17:20, 9 November 2023
YEREVAN, 9 NOVEMBER, ARMENPRESS. The Central Bank of Armenia informs “Armenpress” that today, 9 November, USD exchange rate up by 0.17 drams to 402.68 drams. EUR exchange rate up by 0.86 drams to 430.34 drams. Russian Ruble exchange rate stood at 4.37 drams. GBP exchange rate up by 0.97 drams to 494.33 drams.
The Central Bank has set the following prices for precious metals.
Gold price down by 6.76 drams to 25366.65 drams. Silver price down by 1.11 drams to 290.52 drams.
20:25, 9 November 2023
Measure Urges President Biden to Secure Release of Prisoners; Cut All Military Aid to Azerbaijan
WASHINGTON, D.C.—Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) introduced legislation today demanding Azerbaijan’s immediate release of Armenian prisoners of war, captured civilians, and political prisoners, including Artsakh government officials illegally detained during Azerbaijan’s ethnic cleansing last month, reported the Armenian National Committee of America.
The resolution specifically calls on the Biden Administration to impose sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act on Azerbaijani government officials responsible for the illegal detention, torture, and extrajudicial killing of Armenian POWs. It also reiterates Congressional calls for the enforcement of Section 907 restrictions on U.S. military and security assistance to Azerbaijan.
“Azerbaijan must immediately and unconditionally release all illegally held Artsakh officials, prisoners of war, and other detainees, not in barter – as part of Baku’s cruel commodification of human suffering – but rather in compliance with its own obligations under international law,” said ANCA Executive Director Aram Hamparian. “We thank Congressman Schiff for introducing this measure and look forward to working on a bipartisan basis to see this measure adopted on an urgent basis by the full House of Representatives.”
“Azerbaijan is already guilty of grave atrocities committed during the recent war, and the continued illegal detention of Armenians compounds the problem. Azerbaijan’s treatment of these prisoners, including torture and killings, is heartbreaking and a direct threat to international law and order,” said Rep. Schiff. “My resolution urges the American government and international community to stand up to these gross human rights violations being perpetuated against the Armenian community by the Aliyev regime and return these prisoners back to their families.”
The resolution condemns Azerbaijan’s illegal detention of Artsakh civilian and military officials held as political prisoners: former Artsakh presidents Arkadi Ghukasyan, Bako Sahakyan, and Arayik Harutyunyan, former Artsakh Foreign Minister David Babayan, Speaker of Artsakh’s Parliament Davit Ishkhanyan, former Artsakh State Minister Ruben Vardanyan, and former Artsakh military commanders Levon Mnatsakanyan and David Manukyan.
Rep. Schiff’s resolution builds on similar legislation he and the Congressional Armenian Caucus led in 2021 (H.Res.240), which garnered broad bi-partisan support. The resolution’s call for U.S. sanctions on Azerbaijani leaders and enforcement of Section 907 restrictions on U.S. aid to Azerbaijan echoes bipartisan legislation (H.Res.108 / H.R.5683) and multiple Congressional letters to the Biden Administration which has garnered the support of over 100 Congressional leaders
Thursday, November 9, 2023
Moscow, Yerevan Trade More Barbs
Russia - Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova gestures while
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's annual news conference in Moscow,
January 18, 2023.
Armenia insisted on Thursday that it never agreed to Russian “control” of
potential transport links between Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan exclave passing
through Armenian territory, rejecting Moscow’s latest claims to the contrary.
The Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, provoked a fresh
bitter exchange between the two increasingly estranged allies when she seemingly
blamed Yerevan for the fact that Russian-brokered agreements to open the
Armenian-Azerbaijani border to travel and commerce have still not been
implemented.
Zakharova said that a Russian-Armenian-Azerbaijani task force came close to
working out all practical modalities of the transport links during over a dozen
meetings held in Moscow. The process was not completed because “somebody simply
lacks the political will to do this,” she told a news briefing.
Zakharova also commented on the recent creation of a special unit of Armenia’s
National Security Service (NSS) tasked with ensuring the safe transit of people,
goods and other cargo through the country. Citing the ceasefire agreement that
stopped the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, she said that it is Russian border
guards that should exercise “control over transport communications” between
Nakhichevan and the rest of Azerbaijan.
Responding to Zakharova, the Armenian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Ani
Badalian, said: “Armenia has never, in any document, agreed to any limitation of
its sovereignty, and control of a third country cannot be established over any
part of its sovereign territory,”
Article 9 of the truce agreement stipulates that the Russian border guards
stationed in Armenia will “control” the movement of people, vehicles and goods
to and from Nakhichevan. Armenia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanian said
earlier this year that this only allows them to “monitor” the commercial
traffic, rather than escort it, let alone be involved in border controls.
The Azerbaijani government is understood to have demanded that the special
transport link for Nakhichevan be exempt from Armenian border controls. Yerevan
has repeatedly ruled out that.
The main goal of the agreement cited by Zakharova was to stop fighting in
Karabakh and prevent new hostilities. It called for the deployment of Russian
peacekeepers in Karabakh and gave them control over the Lachin corridor
connecting the region to Karabakh.
The peacekeepers did not push back when Baku disrupted commercial and
humanitarian traffic through the corridor last December and set up a checkpoint
there in April in breach of the agreement. Nor did they intervene when the
Azerbaijani army went on the offensive in Karabakh on September 19, forcing its
practically entire population to flee to Armenia. Unlike the European Union and
the United States, Russia did not denounce the offensive.
Iran Reaffirms Support For Alternative Transport Link For Azeri Exclave
Uzbekistan - Iranian Presiednt Ebrahim Raisi meets his Azerbaijani counterpart
Ilham Aliyev, Tashkent, November 9, 2023.
Iran on Thursday pledged to complete “as soon as possible” the construction of a
new road that will connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave through the
Islamic Republic and bypass Armenia.
Azerbaijani and Iranian officials broke ground on the road during a ceremony
held on October 7. Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk said
afterwards that Baku and Tehran have also agreed to build a similar rail link
bypassing Syunik, the sole Armenian province bordering Iran.
Tehran has repeatedly warned against attempts to strip Iran of the common border
and transport links with Armenia, responding to Azerbaijani demands for a
presumably extraterritorial “corridor” for Nakhichevan.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has implicitly threatened to open the
corridor by force. Azerbaijani September 19-20 military offensive in Karabakh
raised more fears in Yerevan that Baku will act on those threats.
Earlier in October, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi reportedly told a visiting
Azerbaijani official the “Zangezur corridor” sought by Baku is “resolutely
opposed by Iran.” Aliyev’s top foreign policy aide, Hikmet Hajiyev, said later
in October that the corridor “has lost its attractiveness for us” and that Baku
is now planning to “do this with Iran instead.”
Raisi and Aliyev discussed the issue on Thursday when they met in Uzbekistan’s
capital Tashkent on the sidelines of an Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)
summit.
“While expressing his satisfaction with the agreement between the two countries
to solve problems of the region, Dr. Raisi emphasized the determination of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to complete the Aghband Route as soon as possible to
connect the Republic of Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan,” the Iranian president’s
office said in a statement on the talks.
Raisi also said that Baku and Tehran are expanding bilateral ties now that
“conspiracies by the ill-wishers of the two countries have failed.”
Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan continued to publicly press
Armenia to open the special corridor. In a speech at the ECO summit, Erdogan
stressed the need for Armenia to honor its “obligations to Azerbaijan.”
“It is very important to open in the near future transport routes that will
connect Azerbaijan’s western regions to Nakhichevan,” he said.
Erdogan said last week that the corridor rejected by Armenia is important also
because it would link Turkey to Central Asia.
Erdogan too met with Raisi in Tashkent. The official Iranian and Turkish
readouts of the meeting made no mention of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
Pashinian May Skip CSTO Summit
Armenia - Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attends an expanded meeting of
representatives of the CSTO, including foreign ministers, defence ministers and
security councils' secretaries, in Yerevan, November 23, 2022.
The Armenian government signaled on Thursday that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian
may skip an upcoming summit of the leaders of Russia and other ex-Soviet states
making up the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanian said that Pashinian has not yet decided
whether to attend the summit that will place in Minsk on November 23. “When the
decision is made the public will be informed about it,” he told the press
“In theory, Armenia may and may not participate in it,” Kostanian said when
asked about the possibility of a summit boycott.
Pashinian declined to attend a summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), a wider and looser grouping of ex-Soviet states, in Kyrgyzstan on October
13. The secretary of his Security Council, Armen Grigorian, on Wednesday
similarly shunned a meeting of his CIS counterparts in Moscow and met with a
visiting U.S. diplomat instead.
Earlier this year, Armenia also refused to participate in CSTO military
exercises and boycotted a meeting of the defense ministers of the Russian-led
alliance.
Armenia’s relationship with the CSTO and its key member, Russia, has steadily
deteriorated in the last few years, with Yerevan increasingly complaining about
a lack of support from its allies in the conflict with Azerbaijan. The tensions
between Yerevan and Moscow rose further after Azerbaijan’s September 19-20
military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Russian Foreign Ministry last week
accused Pashinian’s administration of systematically “destroying”
Russian-Armenian relations.
Despite the deepening rift, Pashinian has so far announced no plans to pull his
country out of the CSTO or demand the withdrawal of Russian troops.
Major Hurdles Remain To Armenian-Azeri Peace Deal
• Astghik Bedevian
ARMENIA -- A view from Gegharkunik province of Azerbaijani and Armenian army
posts on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, June 18, 2021
Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to disagree on several key issues hampering the
signing of a peace treaty between them, a senior Armenian official indicated on
Thursday.
Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanian said they include the mechanism for
delimiting the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and practical modalities of opening
it for travel and cargo shipments.
“We believe that the delimitation of the border between the two countries must
be the cornerstone of a possible document on the normalization of relations,” he
told journalists.
Yerevan insists on using 1975 Soviet military maps as a basis for the
delimitation process. European Union head Charles Michel, French President
Emmanuel and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz effectively backed this stance in a
joint a statement with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian issued after their October
5 meeting in Granada, Spain.
Azerbaijan made clear afterwards that it continues to reject the idea and wants
the Armenian side to unilaterally withdraw from “eight Azerbaijani villages”
occupied in the early 1990s.
Armenian officials and observers believe that Baku is reluctant to sign a peace
deal that would require it to cede Armenian territory seized three decades ago
and after the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, and preclude Azerbaijani territorial
claims to Armenia. Azerbaijan’s September 19-20 military offensive in Karabakh
raised more fears in Yerevan that it may also invade Armenia to open a land
corridor to the Nakhichevan exclave.
The Granada statement voiced the European leaders’ “unwavering support” for
Armenia’s territorial integrity and called for “regional connectivity links
based on full respect of countries’ sovereignty and jurisdiction, as well as on
the principles of equality and reciprocity.”
In Kostanian’s words, the Armenian government believes that these principles
should also be incorporated into the peace treaty along with a “clear mechanism
for the settlement of disputes.”
“These are the issues on which the two sides still need to bring their
positioners closer to each other,” said the official.
Pashinian hoped to meet Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at Granada and sign a
document laying out the main parameters of the peace treaty. However, Aliyev
withdrew from the talks at the last minute. He also appears to have cancelled
another meeting which Michel planned to host in Brussels later in October.
Kostanian said that there is no agreement yet on the date and venue of the next
Aliyev-Pashinian meeting.
“The mediators are working on organizing a new meeting,” he added, pointing to
U.S. special envoy Louis Bono’s talks with Armenian leaders held on Wednesday.
Some members of Pashinian’s political team have said that the peace deal may
still be signed before the end of this year.
Reposted on ANN/Armenian News with permission from RFE/RL
Copyright (c) 2023 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Inc.
1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
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Peter Holslin needs oud lessons.
To the average crate-digger, mere utterance of the word “deadstock” can inspire Pavlovian excitement and anticipation. Deadstock refers to sealed, mint-condition records that at one point sat on store shelves but never got sold. It’s a term that evokes the gathering of dust and the moldering of cardboard—picture piles of records packed away in their factory boxes and forgotten for decades. But deadstock also evokes feelings of hope, optimism, and unabiding freshness. For people who are constantly on the prowl for overlooked tunes and obscure sounds, a piece of vinyl deadstock can have the almost primeval allure of unplowed snow or a virgin forest.
So you can imagine what a find it must have been for the curators behind the new LA-based imprint Discotchari when they recently stumbled across an entire deadstock run of a long-forgotten 45RPM 7-inch, containing some of the finest Armenian psych-folk ever put to tape.
The two-track effort, originally recorded in 1970, features the Armenian oud player John Bilezikjian and Lebanese percussionist Raja Zahr teaming up for a one-off collaboration. There are mournful melodies, breaks of funky Arabic percussion, and proggy harpsichord riffs that play against soulful runs on the oud, a short-necked lute central to much Middle Eastern music. The duo apparently disbanded not long after they recorded the two tracks, and the records fell into obscurity as the musicians went onto pursue successful solo careers. But now Discotchari has revived this mysterious 7-inch, releasing it this month as a combination deadstock reissue and digital release under the title Something Different.
Something Different sounds at times like 1970s prog bands like King Crimson and Soft Machine, but the arrangements come straight from the music you’d hear in Armenian and Arab urban centers like Glendale, Burbank, and Beirut. The Side A track, “Zulu Man,” is a slow burn of dense, layered instrumentation and moody atmospherics, complete with over-the-top lyrics that reference an African shaman and the troubles of man. Side B’s “Chemical Reaction” is even better: A two-and-a-half minute instrumental banger perfectly primed for a late-night needle drop at an all-vinyl DJ set. Moving at a bracing pace, the track is like surf rock with harpsichords and doumbek—a sure-shot way to get your dopamine receptors firing.
Discotchari was founded by Zach Asdourian and Anaïs Gyulbudaghyan as an offshoot of their label Critique. While Critique focuses on electronic music, they intend this new venture to serve as a platform for their latest Armenian musical finds. The name of the imprint combines the word “Disco” with “Kochari,” the name of an Armenian folk dance, and releases like Something Different represent Asdourian’s and Gyulbudaghyan’s culturally savvy, polyglot outlook. They come from a shared Armenian heritage, but that heritage is anything but static—rather, it’s a living, breathing, ever-evolving culture, extending from its origins in the West Asian steppe to Diaspora communities in Southern California and across the globe. Something Different is just one of many pieces of vinyl they’ve found along that complex path.
https://www.passionweiss.com/2023/11/07/discotchari-something-different-john-bilezikjian-raja-zahr/
The former chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno Ocampo, believes that countries are deliberately ignoring the risk of genocide to avoid the obligation to prevent it.
In an interview with Armenpress Brussels correspondent, Ocampo said that the forced displacement of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh after the Azerbaijani attack constitutes genocide.
Mr. Ocampo, on August 7, you provided and then published your professional opinion to the President of the Republic of Artsakh, considering the blockade and complete siege of Artsakh as genocide. What process could have been started at that time to prevent the coming disaster?
Well, the report was important because we made a point in the public opinion. However, states are doing something fascinating, they are deliberately ignoring the risk of genocide to avoid the obligation to prevent genocide, that’s what we found. We found basically that states are trying to avoid the word genocide. Even because when the US Congress took the report and started activities, then US State Department, without mentioning genocide said they will protect Nagorno Karabakh internationally. But it was late too late. They said that and three days later Aliyev attacked.
How do you interpret what happened after September 19 in Nagorno Karabakh? It seems that when many say genocide, they only imagine a massacre. But in a few days, more than a hundred thousand people forcibly left their homeland, leaving behind everything.
That is a genocide as well, under Genocide Convention article 2B. There's a new report by Juan Mendes saying that the fact that 100,000 people left is showing the mental harm. The fact that they left everything. So that is another form genocide to be, not only killing. The killing was not massive, but there is a mental harm of all the community leaving their land.
What legal mechanisms are there for the rights of the people of Artsakh that can work and how realistic do you consider the restoration of the rights of these people according to international norms?
I think it's important now that France is pushing for that. That's an important state that is pushing the agenda and it's something we should fight for. We should fight for gaining respect of the right of the people, because the people, even if they are not there, they are still the owners of the land and the place, so their rights must be respected. And I think a different priority is to recover, to release the hostages. There are 53 people in jail in Azerbaijan. The problem is international law is not something like if someone steals your bike, you can go to the police and the courts. No, there's nothing like that. We have the International Court of Justice presumably for states, and there is the International Criminal Court for prosecuting individuals. The legal process for releasing these people is not clear, but we should develop the process politically. That is why this meeting is important.
https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2023/11/09/Luis-Moreno-Ocampo/2923751
There is a striking difference between the media response to Azerbaijan’s 2020-2023 aggression against Armenians of Artsakh, which ended in a genocide, and the media’s reaction to Israel’s retaliation in Gaza after Hamas’ October 7th invasion, massacre, and hostage-taking. Most international media ignored Azerbaijan’s bombings, in 2020, of hospitals, schools, kindergartens, homes, and other non-military targets in Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh). They have also ignored the beheadings and mutilations that Azeri soldiers have committed against Armenians.
Artsakh is an Armenian republic in the South Caucasus. Indigenous Armenians lived there for millennia until Azerbaijan bombed and invaded their territory on 19-20 September 2023, forcing around 120,000 Armenians to flee for their lives. Azerbaijan claims the region because, in the 1920s, Stalin granted Artsakh to Soviet Azerbaijan as an autonomous oblast as part of his “divide and rule” strategy. However, Artsakh has never been part of an independent Azerbaijan; instead, it has historically been an integral part of Armenia. In fact, in 1991, the dissolution of the Soviet Union saw the creation of two independent and legally equal republics: Azerbaijan and Artsakh.
Since then, Azerbaijan’s aggression has been unceasing. The September bombardments were Azerbaijan’s second military assault against Artsakh since 2020. An earlier assault took place between 27 September and 9 November, 2020, during which Azerbaijan indiscriminately bombed civilian areas, including hospitals and schools, for 44 days. On 28 October 2020, news website EVN reported:
Stepanakert, the capital of Artsakh, and the town of Shushi came under intensive shelling today by Azerbaijani forces. A maternity hospital in Stepanakert and other civilian infrastructure were heavily damaged. One civilian was killed and several others wounded including first responders of Artsakh’s State Service of Emergency Situations.
The Associated Press then released video footage showing the shelling of the maternity hospital in Stepanakert by Azeri military forces. Artak Beglaryan, a former state minister of Artsakh and at the time the region’s human rights ombudsman, went to the site of the bombed hospital and posted a video on his X (formerly Twitter) page:
My video message and introduction on the Azerbaijan’s today’s deliberate strike on the Republican medical center of Stepanakert, including maternity and child hospital. Intl community bears responsibility for these #WarCrimes as doesn’t stop them. #DontBeBlind
Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued a statement:
This war crime, which is a gross violation of international humanitarian law, customary law, clearly shows that Azerbaijan’s target in Artsakh is the people—infants, mothers, the elderly.
On 26 February 2021, Human Rights Watch issued a report entitled “Unlawful Attacks on Medical Facilities and Personnel in Nagorno-Karabakh: New Research on Three Incidents from 2020 Conflict,” in which they detailed events of the attacks:
Human Rights Watch documented multiple unlawful strikes on a public hospital in Martakert in September through November 2020, and an unlawful strike on a military hospital in the town’s outskirts in October …
Two doctors [of the Martakert Public Hospital] said that when the shelling began on September 27, staff moved all 39 patients, including children and mothers with newborn babies, to the basement. Those whose health allowed it were discharged that day, and the rest were promptly evacuated to Stepanakert…
On September 28, a group of five apparent Azerbaijani servicemen attacked an ambulance…, killing a military doctor, Sasha Rustamyan, 26, and injuring the driver and the accompanying Armenian army sergeant.
Despite these reports, few governments showed concern. Most mainstream media outlets did not even report on these unlawful military attacks against Armenian medical centers, patients, and medical professionals. Schools were also indiscriminately bombed by Azeri forces. The Human Rights Ombudsman of Artsakh issued a report on 9 November 2020, in which it documented Azeri attacks against Armenian children and schools:
Targetings of civilian objects have been deliberate and indiscriminate—strikes on communities have been recorded from the very first day of the offense. The attacks by the Azerbaijani armed forces on civilian households have put life and health of children, women, the elderly and the entire peaceful civilian population, as well as their property, schools and other civilian objects in real danger. Moreover, these assaults have not been tempered relative to other targets and have included the full use of air force, missiles, artillery, attack UAVs and even internationally prohibited weapons and methods …
Densely populated areas, including schools and kindergartens, have been indiscriminately targeted. The armed forces of Azerbaijan have been acting with clear intention to damage lives and health of the civilian population, including children. Based on preliminary data, 71 schools and 14 kindergartens … have suffered material damages from the shelling, rocket and air strikes by the Azerbaijani armed forces. As a result of the Azerbaijani attacks, all the 220 schools and 58 kindergartens were closed. Consequently, all the 23,978 children in Artsakh have been deprived of the Right to Education, the opportunity to attend school and 4,036 children of receiving preschool education.
During and after the war, many Armenians, both civilians and soldiers alike, were beheaded or mutilated. Many videos of the beheadings and mutilations were posted on social media by Azeri accounts. According to a report by Artsakh’s Human Rights Ombudsman, some examples include:
Yuri Asriyan, a resident of Azokh village, Hadrut region, could not leave his place of residence due to health problems. He was captured on October 21 by Azerbaijani troops who invaded the village. Later, in December 2020, a video was spread on the Internet, which contained the scene of Asriyan being beheaded. He repeatedly asked not to be beheaded in the name of ‘Allah’, but a soldier in the uniform of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces beheaded him. Asryan’s body was found on 21.01.2021.
Gennady Petrosyan, a resident of Madatashen village of Askeran region, returned to the village after evacuation on 27.10.2020 to pick up his remaining possesions. During the same period, Azeri soldiers in the village captured him and later in November posted a video on the Internet, which clearly shows Petrosyan being beheaded, and his body and amputated head placed next to the body of a pig.
Alvard Tovmasyan was born in 1963, lived in the village of Karin Tak in the Shushi region, and suffered from mental illness. Her body was found on 13.01.2021 as a result of search operations in the same village. Examination of her body revealed obvious signs of torture; her left ear and tongue were cut off. The corpse was identified by relatives and comparative examination of DNA samples.
The war was halted with an agreement signed by Armenia and Azerbaijan, and brokered by Russia, on November 9, 2020. Yet, the Azeri aggression never stopped. During Azerbaijan’s illegal blockade that lasted from December 2022 to late September 2023, Armenians were besieged in their own land for nine months. They survived with very little food, medicine, or fuel. Then, on 19 September 2023, Azerbaijan again bombed Artsakh, invaded forcibly displaced the Armenian population, and arrested its political and military leaders. On October 19, Anahit Manasyan, the human rights ombudsman of Armenia, said, “Numerous bodies, including those of children and women, bearing signs of torture and mutilation, have been taken to Armenia from Artsakh.”
Many people regularly follow the news and international developments, but are unaware of the true scale of the 2020-23 Armenian genocide committed by Azerbaijan and its ally, Turkey. Azerbaijan’s two brutal wars, carpet bombings, siege starvation, beheadings, and mutilations of Armenians, and its violent targeting of hospitals and schools in Artsakh, should have made headlines in the West.
Despite the many crimes Azerbaijan has committed against Artsakh’s indigenous and peace-loving Armenians, there has been very little factual media coverage. The Western mainstream media has been mostly silent—perhaps even complicit with Azerbaijan. Their silence has helped Azerbaijan drive Armenians out of their ancestral homeland. Tens of thousands of Armenian families have lost their homes, left everything behind, and are now refugees struggling with economic, medical, and psychological problems.
The question demands an answer: Why have most Western media outlets been so blind and apathetic in response to the past three years of the Artsakh Genocide?
8th November 2023, LONDON - BP and its project partners have transferred $35 billion-worth of oil and gas production to Azerbaijan’s government since 2020, the year that war broke out in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The sum is more than four times Azerbaijan’s military spending during this period, as new analysis by Global Witness highlights the ‘dictatorship’s’ economic reliance on the British company’s fossil fuel operations.
BP – Azerbaijan’s largest foreign investor – operates and holds the biggest share of two giant oil and gas extraction projects in the country, which it started developing in the 1990s. BP’s current project partners include Exxon, Equinor and Lukoil.
BP’s contracts with the government require it to transfer a proportion of the projects’ oil and gas production to the state, whose share from January 2020 to December 2022 was valued at $34.9 billion, according to BP’s financial disclosures.
Azerbaijan’s defence budget was $7.9 billion over the same period, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. In 2022, Azerbaijan was the world’s eighth biggest military spender as a share of GDP.
On 19th September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh, a contested region with Armenia. The attack forced over 100,000 people to flee the territory – almost the entire ethnic Armenian population – and prompted the European Parliament to state this amounted to ethnic cleansing. [3]
On 20th September, one day after Azerbaijan began pounding Nagorno-Karabakh with heavy artillery fire, BP sent a senior delegation – including chair of the board Helge Lund and former CEO Lord Browne – to Baku to celebrate the 100th anniversary of former President Heydar Aliyev’s birth, and to reaffirm BP’s “commitment to a long-term partnership” with Azerbaijan.
The decades-long conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh flared up in September 2020. Thousands of combatants were killed on both sides before a ceasefire was agreed six weeks later. [4] Skirmishes continued and in December 2022, Azerbaijan blocked the only road from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, choking supplies of food, fuel and medicines and creating a humanitarian crisis in the region.
BP pays a share of its projects’ oil and gas production to the government as a condition of operating in Azerbaijan. In 2022 alone, the government’s share of production was $19.3 billion, more than the country’s entire public spending budget of $17.6 billion that year, according to UNICEF.
While BP’s oil and gas fields are hundreds of kilometres from Nagorno-Karabakh, the company seems to have few qualms about entering Azerbaijan’s disputed territories. In June 2021, BP signed an agreement with the government to build a 240-megawatt solar farm in Jabrayil, a district within the 2020 war zone which Azerbaijan captured in October that year.
Speaking in Shush in June 2022, a city in Nagorno-Karabakh that was also seized by Azerbaijan in 2020, BP’s regional president said that Azerbaijan’s “liberated territories” have “some of the country’s best solar and geothermal resources”, which makes them a “perfect opportunity for a fully net zero system.”
UN guidelines give companies operating in conflict-affected regions a heightened responsibility to demonstrate their commitment to human rights. Yet in September 2023, BP turned down a request to sign a joint letter from global business leaders to Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev, urging him to protect human rights for all people in the conflict zone.
BP began its partnership with Azerbaijan’s government – one of the world’s most repressive and corrupt regimes – in the 1990s, with an agreement to develop one of Azerbaijan’s largest oil fields, a deal dubbed ‘contract of the century’.
Responding to a request from Global Witness to comment on its operations in Azerbaijan, BP stated that it supports a peaceful settlement to the conflict, and that it remains committed to operating a safe, reliable, and resilient energy business in the region. BP also said that it has a policy to conduct environmental and social impact assessments, including human rights aspects, for projects in conflict-affected regions.
Azerbaijan, its government, nor BP or any of the other entities with which BP is engaged in the oil trade there are subject to sanctions over the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.
Dominic Eagleton, senior campaigner at Global Witness, said:
“BP’s long-standing partnership with the Aliyev ‘dictatorship’ has funded Azerbaijan’s militarization and aggression against Armenia. BP has been happy to keep drilling, having learned nothing from the historic mistake it made in Russia. Funding violent dictators is always a bad strategy.”
Notes to editors:
BP is the operator and holds a 30.37% share of the Azeri-Chirag-Deepwater-Gunashli oilfield in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea. The remaining participating interests are: SOCAR (25%), Molgroup (9.57%), INPEX (9.31%), Equinor (7.27%), ExxonMobil (6.79%), TP (5.73%), ITOCHU (3.65%), and ONGC Videsh (2.31%).
BP is the operator and has a 29.99% share of the Shah Deniz gas-condensate field, also in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea. The remaining participating interests are: Southern Gas Corridor (21.02%), Lukoil (19.99%), TP (19%), and NYCO (10%).
BP’s Payments to Governments reports are available here, under ‘Regulatory information’: https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/sustainability/reporting-centre-and-archive/. The figure for Azerbaijan’s military expenditure is taken from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI’s) Military Expenditure Database: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. SIPRI research shows Azerbaijan was the world’s eighth largest military spender as a share of GDP (page 10): https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/2304_fs_milex_2022.pdf
European Parliament resolution, 5 October 2023: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0356_EN.html
The first Nagorno-Karabakh war took place from 1988 to 1994. While it remained internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, the conflict left Nagorno-Karabakh de facto independent, but with close ties to and heavily reliant on Armenia. Hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis were expelled from the region as a result of the war, which also displaced large numbers of Armenians living in Azerbaijan. A fragile truce ensued, albeit with intermittent clashes. The unresolved conflict escalated into a full-scale war in September 2020, leading to a reported 7,000 soldiers and 170 civilians being killed, with many more wounded. Azerbaijan regained many of its territories before Russia brokered a ceasefire in November 2020, which brought 44 days of fighting to an end.
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/oil-firms-bankroll-azerbaijans-warring-regime-with-billions-in-fossil-fuel-money/
While reporting from the South Caucasus has recently focused on Azerbaijan’s victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it is important to recognise the renewed importance of the Nakhchivan region. This autonomous republic is quickly becoming a key part of regional politics.
November 8, 2023 - Cristian Bolotnicov Laurențiu Pleșca
A little-known autonomous republic within Azerbaijan is another consequence of the Stalinist regime’s policy of “divide and conquer”. Having regained control of Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku has not hesitated to express its desire for a direct link with its exclave Nakhchivan, an intention that complicates relations with the EU and western partners.
This exclave, bordered by Armenia, Turkey and Iran, is located in a predominantly mountainous area, with the exception of plains to its west and south-west. It has a population of 461,500, who are mostly Azerbaijanis, and an area of over 5000 square kilometres. As an integral part of Azerbaijan, a country courted by the EU and other European countries for its energy resources, developments in the area cannot go unnoticed. In this article, we will discuss the region’s past and what the future may hold for the autonomous republic.
One of the oldest cities
The name of the region comes from its capital, Nakhchivan, which was founded around 1,500 BC as one of the oldest cities in the area. In the time of Alexander the Great, it was called Naxuana, and in Armenian it is called Naxcawan. In fact, for Armenians the name of the region and the city is linked to the biblical story of Noah’s Ark, as in Armenian it translates as “the place of the first descendants”, i.e. where the survivors of the Great Flood landed after reaching Mount Ararat.
Like other regions in the Caucasus area, it passed through the rule of Persia, Rome, Armenia, Mongolia and Turkey before becoming part of Russia in 1828. The area has been predominantly Azerbaijani in recent centuries. Thus, some sources mention that by 1914, the Armenian population had decreased by 40 per cent, while the number of Azeris in the region had increased by 60 per cent.
The Nakhchivan region was no exception to the chaos and revolution of 1917, as it was the scene of bloody fighting and purges between Armenians and Azeris who disputed its ownership. In 1918, the region was occupied by Ottoman troops, who engaged in massacres, with around 10,000 Armenians falling victim. The Ottomans later withdrew, with British troops moving into the area.
Sovietisation
When the Soviets arrived in the region, the “Democratic Republics” of Armenia and Azerbaijan continued to struggle for dominance in the region. In July 1920, the Red Army invaded and occupied the area. The Nakhchivan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was declared, which in turn established close ties with the Azerbaijani SSR. In an attempt to gain political support, Armenia’s Bolshevik leaders promised to integrate Nakhchivan, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Zangezur region into the Armenian SSR. At one point this was supported by Lenin and the Bolshevik leaders in Baku.
However, the Soviets held a referendum in 1921, in which 90 per cent of the Nakhchivan population voted to remain part of the Azerbaijani SSR. The result was confirmed by the treaty of March 16th 1921 between Turkey and Soviet Russia. From 1924, it became an autonomous republic within the Azerbaijani SSR. During the Soviet period, the region’s Azerbaijani population continued to grow steadily, while the Armenian minority decreased from 15 per cent in 1926 to 1.4 per cent in 1979.
On January 20th 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Nakhchivan ASSR voted to separate from the USSR and integrate into the Azerbaijani constituent state. The same Supreme Soviet would then elect Heydar Aliyev, the future president of independent Azerbaijan, as the leader of the region. Thus, the break-up of the Soviet colossus left the region part of independent Azerbaijan, which was subject to several blockades by Armenia starting in the 1980s and ending in the mid-1990s.
Current importance
Returning to the present, the revival of the Nakhchivan exclave issue has again emerged in the public arena. Of course, this occurred after Azerbaijan defeated fighters from the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region. However, this is especially true following Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to the region. At the invitation of Azerbaijan’s president, he made a statement stressing the importance of a corridor linking Turkey and Azerbaijan. He also suggested that, without Armenian support, it could cross Iran. Of course, this move has sparked discussion about its geopolitical implications and wider tensions in the South Caucasus region.
Recently, Politico wrote that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken had warned a small group of lawmakers that his department is tracking the possibility that Azerbaijan could soon invade Armenia. Recently, the likelihood of escalated tensions has diminished as Armenia and Azerbaijan have both signaled their intention to sign a peace treaty in the coming months. However, concerns persist. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev’s reference to Armenia as ‘West Azerbaijan’ has raised eyebrows, suggesting underlying contentious issues. Meanwhile, Armenia’s efforts to strengthen its ties with Western nations, despite hosting Russian military bases, add a complex layer to the regional dynamics
However, this small territory does indeed have a small border with Turkey. Therefore, if Azerbaijan succeeds in bridging the divide between the mainland and this disconnected territory, it would establish a direct link for Turkey to access the Caspian Sea in the east. At the same time, Azerbaijan would gain a direct link to Turkey, which would give it access to the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and Europe. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has also expressed interest in creating a land corridor through Armenia to link his country to Turkey. This ambition is rooted in the region’s historical geopolitical landscape, as the Nakhchivan region is currently separated from the mainland of Azerbaijan.
Of course, Armenia has expressed concern about these developments, fearing that such a corridor could lead to further territorial losses. Armenia has also accused Azerbaijan of undermining the peace process and not fully implementing agreements related to the region. Over the last month, the Guardian has noted that more than 100,000 Armenians have fled Nagorno-Karabakh, which was recently conquered by Azerbaijan.
Creating the Zangezur corridor
The Zangezur corridor is a proposed land and rail route that would establish direct links between Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and other Azerbaijani regions. This corridor is considered a key infrastructure project that could strengthen links between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In fact, Turkish President Erdogan, as always, wants Turkey to dominate the Black Sea and Caspian region and is keen to turn the Zangezur and Lachin (linking Karabakh and Armenia) transport routes into “corridors of peace”. This peace would naturally benefit Ankara geopolitically and economically.
The possibility of the Zangezur corridor passing through Iran has raised questions. Moreover, Turkey has threatened Armenia that if it does not cooperate with the project, it could lead to the possibility of the corridor route passing through Iran. Erdogan has expressed optimism about Iran’s willingness to participate in the initiative. This is because it could provide a passage from Turkey to Nakhchivan and wider Azerbaijan. This would represent a new and extraordinary territorial configuration, according to the Anadolu news agency.
The Turkish journalist who wrote this article stated that “The Zangezur region was originally part of Azerbaijan, though the Soviets gave it to Armenia in the 1920s, leaving Azerbaijan deprived of a direct overland route to its exclave of Nakhchivan.” The source also notes that the corridor would be near or adjacent to Armenia’s border with Iran, which would concern Tehran regarding the project cutting across its border with Yerevan. Earlier, Erdogan said the opening of the corridor is a “strategic issue” for Turkey and is “very important” for ties between Ankara and Baku.
“In other words, Azerbaijan has become a serious player in a very large transport market. Of course, the realisation of the Zangezur corridor is a historical necessity. That’s why I said it will be done whether Armenia wants it or not. Although in Armenia they perceive it as another threat, we had no such idea. It is simply inevitable. It will happen sooner or later. Of course, we want it to materialise soon,” the Azerbaijani leader said in 2021.
Also, the signing of the construction of the Igdir-Nakhchivan pipeline will create conditions for the supply of natural gas to the Azerbaijani exclave through another route from Turkey. This will supplement (or replace) gas deliveries from Iran.
Instead of conclusions
The European Union has been working to diversify its energy sources and reduce its dependence on Russia for natural gas. Azerbaijan, notably through the Southern Gas Corridor, has become a strategic partner in this effort. As for the US, it has the first opportunity since the fall of the Soviet Union to gain a significant foothold in the South Caucasus by reimagining the region’s security architecture. However, Russia’s involvement in this complex puzzle of regional dynamics adds another layer of complexity to the situation.
Russia, as an important regional actor, has been closely monitoring the situation. Moscow has criticised Armenia’s handling of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and even accused Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of pursuing a pro-western agenda. The Zangezur corridor proposal and the potential involvement of Iran highlight the evolving dynamics in the South Caucasus region. It also shows that Russia is still not paying attention to the region, as Armenia, once one of the countries most aligned with Russian policy, has been left to fend for itself because of the war in Ukraine.
President Erdogan’s statements signal Turkey’s commitment to strengthening ties with Azerbaijan and finding alternative routes if Armenia does not cooperate. However, they do not rule out the possibility of new territorial seizures, as claimed in some Armenian circles. As tensions persist, regional actors such as Russia could play a key role in influencing the outcome of these geopolitical manoeuvres, making the situation in the South Caucasus one to watch closely in the coming months.
This article was originally published in Romanian on the website agora.md.
Cristian Bolotnicov is a Moldova-based journalist for Agora.md. He specialises in topics related to politics and history writing in-depth analyses and uncovering underreported issues from politics, justice, economy and technology.
Laurențiu Pleșca is a PhD candidate at the Doctoral School of Political Sciences of the University of Bucharest, researcher for the Romanian Centre for Russian Studies and analyst at German Marshall Fund of the United States. His main research interest is on topics such as Russia’s geopolitics in the Black Sea region, domestic and foreign policy of the former Soviet states (in particular the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan).
Documents:
The Honorable James O’Brien
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Dr. Alexander Sokolowski
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and Eurasia
U.S. Agency for International Development