Author: Emil Lazarian

Azeri TV reports more Armenian truce violations
ANS TV, Baku
12 Mar 05
[Presenter] The Armenian armed forces fired at Azerbaijani positions
in Tartar and Agdam Districts today.
[Passage omitted: The same districts were shelled yesterday as well]
[Correspondent] Quoting local residents, our reporter in the ANS
Karabakh bureau reports that the fire from machine guns and assault
rifles intensified between 0600 and 0700 [0200 and 0300 gmt] this
morning. No casualties are reported. From 1345 to 1415 [from 0945
to 1045 gmt] today, Tartar’s village of Qapanli came under fire from
SPK grenade launchers.
[Passage omitted: minor details]

billingsgazette.com
March 11, 2005
Last modified March 11, 2005 – 8:28 am
Tie to illegal degrees doesn’t block school licensing
By MEAD GRUVER
Associated Press
CHEYENNE — Wyoming licensed a Laramie-based online school last year even as
its owner helped direct a Hawaii online school that was offering illegal
medical degrees and was later shut down by a judge.
The owner of American Central University, Adalat Khan, was the Malaysian
regional director for American University of Hawaii, a fact that Wyoming
education officials concede they overlooked in the documents Khan provided
on his background.
As a result, nearly eight months into an ultimately successful lawsuit filed
by Hawaii’s Office of Consumer Protection to get American University of
Hawaii shut down, the Wyoming officials offered no objection when the
Wyoming Board of Education unanimously licensed American Central in April.
And American Central has been an Education Department headache ever since.
For not having even one qualified instructor in Wyoming, the agency prepared
last fall to pull the school’s license — only to have the process bog down
while state attorneys deliberate how to do that.
“The whole thing is in legal turmoil,” said Phil Kautz, the department’s
private school licensing manager, of American Central’s status now.
Khan and an employee of the school in Laramie, Marcia Edwards, declined to
comment.
Khan runs a school in Perak, Malaysia, called the Mina Management Institute.
For a time, American Central and American University of Hawaii were listed
next to each other on the Mina Management Institute Web site as
“distinguished partners” of the institute.
Hawaii’s Office of Consumer Protection sued American University of Hawaii in
August 2003, alleging it illegally offered medical degrees. A judge ordered
the school shut down in January.
Because Wyoming requires private schools to disclose whether any of their
officials has ever had a license suspended, revoked or not renewed,
Education Department officials say Khan may have been required to tell them
he worked for American University of Hawaii.
Khan was certainly required to open up about his work with American
University of Hawaii after the judge closed the school in January, according
to Fred Hansen, the department’s finance director and another of its private
school licensing officials.
“He should have disclosed,” he said.
But while Khan didn’t mention American University of Hawaii in the
department’s licensing forms, he did say he was the school’s Malaysian
regional director in the third sentence of a career summary he provided to
the department.
“I’m not sure we caught that sentence,” Hansen said.
Khan also provided a copy of his 1999 doctorate in business administration
from American University of Hawaii. Although Hansen knew American University
of Hawaii was unaccredited, that was not enough of a stain on Khan’s record
to prevent licensing.
The nonaccreditation may have seemed relatively insignificant compared with
the charges that the school offered illegal degrees.
The medical degree was offered through Yerevan State Medical University in
Armenia. In Hawaii, it’s illegal for a school that’s unrecognized by the
American Medical Association to offer medical degrees.
The lawsuit also accused American University of Hawaii of two other
violations of Hawaii law: offering law degrees despite no American Bar
Association accreditation and not maintaining enrollment of 25 students in
Hawaii.
District Judge Shackley F. Raffetto not only ordered American University of
Hawaii to quit doing business and shut down its Web site, he ordered it to
pay the state $500,000.
“It was such an easy case because the promotional materials and documents
spoke for themselves,” said Jeffrey Brunton, a Hawaii Office of Consumer
Protection attorney.
He said it was one of the larger schools of its kind in Hawaii, enrolling
and graduating thousands of students, mainly from other countries.
The school’s Web site shut down last month. It briefly resurfaced with an
address in Clinton, Miss., but as of Thursday wasn’t active.
Hansen said he would bring up Khan’s work with American University of Hawaii
at the Wyoming Board of Education’s next meeting, in Saratoga in May, and
said it could be grounds for pulling American Central’s license.
Department spokeswoman Deborah Hinckley said the department wants to require
accreditation for all Wyoming schools. Lawmakers in January briefly
discussed requiring accreditation but set the issue aside for study over the
interim.

Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
March 8, 2005 Tuesday
CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE: EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN BLACK SEA AREA
TESTIMONY-BY: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
AFFILIATION: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Statement of Ambassador John F. Tefft Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Eurasian Affairs Department of State
Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European
Affairs
March 8, 2005
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, Senators, I am delighted to be with you this afternoon
to discuss the current state of democracy in the Black Sea region and
the prospects for further democratic evolution there. While we
address aspects of this important issue in one way or another
literally every day at the State Department, occasions for reflecting
comprehensively on the region in its entirety are rare. So I
especially value the chance to share my thoughts with you today on
where we are with U.S. policy towards the countries of the region and
where we are headed. The topic is certainly timely, with this past
Sunday’s parliamentary elections in Moldova, and the memory of
Ukraine’s dramatic presidential contest still fresh.
Overview The nine nations of the Black Sea region – Romania,
Bulgaria, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Russia – are diverse and hard to characterize as a group.
Geographical proximity and overlapping histories have created rivalry
and friction as well as cooperation and alliance; centrifugal forces
impelling countries outward compete with a strong pull towards
greater regional integration. U.S. policy by necessity takes the
specific characteristics of each country and its unique geopolitical
situation into account and deals with each accordingly. There are
some broad commonalities: Black Sea states are all members of the
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and either
members of NATO or NATO’s Partnership for Peace. They belong,
together with Greece, Albania, and Serbia-Montenegro, to the
Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Incidentally,
we are now considering, in consultation with BSEC members, the
possibility of U.S. participation as an observer at the BSEC. Energy
transport is one of the strongest links among the Black Sea nations.
Energy pipelines; existing, (Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Blue
Stream, Odesa-Brody), under construction, (Baku- Tblisi-Ceyhan) and
planned (multiple Bosphorus bypass plans) crisscross the region and
create real opportunities for cooperation and the development of a
regional dialogue. Coordination between energy exporting states and
transit nations is needed to solve Bosphorus bottlenecks and develop
efficient solutions to ensure that energy supplies reach the world
market.
The United States has consistently worked towards this goal through
encouragement of multiple pipelines and export routes. But with a
closer look, the similarities among these countries start to break
down: They vary in size from huge (Russia over 140 million people,
next is Turkey with 70 + million) to rather small (Moldova some 4
million, Armenia 3 million). They are also at different stages of
economic development. For example Turkey, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria
fall firmly in the World Bank’s middle income category, with annual
GDP per capita well over two thousand dollars. Others, such as
Moldova and the Caucasus countries, lag behind, with yearly income
under one thousand dollars per person. Most of the countries belong
to the World Trade Organization – Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan are
the exceptions. On the other end of the economic integration scale,
Romania and Bulgaria are solid candidates for EU membership this
decade; Turkey, already an OECD member, is likely to be next after
them.
Geostrategic differences are also striking. Three countries: Turkey
since the Cold War, and Romania and Bulgaria since last year – are
NATO members; the others, former republics of the USSR, belong,
however loosely, to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Four of these CIS states, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova,
together with Uzbekistan, form GUUAM, an organization with projects
on law enforcement cooperation and development of essential economic
infrastructure. Last week (March 2) in Chisinau Presidents
Saakashvili, Yushchenko, and Voronin jointly called for revitalizing
GUUAM as Moldova assumes chairmanship next month. Separatist
conflicts impede nation- building and democratization in a number of
the Black Sea region’s countries, and the United States is actively
engaged in solving those conflicts. Significant differences remain
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, but Presidents
Kocharian and Aliyev are committed to a peaceful resolution. We
support the OSCE Minsk Group’s efforts to advance towards a
settlement there, and are encouraged by discussions over the last
year towards a negotiated settlement. Transnistrian provocations
caused the collapse of Moldovan political settlement talks last
summer. Nevertheless we continue to work with Moldova and OSCE
partners, to press Russia to work with us and the international
community to promote progress on settlement in Moldova. In Georgia,
we support President Saakashvili’s goal of reuniting the country, and
encourage Georgia to resolve the conflicts in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia in a peaceful manner. We also continue to insist that Russia
fulfill its remaining Istanbul commitments on the withdrawal of its
forces from Moldova and on reaching agreement with Georgia on the
duration and status of Russia forces there. Throughout these
protracted conflicts, the United States has been consistent in
supporting the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Moldova, and
Georgia, as well as of the Russian Federation with respect to the
Chechen separatist movement. These facts provide a context for the
discussion of these countries’ different levels of democratic
development as well. Freedom House, in its 2005 comparative ranking
of the world’s countries, found two of the Black Sea states (Romania,
Bulgaria) meet its standards for “Free” countries, another two
(Russia, Azerbaijan) fall so far short of those standards that they
rated “Not Free.” The other five fall in between; Freedom House
categorizes them as “Partly Free. Our Human Rights Report for 2004,
just released to Congress on February 28, while it does not use such
specific categories, also reflects the divergence Freedom House found
in the democracy and human rights records of these countries.
I’d like to consider democracy and democratization in each of these
countries, and what the U.S. Government is doing to improve the
record. Romania In December 2004, Romania underwent a democratic
transition, with the candidate representing an alliance of opposition
parties winning a very close presidential runoff election. Civil
society organizations (including some that received U.S. assistance)
played a strong role as election monitors, in advocating an
“issue-based” political campaign, and in pressing for non-biased
media coverage of the campaign. President Basescu is scheduled to
meet with President Bush on March 9. The leaders of the former
government, including the former President and Prime Minister, now
serve in Romania’s parliament. Romania believes its location on the
Black Sea, its membership in NATO (since May 2004), and its
prospective membership in the EU (projected for January 2007) leave
it well- placed to provide a bridge to Europe for the countries of
the Caucasus. In particular, the Romanians believe they can serve as
a model for these democratizing countries. To this end, Romania has
been active in the Community of Democracies initiative, and recently
organized an international mission to Georgia of NGO and other
experts to discuss media freedom, judicial reform, and other
democracy issues. Romania also sees opportunities to reach out to its
Black Sea neighbors on economic and security issues.
Romania is the host country for the Southeast Europe Cooperative
Initiative (SECI), and is involved in outreach efforts to Black Sea
littoral and regional states on cooperative law enforcement
initiatives, including customs and border security initiatives,
anti-narcotics and trafficking-in-persons initiatives. The United
States has provided assistance for these regional, cooperative
efforts. We continue to press the Government of Romania to promote
media freedom, and combat corruption. Bulgaria Bulgaria’s sixth
national elections since 1990 are scheduled for June 2005 with a
wide, but moderate, political spectrum expected to participate.
Elections since 1990 have met acceptable standards and reflect the
will of the Bulgarian people. Over the last 15 years Bulgaria has
established a fully functioning, free-market democracy, marked by
strong public support for full Euro-Atlantic integration. Bulgaria
entered NATO in March 2004, and is scheduled to sign an EU accession
agreement in April 2005 leading to full membership in 2007. Aside
from supporting Euro-Atlantic integration, U.S.
Government efforts to ensure stable democratic focus on strengthening
local governments, civil society and a free press. Bulgaria is a
natural route for trafficking in narcotics, contraband and persons.
Like many countries in the region, Bulgaria suffers from substantial
organized crime and corruption that threatens democratic development
and successful Euro- Atlantic integration. Reform of the weak
judicial system is a pressing need, as is greater transparency in
public procurement and privatizations. Bilateral law enforcement
cooperation with the United States has expanded significantly over
the past two years; the Embassy now hosts the U.S. Secret Service,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation plans to open an office in
early FY 2005. The U.S. Government has assisted in legal reforms,
including legislation to combat trafficking in persons, witness
protection, anti-money laundering and regulation of public
procurement. An important USAID legacy mechanism is the National
Institute of Justice (NIJ), which opened last year and is already one
of the leading institutions in Eastern Europe for training
magistrates. Ambassador Pardew is vocal about the need for the
Bulgarian government to face these challenges; just this week the
Ambassador publicly expressed support for a declaration by 14 NGOs
calling for all political forces to commit themselves to judicial
reform. On the border between NATO/EU countries and Eurasia, Bulgaria
sees itself playing a significant role in the region. Bulgaria
considers democratic reform and development of market economies and
free trade in the region, and good neighborly relations with
countries to its east, as important to its own national interest,
placing a priority on the development of NATO’s role in the regional
security system. Turkey Turkey, a staunch NATO ally, is a functioning
secular democracy with a constitutional government. In an effort to
meet the requirements for EU membership, the Government carried out
extensive democratic legal reforms during this past year. For example
in September 2003 Parliament adopted a new Penal Code, and in May
2004 adopted a new package of constitutional amendments. These
reforms were designed to crack down on torture and “honor killings,”
and expand freedom of religion and association. Turkey has made rapid
progress in meeting the EU political criteria laid out during the
Copenhagen Summit in 2002, and on December 17, 2004 the EU decided
that accession talks with Turkey would start in October this year.
The European Union’s historic decision to start accession talks for
Turkey is a major success not only for the Turkish people, but for
Europe as well. Nonetheless, some problems remain. We continue to
press Turkey to resolve Greek Orthodox Church property issues and
open the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary.
Alevis, a heterodox offshoot of Shi’a Islam, is concerned with
discrimination by the majority Sunni population and Sunni-run
Religious Affairs Directorate, and Kurdish rights within general
civil rights remain a sensitive issue. The United States supports
Turkey’s efforts to implement the reforms instituted in order to gain
accession to the European Union. We continue to urge full respect for
human rights, including freedom of speech and the press, freedom of
religion, as well as rule of law. Ukraine In one of the most
significant events of 2004, an event marking a victory for democracy,
the Ukrainian people succeeded in overturning a fraudulent
presidential election and achieving a final outcome that reflected
the will of the voters. Ukraine’s democratic institutions
demonstrated surprising strength in the face of persistent attempts
by elements within the previous government and among oligarchic clans
to subvert democratic processes.
When confronted with allegations of widespread fraud, the judicial
system ultimately acted in an independent manner, and the legislative
branch behaved responsibly in helping to broker a political solution
to the crisis. Many journalists at state- and oligarch-owned media
enterprises stopped taking instructions from the Presidential
Administration and started to report news accurately and objectively.
NGOs and civil society organizations took the lead in organizing
peaceful demonstrations in support of a democratic outcome. It is not
true, as some have said, that the U.S. funded or otherwise supported
any candidate or party in the election. However, over a decade of
U.S. assistance for a democratic process was a contributing factor to
the positive outcome. Over a period of many months, the U.S. and our
European allies repeatedly advised Ukrainian authorities, publicly
and privately, that we were watching the election closely and
considered it a test of Ukraine’s commitment to democracy. The United
States funded local civil society groups to conduct voter education
and get-out-the-vote campaigns. We supported the work of independent
media to improve coverage of campaign issues. We provided nonpartisan
training to political parties and leaders, trained election officials
and observers, and more. Our election- related assistance to Ukraine
was approximately $18 million. Of particular note, the U.S. funded
what we believe was an unprecedented election-observer effort,
domestic and international, which turned out to be critical in
spotlighting electoral fraud, particularly in the November 21 second
round. As Yushchenko and his team turn to the task of governing, they
face a great many challenges. The “Orange Revolution” spurred a
reaction in eastern and southern Ukraine, where some officials began
speaking of federation, autonomy, and even secession and
independence. This would be disastrous for Ukraine and for the
region.
Fortunately, then-President Kuchma summoned these governors and
ordered them to cease and desist. Nevertheless, there is disaffection
in Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine which Yushchenko needs to
address. He also has his work cut out for him in combating endemic
corruption, reforming the economy, consolidating democratic reforms
and promoting human rights. Managing relations with Russia will also
be critical. We look forward to President Yushchenko’s visit to the
United States early next month. Moldova Moldova’s campaign period in
advance of the March 6 parliamentary elections has been blemished
with irregularities, such as media access issues, harassment of
opposition, and misuse of administrative resources. However,
international criticism, including the Department’s engagement and a
Sense of the Senate resolution, prior to election day positively
encouraged the Moldovan Government to take corrective measures. The
United States has provided some $1.7 million for election related
assistance in the past year to support development of the Moldovan
electoral administration and legal framework, independent media,
civic involvement, nonpartisan political party training, and election
monitoring. Again, our focus is on a free and fair electoral process,
not on any particular party or candidate. The results of Sunday’s
election show to what extent the Moldovan leadership’s late
corrective measures to make the campaign more fair allowed OSCE/ODIHR
to assess the elections as generally meeting international standards.
(Note: Oral testimony will update the Subcommittee on the results of
the March 6 elections.) Moldova’s foreign policy priority is to
integrate with the European Union, as manifested by its recent
conclusion of an EU Action Plan. We support Moldova’s efforts towards
this goal, and we would hope that its participation in the GUUAM
regional group could be deepened even further after Moldova assumes
the rotating presidency later this spring. The repressive
Transnistrian separatists are an impediment to regional stability and
democracy. We are therefore actively looking for ways to resolve the
Transnistria conflict in a manner that would strengthen Moldova’s
territorial integrity and also be supported by its people and have
international credibility. We believe enhanced international
participation could give new impetus to the stalled negotiation
process, and are consulting with our EU, OSCE, Ukrainian, and Russian
partners as to the most effective way forward. Equally important,
Moldova, the United States, and our NATO allies continue to press
Russia to fulfill its commitments made at the 1999 OSCE Summit in
Istanbul to complete the withdrawal of its military forces from
Moldova. Georgia The Rose Revolution of 2003 demonstrated that
Georgians desire fair elections and good governance, and are capable
of holding their government accountable. Since the Rose Revolution,
Georgia has made significant internal reforms to fight official
corruption, consolidate bureaucracy and increase revenue collection
in order to provide better services to its own citizens. Progress in
Georgia is hampered by ongoing separatist conflicts in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia; the international community should stand firm to
encourage Georgia to resolve these conflicts peacefully. Internal
reform will strengthen the economy and create incentives for the
separatist regions to integrate into Georgia.
Georgia clearly aspires to join the Euro-Atlantic institutions; the
United States welcomes the EU’s Wider Europe program in the South
Caucasus and encourages Europe to work closely with Georgia and its
neighbors in support of civil society, human rights, and democratic
development. We also continue to support talks between Georgia and
Russia on the 1999 Istanbul commitments to reach agreement on the
status and duration of remaining Russian bases in Georgia. Armenia
Armenia has made significant economic and social progress since its
independence; however, the flawed presidential and parliamentary
elections of 2003 demonstrate that it has some way to go to
strengthen its democratic institutions and ensure an equitable
balance of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial
branches. Armenia needs to take steps to improve its poor human
rights record. The United States is providing extensive assistance to
strengthen the National Assembly, the judiciary and local government
institutions in Armenia. Further reform is hampered by Armenia’s
relatively isolated position and the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, which has been an enormous drain on the government’s
resources for over ten years.
We welcome Armenia’s attempt to work within the BSEC to expand its
economic and other ties to the region, including with Turkey.
Azerbaijan The flawed presidential elections of 2003 demonstrate that
Azerbaijan has far to go to strengthen its democratic institutions
and ensure an equitable balance of powers between the executive,
legislative and judicial branches. We are focusing on assistance
programs and diplomacy on improving election procedures and
strengthening Azerbaijan’s democratic institutions as parliamentary
elections approach this fall. These elections will be an important
test of Azerbaijan’s progress toward democratization. Azerbaijan also
needs to take steps to improve its poor human rights record.
Azerbaijan’s economic progress in the next year will depend on its
ability to direct oil funds toward non-oil sector development.
Political and economic reform is hampered by the ongoing
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as in Armenia, an enormous drain on the
government’s resources for over ten years. Azerbaijan continues to
offer extensive and invaluable support to the United States for the
Global War on Terror, including but not limited to blanket overflight
rights, the use of Azerbaijan military bases, information sharing,
and law enforcement cooperation.
We welcome Azerbaijan’s attempt to work within the BSEC to expand its
economic and other ties to the region. Russia Russia is experiencing
an erosion of its democratic institutions and processes. Especially
over the past two years, checks and balances among the branches of
government have weakened. The Duma offers no meaningful counterweight
to the executive, national television networks are under state
control, and democratic values have yet to be inculcated in Russia’s
political culture. At the same time, there has been little resistance
to this situation within Russia. While the electoral process was
flawed, President Putin was re-elected last year with a solid
majority. Independent polling indicates that as living standards
improve and the threat of terrorism increases, a majority of the
population continues to favor order and stability above all else. The
Russian Government’s efforts to centralize control have taken
advantage of this popular sentiment, further postponing the
development of democratic, accountable governance. Despite some
indications that the situation in Chechnya has improved, basic
security is lacking as terrorists and insurgents continue to battle
pro-Moscow Chechens and federal forces, and human rights violations
continue with impunity. A flawed presidential election in August 2004
did not advance a political solution to the conflict. Terrorist
attacks at Beslan and elsewhere pose a threat to the region. Conflict
appears to be spreading across the North Caucasus, due to a
combination of terrorist activities, religious extremism,
criminality, and the weakness of state structures in the region. As
the situation on the ground allows, we will look for opportunities to
provide development assistance to people in the North Caucasus.
Russia and the United States have shared interests in stability and
economic development in the Black Sea region but differ over how
these goals should be interpreted and pursued. We both want to fight
weapons trafficking, narcotics trafficking, organized crime, money
laundering, and terrorist organizations in the Black Sea region. To
achieve this goal, the U.S. wants to encourage regional stability.
Russia shares the U.S. desire for stability, but appears to interpret
stability in a fundamentally different way. Russia has been critical
of the programs the EU is pursuing under its Neighborhood Policy to
create a string of well-governed states on the EU’s border and that
in the Black Sea region, which explicitly includes Georgia and
Ukraine. Russia defines stability as preservation of the status quo,
with regimes it knows well. Russian support for separatists in other
countries appears to be means in part of maintaining levers of
influence in Moldova and Georgia.
For the same reason, Russia has been slow to close its remaining
bases in Georgia and remove its troops from Transnistria. U.S. and
Russian goals overlap more closely on the practical matter of
shutting down transshipment and smuggling routes on the Black Sea.
The U.S. supports and encourages Russia’s participation in the Black
Sea Force, its cooperation with coast guards of littoral states, and
its participation in Operation Active Endeavor. Russian and U.S.
views also overlap on the issue of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet as an
important element in regional security. The U.S. encourages continued
Russian-Ukrainian cooperation that will allow Russia to lease port
facilities at Sevastopol at least through the current agreement’s end
in 2017. The U.S. and Russia have a shared interest in economic
development and trade, in particular as concerns projects to bring
Russian and Caspian Basin oil and gas to European and world markets.
We hope President Putin’s December 2004 visit to Turkey and President
Erdogan’s visit to Russia the following month will help advance such
cooperation. At the same time, conflicts over the direction of the
Odesa-Brody pipeline and other projects demonstrate that tensions
exist over questions of whose oil and gas will get to market over
whose territory.
Moscow continues to react strongly over a possible U.S. military role
in the region. This can be seen particularly in the pressure that
Russia has placed on Georgia to agree to a “no foreign bases” clause
in a Georgia Russia Framework Treaty, and it can be seen also in
Russia’s displeasure over the U.S. Georgia Train and Equip Program
(GTEP) and Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP) to
train Georgian forces. We have made clear to Moscow at very senior
levels that we have no plans for establishing U.S. bases in Georgia.
Russia’s concerns are likely to increase as Ukraine moves closer to
NATO. We are also urging Russia to stop obstructing an Organization
of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) border monitoring operation
along the Chechnya portion of the Russian-Georgian border. We believe
this monitoring operation has played an important role in deterring
the possible movement of international terrorists and Chechen
fighters between Russia and Georgia. Assistance Finally a word on
U.S. assistance programs to the region. U.S. Government assistance
targets enhancing regional cooperation and development as well as to
support reform bilaterally. Our support for the GUUAM organization is
enabling these countries to cooperate in law enforcement and
harmonize their trade and transportation regimes. The Southeast
European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), which includes Bulgaria,
Romania, and Moldova (in addition to other countries that are not
“Black Sea states”), serves as a regional assistance model for GUUAM
projects. Since 2000, SECI has promoted cross-border cooperation in
Southeast Europe in the fight against organized crime, as well as
reform and harmonization of customs services to promote economic
development and facilitate trade. Democracy assistance is key to our
broader bilateral assistance programs in this region that, with the
exception of Turkey, are funded through the Support for East European
Democracy (SEED) and FREEDOM Support Acts. Under these accounts we
will be providing approximately $126 million in FY 2005 to support
civil society, access to information, pluralistic political
processes, local governance and rule of law in these countries.
Political changes in Georgia and Ukraine in the past year reflect a
desire by these countries – and their people – to establish
themselves as democratic market economies. Our assistance continues
to support their efforts to combat corruption and integrate them into
the world economy, including the Black Sea region.
I welcome your comments and questions.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

2005 The Sports Network
Romania
Iordanescu steps down as Romania coach
11/19 12:51:00 ET
Bucharest, Romania (Sports Network) – Anghel Iordanescu resigned as
coach of Romania Friday following Wednesday’s disappointing 1-1 World
Cup qualifying draw with Armenia.
The point was the first for Armenia in five matches, but Romania was
decimated by injuries and suspensions. Romania is still in position
to qualify for Germany 2006 as they have 10 points from five matches.
“I respect Romanian football fans and because I respect them, I
decided to quit,” said Iordanescu, 54. “I stepped down in order to
allow a better atmosphere around the national team, because without
a good atmosphere, you cannot achieve something great.”
Iordanescu previously coached Romania from 1993-98, leading the
squad to the quarterfinals of the World Cup in 1994 and the finals
of EURO 1996.

IN LATE APRIL U.S. EMBASSY IN ARMENIA TO CELEBRATES NEW HOME
YEREVAN, MARCH 10. ARMINFO. In later April early May U.S. Embassy
in Armenia will move to a new building. A resource in the diplomatic
mission of the United States to Armenia informed ARMINFO.
According to the resource, the construction works in the new building
of the embassy on the avenue after Admiral Isakov is coming to the
end. The whole staff of the embassy will move to the new building.
It should be noted that the new building of the U.S. Embassy in
yerevan is one of the largest buildings of the American diplomatic
mission all over the world.

Analysis: Georgia Parliament Ups Ante On Russian Bases
By Liz Fuller
RFERL
10 March 05
Deputies in Georgia’s parilament voted unanimously on 10 March to
call on the government to effectively blockade the bases if the two
countries do not agree on their removal by mid-May.
Under an agreement signed at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November
1999, Russia undertook to close by 1 July 2000 its military bases in
Vaziani, near Tbilisi, and Gudauta, Abkhazia, and to begin talks with
the Georgian leadership in 2000 on the timeframe for closing its two
remaining bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki. Russia complied with first
of those commitments, and embarked as required on talks on shutting
down the latter two bases.
But in the course of those talks, Russian officials have consistently
argued that a lengthy time period is required to build housing in
Russia for the troops to be withdrawn from Georgia. (That argument is
specious insofar as many of the personnel at the base in Akhalkalaki
are in fact ethnic Armenians who are citizens of Georgia.) Initially,
Russian officials said they needed 15 years to close the bases, then
14; that figure was revised downward to 11, and then eight years,
according to Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli on 9 March.
After the Georgian and Russian sides failed during Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Tbilisi last month to make any
progress toward solving either the deadlock over the bases or any
of the problems bedeviling bilateral relations, it was agreed to
establish working groups to seek to narrow the disagreements and
report on 1 May to the countries’ two presidents. Those working groups
will focus on six issues, including the proposed framework treaty
on friendship and cooperation and the timeframe for the closure of
the two bases.”If Russia rejects or refuses to met that deadline,
the Georgian parliament would declare the bases illegal and measures
would be taken to prevent them from functioning: Georgia would,
for example, decline to issue visas to Russian military personnel.”
Despite that agreement, Givi Targamadze, chairman of the Georgian
parliament’s Defense and Security Committee, announced within days of
Lavrov’s departure that the two remaining Russian bases should close by
1 January 2006 at the latest. On 25 February, parliament speaker Nino
Burdjanadze suggested that the Georgian leadership might declare the
Russian bases illegal if an agreement is not reached soon on a date
for their closure. Then on 7 March, parliament deputy Giga Bokeria
unveiled a draft bill that would require Russia to agree formally by
15 May to close the two remaining bases by 1 January 2006. If Russia
rejects or refuses to met that deadline, the Georgian parliament would
declare the bases illegal and measures would be taken to prevent them
from functioning: Georgia would, for example, decline to issue visas
to Russian military personnel.
Bokeria’s draft bill appeared to take the Georgian leadership by
surprise. ITAR-TASS on 8 March quoted parliament speaker Burdjanadze as
telling the independent television station Rustavi-2 that parliament
should not adopt such a bill until after the expiry of the two months
agreed by Moscow and Tbilisi to try and reach a compromise. President
Mikheil Saakashvili also implicitly cautioned the parliament against
adopting the bill. He reaffirmed on 8 March Georgia’s “crystal-clear”
position that the bases should be closed, but proposed waiting to
see whether it is possible to reach an agreement with Russia within
the two month period, as did Prime Minister Noghaideli. Parliament
was scheduled to debate the draft bill on 9 March, but postponed the
debate until 10 March at Burdjanadze’s request.
On 8 March, a senior Russian military official condemned the planned
debate as an attempt at blackmail, and on 9 March the Russian Foreign
Ministry warned that the debate would make it more difficult for the
two sides to reach the hoped-for compromise agreement. “The Russian
side will shortly submit its proposals aimed at finding solutions to
existing problems,” the Foreign Ministry statement continued.
In what have may have been a deliberate leak intended to defuse
mounting tensions, on 10 March, izvestiya.ru quoted an unnamed Russian
Defense Ministry official as saying that Russia does not want to keep
the bases in Georgia forever, but their personnel will be redeployed
to the Caucasus to serve in a new mountain rifle division which will
be formed only three or four years from now. While that time frame
might appeal to the Georgian leadership — in that the bases would
theoretically have been closed prior to the expiry of Saakashvili’s
first presidential term — it may not be enough to mollify the
parliament. And that anonymous statement represents a clear retreat
from earlier Russian arguments in favor of simply renaming one or
both bases an “anti-terrorism center.”
Meanwhile, the Georgian State Employment Agency is already addressing
the problem of providing employment for the Armenians who currently
account for up to one third of the personnel at the Akhalkalaki base,
and who are already expressing unease at the prospects of losing
their livelihood in a region with few employment opportunities. The
Georgian daily “Rezonansi” on 10 March quoted the agency’s chairman,
Levan Peradze, as saying that a job-creation program is in the works,
and he suggested some of the personnel in question may find jobs
in private security services. And Goga Khachidze, who was recently
named governor of the Djavakheti region where the Akhalkalaki base
is located, pledged the same day that the Georgian leadership will
do everything possible to ensure that its closure “is painless”
for the local Armenian population.
As the Georgian authorities have failed consistently to deliver on
earlier promises to improve conditions in the remote, mountainous
and impoverished region, the Armenians are understandably skeptical.
David Rstakian, leader of the Virk party that represents the local
Armenian community, was quoted by Caucasus Press on 10 March as
saying, “The Armenians of Javakheti will do all they can to prevent
the Russian troops from leaving Akhalkalaki. If Russia refuses to
pull out its troops, it may need our help.”
That help, he implied, would be willingly offered

CONFLICT SETTLEMENT AND STATE BUILDING
Azat Artsakh – Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR)
10 March 05
On March 5 the political party â~@~Movement 88â~@~] conducted
a round-table meeting at the City Hall of Stepanakert on the topic
â~@~Settlement of Karabakh Conflict and State Building: Problems
and Relationsâ~@~]. At the meeting the political forces of Karabakh,
representatives of the authorities and experts were present. By this
kind of undertaking â~@~Movement 88â~@~] aimed to promote the
political settlement of the Karabakh issue and effective participation
of the public in the solution of urgent problems of state building in
Artsakh. The leader of the political party â~@~Movement 88â~@~]
Edward Aghabekian mentioned that the public has the right to take
part in the discussion and solution of problems of people living
in the country, and on the political stage of Karabakh there is an
urgent need for such discussions. Commending these discussions in
the political life of Armenia, the vice chairman of â~@~Movement
88â~@~] Gegham Baghdassarian gave some information on the first
round-table meeting held in Yerevan in the month of February to
which experts from Karabakh were invited too; at the meeting it was
arranged to organize a round-table meeting of the political forces
of Armenia and Karabakh in Stepanakert. Touching upon the current
problems discussed at the meeting Gegham Baghdassarian pointed out
the importance of the problem of devising an operating model of
interrelations in the Diaspora. According to him, the Diaspora pays
serious attention to the policy of the genocide only, whereas it would
be preferable if the Diaspora was interested in the problem of Karabakh
as seriously. According to Member of Parliament Maxim Mirzoyan,
Karabakh adopted two historical documents: the document on unification
with Armenian in February 1988 and the Declaration of Independence in
September 1991. According to him, the adoption of those two documents
was from the legal aspect correct and pertinent. â~@~The problem
is that we ourselves must recognize our independence and only then
the Diaspora. It was our lot to build an independent state with all
its attributes,â~@~] said the member of the National Assembly. The
chairman of the NA committee of foreign relations Vahram Atanessian
commented on the topic of the meeting in reference to Karabakh having
been left out of the negotiation process. Giving facts on the typical
features of the stages of settlement of the Karabakh conflict, Vahram
Atanessian emphasized that the principles of Paris meetings between
Kocharian and Aliev have been circulated since 2001, whereas the
public is not acquainted with the details of the meeting of the two
presidents. â~@~We must find out what status the Armenian diplomacy
considers as preferable for Karabakh, and whether the option acceptable
for Armenia is acceptable for Karabakh as well,â~@~] said the head
of the committee of foreign relations. According to the co-chairman
of the political party â~@~Azat Hayrenikâ~@~] Artur Tovmassian,
presently Baku is much more interested in the construction of the oil
pipeline Baku â~@~S Geihan than in the settlement of the Karabakh
conflict. Aliev Junior is convinced that foreign investors will
invest money only in stable regions, in other words, the resumption
of military actions in Karabakh by Azerbaijan is excluded because
economic growth is the problem N 1 in Azerbaijan. Member of Parliament
Vahram Balayan stressed the idea that a country which won the war
does not have the right to beg. â~@~From the very beginning we
had assumed a yielding position, whereas Azerbaijan demands,â~@~]
he mentioned adding that the international community had from the
very beginning given a chance to Karabakh to do its first steps in
diplomacy. The proof to this is the signature of the Karabakh party on
the document of armistice. As the leader of the National Democratic
Party Murad Petrossian characterized it, national interests underlie
the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Naturally, it should be
found out what interests the super powers pursue. The co-chairman of
the political party â~@~Azat Hayrenikâ~@~] Rudik Hiusnunts thinks,
it is necessary for the political forces to unite and have a common
standpoint. â~@~The problem of Karabakh is the problem of all the
Armenians but it must be solved in Karabakh. This means that there is
need for continuity of similar meetings of political forces,â~@~]
said R. Hiusnunts. The meeting was concluded by the assertion that
similar meetings should be organized more frequently.
NVARD OHANJANIAN. 10-03-2005 [spacer.gif] [spacer.gif]
–Boundary_(ID_jkCYZrTPPceYQUGGF018JQ)–

EDUCATIONAL CENTER OF TECHNOLOGIES OF AMERICAN COMPANY NATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS OPENS AT SEUA IN YEREVAN
YEREVAN, MARCH 9, ARMINFO. An Educational Center of an American company
National Instruments opened at State Engineering University of Armenia
(SEUA) on March 7. National instruments is one of the leading companies
in the world in the sphere of development and production of hardware
and software for automation of dimensions, diagnostics, management,
design.
Speaking at the ceremony, Director on National Instruments Development
Aram Salatyan said that company produced an intensive program of
support to higher education in the world, contributing to creation
and modernization of educational courses, laboratories, educational
and research complexes. He pointed out lack of laboratory examination
works in the world. In this connection, the company organizes tenders
to resume these works. In the current year the above university won
a tender, which resulted in opening of a laboratory in the country
and provision of Lab.View software to the university and necessary
equipment for examination works. “Such laboratories exist only in
Russia and the opening of a similar one in Armenia testifies to the
high potential of Armenian specialists in the sphere,” Salatyan said.
According to the educational plan, teachers, students and specialists
of industrial enterprises will receive education at the Center. The
graphics of LabVIEW development will become a subject of study, which
allows collection of data, automation of dimensions and management of
processes through PC. It is for already two years that teachers of SEUA
have studied the software of LavVIEW package. At present, the package
will be technically replenished and will become a subject for study
of students with a broad spectrum of technical specialties. Besides,
a scientific and technical seminar “Virtual devices – revolution
concept of automating dimensions and management” was held. At the
presentation of the seminar, Director on NI Development Aram Salatyan
made a report. Participating in the seminar were representatives
of SEUA, Yerevan State University, AUA, European Academy, National
Academy of Sciences, the leading National Research Institutions and
industrial enterprises of Armenia.
It should be noted that every year the best educational establishments
of 50 countries in the world participate in a contest for grants of
National Instruments. This year, one of the winners was SEUA. National
Instruments provides SEUA with necessary funds for implementation
of educational process as well as with a full package of software,
laboratory stations and others.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Karabakh leader signs law on ombudsman
Arminfo
9 Mar 05
Yerevan, 9 March: The president of the Nagornyy Karabakh Republic
[NKR], Arkadiy Gukasyan, signed the law “On ombudsman” today.
The NKR president also signed the law “On exempting Azat Artsakh
newspaper from some taxes and fines” and laws on amendments and
additions to the laws “On civil service” and “On the administrative
division of the NKR”.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

A Half Million Lebanese March for Syria
Counterpunch
March 9, 2005
Another Species of Cedar
By ROBERT FISK
It was a warning. They came in their tens of thousands, Lebanese Shia
Muslim families with babies in arms and children in front, walking
past my Beirut home. They reminded me of the tens of thousands of
Iraqi Shia Muslims who walked with their families to the polls in
Iraq, despite the gunfire and the suicide bombers.
And now they came from southern Lebanon and the Bekaa to say they
rejected America’s plans in Lebanon, and wanted – so they claimed –
to know who killed Rafiq Hariri, the former prime minister murdered
on 14 February, and to reject UN Security Council Resolution 1559
which demands a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarmament of
the Hizbollah guerrilla movement, and to express their “thanks” to
Syria. This was a tall order in Lebanon.
But only 100 yards from the Lebanese opposition protests, the
half-million – for that was an approachable figure, given Hizbollah’s
extraordinary organisational abilities – stood for an hour with
Lebanese flags, and posed a challenge to President George Bush’s
project in the Middle East. “America is the source of terrorism”, one
poster proclaimed. “All our disasters come from America”.
Many of those tens of thousands were Hizbollah families who had
fought the Israelis during their occupation of southern Lebanon, been
arrested by the Israelis, imprisoned by the Israelis and feared that
American support for Lebanon meant not “democracy” but an imposed
Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty.
There were Syrians in the crowds – indeed, I saw buses with Syrian
registration plates that had brought families from Damascus – but
almost all the half million were Lebanese Shias and they wanted to
reject 1559 because it called for Hizbollah to be disarmed. They were
perfectly happy to see the Syrians leave (who now remembers the
Syrian massacre of Hizbollah members in Beirut in 1987?) but, bearing
in mind Syria’s transit of weapons from Iran to Lebanon, Hizbollah
wanted to be regarded as a resistance movement, not a “militia” to be
disarmed. What the Shia were saying was that they were a power, just
as they said when they voted in Iraq. In Lebanon, Shia Muslims are
the largest religious community.
Syria is run by a clique of Alawis – who are Shia – and Iraq is now
dominated by Shia Muslims who voted themselves into power, and Iran
is a Shia nation. So when President Bush said “the Lebanese people
have the right to determine their future free from domination of a
foreign power”, the power the Shias were thinking of was not Syria
but the United States and Israel.
And 100 yards away, the demonstrators who have bravely protested
against the murder of Rafik Hariri have become factionalised,
courtesy of the Syrians. At night, the opposition protesters are
largely Christian. Yesterday’s Hizbollah rally, while it contained
the usual pro-Syrian Christians, was essentially Shia. And their
message was not one of thanks to President Bush.
“The fleets came in the past and were defeated; and they will be
defeated again,” Hizbollah’s leader, Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, said in
reference to the Americans. Ironically, President Bush was to refer
within hours to the killing of 241 US Marines in Beirut in October
1982, as if their deaths were the responsibility of al-Qa’ida. To the
Israelis, Nasrallah said: “Let go of your dreams for Lebanon. To the
enemy entrenched on our border, occupying our country and imprisoning
our people, ‘There is no place for you here and there is no life for
you among us: Death to Israel’.”
Nasrallah’s take on the 1975-90 Lebanese civil war was predictable.
The crowds were meeting on the front lines that had separated the
Lebanese during the civil war; indeed, on the very location of the
Christian-Muslim trenches of that conflict. “We meet today to remind
the world and our partners in the country,” Nasrallah said, “that
this arena that joins us, or the other one in Martyrs’ Square, was
destroyed by Israel and civil war and was united by Syria and the
blood of its soldiers and officers.”
This was an inventive piece of history. Israel certainly killed many
thousands of Lebanese – more than the Syrians, although their
soldiers took the lives of many hundreds – but the half million
roared their approval.
So what did all this prove? That there was another voice in Lebanon.
That if the Lebanese “opposition” – pro-Hariri and increasingly
Christian – claim to speak for Lebanon and enjoy the support of
President Bush, there is a pro-Syrian, nationalist voice which does
not go along with their anti-Syrian demands but which has identified
what it believes is the true reason for Washington’s support for
Lebanon: Israel’s plans for the Middle East.
The Beirut demonstration yesterday was handled in the usual Hizbollah
way: maximum security, lots of young men in black shirts with two-way
radios, and frightening discipline. No one was allowed to carry a gun
or a Hizbollah flag. There was no violence. When one man brandished a
Syrian flag, it was immediately taken from him. Law and order, not
“terrorism”, was what Hizbollah wished. Syria had spoken. President
Bashar Assad’s sarcastic remark about the Hariri protesters needing a
“zoom lens” to show their numbers had been answered by a
demonstration of Shia power which needed no “zoom”.
And in the mountains above Beirut, still frozen under their winter
snows, few Syrians moved. There were Syrian military trucks on the
international highway to Damascus but no withdrawal, no retreat, no
redeployment. The Taif agreement of 1989 stipulated that the Syrians
should withdraw to the Mdeirej heights above Beirut, which they have
now agreed to do, 14 years later than they should have done.
The official document released by the Lebanese-Syrian military
delegation in Damascus suggests this is a new redeployment and that
in April the Syrian forces, along with their military intelligence
personnel, will withdraw to the Lebanese-Syrian border.
But the question remains: will they retreat to the Syrian side of the
frontier, or sit in the Lebanese-Armenian town of Aanjar, on the
Lebanese side, where Brigadier General Rustum Gazale, the head of
Syrian military intelligence, still maintains his white-painted
villa?
Either way, Lebanon can no longer be taken for granted. The “cedar”
revolution now has a larger dimension, one that does not necessarily
favour America’s plans. If the Shia of Iraq can be painted as
defenders of democracy, the Shias of Lebanon cannot be portrayed as
the defenders of “terrorism”. So what does Washington make of
yesterday’s extraordinary events in Beirut?
Robert Fisk is a reporter for The Independent and author of Pity the
Nation. He is also a contributor to CounterPunch’s hot new book, The
Politics of Anti-Semitism.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress