Author: Jalatian Sonya

HRANT DINK, ERGENEKON, AND THE SAUCY TURKISH MEDIA

Turkish Daily News
July 9 2008
Turkey

Are these the efforts to black out possible media connections with
the Ergenekon gang? Or are they trying to wash off Hrant Dink’s blood
stains from all over in their spirit?

Cengiz CANDAR

I followed the latest trial session in the murder case of Turkish
Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. I actually had attended all previous
trials but had never entered the courtroom. Since Ogun Samast, one
of the culprits, was under 18 at the time of the murder, trials were
being held behind closed doors. Samast grew up, gained weight and
turned 19. From now on trials will be open to the public. So I was
there to follow it on Monday.

My first impression about the most important "political murder case"
of our times was "impudence" in the trial, to the contrary of how
the entire lawsuit is being echoed outside.

The Israeli girlfriend?:

>From the courtroom to the manners of the accused and even to their
statements, a "saucy" atmosphere existed in the room. Some of the
questions asked by the lawyers of the accused to witnesses proved
how much people like conspiracy theories in Turkey.

For instance, lawyer Fuat Turgut, of the accused Yasin Hayal, who was
arrested for some time in the Ergenekon crime gang investigation, asked
Erhan Tuncel, another culprit, if his girlfriend is of Israeli decent.

What has this got to do with the Hrant Dink murder? If Tuncel had
an Israeli girl friend sometime in the past, while he was a police
informer, Hayal’s defense would’ve been easier considering that he
once was an informer of the Gendarmerie; therefore the Dink murder
would actually be tied to Tuncel. Can’t you see?

Let me paraphrase: Then, it would be easier to claim that Dink became
the victim of a "Zionist conspiracy" targeting Turkey and from there
on it would be claimed that even the Israeli intelligence agency
Mossad was behind this murder.

Therefore the real perpetrators will be blacked out.

Tuncel refused to answer and said this is violation of his privacy;
he even asked permission to leave the courtroom. But he said that
his girl friend is a "Lebanese." Is Tuncel’s girl friend an Israeli
citizen, as it is claimed, or a Lebanese, as he said?

Don’t be surprised, we are talking about a Hrant Dink murder case
trial.

The same lawyer asked Samast if he had talked on the phone with Etyen
Mahcupyan, Dink’s close friend, on the day of murder. Samast replied
that the person calling him was "Jennifer Lopez."

Yes, these were the scenes from the Dink trial. I will not go into
further details. They will be in news stories soon.

The Ergenekon connection:

But I will rather talk about a question that came to my mind. While
I was following the trial, I was also thinking if there is a link
between the Dink murder case and the Ergenekon terrorist organization.

All of Turkey knows Kemal Kerincsiz, the nationalist lawyer. As
Dink pleaded his case in court for violating Article 301 of the
Penal Code, Kerincsiz was among the demonstrators in front of the
Å~^iÅ~_li courthouse or was involved in the ruckus took place in
the corridors. So Kerincsiz got famous and appeared on television
programs more often. These events and demonstrations were like the
revolver that killed Dink on Jan. 19, 2007. And the same events paved
the way for Dink’s murder.

And that Kerincsiz is behind bars today as a result of the Ergenekon
investigation. Once the Ergenekon case is started, he will be among
the culprits.

Besides, I know that Dink was scared for his life and felt threatened
by the ret. Lt. Gen. Veli Kucuk who was detained in the Ergenekon
investigation later on.

How do I know this? Because Hrant was my friend. I also know this
through the statements of his brother Hosrof (Orhan).

As a matter of fact, Yıldıray Ogur of daily Taraf wrote the other
day in his article titled "The darkness creates an Ergenekon actor
born from a baby":

"… While there was not even the Ergenekon investigation, Hrant’s
brother Orhan Dink made the following statements to newspapers on
Jan. 21, 2007: ‘My brother had begun to fear for his life when Kucuk
wanted to get involved in his trial last May… My brother said this
is getting dangerous. We know the Kucuk and the Kerincsiz groups very
well. He was not directly threatened by Kucuk. These persons do not
make trivial mistakes. There could be a bullet fired at my brother
after Kucuk and yet it did come and kill my brother…’"

Also Fethiye Cetin, the lawyer of the Dink case, in an interview to
NeÅ~_e Duzel of daily Taraf said: "The Dink murder is linked with
the Ergenekon gang. They played a key role in the preparation phase
of the murder plot. This is a great opportunity. Through the Dink
murder we could approach the core of Ergenekon."

Could it be possible? I mean could we possibly find a way to the core
of Ergenekon through the Dink murder?

Ergenekon-friendly media:

Perhaps, but a group in the Turkish media turn at least as insolent as
the atmosphere in the Dink murder care trial on Monday if Ergenekon
is the matter. Some newspapers are exerting tremendous efforts to
"dilute" this "extremely serious" Ergenekon investigation as part of
which two retired top generals were detained for "founding a terrorist
organization and a coup attempt." They are trying to cast a shadow over
the issue by bringing up suspects who are released yet pending trial.

The issue here, let me underline once again, is to "found an armed
organization and a coup attempt." If there hadn’t been any coups
in Turkey before, we could’ve found all these "funny." But we are
living in a country facing a coup every decade. There is a historic
background for such a crucial claim. We all know that and the entire
country knows that.

I wonder what they are after by making the Ergenekon investigation
a "ludicrous" one before the public eye. Are these the efforts to
black out possible media connections with the Ergenekon gang? Or are
they trying to wash off Hrant Dink’s blood stains from all over in
their spirit?

There must be an explanation for this sauciness in such a serious
situation.

–Boundary_(ID_eZ54Y4+fbyJsH2U bB4J3qg)–

H-NET BOOK REVIEW
Published by [email protected] (July 2008)

Heghnar Zeitlian Watenpaugh. _The Image of an Ottoman City:
Imperial Architecture and Urban Experience in Aleppo in the 16th and 17th
Centuries_. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004. xxi + 278 pp.
Glossary, illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. $164.00
(cloth), ISBN 90-04-12454-3.

Reviewed for H-Levant by May Farhat,
Department of Fine Arts and Art History,
American University of Beirut

A City Reshaped Heghnar Zeitlian Watenpaugh’s _The Image of an Ottoman
City_ is an important contribution to the literature on the
"non-western city."[1] It explores the impact of Ottoman rule on the
architectural and urban space of Aleppo over the course of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The study’s overarching concern
is with patterns of "Ottomanization," that is, the processes by which
Ottoman imperial power appropriated, transformed, reshaped, and
represented Aleppo’s historically multilayered urban environment,
imprinting it with a distinctively Ottoman signature.

In chapter 1, Watenpaugh positions herself within the disciplinary
practices that have shaped the study of Ottoman cities. Eschewing the
disciplinary divisions that placed Aleppo and Istanbul in separate
fields of inquiry, circumscribed by national boundaries and
nationalist ideologies (Arab vs. Turkish), her goal is to frame
"Aleppo as an Ottoman city," by placing it in its premodern Ottoman
context (p. 5). Central to the author’s thesis is the "metaphor of
encounter," or "interconnection," which allows her to reconceive the
relationship between the imperial center and provincial city, and to
read architectural and urban production as a visual embodiment of that
relationship (p. 8). Watenpaugh argues that the need to "Ottomanize"
the former Mamluk territories must have compelled the architectural
production of standardized forms that "would index Ottoman rule"
(p. 9). She draws widely and expertly on local and imperial archival
sources, and confidently builds on the work of the French school of
research (Jean Sauvaget, Andre Raymond, and Jean-Claude David),
Ottoman architectural and urban studies, (Ulku Bates, Cigdem
Kafescioglu, Gulru Necipoglu, and Irene Bierman), and urban historians
(Spiro Kostof, Henri Lefebvre, and Michel de Certeau).

Chapter 2 sets the scene by exploring Aleppo’s pre-Ottoman urban
context. The author establishes that the pattern of patronage under
the Mamluks changed markedly under the Ottomans. While wealthy local
merchants joined Mamluk amirs and governors to participate in the
process of shaping urban space, the patronage of powerful,
Istanbul-appointed officials was most instrumental in the
transformation of the city’s urban landscape during the first two
centuries of Ottoman rule. Cognizant of Aleppo’s emerging preeminence
as a hub for long distance trade in the empire, Ottoman officials
invested heavily in Aleppo’s commercial infrastructure, radically
changing the orientation of the city and creating a new urban center
at the heart of the intra-mural city.

The Ottomans projected their influence into the former Mamluk cities
by means of large endowed foundations (_awqaf_) that had an impact on
urban, socioeconomic, political, and religious networks. In chapter 3,
Watenpaugh exhaustively analyzes the patronage of the powerful Ottoman
officials who reshaped Aleppo’s urban space into an Ottoman city
during the sixteenth century. Between 1546 and 1580, successive
governor-generals of Aleppo established four major endowments
(_awqaf_). These were located along the old Roman east-west axis of
the city, stretching between the Great Mosque and the Antioch Gate.
The religious institutions at the center of these complexes introduced
a distinctly Ottoman signature ("rumi" aesthetic), characterized by
the domed prayer hall, pencil thin minarets, and spatial
configurations that emphasized visibility (p. 73). These standardized
forms, devised in the office of imperial architects in Istanbul,
"shouldered the articulation of Ottoman hegemony" and permanently
changed the skyline of the city (p. 120).

Watenpaugh argues that a different stylistic choice dictated the
design of commercial structures (_khÄ=81ns_), which were configured
according to Mamluk models. Watenpaugh eschews the conventional view
of two dichotomous styles, an imperial style introduced from Istanbul
and a persistent local "tradition." Instead, she argues that in these
commercial structures, less symbolically charged than the mosque, an
appropriation and Ottomanization of Mamluk forms took place, a point
that she develops further in chapter 5. Contra to Sauvaget, who saw no
evidence of concerted planning in the growth of the Ottoman city,
Watenpaugh argues that the cumulative acts of patronage that
contributed to the architecturally cohesive space of Aleppo’s urban
center constituted a form of urban planning. One wishes, however, that
the author had presented a more detailed analysis of the interplay
between Mamluk typology, local building practices, and Ottoman visual
idioms that contributed to the formation of that distinctive Aleppine
urban language.

In chapters 4 and 5, Watenpaugh extends her examination of patterns of
Ottomanization into the seventeenth century. Political instability at
the turn of the sixteenth century, in conjunction with the slowing
down of international commerce, introduced a rupture in the pattern of
Ottoman patronage. The author briefly alludes to the political and
social developments leading to this rupture. However, a more
comprehensive exploration of the balance of power between the city and
the imperial center would have done much to foreground her analysis of
urban transformation. According to Watenpaugh, the shift from the
patronage of large commercial complexes to the patronage of smaller
religious establishments like Sufi lodges (_takiyyas_) underscored
Ottoman officials’ attempts to co-opt the antinomian movements that
were expanding and proliferating during this period. Visually, the
_takiyyas_ are a disparate, architecturally hybrid group, and do not
project a strong urban presence. While the author brings much needed
attention to these religious institutions, her discussion of their
architectural idioms remains inconclusive. The dearth of new
commercial foundations during the seventeenth century is offset by the
extra-muros commercial complex of Ipshir Pasha, which is distinguished
by its incorporation of a magnificent coffee house. Although Ipshir
Pasha was a notorious rebel, and thus one who may not be perceived as
a willing agent of

Ottomanization, Watenpaugh forcefully argues that by virtue of its
endowment, established to support Islamic institutions and the
protection of the _hajj_, Ipshir Pasha’s foundation remains–very much
like the sixteenth-century foundations–a significant "artifact of
empire" (p. 169).

In chapter 5, Watenpaugh moves the discussion to Ottoman renovation
efforts, specifically the refurbishing of two of Aleppo’s oldest
religious institutions–the Great Mosque and the Madrasa HallÄ=81wiya.
Subtle changes to the façades of these buildings are seen as a
strategy to appropriate and Ottomanize the city’s past, a process that
culminates in the façade of Khan al-Wazir, a commercial structure
built within the city in the late seventeenth century. In her
interpretation of two feline emblems that frame the gate of the
_khÄ=81n_, Watenpaugh deploys a compelling argument that a new visual
idiom was created in the process of appropriating and
recontextualizing Mamluk forms.

In her final chapter, Watenpaugh shifts her focus from the realm of
architecture to that of book publishing, analyzing texts about cities
that were produced in both Istanbul and Aleppo. Locally, the continued
production of biographical dictionaries of Aleppine scholars
underscores the presence of a strong urban identity. These texts, as
the author observes, lack an "aesthetic awareness," and do not
explicitly expound on the spatial and formal qualities of the city’s
architecture (p. 212). In contrast, texts produced by
Turkish-speaking Ottomans at the imperial center, like Matrakci
Nassuh’s portrait of Aleppo and Evliya Celebi’s travelogue, represent
Aleppo from the perspective of the imperial center, and thus reveal
imperialist concerns and attitudes. In Nasuh’s painting, completed
before the Ottoman transformation of the city in the sixteenth
century, Aleppo’s cityscape is punctuated with recognizably Ottoman
minarets featuring pencil-shaped tops and double balconies. As
Watenpaugh suggests, Aleppo is not depicted as it is but how it ought
to be. Celebi’s account displays a keen awareness of the city’s
historical layering, one that privileges the Ottoman layer and
highlights its Rumi style. By the end of the seventeenth century,
Aleppo has been shaped in the image of an Ottoman city, as prefigured
in Nasuh’s portrait.

Finally, Watenpaugh’s publisher, Brill, deserves criticism. The
location of the figures and photographs at the end of the volume makes
for an awkward reading experience; and the poor quality of the
monochromatic photographs often fails to serve the author’s bold
visual analysis. Nevertheless, Watenpaugh’s sweeping account of
Aleppo’s reshaping under Ottoman rule is thought provoking and
groundbreaking. It offers insights into the working of imperial power
in the production of urban space and the staging of public
architecture in a provincial center. It is indispensable reading for
all those concerned with Ottoman and Mediterranean urban history in
the early modern period.

Note

[1]. See Zeyneb Celik, "New Approaches to the ‘Non-Western’ City,"
_Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians_ 58 (September
1999), 374-381.

Copyright (c) 2008 by H-Net, all rights reserved. H-Net permits the
redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonprofit, educational
purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author, web
location, date of publication, originating list, and H-Net: Humanities
& Social Sciences Online. For other uses contact the Reviews
editorial staff: [email protected].

—
H-LEVANT Editor

IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER INVITED EDWARD NALBANDIAN TO TEHRAN

PanARMENIAN.Net
09.07.2008

Armenia’s Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian met Tuesday with First
Deputy Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran Alireza
Sheikhattar, the RA MFA press office reports.

"Relations between Armenia and Iran are developing successfully. Joint
programs cover new fields; agreements achieved during mutual visits
of rank-ranking officials serve as a good basis for development of
bilateral ties," Minister Nalbandian said, making mention of the
activity of the Armenian-Iranian intergovernmental commission for
cooperation.

Stressing that friendship and cultural and historical commonness
ensure progress in the Armenian-Iranian relations, Mr Sheikhattar,
on behalf of Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, invited
Edward Nalbandian to Tehran.

The officials also referred to implementation of joint programs in
energy and transport sectors, Iran’s nuclear file, regional issues
and the Karabakh process.

OSCE SECRETARIAT TO ASSIST ARMENIA IN DEVELOPING COOPERATION WITHIN ORGANIZATION

PanARMENIAN.Net
08.07.2008 14:21 GMT+04:00

Armenia’s Ambassador to Austria Ashot Hovakimian handed the OSCE
Secretary General, Mr Marc Perrin de Brichambaut a letter from
Armenia’s Foreign Minsiter Edward Nalbandian on appointment of
Ambassador Hovakimian as RA representative to the OSCE.

During the meeting, the OSCE Sec. Gen. said that the OSCE Secretariat
is ready to assist Armenia in developing cooperation within the
organization.

For his part, Ambassador Hovakimian praised the OSCE as an
indispensable structure for ensuring cooperation and security
throughout Europe, the RA MFA press office reported.

NEW BILL ON YEREVAN ENVISAGES ELECTED COUNCIL OF ELDERS AND MAYOR ELECTED AMONG MEMBERS OF COUNCIL OF ELDERS

NOYAN TAPAN

Ju ly 8

The basis of the new law On Yerevan is the model of elected Council
of Elders consisting of 65 members. Vache Terterian, the RA Deputy
Minister of Territorial Administration, said at the July 8 press
conference. According to him, the bill also envisages that the Mayor
and the First Deputy Mayor are elected by the Council of Elders
among its members. The Council of Elders should be elected with
four years’ term as the RA Constitution envisages and the members
of the Council of Elders should be elected only by proportional
party lists. However, according to the Minister, the exclusion of
the majoritarian electoral system does not mean that non-partisans
cannot be included in proportional lists.

V. Terterian said that a political force receiving 40% plus one
vote in the Council of Elders elections will have an absolute
majority. According to him, it is noteworthy that the Council of
Elders, if it has the proper bases, will have a possibility to express
political distrust to the Mayor by nominating and electing another
candidate at the same sitting on the same day. If no new candidate is
nominated or the voting does not take place for this or that reason,
according to the Deputy Minister, the current Mayor will be kept on
his post, and since that the Council of Elders will not have a right
to express distrust to him for a one-year term.

The new bill also establishes that the heads of Yerevan communities
(Prefects) should be appointed by the Mayor. Answering to the question
of why elected Prefects should become appointed when the Mayor will
be elected, V. Terterian said: "We consider Yerevan as a whole,
therefore we consider that an elected Mayor should be responsible for
everything happening in the capital." He said that the bill will be
submitted for second reading at the National Assembly autumn session.

ARMSWISSBANK SUBMITS BOND EMISSION PROSPECTUS OF EXPRESS CREDIT UCO

ARKA
July 7

ArmSwissbank submitted Monday papers for registration bond emission
prospectus of Express Credit, universal credit organization.

Press office of ArmSwissbank says the bonds will be placed through
open subscription.

The agreement on the universal credit organization’s bonds was signed
in May. Under the agreement, bonds worth AMD 150 million (6,000 bonds
of AMD 25,000 nominal cost) will be placed under redemption term of
18 months.

Details will be unveiled after the registration of the prospectus.

Express-Credit Universal Credit Organization was established in
December 1997 as Pinar CJSC.

In 2002, the company was renamed into Express-Credit.

The Central Bank of Armenia registered the organizations on February
11, 2003.

The organization’s assets totaled AMD 1.3 billion, liabilities,
729 million and capital 555.5 million at the first quarter of 2008.

The company’s net profit amounted to AMD 99.5 million by late
May.

MEDVEDEV MAKES SPLASH IN BAKU
Shahin Abbasov

ISN, Switzerland
Monday, 07 July 2008

The Russian president pulls out all the stops in Azerbaijan, but is
it more style than substance?

Russian leader Dmitry Medvedev concluded 3 July talks with Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev by pronouncing Baku to be Moscow’s "strategic
partner." Meanwhile, the head of the Kremlin-controlled conglomerate
Gazprom, Alexei Miller, announced that talks would soon begin on
the Russian firm’s purchase of Azerbaijani gas. But experts remain
unconvinced that the upbeat rhetoric surrounding Medvedev’s visit
will lead to any change in the existing bilateral relationship.

During their meeting in Baku, Medvedev and Aliyev issued a declaration
of friendship and presided over the signing of four intergovernmental
agreements covering such areas as customs and privatization. The
friendship declaration was vaguely worded and short on specifics,
although Russia did seem to endorse Baku’s position that any political
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should not undermine
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, according to a report distributed
by the APA news agency. At the same time, Medvedev was non-committal
in his public comments, saying that Russia favors resolution of the
Karabakh conflict through direct talks between the Azerbaijani and
Armenian presidents.

The two sides expressed a desire for better coordination in
the security sphere, and announced an intention to complete the
delimitation of their shared border. In another section of the
friendship declaration, Baku and Moscow pledged to promote a "central
role in international affairs" for the United Nations.

Miller, the Gazprom CEO, made perhaps the biggest news of the visit,
telling journalists that Russia and Azerbaijan had agreed to start
talks covering the purchases of Azerbaijani gas. "Azerbaijan will
become another country where Gazprom can buy gas while just few years
ago, our [Russian] gas was purchased by Azerbaijan," Miller said. He
declined to speculate on how much gas Gazprom was hoping to buy from
Azerbaijan, saying only that the company was prepared pay market
prices to obtain "maximum volume."

While on its surface the Kremlin’s ability to cajole Azerbaijan
into talking about gas sales may seem like a diplomatic coup. But
Azerbaijani experts are skeptical that Medvedev’s visit alone will
prompt Baku to make a geopolitical shift in Moscow’s direction.

Elhan Shahinoglu, head of the Baku-based Atlas non-governmental
think-tank, suggested that Aliyev, not wanting to antagonize Russia,
was stringing Medvedev and Gazprom along, essentially playing for
time. "Baku will try to delay the issue [of gas sales] for as long
as possible," Shahinoglu said to EurasiaNet.

According to Shahinoglu, Baku would prefer not to see Russia become a
middleman for Azerbaijani gas exports to Europe. Instead, Azerbaijani
officials are more interested in pursuing the US- and EU-supported
Nabucco project, which would evade Russia and link Caspian Basin
natural gas directly to European markets. The dilemma for Baku is
that Nabucco has not yet received the final go-ahead, and remains
stuck in the feasibility-study stage.

Another question mark for Azerbaijani export plans is the fact that
Turkmenistan has yet to make a firm commitment to shipping gas
via a trans-Caspian pipeline that would connect into the Nabucco
network. Such uncertainty reinforces Baku’s inclination to "not rush
with answer to Russia’s offer," Shahinoglu said.

Baku-based energy expert Ilham Shaban believes that, at present,
the maximum amount of gas that Azerbaijan is willing to sell
Russia annually is 1 billion cubic meters. In addition, Azerbaijani
officials are disinclined to accede to Gazprom’s desire to purchase
large volumes from the Shah Deniz field. "Baku is unlikely to agree
to sell gas from Shah Deniz to Russia," Shaban told EurasiaNet.

Other experts, such as political scientist Hikmet Hajizade, say
that while Russia currently seems keen on energy cooperation with
Azerbaijan, that stance would change quickly if Nabucco became a
reality. Azerbaijani participation in Nabucco would automatically
transform Baku and Moscow into bitter competitors. In this event,
Hajizade added, Moscow would likely institute economic and diplomatic
policies designed to coerce Baku.

Shahinoglu, the think-tank expert, predicted that if Baku pursues
an export strategy that is not to Moscow’s liking, then the Kremlin
would retaliate in other areas. "It is likely that Russia will use
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to pressure Baku," he said.

Shahinoglu and other experts are also wary of Russia’s tendency to
use corporate investment as a cudgel to compel former Soviet states
to follow the Kremlin’s line. Many Russian firms, especially energy
companies, are awash in capital and are always on the outlook to
obtain stakes in neighboring countries’ infrastructures, such as
energy distribution networks. During his visit to Baku, Medvedev was
accompanied by large group of Russia’s business leaders, including
Gazprom’s Miller, LukOil President Vagit Alekperov, and VTB Bank
chairman Andrei Kostin.

While Shahinoglu characterized the current state of Azerbaijani-Russian
relations as "normal," he and other experts pointed to a trouble
spot on the immediate horizon. The dilemma concerns a border spat
involving two Azerbaijani villages – Xraxoba and Uryanoba, located
in the Khachmaz Region along the border with the Russian autonomous
republic of Dagestan.

The two villages were transferred to Russia for a period of 20 years
during Soviet times, and although the transfer agreement expired in
2004, Russia has shown no signs of returning the settlements.

Indeed, the fate of the villages is perhaps the largest impediment
to the completion of border delimitation, as the residents of those
villages have received Russian citizenship and have been thoroughly
integrated in Russia’s political and economic system.

3rd Annual Armenian Microelectronics Olympiad to Be Held in September

YEREVAN, July 4. /ARKA/. The third annual Armenian Microelectronics
Olympiad is to be held in Yerevan in September as part of the Week of
Synopsys in Armenia, press office of Synopsys Armenia Company reported
on Friday.

Last year about 130 students and young specialists took part in
Olympiad.

Vazgen Melikyan, president of Program Committee of Olympiad and
director of Synopsys Armenia Educational Department said everyone who
has sufficient knowledge not only in the sphere of microelectronics and
electronic design but also in programming, mathematic methods and
algorithms are invited to participate in this Olympiad.

`The Olympiad is a good opportunity to present your knowledge and
skills, evaluate them and determine the right way to develop them’, he
said.

The aim of the program is to stimulate further development of
microelectronics in Armenia, discover young, talented specialists,
raise interest in microelectronics among young specialists, understand
young specialists’ knowledge of microelectronics and adjust educational
programs as necessary in the future.

Competitors may be no older than 30.

The first prize is a notebook, second ` AMD 300,000 (two prizes) and
third AMD 150, 000 (three prizes).
Other, special prizes are also anticipated.

Synopsys, Inc entered Armenian market in October 2004 after signing an
agreement on merging Leda Design and Monetary Arset into Synopsys
Armenia Company. ($1= AMD 303.75). 0–

ARMENIAN CENTRAL BANK CHAIRMAN TO DISCUSS BANKING PROSPECTS IN KARABAKH

ARKA
July 4

Armenian Central Bank Chairman Artur Javadyan will leave for
Nagorno-Karabakh to take part in the visiting board session of the
Union of Banks of Armenia.

The Central Bank Press Service said the Board meeting discussion will
focus on expanding the spectrum of banking services.

‘ERGENEKON’ AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE BETWEEN STATE AND PEOPLE
Mustafa Acar*

Today’s Zaman, Turkey
Jule 4, 2008

Everyone has a stance based on their ideological tendencies and
political perspectives. These discussions are pretty important in
the process by which Turkey is evolving toward democratic, civilian
and pluralist rule.

Because the Ergenekon indictment — based on a case that has led to
the detainment of 23 people, including three former army commanders,
a journalist and the leader of a business group, as part of an
investigation into a powerful and illegal organization suspected of
plotting to overthrow the Justice and Development Party (AK Party)
government — has not been publicized at the time of this article’s
writing, it is possible to make the following assessment without
making improper statements regarding certain people, based on the
disclosed information and documents.

Ergenekon is a clandestine organization that has affiliations within
the state, the military and civilian bureaucracy, the armed forces,
judiciary, media and universities. It became evident that this
organization, which relied on illegal means including the creation of
a terror network, sponsorship of murders and attempted military coups,
has played important roles in a number of unresolved incidents that
sparked public reaction and protest. Elimination of this organization,
which may be described as the Turkish branch of Gladio — designed
as a semi-military organization in the NATO member countries during
the Cold War era by the US to take action whenever a communist
threat became imminent in those countries — is an issue vital to
Turkey’s survival. Turkey should get rid of this clandestine entity
for lasting peace, conciliation between the state and the people and
its worldwide image.

There are three vital reasons that make getting rid of the Ergenekon
gang important:

First, Turkey has to deal with Ergenekon effectively if it seeks to
get rid of the dire impacts of the Progress and Union Party (Ä°VT),
which remained effective in the country for more than a century. The
harm inflicted by the Ä°VT, which revolted against Abdulhamid II with
the promise of bringing liberties but resorted to repressive policies
after it took the office, is simply indescribable. The country
had to deal with enormous problems during the Ä°VT’s term between
1908 and 1918; every attempt by the Ä°VT during this period brought
nothing but disaster and destruction. The Balkan Wars, World War I,
the SarıkamıÅ~_ failure, the Armenian incidents, loss of the Balkans,
northern Africa and the Hijaz, the invasion of Anatolia and the path to
the Sevres Treaty are all products of the Ä°VT rule. The harm inflicted
by the Ä°VT on this country is not limited to the acceleration of
the Ottoman state’s collapse and the incorrect policies that caused
the subsequent tragic events, which still impacts current politics.

Maybe the Ottoman state would have collapsed anyway, just like the big
empires of the time, including the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian
empires, collapsed at the end of World War I. The actual harm done by
the Ä°VT was in the mindset of the party; the Ä°VT mindset, based on
excessive nationalism — some may even call it racism — centralist
ideas, repression, alienation from the people and protection against
external actors left indelible imprints in Turkey’s last century. Ever
since then, the ongoing disagreement between the state and the public,
the clashes between the elected and the appointed, the perception that
freedoms will lead to turmoil and the perception that the recognition
of diverse identities will partition the country have all, to a great
extent, carried the marks of the Ä°VT. Removing the greatest barriers
before Turkey is directly dependent on getting rid of the Ä°VT mindset
and its imprints in the bureaucratic mechanisms.

Second, Turkey should effectively deal with the Ergenekon organization
if it seeks to become a country that is able to generate its own
policies based on its national interests. It is no secret that Turkey
has, since the end of World War II, remained a country that pursues a
foreign policy strongly attached to the actions of the US and Western
orientations and which has been strongly condemned and warned when
it sought to abandon its NATO alignment and orientation. Viewing the
military coups in Turkey as a reflection of domestic power deals
and struggles is actually a failure to see half the picture. It
is true that the coups were staged to consolidate the place of the
military within the political system, to preserve the privileges of
the white Turks and to keep the periphery away from the benefits of
government office. However, the coups also include some external
dimensions. Currently we are aware, from the proper analyses made
and the publicized documents, that every coup promoted and staged in
Turkey is somehow related to the Gladio-counter-guerilla-Ergenekon
organization and the attempt to preserve Turkey in Western
orientation. To this end, it is essential to follow the path of
Italy, Spain, Belgium and other NATO members following the end of
Cold War and eliminate the Ergenekon gang. Unfortunately this gang,
which extensively relied on a nationalist discourse, had done nothing
but implemented plans devised by NATO actors.

Third, Turkey needs to get rid of the Ergenekon gang if it seeks
to become a stable, pluralist and democratic country that has good
relations with its own people and the world and is able to sustain a
high growth rate. In the current world democracy, civilianization,
pluralism, human rights and rule of law are the most popular
notions. The Ergenekon gang does not favor these noble notions. Quite
to the contrary, it is focused on prohibitions, restrictions,
taboos, impositions and all other negative connotations. The point
to which this mindset will take Turkey is a place of a Third World
country suffering from constant turmoil, domestic problems and
instability. However, the new winds of globalization make calls
that imply Turkey should put emphasis on its European Union bid,
social transformation and ending the clash between the state and the
people. Those who seek to reverse this process are destined to lose and
become anachronistic. Eliminating the Ergenekon gang will contribute
to Turkey’s march toward wealth and welfare. We owe appreciation and
thanks to the prosecutors who initiated the investigation process
and the political actors that stood firmly behind the prosecutorial
actions. Further action should be taken decisively for effective
combat against this illegal entity, with the prayers and support of
the people in mind.

–Boundary_(ID_N4+YPYLyjQhIBwXCXj7ggg)–