united
democratic forces behind candidate Alexander Milinkevich. Second, there
has been a rather unseemly international dispute as to the health
effects of Chernobyl, and particularly the long-term mortality rates
from radiation-induced cancers.
President Alexander Lukashenka marked the last two anniversaries with
visits to the Chernobyl zone, which were marked with intensive TV
publicity and the overall message that if the area was dangerous, then
the president of the country would not be visiting there. Though parts
of the zone — especially Homel region — have been depopulated,
students and migrants are being used to cultivate land that remains
contaminated with radio-nuclides, particularly Cesium-137 and
Strontium-90. Lukashenka has detained several scientists whose findings
contradict the official position that the accident in Belarus has been
largely overcome, and using the forces of the government without outside
assistance.
The government of Belarus did not agree with some of the findings of the
Chernobyl Forum Report, issued in September 2005. That report, the most
comprehensive to date, demonstrated the enormous health and
psychological impact of the accident in Belarus. About 90% of the
republic was irradiated with short-lived radio-nuclides, deposited by
the “radiation cloud” that was formed after the two steam explosions at
the fourth reactor unit of the Chernobyl nuclear plant in the early
morning of April 26, 1986. The reaction of the republican authorities
was delayed by the lack of information about what had happened from both
the Soviet authorities in Moscow and the Ukrainian party leadership in
Kyiv.
The radioactive iodine (Iodine-131 with a half-life of eight days) was
to take a serious toll and has resulted in some 4,000 cases of thyroid
cancer to date, almost a quarter of them in young children, and in most
instances contracted after 1989. Long-term effects are equally serious.
Over the 17-year period 1986-2003, surgery had been carried out on
almost 2,000 young adults and children, and 19 have died as a result of
the progression of the tumors. About 23% of Belarus was contaminated
with Cesium and Strontium, and about 2% of the territory affected with
Plutonium radio-nuclides (half-life 24,000 years). Many of the affected
regions did not take any preventive action until 1989, when it was
revealed officially that they formed part of the contaminated zone.
Belarus lost a quarter of its valuable forests.
Today about 1.5 million residents of Belarus are provided with medical
assistance as a result of the 1986 disaster. Among those Belarusians who
took part in the cleanup operations — they are referred to today as
“liquidators,” a term reminiscent of the Stalin era — there were
registered more than 2,800 first-time cases of cancer, and in 73% of
these incidences it occurred among those working in the zone in 1986-88.
Over 300,000 children continue to reside in the most affected regions of
Homel and Mahileu. They suffer from a rise in frequency of sicknesses of
all types, but particularly respiratory diseases, digestive problems,
and childhood diabetes. Among the age group 10-14, for example, newly
formed cancers in the Chernobyl zones exceed those in the “clean” region
of Vitsebsk by 1.5 times, and the incidence of endocrinal pathology is
double the average in clean areas.
This disturbing picture has been partly concealed by an international
dispute over the “true” health effects of Chernobyl, and the number of
long-term mortalities. Two reports are now extant: the Chernobyl Forum
Report (CFR) and the Greenpeace Report. The latter raises the number of
long-term victims to over 90,000, and reports some 34,000 deaths to date
among liquidators. However, the dispute is largely contrived. It derives
from the unfortunate and misleading press releases issued by
representatives of the Chernobyl Forum, which do not reflect accurately
the contents of the CFR. The issue of 4,000 long-term deaths is even
belied by the CFR itself, which includes a table indicating some 9,000
long-term deaths.
Even that figure pertains only to a small fraction of the lands
contaminated by Chernobyl, namely the republics of Russia, Ukraine, and
Belarus. Neither report really disputes that the Chernobyl-linked cancer
deaths will be in the tens of thousands. The Belarusian government,
which is listed as one of the authors of the CFR, would have been
content with the misleading press release (less than 60 current
casualties and under 4,000 long-term), but not with the figures within
or in the heated Greenpeace Report, comprised mainly from the research
of Ukrainian scientists.
For the 1.5 million individuals still requiring medical attention from
the disaster, such arguments are largely irrelevant. Most of then have
lived off contaminated land for the past 20 years, their benefits now
reduced, and their concerns dismissed as “psychological stress” and
“dependency.” The impact of Chernobyl has not dissipated after two
decades.
–David Marples
CIS SPLIT AT MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE
The meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the Commonwealth of
Independent States member countries, held on April 21 in Moscow, exposed
a profound split in the organization. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and
Azerbaijan formed a common front on issues of shared concern, opposing
Russian policies directed against their interests. The four countries
are members of the GUAM group, though they did not act in that capacity
at the conference.
The Ukrainian delegation, led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys
Tarasyuk, led this group of independent-minded countries in the debate
on most economic and political issues of concern to them. Russia, with
the support of loyalist or neutralist countries whose interests are not
involved in those issues, rejected the four countries’ initiatives with
a high-handedness that can only exacerbate the differences at upcoming
high-level CIS meetings.
Georgia and Moldova submitted separately prepared statements about
Russia’s ban on imports of their wines and other agricultural products
on the Russian market. Describing the ban as politically motivated,
abusive, and unwarranted, the statements underscored the “massive
economic damage” inflicted on the two countries. Georgia and Moldova
regard the ban as an “unfriendly action” by the Russian government, are
asking the Russian government for explanations, and are challenging the
Russian agencies involved — mainly the Consumer Protection Inspectorate
— to show cause for this action. The Ukrainian delegation lodged its
own complaint about recent Russian restrictions on the import of a wide
range of Ukrainian agricultural products on the Russian market.
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov handled those
grievances at the concluding press briefing with a dismissive reference
to “some kind of declarations” made during the conference. He warned by
Georgia and Moldova against “politicizing” the issue, as this “will not
facilitate a solution.” Russia takes the position that the issue should
be discussed at the level of technical agencies. Thus, Moscow seeks to
evade political responsibility for a measure undoubtedly ordered by high
political authorities. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine intend to raise the
issue again at the upcoming CIS meetings of prime ministers (May 25) and
of the heads of state shortly thereafter.
The Russian side also blocked Ukraine’s proposal to discuss the creation
of a CIS Free Trade Zone at the conference. The proposal, nominally
endorsed by Russia as well, is almost a decade old and no member country
seriously expects Russia to actually implement it. In Ukraine, however,
the proposal has become topical again in connection with the
Russia-planned Single Economic Space (Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan, with
Ukraine invited to become a member). Some groups in Ukraine (not only
within the Party of Regions) want the country to join the Single
Economic Space in one form or another — a move that would compromise
Ukraine’s European aspirations. On the other hand, Ukrainian proponents
of integration with the European Union cite the proposal for a CIS Free
Trade Zone as potentially advantageous to Ukraine as well as compatible
with the country’s progress toward the EU. However, Ukrainian
attempts to discuss the free-trade proposal with Moscow shatter against
the resistance of Russian protectionist interests. Thus, the Moscow
conference strengthened the view that the CIS is, at best, useless to
member countries generally and, at worst, actually detrimental to their
interests.
A proposal to discuss the “frozen conflicts” at the conference was also
blocked by the Russian side. Ukraine took the lead in submitting this
proposal with the support of Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The
obstruction by Moscow and its allies will strengthen the case for
internationalization of the existing “peacekeeping” and negotiating
frameworks on Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, as well as
underscoring the value of American efforts to settle the Karabakh
conflict.
Ukraine asked the conference to prepare a proposal for the upcoming CIS
summit to express its attitude to the 1930-33 famine and genocide in
Ukraine (the Holodomor). However, the Russian side orchestrated a
procedural move that eliminated the proposal from the agenda. Belarus,
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan voted with Russia against the
proposal. Armenia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan abstained. Moldova,
Georgia, and Azerbaijan voted with Ukraine.
According to Lavrov at the concluding briefing, discussion of the
Holodomor would have “politicized” a historical issue. Lavrov argued —
as Russian Ambassador Viktor Chernomyrdin also did in Kyiv — that
Russians and other Soviet citizens suffered equally in Soviet times and
it would therefore be inappropriate to single out any people in this
regard.
This argument is heard regularly from Moscow about the Baltic states as
well: “It was a common pain in the Soviet Union.” Such an argument
constitutes the ultimate expression of a social culture of collectivism.
It also overlooks, first, the fact that Moscow organized the famine and
deportations in Ukraine, the Baltic states and elsewhere; and, second,
that the Kremlin today is actively discouraging the attempts to come to
terms with Soviet Russia’s own totalitarian recent history. While
refusing to assess the actions of the Soviet regime, Russia at the same
time claims prerogatives as the legal successor of the USSR.
The Moscow conference was to have discussed a CIS Executive Committee
report on implementing decisions on CIS reform, adopted by the heads of
state at the August 2005 summit in Astana. A corresponding Russian
proposal envisaged setting up a high-level group on “measures to enhance
the effectiveness of the CIS.” Neither initiative was mentioned after
the conference. In his conclusions, Tarasyuk was scathing about the CIS:
“not a normal international organization,” “unresponsive to situations
that are most sensitive to member states,” “useless,” and “has no
future.”
(Interfax, Itar-Tass, Moldpres, Imedi TV, April 21, 22)
–Vladimir Socor
BISHKEK WELCOMES EXPANDED RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN KYRGYZSTAN
Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev met with Russian President Vladimir
Putin during his first state visit to Moscow on April 24-25. The meeting
began with Bakiyev stating that Kyrgyzstan today needs economic
assistance, which Russia is able to provide. Putin welcomed the idea of
intensifying bilateral cooperation in the energy sector and food
industry with special attention to the development of small and medium
businesses. However, Putin’s announcement that Russia will increase its
military contingent at the Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan with the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) became the focus of the
discussion.
Bakiyev approved Putin’s plans, acknowledging, “The Russian base in Kant
contributes to the provision of stability and security not only in
Kyrgyzstan, but in the entire Central Asian region” (Itar-Tass, April
24). Bakiyev’s support for intensifying security ties with Russia
followed his abrupt request to the U.S. Embassy to increase the rent
paid for the U.S. “Gansi” military base at Bishkek’s Manas airport (see
EDM, April 20). This is the second time since the March 24, 2005, Tulip
Revolution that Bakiyev has publicly pressured Washington over the
status of the U.S. military presence. In July 2005, U.S. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Bishkek to discuss issues of bilateral
security cooperation following Bakiyev’s demand to establish deadlines
for the duration of the U.S. military presence. However, ten months
after Rumsfeld’s visit, the agreement on the status of the
military base remains without any significant changes.
Putin announced that Russia and Kyrgyzstan will conduct joint
anti-terrorist training in 2006, focusing on efforts to eradicate
transnational crime and the illegal drug trade. Previously Russia
initiated several regional large-scale military training exercises
within the CSTO, which scored high approval ratings among local security
experts. However, these drills were also often criticized for carrying
strong political symbolism, yet few practical applications (see EDM, May
24, 2005).
In summer 2005 Bakiyev proposed placing the Kyrgyz hydro-energy sector
under the management of the Russian government-controlled Unified Energy
Systems enterprise. The president’s proposal was regarded as highly
corrupt, according to representatives of the Kyrgyz energy sector,
because the government sidestepped an open auction to consider other
options for the sector’s development.
Before visiting Moscow, Bakiyev was careful about making any definite
statements about the possibility of Kyrgyzstan’s joining the World
Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Although there
is a certain pressure from the international community on the Kyrgyz
government to join the HIPC, many Kyrgyz experts believe this move would
make the country dependent upon Western funds (Gazeta.kg, April 24). In
particular, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Paris Club
creditors would be able to increase their influence regarding the
country’s economic and financial regulations. Furthermore, Kyrgyzstan
would be unable to advance issues concerning its foreign policy, such as
the U.S. military base.
The possibility of Kyrgyzstan joining the HIPC program has prompted wide
discussion in the local media. Some claim that it is an issue of
national dignity, as enrolling in the debt-relief program would mean
joining the ranks of the poorest states in Africa and Latin America.
Kyrgyzstan’s external debt is currently about billion.
Days before Bakiyev’s visit to Moscow, the president’s former political
allies again criticized his government for corrupt politics. Minister of
Industry, Trade, and Tourism Almazbek Atambayev resigned to express his
fundamental disagreement with the actions resulting from the president’s
political alliance with Prime Minister Felix Kulov. He accused the
president of engaging in clan politics and failing to curb criminal
figures’ infiltration of state institutions. Atambayev had been
considered to be one of Kulov’s few supporters, but he has now moved
into the opposition. Former prosecutor-general Azimbek Beknazarov told
Azattyk radio that the Bakiyev-Kulov partnership should be destroyed due
to its dysfunctional nature (Akipress, April 22). Beknazarov commented
that Bakiyev and Kulov are pursuing personal goals in politics and,
“They both are very similar in their strive for power.”
Meanwhile, the Kyrgyz public, as well as the government, are preparing
for the peace demonstrations in Bishkek on April 29 (see EDM, April 11).
The Ministry of the Interior will deploy special security forces to
prevent any acts of civil disobedience. The Kyrgyz Coalition for
Democracy and Civil Society is the lead organizer of the demonstration,
but several parliamentarians and numerous other civic organizations have
expressed an interest in participating. Melis Eshimkanov, Beknazarov,
and a number of other parliamentarians will mobilize their own
constituents at the demonstration.
Bakiyev’s recent visit to Russia is his fourth since the Tulip
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan last year. The president’s visit to Moscow
confirmed the Kyrgyz government’s pro-Russian views. However, the
president’s pro-Moscow tilt creates problems for Bishkek. The
international community has condemned his attitude toward the status of
the U.S. military base. The president also delayed stating his opinion
regarding Kyrgyzstan’s joining the HIPC until after his consultations in
Moscow.
–Erica Marat
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