THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN WAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST
Ariel Cohen
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
August 15, 2008
Israel
Moscow formulated far-reaching goals when it carefully prepared –
over a period of at least two and a half years – for a land invasion
of Georgia. These goals included: expelling Georgian troops and
effectively terminating Georgian sovereignty in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia; bringing down President Mikheil Saakashvili and installing
a more pro-Russian leadership in Tbilisi; and preventing Georgia from
joining NATO.
Russia’s long-term strategic goals include increasing its control
of the Caucasus, especially over strategic energy pipelines. If a
pro-Russian regime is established in Georgia, it will bring the
strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzurum
(Turkey) gas pipeline under Moscow’s control.
In recent years, Moscow granted the majority of Abkhazs and South
Ossetians Russian citizenship. Use of Russian citizenship to create a
"protected" population residing in a neighboring state to undermine
its sovereignty is a slippery slope which is now leading to a redrawing
of the former Soviet borders.
Russian continental power is on the rise. Israel should understand
it and not provoke Moscow unnecessarily, while defending its own
national security interests staunchly. Small states need to treat
nuclear armed great powers with respect.
U.S. intelligence-gathering and analysis on the Russian threat
to Georgia failed. So did U.S. military assistance to Georgia,
worth around $2 billion over the last 15 years. This is something to
remember when looking at recent American intelligence assessments of
the Iranian nuclear threat or the unsuccessful training of Palestinian
Authority security forces against Hamas.
The long-term outcomes of the current Russian-Georgian war will be
felt far and wide, from Afghanistan to Iran, and from the Caspian to
the Mediterranean. The war is a mid-sized earthquake which indicates
that the geopolitical tectonic plates are shifting, and nations in
the Middle East, including Israel, need to take notice.
Russia’s Goals
Moscow formulated far-reaching goals when it carefully prepared –
over a period of at least two and a half years – for a land invasion
of Georgia, as this author warned.1 These goals included:
Expelling Georgian troops and effectively terminating Georgian
sovereignty in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia is preparing the
ground for independence and eventual annexation of these separatist
territories. Thus, these goals seem to be on track to be successfully
achieved.
"Regime change" – bringing down President Mikheil Saakashvili and
installing a more pro-Russian leadership in Tbilisi. Russia seems
to have given up on the immediate toppling of Saakashvili, and is
likely counting on the Georgian people to do the job once the dust
settles. Russia, for its part, will pursue a criminal case against
him for genocide and war crimes in South Ossetia, trying to turn
him into another Slobodan Milosevic/Radovan Karadzic. This is part
of psychological operations against the Georgian leader, of which
more later.
Preventing Georgia from joining NATO and sending a strong message
to Ukraine that its insistence on NATO membership may lead to war
and/or its dismemberment. Russia succeeded in attacking a state that
has been regarded as a potential candidate for NATO membership since
April 2008. The Russian assault undoubtedly erodes the NATO umbrella in
the international community, even though Georgia is not yet formally
a member, especially if it emerges that Moscow can use force against
its neighbors with impunity. While it remains to be seen whether
Georgia ultimately is fully accepted into NATO, some voices in Europe,
especially in Germany, will see in the war a vindication of their
opposition to such membership. Georgia’s chances will decrease further
if the next U.S. president is noncommittal on the conflict. Ukraine
is standing tall in solidarity with Georgia for the time being, and
has taken a strong step to limit the movements of Russia’s Black Sea
fleet, but has little domestic support for NATO membership.
Russia’s long-term strategic goals include:
Increasing its control of the Caucasus, especially over strategic
energy pipelines.2 If a pro-Russian regime is established in Georgia,
it will bring the strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the
Baku-Erzurum (Turkey) gas pipeline under Moscow’s control. Israel
receives some of its oil from Ceyhan, and has a stake in the smooth
flow of oil from the Caspian.
Russian control over Georgia would outflank Azerbaijan, denying
the U.S. any basing and intelligence options there in case of a
confrontation with Iran. This kind of control would also undermine
any options for pro-Western orientations in Azerbaijan and Armenia,
along with any chance of resolving their conflict based on diplomacy
and Western-style cooperation.
Recreating a nineteenth-century-style sphere of influence in the
former Soviet Union and beyond, if necessary by use of force. Here,
the intended addressees included all former Soviet republics,
including the Baltic States. The message may have backfired as the
presidents of Poland, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania came
to Tbilisi and stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Saakashvili. However,
without Western European and U.S. support, "New Europe" alone cannot
stand up to Moscow.
Russian Proxies Inside Georgia
Russian relations with Georgia were the worst among the post-Soviet
states. In addition to fanning the flames of separatism in South
Ossetia since 1990, Russia militarily supported separatists in Abkhazia
(1992-1993), which is also a part of Georgian territory, to undermine
Georgia’s independence and assert its control over the strategically
important South Caucasus.3
Despite claims about oppressed minority status, the separatist
South Ossetian leadership is mostly ethnic Russians, many of whom
served in the KGB, the Soviet secret police; the Russian military;
or in the Soviet communist party. Abkhazia and South Ossetia have
become Russia’s wholly-owned subsidiaries, their population largely
militarized and subsisting on smuggling operations.
This use of small, ethnically-based proxies is similar to Iran’s use of
Hizbullah and Hamas to continuously attack Israel. Tbilisi tried for
years to deal with these militias by offering a negotiated solution,
including full autonomy within Georgia.
In recent years, Moscow granted the majority of Abkhazs and
South Ossetians Russian citizenship and moved to establish close
economic and bureaucratic ties with the two separatist republics,
effectively enacting a creeping annexation of both territories. Use
of Russian citizenship to create a "protected" population residing
in a neighboring state to undermine its sovereignty is a slippery
slope which is now leading to a redrawing of the former Soviet borders.
On August 7, after yet another Russian-backed South Ossetian
military provocation, Saakashvili attacked South Ossetian targets
with artillery and armor. Yet, Tbilisi was stunned by the ferocity of
the Russian response. It shouldn’t have been, nor should Americans
be surprised. The writing was on the wall, but Washington failed to
read it, despite repeated warning from allied intelligence services
and a massive presence of diplomats and military trainers on the
ground. The results for Georgia are much more disastrous than for
Israel in summer 2006.
"Kill the Chicken to Scare the Monkey"
Aggression against Georgia also sends a strong signal to Ukraine
and to Europe. Russia is playing a chess game of offense and
intimidation. Former president and current Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin spoke last spring about Russia "dismembering" Ukraine, another
NATO candidate, and detaching the Crimea, a peninsula which was
transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954, when both were integral
parts of the Soviet Union.
Today, up to 50 percent of Ukrainian citizens speak Russian as
their first language and ethnic Russians comprise around one-fifth of
Ukraine’s population. With encouragement from Moscow, these people may
be induced to follow South Ossetia and Abkhazia to Mother Russia’s
bosom. Yet, Ukraine’s pro-Western leaders, such as President Victor
Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko, have expressed a
desire to join NATO, while the pro-Moscow Ukrainian Party of Regions
effectively opposes membership. NATO opponents in Ukraine are greatly
encouraged by Russia’s action against Georgia.
In the near future, Russia is likely to beef up the Black Sea Fleet,
which has bases in Tartus and Latakia in Syria, and used to have an
anchorage in Libya. For over two hundred years the navy has been the
principal tool of Russian power projection in the Mediterranean and
the Indian Ocean.
Beyond this, Russia is demonstrating that it can sabotage American
and EU declarations about integrating the Commonwealth of Independent
States members into Western structures such as NATO.
By attempting to accomplish regime change in Georgia, Moscow is also
trying to gain control of the energy and transportation corridor
which connects Central Asia and Azerbaijan with the Black Sea and
ocean routes overseas – for oil, gas and other commodities. Back
in 1999, Western companies reached an agreement with Central Asian
states to create the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. So far, this has
allowed Azerbaijan to bypass Russia completely and transport its
oil from the Caspian Sea basin straight through Georgia and Turkey,
without crossing Russian territory. The growing output of the newly
independent Central Asian states has been increasingly competing
with Russian oil. By 2018, the Caspian basin, including Kazakhstan
and Azerbaijan, is supposed to export up to 4 million barrels of oil
a day, as well as a significant amount of natural gas. Russia would
clearly like to restore its hegemony over hydrocarbon export routes
that would considerably diminish sovereignty and diplomatic freedom
of maneuver in these new independent states.
A Russian S-300 Anti-Aircraft Shield for Iran?
Russia’s Georgian adventure also emboldens Iran by securing its
northern tier through denial of bases, airfields, electronic
facilities and other cooperation in Georgia and Azerbaijan to the
U.S. and possibly Israel. At the same time, in March 2009, Russia
is likely to deploy modern S-300 long-range anti-aircraft missiles
in Iran. By June 2009 they will become fully operational, as Iranian
teams finish training provided by their Russian instructors, according
to a high-level Russian source who requested anonymity.4
The deployment of the anti-aircraft shield next spring, if it occurs,
effectively limits the window in which Israel or the United States
could conduct an effective aerial campaign aimed at destroying,
delaying or crippling the Iranian nuclear program.
The Islamic Republic will use the long-range anti-aircraft system, in
addition to the point-defense TOR M-1 short-range Russian-made system,
to protect its nuclear infrastructure, including suspected nuclear
weapons facilities, from a potential U.S. or Israeli preventive strike.
The S-300 system, which has a radius of over 90 miles and effective
altitudes of about 90,000 feet, is capable of tracking up to 100
targets simultaneously. It is considered one of the best in the world
and is amazingly versatile. It is capable of shooting down aircraft,
cruise missiles, and ballistic missile warheads.5 The S-300 complements
the Tor-M1 air defense missile system, also supplied by Russia. In
2007 Russia delivered 29 Tor-M1s to Iran worth $700 million.
Israel has been very effective in electronic warfare (EW) against
Soviet- and Russian-built technologies, including anti-aircraft
batteries. In 1982, Israeli Air Force F-16s smashed the Syrian
anti-aircraft missiles in the Beka’a Valley and within Syria, allowing
Israel full air superiority over Syria and Lebanon. As a result, Syria
lost over 80 planes, one-third of its air force, in two days, while
Israel lost one obsolete ground support A-4 Skyhawk to ground fire.
In 1981, Israeli F-15s and F-16s flew undetected over Jordan and
Saudi Arabia on their mission to destroy Saddam Hussein’s Osirak
reactor. More recently, the Israeli Air Force surprised the Syrians
when they destroyed an alleged nuclear facility in the northeast of
the country in September 2007, apparently flying undetected to and
from the mission.
However, a mission over Iran, if and when decided upon, is very
different than operations over neighboring Syria. First, if Israel
waits until March 2009, there may be a president in the White House
who emphasizes diplomacy over military operations. Even if the George
W. Bush Administration allows Israel over-flight of Iraqi air space
and aerial refueling, a future administration might not, opting for an
"aggressive diplomacy" approach instead – especially with an emboldened
and truculent Russia as a geopolitical counter-balance.
Second, Israel, military experts say, does not have long-range bomber
capacity, such as the Cold War-era U.S. B-1 heavy supersonic bomber,
or the B-2 stealth bomber. Israel, a Russian source estimated, can
hit 20 targets simultaneously, while the Iranian nuclear program
may have as many as 100. Many of the Iranian targets are fortified,
and will require bunker busters.
Operational challenges abound. Israel’s EW planes, needed to suppress
anti-aircraft batteries, are slow and unarmed, and could become a
target for Iranian anti-aircraft missiles or even fighter sorties. But
the most important question analysts are asking is whether the current
Israeli leadership has the knowledge and the gumption to pull it
off. After all, the results of the 2006 mini-war against Hizbullah
were disastrous for Israel, and the Israel Defense Forces have exposed
numerous flaws in its preparedness, supply chain, and command, control,
communications and intelligence.
The Need to Defang Tehran
Nevertheless, the need to preemptively defang Tehran may prove decisive
in view of Tehran’s hatred and intransigence.
As noted by Professor Stephen Blank of the U.S. Army War College:
When one is dealing with a national leadership which is motivated
by ethnic and religious hatred, one needs to remember that such
a leadership becomes obsessed and loses its ability to calculate
things. They may risk war rather than seek accommodation. This was
not only the case with Nazi Germany, but also with the antebellum
American South of the 1840s and 1850s, where racial hatred of the
slave owners cause them to lose sight of what was at stake.
Blank goes on to conclude that the Iranian leadership believes that
Russia and China will provide them with protection, of which the S-300
is an important component, and that the sanctions are not effective.
Under the circumstances, an Israel-only preventive bombing campaign –
without the United States – might be too risky to pull off. If the
United States sits this crisis out, Israel could possibly settle for
deterring Iran by taking its cities and main oil facilities hostage.
This was known during the Cold War as Mutually Assured Destruction
(MAD), brought to you courtesy of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
and President Ahmadinejad. Going MAD would make the Middle East
even more fragile than it already is, and would make the life of its
inhabitants ever more difficult and tragic.
Clearly, with the renewal of East-West tensions as a result of
Russia’s moves against Georgia, it will be much more difficult to
obtain Moscow’s agreement to enhance sanctions and international
pressures on Iran. The struggle to diplomatically halt its nuclear
program will become far more difficult.
Lessons from the War
Lessons for the Middle East and Israel from the Russian-Georgian
War abound, and apply both to military operations, cyber-warfare,
and strategic information operations. The most important of these are:
Watch Out for the Bear – and Other Beasts! Russian continental power
is on the rise. Israel should understand it and not provoke Moscow
unnecessarily, while defending its own national security interests
staunchly. Small states need to treat nuclear armed great powers
with respect. Provoking a militarily strong adversary, such as Iran,
is worthwhile only if you are confident of victory, and even then
there may be bitter surprises. Just ask Saakashvili.
Strategic Self-Reliance. U.S. expressions of support of the kind
provided to Georgia – short of an explicit mutual defense pact –
may or may not result in military assistance if/when Israel is under
attack, especially when the attacker has an effective deterrent,
such as nuclear arms deliverable against U.S. targets. In the future,
such an attacker could be Iran or an Arab country armed with atomic
weapons. Israel can and should rely on its own deterrent – a massive
survivable second-strike capability.
Intelligence Failure. U.S. intelligence-gathering and analysis on
the Russian threat to Georgia failed. So did U.S. military assistance
to Georgia, worth around $2 billion over the last 15 years. This is
something to remember when looking at recent American intelligence
assessments of the Iranian nuclear threat or the unsuccessful training
of Palestinian Authority security forces against Hamas. Both are deeply
flawed. There is no substitute for high-quality human intelligence.
Air Power Is Not Sufficient. Russia used air, armor, the Black Sea
Fleet, special forces, and allied militias. Clausewitzian lessons
still apply: the use of overwhelming force in the war’s center of
gravity by implementing a combined air-land-sea operation may be
twentieth century, but it does work.6 Israel should have been taught
this lesson after the last war with Hizbullah.
Surprise and Speed of Operations Still Matter – as they have for
the four thousand years of the recorded history of warfare. To be
successful, wars have to have limited and achievable goals. Russia
achieved most of its goals between Friday and Monday, while the world,
including President George W. Bush, was busy watching the Olympics
and parliaments were on vacation.
Do Not Cringe – within reason – from taking military casualties and
inflicting overwhelming military and civilian casualties at a level
unacceptable to the enemy. Georgia lost some 100-200 soldiers and
effectively capitulated. A tougher enemy, like the Japanese or the
Germans, or even Hizbullah, could well suffer a proportionally higher
rate of casualties and keep on fighting.
Information and Psychological Warfare Is Paramount. So is
cyber-security. It looks like the Russians conducted repeated denial
of service attacks against Georgia (and in 2007 against Estonia),
shutting down key websites. Russia was ready with accusations and
footage of alleged Georgian atrocities in South Ossetia, shifting
the information operation playing field from "aggressor-victim" to
"saving Ossetian civilians from barbaric Georgians." These operations
also matter domestically, to shore up support and boost morale at home.
Conclusion
The Russian-Georgian war indicates that the balance of power in
western Eurasia has shifted, and that U.S. power may be deteriorating
in the face of its lengthy and open-ended commitments in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terror, which are leading to a
global overstretch.
While the Middle East, and especially the Persian Gulf, will remain a
top priority in U.S. foreign policy regardless of who wins the White
House, Israel is heading towards a strategic environment in which
Russia may play a more important role, especially in its southern tier,
from the Black Sea to Afghanistan and western China. Twenty-first
century geopolitics is presenting significant survival challenges to
the Jewish state and the region.