“Dialogue inside my mind” with a brother killed in the war. Video from Armenia


Oct 8 2021



    Hrant Marinosyan, Yerevan


Sister tells about her brother who was killed in the war. Video from Armenia

Sargis Saribekyan volunteered to go to the front immediately after the second Karabakh war started. His sister Arpine continues to talk to him, calling these conversations a “dialogue in her mind”. In this video, she talks about her borther’s last days and unfulfilled dreams.

During the 44 days of war, 3 788 military and civilians were killed on the Armenian side.

Watch the video at 

Followers of Armenian Church should have unimpeded access to Shushi Cathedral: One year after the attack

Public Radio of Armenia
Oct 8 2021

The Cathedral of Shushi is one of the most important centers of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Artsakh, and the servants and followers of the Armenian Church should have an unimpeded access to this sanctuary, Spokesperson for the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Vahan Hunanyan said in a statement on the anniversary of the strikes on the place of worship by Azerbaijan during the aggression unleashed against Artsakh in the fall 2020.

On October 8, 2020, during the military aggression unleashed against Artsakh and its people, the Azerbaijani armed forces launched double air strikes on the Holy Savior Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in Shushi with high-precision weapons, causing significant damage to the latter. A few days after the Trilateral Statement of November 9, the same church was vandalized and desecrated. Along with the physical damage of the Shushi Cathedral, Azerbaijan continues the attempts of distorting the Armenian identity of the church by changing the architectural appearance of the church under the pretext of renovation.

“The repeated deliberate strikes on a place of worship is not only a condemnable crime under international law, in particular the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954) and its Second Protocol (1999), but also as a symbolic demonstration of the intent. It is a clear manifestation of Azerbaijan’s policy aimed at annihilating any trace of the Armenian presence in Artsakh,” the Spokesperson said.

He noted that a year after the aggression unleashed by Azerbaijan against Artsakh, the fate of around 1,500 historical and cultural heritage sites and places of worship, as well as thousands of museum specimens in the territories of Artsakh fallen under the control of Azerbaijan, remains uncertain and endangered.

“There are many documented cases of deliberate destruction and vandalism of Armenian churches, other cultural and religious monuments by the Azerbaijani armed forces. Besides, along with their physical destruction, we are observing the falsification of historical facts and distortion of the identity of Armenian monuments by Azerbaijan,” Hunanyan added.

“In this context, apparently, it’s no coincidence that Azerbaijan continues blocking or, as far as possible, restricting the access of the UNESCO expert mission to the endangered Armenian cultural heritage sites, attempting to conceal its war crimes,” he noted.

The Spokesperson stressed that the vandalism against historic-cultural monuments and places of worship representing people’s cultural and spiritual heritage, are flagrant violations of international law, contradict universal values and are strongly condemnable.

“The Cathedral of Shushi is one of the most important centers of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Artsakh, and the servants and followers of the Armenian Church should have an unimpeded access to this sanctuary,” he concluded.

 

Armenia delivers statement on protection of humanitarian law in armed conflicts at UN Human Rights Council

Public Radio of Armenia
Oct 8 2021

In the framework of the 48th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council taking place in Geneva, the Republic of Armenia delivered a joint statement dedicated to the protection of international humanitarian law and international human rights law during armed conflicts. The cross regional group of nineteen countries joined the statement.

Referring to the UN Charter basic principles of the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and refraining from the threat or use of force the statement strongly condemns gross violations and abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law during armed conflicts and urges States to hold accountable the perpetrators of such crimes.

It particularly states that the unlawful use of force is often preceded or accompanied by hate speech, large-scale propaganda of war, statements by political leaders and public figures that express support for the affirmation of the superiority of a race or an ethnic group, disseminating hostility and prejudice against ethnic, religious or racial groups, or condone or justify violence against them.

The States reaffirm the right of the victims to be assisted by humanitarian organizations, as set forth in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other relevant instruments of international humanitarian law, and call for safe and timely access for such assistance.

The countries reiterate that prisoners of war and internees must be treated in accordance with international humanitarian law and must be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. The hostage-taking, prolonged detention of prisoners and internees for bargaining purposes, is prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The Joint statement encourages the implementation of effective legislative, administrative, judicial, or other measures to prevent, terminate and punish acts of enforced disappearance.

The States call upon the UN’s appropriate bodies to assume a more active role in the promotion and protection of human rights in ensuring full respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law in all situations of armed conflict, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Tigran Abrahamyan: Azerbaijanis carrying out large-scale infrastructure work on Goris-Kapan road

Panorama, Armenia
Oct 8 2021

Azerbaijani forces are carrying out large-scale infrastructure work on the Goris-Kapan interstate road, lawmaker Tigran Abrahamyan from the opposition With Honor faction, said on Friday after his regular visit to various sections of the road.

“I paid a regular visit to various sections of the Goris-Kapan interstate road through Vorotan and Shurnukh, as well as the second road through Tatev,” the MP wrote on Facebook.

In particular, he said he had held conversations with border guards deployed on different sections of the road and monitored the Azerbaijani-controlled Karahunj-Vorotan section of the road, which “has been turned into a construction site”.

“Azerbaijanis are carrying out large-scale infrastructure work to build and deploy both military and civilian facilities,” Abrahamyan said.

“Weather conditions do not allow for much activity and research, however, on the other hand, they reveal all the problems that arise in case of foggy weather, snow or due to other circumstances.

“In the current situation, the Tatev road will not solve all our problems, but its availability and renewal will naturally resolve some of them.

“Compared to the previous month, a lot of work has been done on various sections of the road, but additional reconstruction and upgrading of the road will be required in the future,” he noted.

Hague court announces dates for considering petition for Armenian captives’ return, urgent measures against Azerbaijan

News.am, Armenia
Oct 8 2021

This is the first time that Armenia has filed a lawsuit with the UN International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. The representative of Armenia before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Yeghishe Kirakosyan, who will represent Armenia’s interests in this case at the ICJ, on Friday told about this to Armenian News-NEWS.am.

The hearing at Armenia’s request to take urgent measures against Azerbaijan will take place at ICJ on October 14 and 15. Armenia asks the court to apply a number of urgent measures against Azerbaijan, including the return of all Armenian prisoners of war and detained civilians, and the closure of the “military trophy park” in the Azerbaijani capital Baku.

According to Kirakosyan, this lawsuit is an unprecedented step taken by Armenia. He said that the phase of ICJ examining this urgent measure will be followed by the phase of examining the lawsuit itself.

“The consideration of the actual case will take years. But there is an expectation that the decision on the matter of applying urgent measures will be made in one to 1.5 months,” he added.

As per Yeghishe Kirakosyan, the respective submitted evidence is convincing.

“Just the fact that we already have an international legal process at the UN International Court of Justice, where Armenia very clearly presents its demands and legal grounds, I believe, will have in itself a quite significant impact on the formation of international public opinion, the right international public atmosphere,” he noted.

Kirakosyan said that the evidence and claims in the lawsuit are extensive, and they refer to gross violations of the convention.

“And for this purpose, in addition to the main claim, Armenia has also submitted a demand to apply urgent or conditional measures. The hearings on that are scheduled for October 14 and 15, a group has been set up to attend it, which also includes well-known international experts who will help represent Armenia’s interests,” Armenia’s representative before the ECtHR added.

Institute of Turkish Studies Caught in Turkey’s Crackdown on Academic Freedom

The Hoya
By Liam Scott
Oct. 7, 2021
For over 30 years, the Turkish government-funded Institute of Turkish
Studies (ITS) was the only U.S.-based nonprofit that supported the
development of Turkish studies in U.S. higher education. Widely
recognized as one of the most prestigious centers for Turkish studies,
the ITS awarded research grants to more than 400 scholars in the field
throughout its history.
The ITS aimed to advance the field of Turkish studies and improve the
American public’s understanding of Turkey by awarding grants to
scholars, hosting lectures and conferences, helping U.S. universities
develop Turkish studies programs and supporting the publication of
books and journals, according to the ITS mission statement.
Despite its academic reputation and historic support of scholars, when
the Turkish government decided to stop funding the ITS in 2015, Jenny
White, who served on the ITS board for nearly 20 years until its
closure, was hardly shocked.
“We were all horrified, but not particularly surprised,” White said in
a Zoom interview with The Hoya. “These are the sorts of people they do
not want to be supporting because they are the ones who will have a
critical mind.”
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had begun consolidating power
four years earlier and White, now a Stockholm University professor,
said the fate of the ITS paralleled political trends in Turkey.
In defunding the ITS in 2015, the Turkish government condemned the
Georgetown University-affiliated organization to close. The institute
maintained operations through its own fundraising efforts, but it
ultimately shut down in September 2020.
Several years earlier, Turkey experienced the unprecedented
pro-democracy Gezi Protests in 2013 and a failed coup in 2016. Since
that time, the Turkish government has repressed the press and academia
and has closed thousands of private schools, foundations and
associations.
According to former ITS Executive Director Sinan Ciddi and former ITS
board members Walter Denny and Steven Cook, Turkey’s decision to
defund the ITS came amid rising government pressure to blindly support
and loyally promote Erdoğan. The ITS was caught in the line of fire of
government repression that has characterized Erdoğan’s increasingly
autocratic Turkey, they said.
A History of the Institute of Turkish Studies
The Turkish government founded the ITS in 1982 with a grant of $3
million, which was placed in a trust. Initially completely independent
from Georgetown University, the institute established an official
relationship with the university in the late 1990s, according to
Georgetown professor of Turkish studies Sinan Ciddi. Ciddi served as
executive director of the ITS from 2011 until its closing in 2020.
Georgetown provided the ITS with office space and administrative
assistance, but the university did not have a say in the institute’s
operations. Georgetown also supplemented the salary of the institute’s
executive director after the ITS lost funding from the Turkish
government, according to Ciddi and ITS meeting minutes obtained by The
Hoya.
Ciddi said the ITS’ annual operating budget mainly came from the
interest earned off of the grant money, as well as other donations.
A board of governors whose members included top scholars in Ottoman
and modern Turkish studies led the ITS. Board members were mainly
tasked with reviewing research grant applications from scholars in the
field, according to White.
White suspected the ITS was a component of Ankara’s strategy to
improve the public image of Turkey in the eyes of the United States.
This tactic was effective because the ITS was not an inherently
political organization, she said.
“In terms of bang for your buck, this is the best advertisement that
there could have been for Turkey,” White said.
Over the years, scholars criticized the ITS for allegedly advancing
Ankara’s political agenda regarding sensitive topics like the Armenian
genocide. For instance, scholars and members of the Armenian diaspora
criticized Heath Lowry, the founding executive director of the ITS,
for denying the Armenian genocide.
In 1995, UCLA students protested the establishment of an ITS-endowed
Ottoman studies chair in the UCLA history department because of the
ITS’ perceived historic views on the Armenian genocide.
In 2006, after insisting on the importance of researching the Armenian
genocide, former Binghamton University professor Donald Quataert
resigned as chairman of the ITS board of governors.
Two years later, in an open letter to Erdoğan, who was prime minister
at the time, the nonprofit Middle East Studies Association’s Committee
on Academic Freedom wrote that Quataert resigned because of pressure
from the Turkish government. Several other ITS board members resigned
in support of Quataert. Turkey’s ambassador at the time, Nabi Sensoy,
denied that he played any role in Quataert’s resignation.
In its final years, the ITS was emerging from the long shadow
historically cast by its relationship with the Turkish state,
according to Nicholas Danforth, a fellow at the Hellenic Foundation
for European and Foreign Policy who received an ITS grant while
pursuing his Ph.D. at Georgetown during the 2012-13 academic year.
“It was supporting serious, cutting edge research on all aspects of
Turkish history, including issues that had often been too sensitive
for scholars to touch,” Danforth wrote in an email to The Hoya.
Through its support of scholars and academic programs in the field of
Turkish studies, the contributions of the ITS to the field are
undeniable, according to White.
“The ITS has supported almost every single major scholar of Turkish
studies in any field in the United States,” White said.
The ITS never sought to involve itself in the politics of Turkey or
any other country, according to several former board members,
including White and Denny.
The ITS was an impartial supporter of Turkish studies that valued
academic freedom, according to Denny, who served on the ITS board for
over two decades and is now a professor at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst.
“We made every effort to be as unpolitical as possible,” Denny said.
“Never in my term on the board did I ever see any political decision
made on the basis of Turkish domestic politics.”
The ITS mission statement also confirmed the organization’s efforts to
remain apolitical.
“The Institute is an independent, tax exempt organization and does not
seek to influence legislation nor advocate particular policies or
agendas,” the institute’s website said in 2013.
But Ciddi said the apolitical nature of the ITS likely contributed to
its defunding. As Erdoğan began to consolidate power — starting in
2010 during his tenure as prime minister, lasting through his election
to the presidency in 2014 and continuing today — the government sought
to increasingly control civil society groups, according to Denny and
Ciddi. The ITS was one among many.
The Turkish government’s efforts to censor the press and academia
escalated in 2014, one year before it decided to defund the ITS,
according to former ITS board member Steven Cook, who is now a senior
fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Ciddi believed the Turkish government did not see the point in
researching subject areas like regional art or ancient civilizations,
which did not have an obvious political agenda, and so the government
did not think the ITS benefited Turkey.
“For the most part, they were displeased with the kind of research we
funded. For them, it seemed like esoteric, academic mumbo-jumbo,”
Ciddi said. “There was always a discord between the academic research
and how that helps Turkey.”
Former ITS board member and current Binghamton University professor
Kent Schull agreed that the defunding of the ITS underscored political
trends in Turkey.
“They started to pull back soft power where they felt they could not
control,” Schull said. “Erdoğan felt very threatened and started to
lash out on other things. He started to increase powers in his own
hands, and when Gezi pushed away on these developments, he couldn’t
take it. He cracked down hard.”
Between 1982 and 2014, six Turkish diplomats served as ambassadors to
the United States, and the ITS maintained cordial relationships with
all of them, according to Ciddi.
Ciddi alleged that the dynamic changed with the seventh ambassador,
Serdar Kılıç. Kılıç began serving as Turkey’s ambassador to the United
States in April 2014 as political tumult rose in Turkey. He left the
post in February 2021.
Historically, the institute had dinners in the fall and spring at the
Turkish ambassador’s residence. They were always cordial, and board
members looked forward to attending, Ciddi said.
“Wonderful affairs — great dinner and great conversation,” Ciddi said.
“Nothing political and no asks. It was very, very respectful.”
But the May 2015 dinner — the first one with Kılıç as ambassador —
played out differently, according to Ciddi.
“Something was awry, and he wanted something else,” Ciddi said.
At that dinner, Kılıç had a private conversation with career U.S.
diplomat Ambassador Ross Wilson, who was the chairman of the ITS board
of governors at the time and recently served as Chargé d’Affaires at
the U.S. embassy in Kabul, according to Wilson and Ciddi.
Wilson alleged that Kılıç was concerned that some recent work from the
ITS was negative toward the Turkish government and expressed interest
in redirecting the work of ITS to politically benefit the government.
“Kılıç expressed concerns about what he felt were negative,
politically-oriented programming and statements by the ITS director
and expressed interest in reorienting the work of ITS in ways that
would have greater political impact for the Turkish government,”
Wilson wrote in an email to The Hoya.
“I responded that I would discuss his concern with the board and that
ITS as an organization did not aim to be political, but that the
organization had been set up to provide for independent, academic
management to support academic ends,” Wilson wrote.
Kılıç did not respond to The Hoya’s two requests for an interview.
Ciddi viewed Kılıç’s alleged request as an effort to pressure the ITS
to celebrate the Erdoğan government’s so-called accomplishments.
“They want your active participation in clapping for what they are
trying to achieve politically at home and abroad,” Ciddi said. “If
you’re not celebrating what they’re doing, then you’re just as
culpable as the guy who crosses the red line.”
After that meeting, the ITS operated business as usual, Ciddi said.
But when the time came for the fall dinner at the ambassador’s
residence, the embassy told the ITS that the ambassador had a prior
engagement, according to Ciddi.
In early September 2015, Saltzman and Evinch, a Washington, D.C. law
firm representing Turkey’s U.S. embassy, called the ITS to notify the
institute that it was losing its trust funding, according to Ciddi.
David Saltzman of Saltzman and Evinch declined to provide comment to
The Hoya, saying the Turkish embassy did not clear him to respond. The
Turkish embassy also did not respond to The Hoya’s multiple requests
for comment.
The ITS protested the decision, with Wilson writing a letter to Kılıç
in an effort to reverse the funding decision.
“Whatever may be the intention now in considering an end to the trust
arrangement, it will almost certainly be interpreted widely in ways
unhelpful to Turkey, injurious to the personal and other relationships
that you and I have cared about, and detrimental to the kind of
support and sympathy your country and government get here,” Wilson
wrote in the Sept. 27, 2015 letter obtained by The Hoya.
In the letter, Wilson also said Turkey had accomplished its goals with
the ITS of increasing U.S. appreciation of Turkey.
“ITS beneficiaries have touched thousands of others, making friends
for your country across a broad front, and they have helped to foster
and then further the tremendous increase in American public interest
in Turkey that has developed over the last 10-20 years — exactly the
purpose for which ITS was created,” Wilson wrote in the letter.
“Turkey has received a huge return on its investment.”
But the Turkish government maintained its decision. Kılıç sent a
letter the same day to the ITS about defunding the organization in
which he confirmed the government would provide the ITS with enough
funds to meet its outstanding financial obligations.
In that letter, Kılıç wrote that Turkey cut the ITS funding because
the original trust agreement had expired in 1988.
“Since that time, Turkey nonetheless continued to support ITS,” Kılıç
wrote in the letter, which was obtained by The Hoya. “It has been
established that treating an invalid Trust Agreement as valid may
cause problems in Turkey in light of Turkish domestic law. Therefore,
the Government of Turkey has determined to retrieve the funds in the
corpus of the Trust.”
Although Kılıç was correct that the trust agreement had expired, Ciddi
questioned what prompted Turkey to act over 20 years after it had
expired.
“They had a point, but the problem with that was the terms expired in
1988 — and since then, no one has been asking questions,” Ciddi said.
Ciddi interpreted the decision to defund the ITS as an indication of
the government’s lack of understanding about how U.S. nonprofits
operate.
“They want organizations to sell an unsellable message that the
Erdoğan government is a good government that is a responsible
international actor, that he’s a world leader,” Ciddi said. “If you
don’t do that, then they say, ‘We will take away our money and give it
to someone who is willing to do it.’”
According to Denny, the ITS fell because it refused to be actively pro-Erdoğan.
“This is just a reflection of the larger problem of Erdoğan’s way of
operating in Turkish society: that if you are not vocally for him, he
does not want anything to do with you,” Denny said. “This business of
loyalty became so important.”
After Turkey cut the organization’s funding, the School of Foreign
Service (SFS) provided the ITS with additional financial and
administrative support, but it never considered replacing the funding
the institute lost, largely because the SFS does not have any centers
that focus exclusively on one country, and the SFS does not fully fund
any of its centers, according to SFS Dean Joel Hellman.
Following the defunding of the ITS, the organization had enough funds
to continue operations for three years, so the organization remained
open in a scaled-back capacity as it launched a fundraising campaign,
according to May 2016 board meeting minutes obtained by The Hoya.
The organization’s fundraising efforts were ultimately not enough,
according to White.
“We tried to do individual fundraising,” White said. “But it did not
work because I think people were scared of the government.”
In November 2018, the board of governors discussed suspicions that
Turkish politics led to the decline in donations to the ITS, according
to a copy of board meeting minutes obtained by The Hoya.
In a June 2019 letter signed by the ITS board of governors, the ITS
announced that despite receiving funding from individual donors and
groups like the Turkish industrial conglomerate Koç Holding and
Turkish holding company FİBA Group, the institute could not
financially sustain itself and would close its doors Sept. 30, 2020.
The Final Moments
The Erdoğan government continues to hinder academic freedom, including
recently with the 2021 political appointment of a rector to Boğaziçi
University, one of Turkey’s most prestigious academic institutions,
according to White.
The very structure of the ITS set it up for trouble from the start,
according to Hellman, who added that the defunding and closure of the
ITS is an example of how international affairs can directly impact the
university.
“An institute funded to study a single country, funded by the
government, is highly unusual,” Hellman said in an interview with The
Hoya. “The problem with such an arrangement is that it becomes very,
very susceptible to government interference in their work.”
The closure of the ITS was a loss for the Georgetown community and the
field of Turkish studies, according to Hellman.
“It was a unique and important body,” Hellman said. “And anything that
limited its ability to do its mandate is harmful to the cause of our
understanding of Turkey.”
Despite the closure of the ITS, several former board members,
including Denny, reflect on their time with the ITS with pride.
“We all felt that it was one of the great privileges we had in our
lives to serve on this board. We really believed and continue to
believe in ITS and its mission,” Denny said. “If I have even the
remotest chance of getting into heaven on judgment day, my best bet —
my best ace in the hole — is going to be that I worked for ITS all
those years, and we did so much good.”
The ITS held its final board meeting on the morning of Nov. 7, 2020,
about six weeks after the organization formally ceased to exist,
according to meeting minutes obtained by The Hoya.
At the last meeting, the board discussed how to disperse the remainder
of the ITS funds, which amounted to around $60,000, to continue
supporting Turkish studies in the organization’s final moments. The
board had previously agreed to disperse the funds equally between the
American Research Institute of Turkey and the American Association of
Teachers of Turkic Languages.
At the last minute, Schull suggested the ITS also donate $8,000 to the
Journal of Turkish Studies, which was struggling financially at the
time. The board unanimously agreed.
Ciddi said that while the field of Turkish studies owed much to the
ITS, the field was no longer dependent on the organization, according
to the minutes.
“Turkish Studies in the United States is now self-sufficient and
growing on its own, which effectively means that the original mission
of the institution has been accomplished,” the minutes read. “The
final board meeting of the ITS concluded with expressions of both
regret and satisfaction.”
*
A Hoya staff writer contributed writing and reporting to this article.
They requested anonymity due to safety concerns in Turkey.
 

Security Council Secretary, Dutch Ambassador discuss situation on Armenian-Azerbaijani border

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 13:50, 7 October, 2021

YEREVAN, OCTOBER 7, ARMENPRESS. Secretary of the Security Council Armen Grigoryan received today Ambassador of the Netherlands to Armenia Nico Schermers.

“The sides praised that the Armenian-Dutch relations are on friendly nature and have a tendency for further development”, Mr. Grigoryan’s Office said in a statement.

The Dutch Ambassador highly appreciated the resistance of democratic institutions in Armenia during this difficult period, as well as the efforts of the government for the constant development of these institutions.

The Secretary of the Security Council presented the Armenian government’s works aimed at strengthening democratic institutions and rule of law, as well as upgrading the Armed Forces.

Both sides stressed the importance of the fight against corruption.

Armen Grigoryan and Nico Schermers also discussed the security issues in the region and the situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.

 

Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan

Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan, his delegation hosted at Armenian Embassy in Russia

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 14:43, 7 October, 2021

YEREVAN, OCTOBER 7, ARMENPRESS. The Embassy of Armenia in Russia organized an official reception for Armenia’s Speaker of Parliament Alen Simonyan and his delegation during their official visit in the Russian Federation.

The event was attended by representatives of diplomatic corps accredited in Russia, public-political figures and representatives of the Armenian community, the Parliament’s press service said.

 

 

Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan

Pashinyan, Putin discuss situation in region over phone

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 14:57, 7 October, 2021

YEREVAN, OCTOBER 7, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan held a telephone conversation today with President of Russia Vladimir Putin, the PM’s Office said.

Pashinyan congratulated Vladimir Putin on birthday, wishing good health and a lot of energy for implementing all the programs and goals in his responsible position.

Pashinyan stated that Armenia and the Armenian people highly appreciate the Russian President’s efforts and exclusive role in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and expressed gratitude for the attention paid to Armenia.

The Russian President thanked the Armenian PM for warm congratulations and wishes and said that Russia attaches great importance to the close cooperation with strategic ally Armenia.

Pashinyan and Putin discussed also issues relating to the agenda of the Armenian-Russian relations. They also touched upon the current situation and developments in the region.

 

Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan

Geopolitical rivalry in Caucasus gets militarized

Oct 7 2021
The geopolitical power struggle in the Caucasus is growing increasingly militarized as converging interests pit Iran and Armenia against Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Israel.
October 7, 2021

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey began five days of military exercises this week to enhance their preparedness to protect regional economic projects. The Eternity 2021 exercises, which kicked off in Georgia Oct. 4, aim to develop capabilities on both command and staff level to ensure the security of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, according to the Georgian Defense Ministry. 

Meanwhile, the three countries’ defense ministers met in Georgia’s Kakheti region Oct. 5 to discuss ways to advance military cooperation, including in the fields of military technology and education. The ministers signed a protocol on trilateral military cooperation and Georgian Defense Minister Juansher Burchuladze said Turkey and Azerbaijan had been invited to another military exercise called Eagle Spirit to be held in Georgia in the near future. 

The growing military cooperation between the three countries has led observers to question whether a trilateral security bloc is emerging in the Caucasus.

The military rapprochement between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, coupled with growing military ties between Azerbaijan and Israel, seems to be ringing the alarm bells in Iran. Last week Tehran launched surprise military exercises near its border with Azerbaijan. Tellingly, the drills were named “Conquerors of Kheibar,” a reference to the Battle of Khaybar waged by early Muslims against Jews in the 7th century at Khaybar, an oasis in the northwestern Arabian Peninsula. In a clear sign that Tehran now sees Azerbaijan as Israel’s chief ally in the region, the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson said, “Iran will not tolerate the presence of the Zionist regime near our borders.”

Ostensibly, many in Tehran have come to conclude that Azerbaijan, counting on Israeli and Turkish support, is seeking to redraw borders by annexing a strip of territory across Armenia’s southernmost province of Syunik, which borders Iran and separates mainland Azerbaijan to the east from the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan to the west. In the Russian-mediated cease-fire deal that Azerbaijan and Armenia signed in November 2020 after a six-week war over the nearby Nagorno-Karabakh region, Armenia committed to guarantee transportation links between Azerbaijan proper and Nakhchivan, a route that Baku calls the Zangezur corridor and has threatened to secure by force if need be. Azerbaijan’s capture of the strip could cut the direct border connection between Armenia and Iran while establishing a land link between Azerbaijan and Turkey via Nakhchivan.

Such a move by Azerbaijan would deal a major economic and geostrategic blow to Iran by cutting its only land link of trade and transit to Armenia and thus the entire northern Caucasus. Logically, Israel would support the move in the interest of containing Iran from the north. Azerbaijan’s quiet but close ties with Israel, including its purchases of Israeli military equipment, have long irked Iran and added to rising tensions between the two neighbors in recent days. According to reports this week, Azerbaijan is considering buying Israeli-made Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile systems, one of three flagship interceptor missiles built jointly by Israeli and US producers.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned Oct. 3 against Israeli influence in the region. “The military forces of the region are able to ensure the security of the region and should not allow foreign armies to interfere or have a military presence there to secure their own interests. What is happening in northwestern Iran, in some neighboring countries, should be resolved with the logic of avoiding foreigners’ presence,” he said. In an apparent reference to Turkey’s alleged role in the current standoff between Iran and Azerbaijan, Khamenei warned, “The person who sets a trap for his brothers is the first one to fall into it.” 

Iranian officials have thus far refrained from explicitly targeting Turkey, focusing their attacks on Israel. Baku, for its part, denies any Israeli military presence in Azerbaijan. 

The tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran flared up in mid-September as Azerbaijan began charging fees from Iranian trucks on a road through southern Armenia, a section of which has come under Azerbaijani control as a result of Baku’s territorial gains from last year’s war with Armenia. Azerbaijan has established police and customs checkpoints on the road, which connects the Armenian towns of Goris and Kapan and is in the same region with the envisioned Zangezur corridor.

In response, Iran and Armenia have intensified contacts. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan traveled to Tehran Oct. 4 for talks with his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. The two sides have reportedly agreed to cooperate on the speedy completion of an alternative route bypassing Azerbaijan. 

In further trouble for Armenia, the Georgian authorities have reportedly been keeping about 200 Armenian trucks from crossing to Russia, while letting other vehicles cross the border.

Azerbaijan’s joint military exercises with Georgia and Turkey are of great importance in terms of improving security cooperation, increasing interoperability between their militaries, dominating the airspace of the Caucasus, securing energy pipelines, limiting Armenia’s land connection with Russia and surrounding Armenia geographically from the west, north and northwest. 

Joint military exercises between Azerbaijan and countries neighboring Iran also point to a shift in the strategic balance in the Caucasus. Israel’s strong defense cooperation with Azerbaijan is a clear indication that Iran is now under threat from the north.

A possible operation by Azerbaijan to control a strip connecting Nakhchivan to Nagorno-Karabakh and then mainland Azerbaijan, thus disabling Iran’s direct land passage to Armenia, would cause many stones to be moved in the Caucasus.

In fact, some in Baku have been expecting Armenia to cede the Zangezur area to Azerbaijan instead of paying war reparations over the Nagorno-Karabakh clashes. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly asserted that Armenia’s provision of a corridor to Azerbaijan enabling the free movement of people, vehicles and goods in both directions is a must for normalization and a lasting peaceful solution to the problem. 

Azerbaijan’s increased profile in the area would constitute a major obstacle to Iran’s trade route to the north Caucasus, although the area remains under Armenian sovereignty. The latest row is thus about Baku’s resentment toward Tehran for providing economic sustenance through trade and transit options to its landlocked arch-nemesis, Armenia. 

Such spats between Baku and Yerevan over the implementation of the cease-fire deal have been further exacerbated by recent border tensions. Yerevan has accused Baku of a military buildup at the border, a charge Baku has denied. 

Thus, Tehran is seriously concerned about the risk of a Zangezur corridor falling under Azerbaijani sovereignty in the future and thus losing Iran’s border connection with Armenia.

Also, Iran has been carefully monitoring Israel’s alleged increasing military and intelligence profile in the Caucasus as well as northern Iraq, wary that it could end up contained from both the north and the southwest. Last month, Iranian Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib threatened “active and aggressive” moves against US and Israeli bases in neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan should they try to stoke instability in Iran and urged the expulsion of Iranian-Kurdish dissidents based in Iraqi Kurdistan. In the same vein, Tehran sees Azerbaijan as a Trojan horse letting Israel into the Caucasus.

Russia has offered help for a diplomatic solution of the Zangezur spat through the formation of a border commission, but such efforts have yet to yield tangible results. At the geopolitical level, Russia has been keeping Turkey and Azerbaijan at bay, while trying to keep Armenia under its full domination and defuse Iran’s concerns. However, Russia’s balancing policy is hardly sustainable, given the fragility of the Nagorno-Karabakh deal and the increasing geopolitical complexity in the Caucasus due to the power game between Turkey, Iran and Israel.