ANALYSIS: Armenia and Kazakhstan Reveal Cracks in Russian-Led Regional Blocs

Kyiv Post, Ukraine
Nov 16 2023



Armenia’s snubbing of Moscow-led summits combined with Kazakhstan’s leader’s behavior during President Putin’s recent visit may indicate a fundamental change in the existing power dynamic.

By Steve Brown

Russia has tried to maintain control of many of its former Soviet republics through two bodies that are analogous to similar bodies in the West.

The Russian-led Collective Treaty Security Organization (CTSO) is a military alliance formalized in 2002, that attempts to be Russia’s equivalent to NATO with, currently, six members Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, along with Armenia and Belarus.

In an echo of NATO’s Article 5 treaty, CSTO’s Article 4 states: “If one of the Member States undergoes aggression, it will be considered by the Member States as aggression to all the Member States of this Treaty… all the other Member States at the request of this Member State shall provide the latter with the necessary help, including military… in accordance with the right to collective defense pursuant to article 51 of the UN Charter.”

Although it has been in existence for over 20 years, the Article has only been used once when a small force deployed to Kazakhstan in January 2022 to deal with political unrest that Moscow categorized as a coup attempt backed by “foreign terrorists.”

Recent events may be the first signs of the cracks appearing in Russia’s hold over their southern partners.

The other body that Russia has used to retain its influence is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) a quasi-equivalent of the European Union that calls itself a regional intergovernmental organization.

It was formed in 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union ostensibly to assist its members’ transition into free democratic nations although, the cynic would say it was an attempt by Russia to keep some semblance of control over its former vassal states.

The stated aims of the organization are: to facilitate and strengthen cooperation in the political, economic, ecological, humanitarian, cultural, and other fields among its member states, who are currently: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

Although Ukraine ceased active participation in the statutory bodies of the CIS in 2018 in protest at Russia’s annexation of Crimea and continued aggression in the Donbas it has never formally withdrawn from the CIS Free Trade Area, even following Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion.

Recent strains show in the Armenian-Russian relationship

Armenia’s Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, announced on Tuesday that he would not participate in the Nov. 23 CSTO meeting in Minsk, Belarus. Commentators see this as another example of the deteriorating relationship between Yerevan and Moscow.

In 2020 the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Armenian separatist region Nagorno-Karabakh ended with a Moscow-brokered peace plan that included deployment of a Russian peacekeeping force. Armenia became unhappy with the peacekeepers’ reluctance to fulfil their mandate, which was exacerbated by the Kremlin’s refusal to intervene during this year’s outbreak of hostilities.

Pashinyan in turn angered Russia by canceling its hosting of the annual CSTO military exercises, but later held joint exercises with US forces, declined to attend a meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Bishkek where Putin made his first trip outside Russia since being indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC) after which Armenia then voted to join the ICC.

According to TASS, Russia’s state media outlet, the former defense minister and head of Armenia’s opposition party, Seyran Ohanyan, accused Pashinyan of threatening the country’s security through this rebuff of Moscow:

“As threats surround us in a complicated military and political situation, not taking part in CSTO events puts Armenia’s security at further risk. We are a member of this alliance. In many cases, Armenian authorities played a part in the deterioration of relations.”

And the Russian-Kazakhstan relationship?

On Nov. 9 at what was called a “routine bi-lateral” meeting between the leaders of Kazakhstan and Russia, Putin was unable, not for the first time, to correctly pronounce Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s name on several occasions. Perhaps in payback for that and also, in what some commentators have categorized as a power move, gave his closing speech in Kazakh rather than the usual Russian, much to the confusion of the visiting Moscow delegation.

Kazakhstan had earlier hosted a visit by French President Emanuel Macron, as part of his tour of Central Asia, during which deals were agreed in relation to oil and rare earth metals that Kazakhstan has in abundance, as well as pharmaceuticals and aerospace contracts.

With sanctions imposed on Moscow following the invasion of Ukraine having resulted in a major reduction in Russian oil exports to the EU, Kazakhstan is now the EU’s third-largest supplier behind Norway and the US.

At a meeting with President Tokayev, Macron thanked him for not siding with Moscow in its war on Ukraine and commented:

“I don’t underestimate by any means the geopolitical difficulties, the pressures… that some may be putting on you… France values the path you are following for your country, refusing to be a vassal of any power and seeking to build numerous and balanced relations with different countries.”

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where Macron traveled on his next visit, have refused to recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories and have pledged to abide by Western sanctions against Moscow.

"The European Union isn’t hiding its intentions to restrain Russia in every possible way and push it out of Central Asia and the South Caucasus.” – Sergei Lavrov

A BBC report quoted the Kazakh political analyst Dosym Satpayev, who said the war in Ukraine had resulted in a diminishing of Russian influence in the region. “There is less military co-operation, the perception of Russia since the war has worsened. Central Asian governments are not talking openly about it – but it is happening.”

Russia in turn has voiced concern at the West’s growing commercial and diplomatic activity in the former Soviet nations of central Asia.

Asked for his views on Macron’s visit and comments, the Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Kazakhstan, as a sovereign state, was free to develop ties with any countries, but emphasized his view that Moscow valued its relations with Kazakhstan “very highly.” He then told reporters: “In our turn, we have historical ties, ties of strategic partnership with Kazakhstan, they are our allies and our interests are united in many international bodies.”

Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, took a less conciliatory line. In an interview broadcast on Sunday, he accused the European Union of attempting to drive Russia out of Central Asia. He said the West was trying to pull Russia’s “neighbors, friends and allies” away from it.

“The European Union isn’t hiding its intentions to restrain [Russia] in every possible way and push it out of Central Asia and the South Caucasus,” he said. “These attempts are futile. We have been historically present there and are not going to disappear.”

Nevertheless, a number of commentators suggest these recent events may be the first signs of the cracks appearing in Russia’s hold over their southern partners.

It is not only the EU nations that are focusing on an area they have long neglected. China is becoming ever more active in Central Asia with its “Belt and Road” project. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also shown growing interest in the region.


Turkey accused of double standard as Armenian journalist’s killer walks free

Nov 16 2023
Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink's murderer walked free in Turkey Wednesday while the government's critics pointed aghast to political prisoners held years beyond the court's authority to keep them.


Amberin Zaman

This is an excerpt from Turkey Briefing, Al-Monitor's weekly newsletter covering the big stories of the week in Turkey. To get Turkey Briefing in your inbox, sign up here.

The assassin of prominent Armenian news editor Hrant Dink was freed late Wednesday for “good conduct” in what critics charge is a further example of the politicization of Turkey’s judiciary under the country’s authoritarian president.

Ogun Samast was released on parole under the terms of an amnesty law passed in July (one that excludes terrorism cases) after spending 16 years and 10 months for the 2007 murder of Dink outside the office of his newspaper, Agos, in Istanbul.

Ozgur Ozel, the newly elected leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party, blasted the move, saying Samast was “supposed to stay for life.” “We have no words. Any who talks about justice after this is truly heartless,” Ozel noted on X.

“This night is a very bad night. The worst night in recent years,” lamented Alin Ozinian, an Armenian-Turkish journalist. Dink had told Ozinian in an interview, the last prior to his death, “The deep state has put a target on me.”

Samast, who was 17 years old at the time of the murder, was widely believed to be acting in concert with rogue ultranationalists and their allies in the security forces. They viewed Dink as a threat because of his efforts to draw attention to the genocide of more than one million Armenians by the Ottomans in 1915, a taboo topic.

His murder struck a chord and more than 100,000 people, many of whom had not previously heard of Dink, marched at his funeral bearing placards that read “We are all Armenians.”

In truth, Samast was expected to be released earlier — in 2020 — and serve his remaining 1.5 years on parole. However, his discharge was postponed after he was given a separate five-year long sentence for striking a prison warden. The actual miscarriage of justice, legal experts say, stems from the fact that Samast was not prosecuted for Dink’s murder as part of an organized terror network and was sentenced instead for voluntary manslaughter and illegal possession of a weapon.

Erdal Dogan, one of several lawyers who represented the Dink family in the case, commented on the matter to Al-Monitor. “The Turkish justice system that penalizes even the slightest criticism of the government as ‘membership of a terrorist organization’ or ‘terrorist propaganda’ chose to treat the political murder of Hrant Dink that was planned by tens of people, including those serving in state institutions, as an ordinary crime,” he said.

Turkey’s justice system has been repeatedly condemned by international legal bodies, notably the European Court of Human Rights, whose rulings Ankara has considered binding since 1990. Yet in recent years Turkey has repeatedly flouted them, most notably with respect to the court’s demands that Turkish philanthropist Osman Kavala and Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtas be immediately freed.

Kavala, a dogged proponent of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, has been in jail since 2017, serving the most severe type of life sentence under Turkish law, on flimsily evidenced charges that he sought to overthrow the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as an alleged instigator of the mass Gezi protests that shook Turkey in 2013. 

Demirtas has been convicted on a raft of similarly specious terror charges, with prosecutors demanding life in a case linked to the Kobani riots that erupted in 2014 in the mainly Kurdish city of Diyarbakir over the government’s perceived support for the Islamic State.

In a further twist, Turkey’s Court of Cassation filed a criminal complaint against the Constitutional Court, the highest court in the land, for having ruled in favor of freeing Can Atalay, a human rights activist jailed in the Gezi case, after he was elected to parliament from a left-wing opposition party in the May elections. Under Turkish law, members of parliament are immune to prosecution and Atalay’s continued detention is deemed unlawful under Article 14 of the Turkish constitution.

Erdogan waded into the debate, calling the Constitutional Court’s ruling “a mistake."

In a September interview with PBS’ “Newshour,” Erdogan called Kavala the “financier” of the Gezi protests and Demirtas “a terrorist who caused the death of more than 200 people.” He said that the original ruling was rightfully upheld. When anchor Amna Nawaz reminded him that the European Court of Human Rights disagreed with his assessment, Erdogan erupted. “You're not going to interrupt me. And respect me. And you are going to respect the judgment of the judiciary as well?” Erdogan fumed. Kavala and Demirtas deny all the charges.

'Dark corridors'

Coming only days before a conference on minority rights in Turkey to be hosted by the Hrant Dink Foundation on Nov. 17, Samast’s release has touched a raw nerve among Armenians worldwide.

Khatchig Mouradian is a professor at Columbia University in New York who was written extensively on the Armenian genocide. He told Al-Monitor, “Sunlight, they say, is the best disinfectant. When Ogun Samast walks free and Osman Kavala remains in prison in two cases that have for years been under global spotlight, one can’t even begin to imagine what happens in the darker corridors of Turkey’s justice system.”

Mouradian contended that Samast’s release is further proof of Ankara’s cavalier approach to purported normalization with neighboring Armenia, with which it has yet to establish diplomatic relations or open its land borders.

In 2020, Turkey played a pivotal role in helping Azerbaijan wrest back territories occupied by Armenia in a previous war and sat on its hands in September as Azerbaijan effectively expelled in less than two weeks nearly the entire Armenian population — more than 100,000 people — of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, which was until then majority Armenian but formally part of Azerbaijan.

“Over the past three years, Ankara has not displayed a shred of concern for how its words and deeds may impact normalization. Why should it care now? It believes Yerevan has no choice but to stay the course,” Mouradian said.

The case of Gultan Kisanak, the former co-mayor of Diyarbakir who was ousted by the government and jailed in 2016 for her alleged role in the Kobani riots, among other supposed crimes, is one such travesty. She remains behind bars even though under Turkey’s penal code defendants who have not been convicted can only be held for a maximum of seven years. “This is, in essence, an automatic violation of my right to a fair trial. You are aware of this,” she told the presiding judge in a Nov. 12 hearing.  

Borrow books or else

Such violations abound but are rarely noticed as most victims are not in the public eye. Take Mustafa Okcul, who was jailed and sentenced to death in 1993 for membership in the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) at the height of the rebels’ insurgency. His sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in 1999 when Turkey scrapped the death penalty in line with its now moribund efforts to join the European Union. Okcul was due to be freed on good conduct six months ago. However, prosecutors deemed that he had not “borrowed enough books from the prison library” and was therefore not fit to “integrate with society.”

Bunyamin Seker, president of the Free Lawyers’ Association, an advocacy group based in Diyarbakir, is dealing with Okcul’s case along with a host of similar ones. He said that the prison set a cap on the number of books inmates are allowed to borrow and that Okcul’s family would send him books on a regular basis. “The claims are laughable,” Seker noted. “Mustafa had fulfilled all the criteria for good conduct. He had not engaged in any violence when he was arrested.”

From his private meetings with Turkish officials, Seker said he had concluded that “the real reason” Okcul was not being freed was because he refused to denounce the PKK and express contrition. Another of his clients, a university student who was jailed for six years for taking part in an anti-government demonstration, saw her release put off by a year. Authorities cited Emine Erol’s refusal to meet with a prison psychiatrist for the delay. She was finally released two weeks ago.

“The system is riddled with double standards,” Seker told Al-Monitor. “Some are more equal than others before the law.”



Music: Planting Apricot Stones: Armenia-Azerbaijan Relations Through the Lens of Eurovision

Brown Political Review
Nov 16 2023

Nestled within the religious, political, and cultural crossroads of the Caucasus mountains, Armenia and Azerbaijan appear to be eternally locked in a heated ethnic struggle. More than a century ago, deep-seated tensions within the region manifested themselves in the brutal Armenian genocide, in which as many as 1.2 million ethnic Armenians living in present-day eastern Türkiye were murdered by the Young Turks-controlled government in the fading Ottoman Empire. Türkiye and Azerbaijan still refuse to recognize the events as a genocide.

Today, those same tensions are woefully unresolved, flaring up most significantly in Nagorno-Karabakh. The region, situated in what is internationally recognized as southwest Azerbaijan, has historically been inhabited mainly by ethnic Armenians and was long governed by the Armenia-backed breakaway Republic of Artsakh. In the past, Russia has played an active role in keeping the peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, but with the war in Ukraine, its attention has turned elsewhere. Encouraged by Russia’s relative absence, the Turkish-backed Azerbaijani military invaded Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Ultimately, Azerbaijan regained control of the region and forced the breakaway government to dissolve. Over 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled to Armenia, fearing a renewed genocide.

The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is only the most recent episode in a conflict that has raged since Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the Soviet Union in 1922. In recent decades, both countries have begun to court broader international political backing through what is perhaps an unlikely medium: the Eurovision Song Contest. Their approaches have differed, certainly—Azerbaijan has turned to chicanery—but the art presented in the contest invariably reveals the absurdity at the center of the conflict.

Held annually since 1956, Eurovision is a unique and widely-viewed international spectacle. Representative artists from roughly 40 (mostly) European countries present a song every year as up to 200 million viewers watch, vote on, and revel in 25 to 26 final performances, ultimately crowning one winner. The final scores are tabulated through a combination of jury and public votes from each country, with the winning nation traditionally hosting the contest the following year. Each country’s entry is managed by their public broadcaster, which in many countries creates a direct connection between Eurovision and the national government. 

For both Armenia and Azerbaijan, having debuted at the contest in 2006 and 2008 respectively, Eurovision provides a valuable staging ground for the countries to gain soft power. With their entries, they can appeal to the consciences of tens of millions of voting Europeans, with the broader goal of tying the earned international sympathy to more favorable foreign relations.

For Armenia, this appeal is contained in the art itself. The messaging is often unmistakably political despite Eurovision’s ban on political entries. For example, Armenia’s 2010 entry, Eva Rivas’ “Apricot Stone,” is a poignant message to the Armenian diaspora. The lyrics describe a forlorn little girl being given apricots by her mother, endowed with the responsibility to plant the leftover seeds and rear her own apricots—a clear allusion to homeland, family, and legacy. The lyrics even indirectly invoke the conflict with Azerbaijan, as Rivas triumphantly sings, “Now I’m not afraid of violent winds. They may blow, they can’t win.” The impact of this appeal to the diaspora cannot be overstated, as figures such as Kim Kardashian, a fourth-generation Armenian American, front lobbying campaigns demanding US assistance to Armenia.

Armenia’s 2015 and 2018 entries both indirectly invoke the Armenian genocide. The former features Armenians from five continents demanding “don’t deny” (alluding to Azerbaijan and Türkiye’s refusal to recognize the genocide), while the latter employs the aforementioned “wind” imagery. The lyrics of its 2022 entry, “Snap” by Rosa Linn, were not overtly political, and the song enjoyed considerable commercial success after Eurovision. However, while performing at the iHeartRadio Music Festival, Rosa Linn sported a jacket with the words “Stop the blockade” etched across her back (in reference to Azerbaijan’s blockade of humanitarian support to Nagorno-Karabakh) and “#Artsakh” along the sleeve. In a global news environment where Armenia is usually pushed aside, Eurovision provides the country with unique exposure. It’s a place where, for at least three minutes, Armenian culture, music, talent, and, subliminally, political interests, are in the spotlight.

Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has pursued Eurovision success by outsourcing talent and refusing to acknowledge its bordering enemy wherever possible. The country frequently employs Swedish, Dutch, and British songwriters to compose its entries, including the 2011 winning number, “Running Scared.” Its Eurovision singers generally have pretty, congenial faces, impressive social media followings, and a modern “pop star” look—all of which lend themselves to de facto cultural ambassadorship. 2021’s Efendi is a prime example, winning fans on stage with a bumping Dutch-produced dance track, then taking to social media with the message “Stop Armenian terror” and a photoshoot in recently conquered Karabakh territory. The mere 43 viewers in Azerbaijan who dared to vote for Armenia in 2009 were brought in for questioning as a “matter of national security,” and the country’s national broadcaster blatantly refused to show Armenia’s 2021 Junior Eurovision winning performance.

They have also sought to corrupt the integrity of the competition: In 2013, Lithuanian journalists unearthed alleged clandestine Azerbaijani efforts to buy votes from local students in Vilnius. The journalists did so by going undercover, secretly filming a meeting with a Russian-speaking operative, Sergei, in which they feigned the intention of voting for Azerbaijan in exchange for payment. The footage suggested that similar vote buying schemes were simultaneously occurring in 15 different countries, many of which did end up giving the vaunted maximum of 12 points to the Azerbaijani Eurovision entry. However, no connection between the operatives and the Azerbaijani broadcaster has been proven. Sergei also made the broad claim that “all countries who want to win do it” in reference to his vote buying plot—a concerning statement considering Azerbaijan’s victory just two years earlier. These murky details are further compounded by the lack of detailed public voting results from 2013 and Azerbaijan’s comparatively minimal success following a presumed crackdown by the Eurovision’s governing body after the alleged scandal. Similarly, in 2022, Azerbaijan was one of six countries caught participating in a jury vote corruption scheme in the semi-final.

Ironically, a controversy surrounding Armenia’s 2009 entry, “Jan-Jan,” shows that the two neighbors, sworn political enemies, are perhaps more alike than they would like to admit. The performers, Inga and Anush Arshakyan, were accused of appropriating traditional Azerbaijani song and dress, with one YouTube commenter alleging that the performers “came out wearing Azerbaijani clothes.” But their ornate braids, outfits fashioned from deep blue velvet, and swaying duduk, were not solely Armenian, or Azerbaijani, or even Turkish. Rather, they represented the broader Caucasus region. Nevertheless, confronted with the dazzling glee of “Jan-Jan,” reminiscent of the Azerbaijani local hit, “Nakhchivani,” many Azerbaijani people automatically assumed Armenian theft rather than cultural similarity. 

That reality is difficult for governments like Azerbaijan, who weaponize art and culture to stoke their own nationalist individualism, to process. Nationalist governments, particularly those with a defined ethnic “enemy,” often disseminate the idea of shared values, history, and legend coalescing around a single defined homeland. But ethnicity and culture are not and never have been that simple. Modern nation-states have ironed out ethnic boundaries through force, using language and religion to paint endemic inhabitants as genetic “others.” 

Erasure and suppression of language, tradition, and religion are grave issues, and the “Jan-Jan” case does not discredit the very real threat of cultural genocide in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. However, it does challenge the flawed notion at the center of ethnic nationalism: that one group is fundamentally different from another due to entirely disparate cultural and genetic histories.

To this effect, despite all of its utility in politically weaponizing culture, the Eurovision stage still leaves a resounding message of harmony. It shows viewers that inflexible nationalist and cultural divisions are in large part arbitrary. This is why the Azerbaijani government, whose political rhetoric depends heavily on reclaiming their ancestral homeland, felt so threatened by its own citizens recognizing and appreciating regional cultural similarities in 2009. It’s also central to what makes Eurovision so beautiful: Two bejeweled sisters joyously belting “everybody move your body” can threaten despotic ideology. It’s a truth perfectly encapsulated by the aforementioned Azerbaijani residents who voted for Armenia’s entry. Those 43 Azerbaijani voters, the threat of detainment looming over their heads, couldn’t help but reach across that unfordable border and rejoice in what, impossibly, is shared.

https://brownpoliticalreview.org/2023/11/planting-apricot-stones-armenia-azerbaijan-relations-through-the-lens-of-eurovision/

Armenia becomes 124th State Party to International Criminal Court

Jurist
Nov 16 2023

Armenia officially became the 124th State Party to the International Criminal Court (ICC) on Tuesday after Ambassador Mher Margaryan deposited Armenia’s accession documents in a ceremony held at the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, where Margaryan presented the instrument of ratification to the Director of the Treaty Section.

This ceremony is the conclusion of the accession process which began in 2022 when the government approved a law on Rome Statute ratification and a declaration, accepting the ICC’s retroactive jurisdiction before the Armenian Constitutional Court authorized the ratification. 

In 2003, Armenia implemented partial legislation to give the country jurisdiction over crimes punishable by the ICC under the Rome Statute. However, Progress towards ratification of the Rome Statute has faced obstacles. In 2004, the Armenian Constitutional Court ruled that the Rome Statute conflicted with the country’s national laws. The Armenian Constitution was subsequently changed in 2005 and later in 2015.

The move comes as the country and it population are facing multiple international disputes that may implicate the Rome Statute. Last month, JURIST spoke with international lawyer Sheila Paylan and Member of the UK House of Lords Baroness Caroline Cox about the current conflict and aggression by Azerbaijan in the self-declared independent republic of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh), as the region lowered its flag, opting to dissolve all state institutions following a months-long blockade by Azerbaijani forces that brought about an acute humanitarian crisis among its predominantly ethnic Armenian population. Paylan responded to Armenia’s accession telling JURIST:

By ratifying the Rome Statute of the ICC, Armenia has affirmed its sovereignty, demonstrated its shared values with democratic nations, and finally gained a viable avenue to seek criminal accountability for the heinous atrocities committed by Azerbaijanis on Armenian territory.

This move will also obligate Armenia, a former Soviet republic, to arrest Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, if he were to visit the country, due to the outstanding ICC arrest warrants against Putin. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov has warned Armenia that its actions in joining as a signatory of the Rome Statute would be seen as an “extremely hostile” act. 

The instrument of ratification will now be deposited with the UN Secretary-General, who serves as the custodian of the Rome Statute.

Outcry in Turkey over released convicted murderer of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink

MEDYA News
Nov 16 2023

Ogün Samast, the convicted murderer of Hrant Dink, a renowned Armenian journalist and editor-in-chief of the newspaper Agos, was released on Wednesday, sparking a wave of condemnation and intense debate within the Turkish political sphere.

Samast assassinated Dink in a gun attack in front of the Agos office in Şişli, Istanbul, on 19 January 2007, and was released from Bolu F Type Prison under conditional release terms. A minor at the time of the crime, Samast served 16 years and 10 months, sentenced with “premeditated murder” and “possession of an unlicensed firearm”.

The Hrant Dink support group, known as ‘Hrant’ın Arkadaşları’, condemned the release, saying, “While the Hrant Dink murder remains unsolved, many of our friends, human rights defenders, journalists, and politicians are unjustly and unlawfully held in prisons, the murderer of Hrant Dink, Ogün Samast, has been released… There is no justice! No conscience! No integrity!”

Samast’s was reportedly released due to ‘good behaviour’. This decision has been met with strong criticism from various political leaders, who question the justification of releasing someone convicted of such a heinous crime.

Main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Chairman Özgür Özel expressed disbelief and dismay at the release, highlighting the premeditated nature of the murder and its significant impact on the Armenian community in Turkey. He criticised the notion of ‘good behaviour’ in the context of such a brutal act.

Further political reactions include Parliament Deputy Speaker Sırrı Süreyya Önder of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (HEDEP), who paid respects to Dink’s memory, and Gökhan Günaydın, Deputy Group Chairman of the CHP, who emphasised Dink’s role in bridging the Armenian-Turkish divide. Günaydın also raised concerns about the justice system, questioning the rationale behind Samast’s release while many prisoners of conscience remain incarcerated.

HEDEP Group Deputy Chairwoman Meral Danış Beştaş described the release as a “grave news”, contrasting it with the ongoing imprisonment of democrats and freedom of _expression_ advocates. Felicity Party Deputy Group Chairman İsa Mesih Şahin echoed these sentiments, criticising the paradox of releasing a convicted murderer while non-violent offenders remain jailed.

The release of Samast has reopened discussions on judicial reform and the influence of politics in legal proceedings, highlighting concerns over the treatment of criminals versus political prisoners in Turkey.

 

Hrant Dink’s assassination and subsequent legal proceedings

Dink was assassinated on 19 January 2007 by 17-year old Ogün Samast. Samast was arrested in Samsun the following day and incarcerated.

The court filed a criminal complaint against Samast and others for membership of the Fethullah Gülen Organisation (FETÖ), the group accused of plotting the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, linking the murder to their objectives.

Several individuals, including journalist Ercan Gün and former soldier Muharrem Demirkale, received varying prison sentences for related crimes. Cases against some former police chiefs were dismissed due to the statute of limitations.

The case involved 130 hearings, with the prosecution presenting its final opinion in December 2020. The prosecutor requested various outcomes for the defendants, including acquittals and punishments. Some defendants were arrested for prior knowledge of the murder, and others denied connections with FETÖ.

Following Dink’s assassination, the suspect was quickly identified from security footage. Controversy arose when images of Samast with police officers were broadcast, raising questions about official involvement in the murder.

At the funeral, Hrant Dink’s wife, Rakel Dink, said, “No matter their age, 17 or 27, no matter who the murderer is, I know they were once babies. Nothing can be done, my brothers, without questioning the darkness that turns a baby into a murderer.”

Hrant Dink’s family’s statement on court judgement

Dink’s family expressed strong dissatisfaction with the court’s judgment on his murder, stating it was “far from the truth”. They highlighted that the judgment failed to address the deeper state mechanisms and the broader context of events leading to Dink’s assassination.

Before his assassination, Dink had spoken about being targeted by deep state operations, as recalled by his family. He had written about being chosen as a target and mentioned this in his last speeches, indicating a systematic campaign against him.

The family criticised the investigation for neglecting key aspects and individuals mentioned by Dink, and for evidence spoliation and misdirection. They argued that the trial did not adequately address these issues, leading to a judgment that appears to punish the exposure of a crime rather than the crime itself.

The family pointed out the alleged connection between Dink’s murder and the FETÖ organisation, responsible for the 15 July 2016 coup attempt. They lamented that a timely and effective investigation into Dink’s murder could have potentially prevented the loss of many lives in subsequent years.

Questioning the integrity of the judiciary, the family suggested that the current environment is conducive to injustice and similar to the climate when Dink was targeted. They expressed concern about ongoing racism and the potential for future crimes if the deep state mechanism is not thoroughly investigated and dismantled.

Dink’s family continue to emphasise an urgent need for transparency, democracy and legal reform. They advocate for societal confrontation with the crime, the criminals’ confrontation with their actions, and institutional accountability.

https://medyanews.net/outcry-in-turkey-over-released-convicted-murderer-of-armenian-journalist-hrant-dink/

East Jerusalem: Israeli settlers seek to take over Armenian Quarter by force

Nov 16 2023
Armed settlers, backed by Israeli security forces, attempt to occupy almost 25 percent of Armenian Quarter in 'existential threat' to centuries-old community
By Elis Gjevori

A convoy of Israeli settlers' cars and motorcycles entered the Armenian Quarter in occupied East Jerusalem on Wednesday, looking to usurp the Armenian-held area, the community has said in a statement. 

The Movement for the Protection and Preservation of the Armenian Quarter, in a post on Instagram, warned that tensions were high and that Israeli police had “without probable cause” arrested three Armenians, including a minor, while backing Israeli settlers. 

“Instead of removing the trespassers, the Israeli police permitted a few settlers to continue their presence intended to possess the Armenian property,” said the community in a statement. 

With Israel’s war on Gaza taking much of the world's attention, Israeli settlers in the occupied territories, including the Old City in East Jerusalem, have increasingly used the distraction to press illegal land claims.

The movement said that the attempt by Israeli settlers to overrun the “Armenian Gardens” – known as the “Cows' Garden” in the Old City of Jerusalem, was a “malicious attempt to change facts on the ground”.

“We are fighting now for the integrity of the Armenian and Christian quarters,” said Hagop Djernazian, a co-founder of the movement to save the Armenian quarter, and member of the Jerusalemite Armenian Community. 

The dispute started after the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem signed a murky and secretive deal with a company named Zana Capital, leasing the historical Armenian gardens, to build a luxury hotel, he explained.

'We may face an existential threat, not only to the Armenian presence in Jerusalem, but also to the Christian'

- Hagop Djernazian, activist

“Unfortunately this deal includes manipulations and fraud,” said Djernazian, speaking to Middle East Eye. 

The community now faces an existential threat from a deal that would see some 25 percent of the Armenian quarter sold on a 99-year lease to Israeli settler communities looking to purportedly build a luxury development. 

The Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem announced on 26 October that a letter was sent to the companies managing the development that the deal would be cancelled. 

Though signed in 2021, the deal became public in 2023, when one of the Israeli businesses sought to take ownership, sparking protests from the Armenian community. 

“Since 26 October, the so-called Zana Company, which turns out was backed by settlers and Ateret Cohanim, a settler organisation trying to change the demographic makeup of the Old City into a Jewish majority, are trying to provoke and to take over parts of the land by force,” said Djernazian. 

Israeli settlers had attempted to intimidate the community and the movement to save the Armenian Quarter by, amongst other things, bringing bulldozers and trucks to demolish walls and the land, said Djernazian. 

“They brought in armed settlers two weeks ago to take over the land by force using armed settlers and attack dogs,” he added. 

“Yesterday and today the so-called company brought a security company so they can take over the land by force with the support and cooperation of the Israeli police.”

The far-right Israeli government, headed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which is also comprised of settlers, has created an even more permissive climate for such land grabs. 

A group of Armenians in cooperation with the Patriarchate, protested in the Armenian Quarter to stop illegal construction on their land (Movement to Protect Armenian Quarter)

“Authorities are not doing anything to save and help the Armenian community,” said Djernazian, adding that “they are doing the opposite of saving the Armenian community. They are pressuring us.”

Djernazian said that they now believe Israeli settlers are behind the deal whereby the land was initially sold to an Australian businessman. 

“These Israeli settlers are backed by the Israeli government, and ministers in the Israeli government are pressuring the community and putting the community in a great existential threat,” added Djernazian. 

The future of the Armenian community and more broadly that of the wider Christian community in the Old City now hangs in the balance. 

“If we succeed in this struggle to protect the integrity of the Armenian Quarter to protect our lands, we can continue and live in Jerusalem as we did since the fourth century by encouraging our youth to stay here,” said Djernazian. 

“But, unfortunately, if we do not succeed to cancel the deal officially, we may face an existential threat, not only to the Armenian presence in Jerusalem, but also to the Christian presence, because this deal puts the Armenian and Christian quarters in great danger,” added Djernazian.

“Christians should unite and join forces with the Armenians in order to protect the status quo and the mosaic of the holy city of Jerusalem and also for us to have a future in this city,” he added.

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israeli-settlers-jerusalem-take-over-armenian-quarter-force

Armenia has political will to normalize relations with Azerbaijan based on Granada principles, says foreign minister

 20:17,

YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 15, ARMENPRESS. On November 15, in Brussels Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan delivered remarks at the 15th annual Assembly of Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, the foreign ministry said in a statement.

The full speech is presented below.

“Dear colleagues, 

This is an honor to address the participants of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum Annual Assembly. I do believe that today, among like-minded partners, we can openly discuss and critically assess the developments both in each Eastern partner state, and on regional and European levels. 

 So, for triggering further discussion let me put forward two questions, reflection on which might be helpful today.

  1. What was and what is the Eastern partnership about?
  2. What is the role of civil societies in changing the world and the Eastern partnership, in particular?

Back in 2009, when EaP was being launched, it was aimed to strengthen the ties of the partners with the EU and EU Member states based on common values, deepen economic and political cooperation and support reform agenda. If we try to summarize it in one sentence – EaP was launched being about democracy and today it remains about democracy.

I can proudly state that my country remains committed to democracy and democratic values. During the recent years despite the whole challenges that we have been facing – COVID 19 pandemic, war of 2020, military attacks and aggressions against the sovereign territory of Armenia, influx of more than 100 thousand refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh as a result of ethnic cleansing, the democratization process and implementation of ambitious reform agenda did not stop in Armenia for a single moment. The Government of Armenia continues to remain committed to the endeavors of the 2018 democratic, non-violent Velvet revolution.

And it is really difficult. It is difficult to sustain democracy if there is no conducive environment. The collapse of the European security architecture, rise of authoritarianism in the world, massive violations of the UN Charter on the one hand and the democratic values on the other, make it necessary to seriously rethink how the EU should position itself. And this requires the EU not only strengthening its links with Eastern Partners, but also the EU encouraging the cooperation among Eastern Partners. 

In this context, I want to commend the European Commission’s decision to recommend the European Council to open accession talks with Moldova and Ukraine and to grant candidate status to Georgia. This decision is welcomed not only by the Government of Armenia, but also people of Armenia, who also have European aspirations. During the last several years we have had an impressive record of joint work to bring Armenia and the EU closer. We are cooperating on implementation of the reform agenda, on realization of flagship initiatives of 2.6 billion euros, and in many other fields. Recently we launched the high-level Armenia-EU Political and Security Dialogue, the second round of which is taking place today in Brussels. I should also commend the decision of the EU to deploy a monitoring mission along the state border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, the EU is an important partner of Armenia’s peace agenda in assisting our efforts in bringing peace and stability in the South Caucasus. The Government of Armenia has political will to normalize relations with another Eastern Partner – Azerbaijan, and we are ready to move forward to that end on the basis of the principles adopted in Granada by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia, President Michel of the European Council, President Macron of France and Chancellor Scholz of Germany. 

Furthermore, as we believe that peace and stability in the Eastern neighborhood much depends on economic cooperation of the Partners, Armenia has recently introduced the project of the “Crossroads of peace”, as a token of our commitments to the establishment of peace and cooperation in the region and beyond. Armenia is also interested in joining the Black Sea Electricity Cable project, and we hope that the European Union will support this aspiration using its toolbox. 

Ladies and gentlemen, 

Coming to my second question on the role of civil societies, I should confess that no government in the world is able to implement a development agenda nor to combat the challenges alone without you. The times that we are living through are not easy at all, and I definitely know that the issues which I was talking about will not be addressed without your participation, without your criticism but also your support.

And I thank you. 

And this is not the traditional “thank you” that we usually say at the end of our statements, I really want to thank you for the tremendous job that you are doing for Eastern Partnership’s common cause, for our values, for democracy, for peace.”




Armenpress: Armenia-EU: joint press release on the Second Political and Security Dialogue

 21:57,

YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 15, ARMENPRESS. The second high-level Armenia-EU Political and Security Dialogue took place on Wednesday in Brussels. The parties have issued a joint press release, the foreign ministry said.

''Building upon the inaugural meeting of the dialogue held in Yerevan this January, the meeting confirmed mutual interest of Armenia and the EU to further enhance political dialogue and cooperation in the areas of foreign, security and defence policy. The EU reiterated its unequivocal support to the sovereignty, territorial integrity (29.800 km2) and inviolability of borders of Armenia and welcomed Armenia’s readiness for closer cooperation with the European Union.

During the meeting, the parties touched upon the present challenges to the European security architecture. In this regard, the unacceptability of the use, or the threat of use of force, was strongly highlighted. 

The parties stressed the absolute necessity of establishing durable peace and stability in the South Caucasus. In this regard the EU expressed support to the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan based on the principles of mutual recognition of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders based on the 1991 Almaty Declaration, border delimitation based on relevant USSR General Staff maps that have been provided to the sides, and the unblocking of regional communications based on respect for the sovereignty and jurisdiction of either country, on the basis of reciprocity and equality. Armenia confirmed its willingness to attend leaders’ meeting in Brussels facilitated by President of the European Council Charles Michel. The EU welcomed Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” project concept, as an _expression_ of commitment of the Government of Armenia to the establishment of peace and cooperation in the region and beyond.

Armenia highly appreciated the fast deployment of the EU civilian CSDP mission (EU Mission in Armenia – EUMA) along the internationally recognised border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the support rendered by the EU Member States to it. The Armenian side also welcomed the EU’s readiness to involve third countries in the Mission. The parties discussed the possibility of extension of the Mission, as well as non-lethal support to Armenia through the European Peace Facility. The support to Armenia's participation in regional projects such as the Black Sea Underwater Electricity and Internet Cables was reaffirmed. 

The parties also touched upon the issues of mass displacement of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, reaffirming previously stated positions that the rights and security of the Karabakh Armenians including right to return should be ensured. 

With regard to the Armenia-Türkiye full normalisation process, both parties expressed hope that agreements reached so far, in particular the opening of land border for the third country citizens and diplomatic passports holders, will be implemented in the earliest possible timeframe. 

The participants of the Dialogue also discussed the state of relations with countries in the region, wider geopolitical developments, as well as issues relating to hybrid threats and other security challenges.

The next Armenia-EU Political and Security Dialogue will take place in Yerevan in 2024.

The high-level Political and Security Dialogue was co-chaired by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia Vahan Kostanyan and Deputy Secretary General/Political Director of the European External Action Service Enrique Mora,'' reads the statement.

Between the “Crossroads of Peace” and the Union State

Following Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 Artsakh War, and the Armenian government’s concessions under the sham banner of “democracy,” came the “peace” narrative – peace at any cost, even if it meant recognizing Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan and abandoning its population to ethnic cleansing, which has been swiftly followed by the willingness to give away the enclaves (eight villages demanded by Azerbaijan) and the Syunik province.

Prime Minister Pashinyan presents the “Crossroads of Peace” project at the Tbilisi International Forum in October (Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia)

This has now been elevated to new heights by the “crossroads of peace,” a plan for regional interconnectivity that was introduced by the European Union and mimicked by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan as if it is the genius invention of his administration. While presenting the project at an international conference in Tbilisi on October 26, PM Pashinyan said it would enhance communication between Armenia, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Russia through infrastructure development.

But what does it really mean? 

The current government has admitted that Azerbaijan’s appetite for more territory was not satisfied by the fall of Artsakh, and a peace agreement might not end Azerbaijani aggression towards Armenia. It also says that Armenia has no security guarantor, as Russia has stopped its role. Instead of offering a substantial policy to fill the security vacuum, Armenia feels it has no choice but to offer the “crossroads of peace” for the sake of the economic wellbeing of the region, which is supposed to bring a hypothetical peace.

Instead, the “crossroads of peace” is an extension of appeasement, a foreign policy of pacifying an aggrieved country through negotiation in order to prevent war. It compels Armenia to submit and concede, to become useful to aggressive neighbors through realism.

The concept of regional connectivity through transit routes is not new, as it has been considered by previous administrations. However, it is unrealistic at this stage, as alternative trade routes already exist that bypass what is offered under the “crossroads of peace” plan. Rather, the project would further benefit Azerbaijan. Through soft power, Azerbaijan would control Syunik and the enclaves and disrupt other infrastructure. The peace agreement that PM Pashinyan is so keen to carry out, even though he does not have the legitimacy to do so, is a pretense for capitulation that would bring further losses and see the creation of Azerbaijani settlements on Armenian territory.

To participate in this project and create a route connecting Armenia and Turkey, the latter would demand that Armenia end claims to historic lands, stop pursuing Armenian Genocide recognition and change the wording of Armenia’s constitution. This is actively being discussed in the ruling Civil Contract party circles and has been mentioned a few times by the Prime Minister. All nationalist, “revanchist” elements of society would be banished, followed by a change in the education system to implement internationalism and globalism as opposed to national values. Armenia would become a society void of any identity, where nationality does not matter and only money and commercial benefits are prioritized.

One must fight for sovereignty, independence and freedom, as was the case during the world wars, after the Armenian Genocide and during the 1990s. A country must build an army that is not afraid to die for liberty and form alliances with powers that can guarantee the strengthening of military capacities.

But is the concept of “peace” realistic in an environment where Armenia is surrounded by aggressive, fascist states that only want to see Armenia’s demise? In such an environment, Armenia could be wiped off the map, as its survival would not be tolerated. 

Moreover, the “crossroads of peace” will not serve the independence and sovereignty of Armenian statehood. The operating license of Armenia would be handed over from Russia to Turkey and Azerbaijan. 

One must fight for sovereignty, independence and freedom, as was the case during the world wars, after the Armenian Genocide and during the 1990s. A country must build an army that is not afraid to die for liberty and form alliances with powers that can guarantee the strengthening of military capacities.

Pashinyan is not capable of creating a sovereign state or strengthening the army. In fact, he has done the opposite and has become a symbol of defeat and capitulation. The bar has been lowered to the point that no red lines remain. 

It has been three years since the end of the 2020 war, and no alternative narrative has been put forward to create an army and foreign policy that will strengthen Armenian statehood. Instead, a defeatist narrative has penetrated the opposition mindset as well. . 

We have heard endless messages about how Armenia is facing an existential danger. However, for three wasted years, Armenia has waited for Russia to come to its rescue while it has repeatedly betrayed Artsakh. We must accept that Russian interests have changed, and while it no longer sees Armenia as a useful slave, it has forged deep alliances with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Russia greenlit the war in 2020, the blockade and the genocide carried out by Azerbaijan in Artsakh. 

Yet, the opposition still has not accepted this reality. It does not openly criticize Russia and still believes that negotiation can win Russia over. The opposition has made several mistakes:

  1. It never openly rejected the November 9, 2020 ceasefire agreement.
  2. It trusted Russia’s promises that it would come to power in the near future, made periodically over the last three years, which gave the opposition a false hope and only cemented Pashinyan’s power.
  3. During the blockade, it never expressed dissatisfaction towards the peacekeepers’ inability to keep the Berdzor (Lachin) Corridor unobstructed and avoid the massacres of September 19. It never demanded an international peacekeeping presence.
  4. To this day, it has not demanded answers from Russia regarding why it assisted the genocide and forced displacement of Artsakh’s Armenian population. Artsakh’s Armenians, unlike Pashinyan’s Armenia, stayed loyal to Russia until the end. They entrusted Russians with their safety and returned to Artsakh after the 2020 war, where large billboards were raised featuring Putin’s images.
  5. It did not demand to know why the security and dignity of Artsakh’s Armenians were not protected. Rather, they were subjected to humiliation by the abduction of civilians at Azerbaijan’s checkpoint along the Berdzor Corridor and of Artsakh officials from Stepanakert.

The longevity of statehood is ensured by creating policies and offering solutions to survive in a complex geopolitical environment and evolving world order. It is not ensured by repeating that we are in crisis.

Instead, some of the opposition members have come up with the defeatist solution of joining  the union state with Russia. The so-called nationalists prefer to forsake sovereignty and join a union that is not accepted by the world for the sake of saving what we have left.

Some of the opposition is prepared to offer a shrunken country to Russia rather than keeping the current territories intact. It provides parallels to 1920, when Armenia became Sovietized to deter more bloodshed. However, Russia is not the same as it was then. The Soviet Union and the Cold War no longer exist. Russia is weak, rejected by the world, isolated and in a deep strategic cooperation with Turkey and Azerbaijan. One cannot trust the security guarantees that Russia offers but is incapable of or willing to implement.

Our current political elite has presented two scenarios: to submit to Azerbaijan, concede to their demands and end up with a Yerevan city-state with no national identity, or join the union state. Both are equally flawed and equally dangerous for the survival of Armenian statehood. 

What are some alternatives?

Although we have lost precious time and territories with the loss of Artsakh and the war, national values can be reinvigorated by contributing our global nation’s collective resources to create the ideal state. The time to act is now. We cannot wait until the traitorous “peace” agreement is signed. We did not resist when Berdzor was handed over without a fight, which was followed by the blockade and depopulation of Artsakh. We must organize to stop the shrinking of our land bit by bit and uphold our territorial integrity. We must rebuild the army and form alliances that will strengthen our security. We must reach a consensus for a national agenda that will protect our statehood and reject the two remedies that do not serve national interests. All the concerned and caring groups who want to see an independent state must unite to determine what we want as a nation.

Armenians made the impossible, possible after the Armenian Genocide, when we had no state institutions and no external help. We achieved this once again in the 1990s, when we created an independent state based on the ideology of Artsakh’s independence, with no army or assistance. History demonstrates that when Armenians unite in times of adverse danger, they create victorious resistance movements.

This is not an easy task. It requires leadership with the right mindset, dedication, sacrifice, conviction and determination to succeed. If we do not fight for our survival, no one else will do it for us. We will only gain our integrity and respect from the international community when we stand for our just cause. If we don’t, we deserve to be stateless. After all, romanticism brought us victories, not realism.

Annette Moskofian was born in Tehran and grew up in London. She has a masters in international relations and democratic politics. Annette is the chair of the Armenian National Committee of the United Kingdom.


French weapons arrive in Armenia through Georgia

French President Emmauel Macron and Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan meet in Paris before the transfer of weapons (Photo: RA Office of the Prime Minister)

YEREVAN—France’s government has initiated the dispatch of weapons to Armenia, setting in motion terms set forth in French-Armenian cooperation agreements inked last month. 

Footage aired recently showcased the unloading of several French-manufactured Bastion versatile armored vehicles and parts of the ARQUUS’ brand, specifically designed for the Bastion, at Georgia’s Poti port along the Black Sea coast. The shipment reportedly included over 21 Bastion vehicles out of the 24 allocated by the French military. These vehicles and corresponding components are slated to journey from Poti to the Georgia-Armenia border for transfer to the Armenian side. 

France had initially intended to supply the Bastion armored personnel carriers to Ukraine but was rejected by Kiev, as reported by Ouest France. The 12.5-ton vehicles were turned down by Ukrainian authorities, who determined that they would provide inadequate protection against artillery and anti-tank missiles. La Tribune had previously disclosed France’s plans to provide Kiev with 20 Bastion vehicles in October 2022.

When asked about the reports and images circulating on Telegram channels regarding France’s delivery of military equipment to Armenia, spokesperson of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) of Armenia Aram Torosyan refrained from providing further details beyond the official messages and statements on cooperation in the defense sector between Armenia and France stating, “We cannot disclose any additional information at this time.” 

This move by the French military follows the signing of agreements aimed at “expanding bilateral cooperation” last month. French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna had previously announced Paris’s commitment to forthcoming contracts for supplying military equipment to Yerevan. The contracts were formally signed on October 23 in Paris, where Armenia’s Defense Minister Suren Papikyan and his French counterpart Sébastien Lecornu were signatories.

Lecornu emphasized that along with the arms delivery, France would provide training for Armenian officers on operating the military equipment and support ongoing reforms within the Armenian armed forces. He underscored the defensive nature of the weaponry, stating it was intended to bolster Armenia’s self-defense capabilities and protect its population.

France also plans to sell Mistral short-range surface-to-air missiles and three radar systems to Armenia. Reports suggest that around 50 units of VAB MK3 medium-weight combat-proven armored vehicles might also be part of the current agreements.

Georgian authorities confirmed that France dispatched ACMAT Bastion armored personnel carriers to Armenia via the Port of Poti, which was also verified by APM Terminals Poti to RFE/RL’s Georgian service. 

Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Ayhan Hajizadeh strongly criticized France’s supply of armored vehicles to Armenia. He expressed concern that this equipment transfer would bolster Armenia’s military strength.

Hajizadeh rebuked France for undermining efforts toward regional normalization based on “mutual respect for sovereignty and borders,” stating that the weapons dispatch would exacerbate regional tensions. He urged both Armenia and France to halt regional militarization, advocating for peace and cooperation as the sole viable path forward. Furthermore, he called on the international community to refrain from arming Armenia, claiming such actions impede peace and prosperity in the region. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan continues to arm itself with Israeli weapons. 

When asked about the transfer of French armored vehicles to Armenia through Georgia, Georgian Foreign Minister Ilia Darchiashvili stated, “Every nation retains the right to maintain defense forces and acquire conventional weaponry allowed by international agreements.” Darchiashvili affirmed that both countries should equally access Georgia’s transit function, noting that baseless insinuations were unwarranted.

Furthermore, he reiterated Georgia’s stance on non-participation in the “3+3” negotiation format. Darchiashvili highlighted Georgia’s positive bilateral relationships and cooperative ties with neighboring countries Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan, reinforcing Tbilisi’s commitment to maintaining amicable relations in such bilateral formats.

As the republic receives military equipment rejected by Ukraine from France, Armenia has also finalized an arms deal with India. Armenia reportedly plans to acquire anti-drone military equipment worth $41 million from India, specifically the Zen Anti-Drone System (ZADS), to bolster its air defense capabilities. Armenia has reportedly signed the contract involving supply, maintenance and training by Zen Technologies. This follows prior defense cooperation between India and Armenia following the 2020 Artsakh War, including arms deals totaling $400 million, which consist of Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRL), anti-tank missiles, rockets and ammunition. 

The European Union has also discussed providing non-lethal military aid to Armenia. During its November 13 meeting, the EU Foreign Affairs Council deliberated enhancing the EU monitoring mission by sending more observers and patrols to the Armenian border. The Council emphasized vigilance against destabilization in Armenia and warned Azerbaijan against compromising its territorial integrity. 

Armenia’s deepening relations with the West and India suggest a significant shift in regional geopolitics. These deals aim to diversify Armenia’s arms suppliers beyond its traditional reliance on Russia. There is speculation that Armenia could take further steps, such as withdrawing from Russian blocs like the CSTO and the EAEU. Russia, though equipped with economic leverage, has not taken action against Armenia’s pivot. 

Armenian authorities have repeatedly declined to participate in CSTO meetings. Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan has informed Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko that he will not be present at the upcoming CSTO Summit in Moscow on November 23, citing scheduling constraints. The Armenian government, via its Telegram channel, conveyed Pashinyan’s decision, hoping for understanding from CSTO partners. This follows Pashinyan’s absence from the CIS Summit in Bishkek last month. In a recent interview with The Wall Street Journal, Pashinyan voiced discontent over the fulfillment of alliance obligations by the CSTO and Russia, stressing Armenia’s need to diversify its national security relations.

Armenia’s pivot away from Russia is taking place amid uncertainty over the status of enclaves in Armenia and the potential threat of Azerbaijani aggression aimed at controlling a corridor through the Syunik province.

Hoory Minoyan was an active member of the Armenian community in Los Angeles until she moved to Armenia prior to the 44-day war. She graduated with a master's in International Affairs from Boston University, where she was also the recipient of the William R. Keylor Travel Grant. The research and interviews she conducted while in Armenia later became the foundation of her Master’s thesis, “Shaping Identity Through Conflict: The Armenian Experience.” Hoory continues to follow her passion for research and writing by contributing to the Armenian Weekly