Author: Emil Lazarian

Turkish Press
May 12 2006
Press Review
CUMHURIYET
BELGIAN PARLIAMENT TO DEBATE ARMENIAN BILL
A bill to criminalize denial of the so-called Armenian genocide has
been submitted to the Belgian Parliament. The bill, drawn up by
Liberal Party Senators Francois Roelands du Vivier and Christine
Defraigne, aims to penalize those rejecting the so-called Armenian
genocide. The Belgian Parliament’s Justice Commission has not yet set
a date to debate the bill. /Cumhuriyet/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

The New Anatolian, Turkey
May 12 2006
AKP discusses recognition of Algerian ‘genocide’
A ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party deputy on Wednesday
opened a draft bill for signatures that aims at Turkey’s recognition
of a French massacre of 200,000 Algerians between 1954 and 1962 as
“genocide.”
The move mirrors the French Parliament’s current discussions on a
bill that aims to punish those who question Armenian genocide claims
with prison time.
“The rationale of the Algerian draft bill underlines the French
double standards in denying crimes in Algeria and Rwanda and closing
its archives on the one hand, and not hesitating to move on a law
dictating imprisonment for those who question Armenian genocide
claims,” a source from the AK Party told The New Anatolian yesterday.
Although the draft bill succeeded in winning some support from AK
Party deputies, other members of the ruling party opposed bringing
such a bill to Parliament’s discussion floor, saying that
controversial historic issues should be discussed by historians not
parliaments. Opponents of the draft bill also say this contradicts
the Turkish position on the Armenian genocide claims.
The Algerian draft bill is expected to be discussed at an AK Party
group meeting on Tuesday and if approved will be brought to
Parliament.
Turkey has always opposed the debates that have taken place in many
European parliaments on the Armenian genocide claims, some of which
voted for recognition, saying that history should be left to studies
and interpretation by scholars.
In line with the Turkish thesis, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
suggested to Armenian President Robert Kocharian the establishment of
committees composed of Turkish and Armenian historians to study the
controversial events of 1915. Kocharian refused the suggestion,
saying that historian committees could only be established within the
process of a normalization of relations between the two countries.
French massacre of Algerians
The 1954-1962 Algerian War of Independence cost the lives of 1.5
million Algerians, according to the Algerian government, but French
figures for the same period show that just 200,000 were killed.
According to Algerian sources, Muslims were systematically killed at
the time. Senior French officers who fought in Algeria recently
confessed that torture and summary executions were routine grisly
instruments of French warfare. President Jacques Chirac, however,
fiercely opposed a parliamentary inquiry into the killings and said
it is a subject best left for historians to explore.
The Algerian archives were taken to France, and the French archives
for that period are off-limits to historians carrying out genocide
research.
Although the Algerian government has been seeking an apology from
France for its massacre of Algerians and other crimes committed while
the French were the country’s colonial rulers, besides not
apologizing, French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy last month
warned Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika not to overuse the
term “genocide.”
Algeria and France were last year preparing to sign a friendship
treaty, similar to the 1963 Franco-German reconciliation treaty, as
part of efforts to normalize their relations. It was blocked,
however, by the French Parliament’s approval of a law that included a
reference to the “positive role of the French presence overseas,
especially in North Africa,” which provoked a strong reaction from
Algeria.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

The New Anatolian, Turkey
May 12 2006
Socialists insist on bringing Armenian bill to French Parliament
French Socialist Party (PS) Secretary-General Francois Hollande
yesterday expressed his party’s insistence on bringing a bill
stipulating prison terms for questioning the Armenian genocide claims
to the French Parliament’s floor.
Hollande’s remarks came in response to a call from French scholars
and intellectuals urging Parliament to remove the Armenian bill from
the Parliament’s agenda at next Thursday’s gathering, underling that
history should be left to historians.
“I understand historians’ criticism but to debate history is also the
duty of parliaments,” said Hollande, stressing that approval of the
bill by Parliament won’t block historians’ debates on the Armenian
genocide claims.
Urging Turkey to recognize the controversial Armenian events,
Hollande also claimed that one of the requirements for Ankara to
become a member of the European Union is recognition of the genocide
claims.
French historians, in a joint statement on Tuesday, expressed strong
opposition to the PS’ move to bring the Armenian bill to French
Parliament for approval, warning that history teachers will become
“prisoners” if the bill is approved.
The same historians in a joint declaration four months ago called on
Parliament to annual its recognition of the Armenian genocide claims
— taken in 2001 — underlining that parliaments cannot write
history.
Turkish ambassadors return to posts
The Turkish ambassadors to France and Canada, who were recalled to
Turkey for consultations, left Turkey yesterday to return to their
posts.
Turkish Ambassador to France Osman Koruturk and Ambassador to Canada
Aydemir Erman were recalled this week for “a short time” for
consultations, announced the Foreign Ministry on Monday.
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Namik Tan stated that while Ambassador
Koruturk was recalled for consultations concerning the French
Parliament’s possible approval of the Armenian bill, Ambassador Erman
was recalled over Canada’s move to recognize the 1915 events as
“genocide.” “It’s anticipated that the ambassadors will return to
their posts after the consultations,” Tan also said on Monday.
Sezer urges Chirac to block Armenian bill
Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer this week sent a letter to his
French counterpart Jacques Chirac urging him to block the possible
approval of the Armenian bill, underling that it would be to the
advantage of neither country.
Calling on his French counterpart not to take any action that would
to ruin or upset cooperation and friendship between Turkey and
France, Sezer also stressed that approval of the controversial bill
would deal a serious blow to freedom of expression and thought, two
aspects of life that reminded Chirac are important to the French way
of life.
Sezer’s letter followed a similar one from Parliament Speaker Bulent
Arinc to his French counterpart in which Arinc warned French
Parliament not to take a decision that would undermine bilateral
relations between the two countries and efforts towards a
normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia.
In related news, Ankara Chamber of Trade and Commerce (ATO) Chair
Sinan Aygun yesterday sent a letter to its French counterpart calling
on the withdrawal of the Armenian bill, stressing that such a
political move would damage commercial and economic relations between
the two countries as Turkish companies and the Turkish public are
preparing to boycott French goods and services.
Also yesterday Turkish Parliament’s European Union Harmonization
Commission head Yasar Yakis dismissed the consequences of a possible
approval of the Armenian bill, saying that the move won’t affect
Turkey’s EU accession process. “Turkey doesn’t have to do what each
European state wants,” he added.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Hürriyet, Turkey
May 12 2006
Mehmet Y. Yilmaz: I’m heading for Paris with my poster if the
genocide bill becomes law
If the “Armenian Genocide” bill in France becomes law, it will mean
that the French are discounting the very values which they have
defended since their revolution. France will be shelving freedom of
expression and the right to argue over information, even if this
shelving is limited only to one subject.
You know, there is an international organization found in the middle
of Paris which we all recognize: UNESCO. Why doesn’t our Ministry of
Foreign Affairs say “Friends, there is no more academic freedom in
France, let’s move the UNESCO headquarters to a place where academic
freedom actually exists”? There are some things that we can do
ourselves if this bill becomes law:

For example, I will go to Paris if the bill is voted in as law, and
will hold a poster proclaiming “There was no Armenian genocide!” in
front of the central police station in Paris. They will catch me, try
me, and expel me from the country. Then I can go to the European
Court of Human Rights with my carefully plotted out case against
France, and, winning a large sum of money in recompensation for
everything I experienced, I will have taken a large step towards
making my retirement dreams come true.

What I’m trying to say is that, if we all think hard, I think we can
come up with more effective ways of protesting this Armenian genocide
law than through the simple boycotting of French goods. Because let’s
not also forget that many of things which we assume are purely French
products are in fact “made in Turkey.” And the number of Turkish
people involved in the production of these products is over 30
thousand.

So, let’s leave off our laziness, and find creative ways of
protesting!

Transitions Online, Czech Republic
May 12 2006
Georgia’s Contagious Separatism
by David Young
11 May 2006
Georgian leaders promise new roads and development in a bid to subdue
demands for greater autonomy by Armenians in the country’s south.
TBILISI, Georgia | It seems only natural for minorities in the former
Soviet Union to feel a constant pull toward separatism. Their
national borders were drawn almost arbitrarily – often to encourage
conflicts – and a nascent sense of self-determination that followed
the end of Soviet communism certainly plays a role in the region’s
separatism, even today. Georgians, in particular, have witnessed
their share of nationalist struggles, together leaving thousands dead
and hundreds of thousands homeless.
In Georgia’s region of Javakheti, however, the potential for conflict
has always rested just beneath the surface, requiring a greater and
untapped impetus to inspire rebellion. As Georgia’s southernmost
region, Javakheti shares a border with Armenia, but not just a
border: More than 90 percent of its people have language or cultural
ties to the neighboring state. Despite being born in Georgia, few of
these people, many of them descendants of Armenian families moved to
Georgia in the early Soviet period, feel any allegiance to Georgia at
all. Culturally, linguistically, and politically, most Georgian
nationals in Javakheti are Armenian.
And while any unrest in Javakheti pales in comparison to the tension
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia – Georgia’s authentic separatist
regions, which enjoy de facto autonomy under Russian patronage –
Javakheti has all the makings of a civil ethnic conflict. Not only is
Armenian the most common language, but Javakheti has a better
relationship with Yerevan, Armenia’s capital, than it does with the
Georgian capital, Tbilisi. The central government provides little
financial assistance to Javakheti, citing economic difficulties and
limited resources, which inevitably leave the underdeveloped region’s
infrastructure in pieces and the people alienated.
Unlike in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, calls for secession or reunion
with the “home country” have never been quite as loud in Javakheti.
Yet the signs can be read of unrest tethered to economic and cultural
concerns – both typical catalysts for heating up conflicts.
Armenian political groups on both sides of the border continuously
push Tbilisi to give the Armenian language equal official status to
the Georgian tongue in the Javakheti region. Armenian is already
spoken in the schools, despite a law that requires public schools in
Georgia to teach the Georgian language and Georgian history above all
others. Javakheti’s Armenians neither speak the Georgian language nor
know the history of Georgians. When fewer than one in 10 people in
the region speak Georgian and when the local bureaucracies and
infrastructure are entirely sustained by Armenians, such a law could
hardly be enforced.
Javakh Armenians’ demands go beyond language rights. They call for
mandatory teaching of Armenian history in local schools, an end to
the general `Georgianization’ of Armenian culture and heritage, a
Georgian minority rights law, the construction of a highway linking
Javakheti to Yerevan (which Armenia will finance), and the
recognition of Javakheti political movements pushing for the region’s
political autonomy.
RUSSIA AND THE BASE
Perhaps the most important immediate concern for Armenians living in
Javakheti is the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki, the region’s
capital. After years of negotiations, Russia has agreed to withdraw
by the end of 2007 from the base that has been a crutch to
Javakheti’s economy since its opening in the mid-1990s when Georgia
agreed to the Russian military presence in order to stabilize the
recently independent country. Upwards of 10,000 locals are dependent
on the income of the thousand or so, mostly Armenian, workers at the
base. Moreover, the Russian troops consume a big slice of Javakheti’s
farm products – the region’s primary source of income. President
Mikheil Saakashvili has promised that the Georgian government will
fill the void left by the Russian military, whose departure is a
great cause for celebration in Tbilisi, despite years of protest by
Armenians living both in Armenia and Javakheti. Specifically,
Saakashvili proposed to use the produce consumed by Russian troops to
feed Georgian troops instead, but many analysts have suggested that
the region produces far more potatoes and milk than the Georgian army
can consume. Besides, inviting Georgian soldiers to Akhalkalaki would
likely add kindling to the tension. Recognizing this, Saakashvili
altered his remedy on a visit to Javakheti in late April, saying
“We’re not planning to set up a new military unit” there and offering
social programs and business training for people affected by the
Russian pullout.
“These people must not feel they will lose out on the deal. On the
contrary, they must benefit from the fact that Georgia is
developing,” Saakashvili said, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
reported.
Another solution put forward recently by Parliamentary Speaker Nino
Burjanadze is to establish `food processing enterprises’ in
Akhalkalaki to create new jobs. The ethnic Armenians in Javakheti are
understandably skeptical.
For its part, Russia has its own ambitions in a Caucasus that has
looked increasingly to the West to provide its necessary political
and economic support. Armenia happily gives Moscow its desired
influence in the southern Caucasus, in exchange for Russian
protection from Armenia’s neighbors Turkey and Azerbaijan, both of
which maintain strict blockades at their borders with Armenia. The
dispute over Turkish responsibility for the mass killing and abuse of
Armenians during and after World War I has long frozen
Armenian-Turkish relations. And Azerbaijan is no friendlier, having
been humiliated by Russian-backed Armenia in the early 1990s in the
Nagorno-Karabakh war and forced to tolerate an island of
Armenian-dominated land in the middle of its territory.
Yet regardless of any real or exaggerated threat to Armenia, Russia
has always been eager to manipulate the region’s conflicts – much to
Tbilisi’s fury – in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh.
And for years some in Tbilisi have accused Russia of colluding and
inciting conflict in Javakheti, most recently in March after
Armenians stormed a courtroom and a university building in
Akhalkalaki, two days after an ethnic Armenian was killed in a fight
in a neighboring region. As Georgian politicians often do, Parliament
Speaker Burjanadze hinted that outsiders were fomenting separatism
among the Armenian minority. The protests and general unrest in
Javakheti, she suggested, could be attributed to `external forces …
serious forces, who try to trigger destabilization in this region,”
the website Civil Georgia reported. This was seen as a coded punch at
Russia for its military presence in Akhalkalaki. Some Tbilisi
officials alleged that weapons belonging to Parvents, a Javakh
paramilitary group, could be traced to the Akhalkalaki base and were
used in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Naturally, Russia continues to
deny this, and as recently as 26 April, Georgia’s own interior
minister, Vano Merabishvili, said Moscow has had nothing to do with
the recent unrest in Javakheti, despite Russia’s regional interests.
MOUTHPIECES
Much of the public outcry over Tbilisi’s poor treatment of its
Armenian citizens actually comes from political parties in the
Armenian ruling coalition, which have a greater capacity for
political mudslinging than their relatively disorganized and
inexperienced Javakh counterparts. One party, Zor Airenik (Mighty
Homeland) was even formed by natives of Javakheti who now live in
Armenia (there are more than 100,000 such emigrants, most of whom
left for economic reasons). And other parties, such as Nor Serund
(New Generation), the Armenian Democratic-Liberal Union, and Ramkavar
Azatakan all have similar agendas for the security the Armenians in
Javakheti who, they say, live in fear of ethnically motivated
harassment and violence. Nearly all these parties argue that
increased political autonomy and self-governance in Javakheti are
warranted given Javakheti’s ostracized culture and its security
concerns.
These moderate parties often call on the Saakashvili administration
to pay more attention to the needs of Javakheti and its residents,
while seldom encouraging the outright secession of Javakheti. Merely
calling for `political autonomy’ was deemed separatist enough for
Tbilisi to prohibit Virk, a local political movement in Javakheti,
from registering as a political party in July 2002. No wonder then
that most ethnic Armenians who run for Georgia’s parliament do so
under the auspices of a mainstream party – like Saakashvili’s
National Movement Party – while openly defending the interests of
Georgia’s ethnic Armenians.
The Armenian lobby in the Georgian parliament is far from united,
though. A handful of parliamentarians, among them Van Baiburt, a
native of Javakheti, often hear voices saying they aren’t hard enough
for Javakh interests. On 16 March, Baiburt caused grumbling in
Javakheti when he said, `The Georgian authorities are not imposing
any restrictions on Georgia’s Armenian population,’ and went on, `The
government has agreed to allow official business to be conducted in
Armenian in the area’ because Tbilisi understands that it is
`unreasonable’ to expect and demand that Armenians suddenly speak
Georgian. And in any case, he noted, it is unrealistic for
Javakheti’s civil society to demand a heightened status for the
Armenian language in Javakheti.
In an October 2005 interview, Baiburt even indicated that he believed
Russia and Armenian radicals were to blame for Javakheti’s dangerous
separatist leanings. Unsurprisingly, then, Javakheti’s moderate
politicians – and certainly the radical ones – feel abandoned by
politicians like Baiburt. As a result, Javakh Armenians feel they
must look for help from Armenia and, to a lesser extent, Javakheti’s
local government and civil society.
In response, the Georgian government and media often paint
Javakheti’s Armenian advocacy groups as instigators of separatist and
anti-Tbilisi sentiment in the region, and the authorities cite such
concerns as a basis for keeping civil-society groups from becoming
recognized political parties. While Virk’s political ambition has
received the most attention, other local civic organizations, such as
the United Javakh-Democratic Alliance (a union of eight youth
organizations) and Javakh, another group also pushing for political
autonomy, are encountering equal resistance for allegedly instigating
violence. Virk leader David Rstakian, however, attributes the
relative calm in Javakheti (compared to South Ossetia and Abkhazia)
to the restraint of these demonized groups, which he says actually
prevent Armenian protests from escalating into outright separatism.
In the past, Rstakian has also insisted that outright secession or
reunion with Armenia is not necessary to ensure the safety and
prosperity of the Javakh people.
The United Javakh-Democratic Alliance leader takes a less measured
tone. Vahan Chakhalian has said that the Russian withdrawal will
leave local Armenians defenseless and that his organization would be
forced to retaliate if Georgian troops tried to use the base –
regardless of whether they, too, would purchase much of the locally
grown produce. Such declarations are eerily similar to those put
forward by Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatists in the early
1990s, immediately preceding two very bloody and still unresolved
conflicts.
On the other side of the border, Dashnaktsutiun, a radical
century-old political party in Armenia and a member, although not an
influential one, in the ruling parliamentary coalition, often reacts
heatedly to Tbilisi’s policies in Javakheti, even warning that
discriminatory policies in Javakheti give the people `no other choice
than the use of force to protect their interests and dignity.’
So far, the bulk of the political parties and movements in Javakheti
are not pushing for violent resistance, but they are pushing for
cultural and political autonomy, if not outright secession and
reunification with Armenia. But Javakh Armenians may not need much
saber rattling to push them over the edge, as events in the last year
illustrate.
APPROACHING THE THRESHOLD
The past year has seen local Armenians take to the streets on several
occasions, flying several metaphorical banners of resistance. In
March 2005, 6,000 Javakh Armenians rallied in Akhalkalaki to protest
a resolution in the Georgian parliament that called for the
withdrawal of the Russian base. They also aired many other
grievances.
In July, Armenians from the city of Samsar refused to allow a group
of students and nuns from Tbilisi to restore a nearby medieval
church, accusing them of intent to `Georgianize’ the Armenian church
and culture. The dispute quickly turned physical and left a number of
people seriously injured. The same day, in Akhalkalaki, a number of
Javakh Armenians and Greeks decried “Georgianization” in a protest at
a Georgian school.
In October, Tbilisi tax officials closed 10 small Armenian-owned
shops in Akhalkalaki for financial irregularities, setting off
protests by hundreds in front of the district’s state administration
building. Local police tried to disband the demonstrators with rubber
truncheons and by firing gunshots into the air, injuring many of
them.
And this year on 9 March, an ethnic Armenian was killed in a bar
fight in Tsalka, a city in Javakheti’s neighboring Kvemo-Kartli
region; soon afterward, hundreds of ethnic Armenians marched in
memory of the man they called a victim of the climate of ethnic
intolerance. The jail holding the suspected killers was soon
surrounded by protesters calling for swift justice.
Only two days later, Armenians gathered in Akhalkalaki to protest the
dismissal of an ethnic Armenian judge, the latest of several fired
(the protestors said) for not knowing and using the Georgian language
in court. To reinforce the now-frequent demand that the Armenian
tongue be given equal status with Georgian, the protesters raided a
local courtroom, ousted a Georgian judge, and then stormed a Georgian
Orthodox church and the local branch of Tbilisi State University.
United Javakh issued a statement condemning the judges’ dismissals as
`cynically trampling on the rights of the Armenian-populated region.’
More broadly, the statement warned that the “destructive trends in
the Georgian government’s policy” illustrated Tbilisi’s desire to
`crush the will of Javakh’s Armenian population to protect its right
to live in its motherland.”
A Georgian ombudsman quickly tried to cut the tension with a finding
that the Tsalka bar fight was merely a `communal crime’ with no
ethnic basis, and other Georgian officials continue to maintain that
the judges were fired for misconduct alone. Nevertheless, in the past
Tbilisi has appointed a number of judges in Javakheti who speak no
Armenian and must use translators to conduct judicial proceedings,
much to the frustration of local Armenians, who charge Tbilisi with
cultural imperialism.
In the last two months, Javakhetians have held a number of organized
and spontaneous protest rallies and physically blockaded the Russian
military withdrawal. Eager to facilitate the departure of the Russian
troops, Saakashvili on 28 April asked his Armenian counterpart,
Robert Kocharian, to help ease the tension in Javakheti.
MEETING HALFWAY?
While visiting Akhalkalaki on 19 April, Saakashvili pledged to put an
end to Javakheti’s isolation in Georgia, beginning with the
construction of a road from Akhalkalaki to the capital of the
neighboring Samtskhe region, Akhaltsikhe, and another connecting
Akhalkalaki to Tbilisi. Funded by the U.S. Millennium Challenge
Account, these infrastructure developments would boost local
agriculture and attract new business to the area. “Roads and
development: These are what Javakheti needs now,” he said.
With policies like these, it seems that Tbilisi is hoping to recruit
friendly Javakh Armenians by encouraging interaction between
Georgia’s diverse ethnicities. Georgian decision makers may reckon
that better transport will lead to better cooperation and perhaps
enough assimilation to quell separatist rhetoric and ambitions.
In fact, if national policies like these actually come to fruition,
they could help integrate and intertwine the Georgian and Armenian
communities through significant economic and humanitarian gains. But
these are not the gains that the Armenians insist they need most: For
instance, Javakheti will get an important highway, but it traverses
the 300 kilometers to Tbilisi, not Yerevan.
Tbilisi refuses to give Javakheti a broader self-governance or
autonomy package because such policies are seen as just as likely to
isolate Javakheti even further. Worse still, loosening the leash
might set a dangerous precedent for successful separatism. So it
seems, then, that the politicians have no choice but to return to the
scales and reset the balance for another day of gambling, perhaps
hoping simply to break even.

David Young works for the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and
International Studies in Tbilisi.

Turkish Press
May 11 2006
Press Review
MILLIYET
FRENCH PARLIAMENT COMMISSION REJECTS ARMENIAN BILL
The Foreign Relations Commission of France’s Parliament yesterday
rejected a bill to criminalize denial of the so-called Armenian
genocide. However, the bill is still set to be considered by the
General Assembly next Thursday. /Milliyet/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Turkish Press
May 11 2006
Press Review
TURKIYE
IN FRANCE, GENDARMERIE COMMANDER TO WARN APPROVAL OF ARMENIAN BILL
WOULD HURT TIES; FRENCH BUSINESSMEN PRESS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF BILL
Gendarmerie General Commander Fevzi Turkeri, currently in France for
an official visit, is set to tell his French counterparts that Ankara
is very sensitive about the so-called Armenian genocide issue. He is
expected to meet with his counterparts and say that approval of the
Armenian bill by France’s Parliament would hurt relations between the
two countries. In related news, leading French businessmen say that
the Armenian bill should be withdrawn as soon as possible, warning
that France could lose the Turkish market worth $4.7 billion.
/Turkiye/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Arka News Agency, Armenia
May 11 2006
ARMENIAN PRESIDENT RECEIVES KILIKIA ARMENIAN SHIP’S CREW
YEREVAN, May 11. /ARKA/. Armenian President Robert Kocharyan received
Thursday Kilikia Armenian ship’s crew, presidential press service
told ARKA News Agency. The crew members will travel to London on May
14 to prepare the ship for voyage.
President Kocharyan wished them good luck in their voyage. He said
that negotiations with special overseas companies over construction
of a berth in Lake Sevan are under way now.
The crew members discussed with Kocharyan yachting development
prospects in Armenia. The President pledged support.
At the moment, the ship is in a British harbor. It will start its
voyage on May 28, cross Northern Sea and Baltic Sea and reach Saint
Petersburg in August. Then the ship will sail through river way to
Georgian harbor of Poti. Eventually the ship will be brought to
Armenia.
Kilikia is constructed by Hayas, Yerevan Sea Exploration Club, like
trade ships of 13 century, on which Kilikian merchants sailed.
The ship construction took 11 years – from May 1991 to May 2001. M.V.
-0—
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

From: Assembly
Subject: AAA: US Amb To Azerbaijan Nominee Affirms Commitment to Peaceful Res
Armenian Assembly of America
1140 19th Street, NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: 202-393-3434
Fax: 202-638-4904
Email: [email protected]
Web:
PRESS RELEASE
May 12, 2006
CONTACT: Christine Kojoian
E-mail: [email protected]
U.S. AMBASSADOR TO AZERBAIJAN NOMINEE AFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL
RESOLUTION OF NK CONFLICT
Senator Sarbanes submits questions for the hearing record
Washington, DC – During her Senate confirmation hearing today,
Ambassador-designate Anne Derse reiterated U.S. policy for a peaceful,
mutually acceptable resolution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict,
stating that “a return to violence would be a tragedy.”
Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), a senior member of the Foreign Relations
Committee, submitted a series of questions for the record, including
the government of Azerbaijan’s continuing war rhetoric and other
bellicose actions taken against Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh.
Specifically, the Senator inquired about the impact of such acts on
the Karabakh peace process, and what steps will be taken to end
Azerbaijan’s ongoing blockade of Armenia.
Further, he addressed Azerbaijan’s attempts to isolate Armenia via a
proposed railway that would connect Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey,
but not traverse Armenia. The Senator also raised questions regarding
the decision of the Administration to provide asymmetrical military
assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as on Azerbaijan’s human
rights record.
“The Assembly commends Senator Sarbanes for his outstanding leadership
on these issues of great significance,” said Assembly Board of
Trustees Executive Committee Member Annie Totah.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard G. Lugar (R-IN)
asked Derse about the status of the Karabakh issue and her general
assessment of democracy in the Azerbaijan. Lugar added that
Azerbaijan will not reach its full potential if the rule of law is not
improved.
Derse responded that if confirmed, she will work toward expanding and
strengthening U.S.-Azerbaijan security cooperation and help promote
democracy and governance. She said a peaceful settlement to the
Nagorno Karabakh conflict is critical to achieving this goal and
expressed hope that President of Armenia Robert Kocharian and
President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev will work together on this issue.
She further stated that as Co-Chair of the Minsk Group, the U.S. will
also urge Armenia and Azerbaijan to remain engaged in the process and
demonstrate political courage. Derse also expressed her commitment to
work with both countries towards a peaceful resolution.
“We appreciate Ambassador-designate Derse’s intentions to promote
democracy in Azerbaijan and the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict,” said Totah. “But the Nagorno Karabakh problem
calls for the full commitment of the United States to require
Azerbaijan to end its threats of renewed warfare and to defend the
right of the population of Nagorno Karabakh to determine its political
future through a democratic government of their free choice. Regional
security, economic prosperity, and peace will be possible only if
these principles are followed.”
On the issue of good governance, Derse stressed the importance of a
genuine effort by Azerbaijan to respect human rights in order to
pursue democratic reform and ensure long-term political stability.
Derse most recently served as Director for Bio Defense Policy at the
Homeland Security Council at the White House. Prior to this, she
served as Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs at the United States
Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq. Earlier in her career, she served as
Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs at the United States Mission
to the European Union in Brussels, Belgium.
The Armenian Assembly of America is the largest Washington-based
nationwide organization promoting public understanding and awareness
of Armenian issues. It is a 501 (c) (3) tax-exempt membership
organization.
###
NR#2006-049
Editor’s Note: Attached are the questions Senator Sarbanes submitted
for the hearing record.
1. What steps will you take in response to President Aliyev’s
increasingly belligerent rhetoric and actions, such as his threats to
restart the war against Nagorno-Karabakh, his call for a return of
Nagorno-Karabakh “no matter what it takes,” and his proposals for vast
increases in military spending? What impact do you believe such
actions will have on the prospects for a negotiated settlement in
Nagorno-Karabakh?
2. Despite U.S. and international calls for regional cooperation and
economic integration, Turkey and Azerbaijan continue their illegal
decade-long blockade of land-locked Armenia. Azerbaijan and Turkey
are now escalating this policy of isolation by planning to build a
railroad line to connect Turkey and Azerbaijan, excluding Armenia.
There is currently legislation pending that would prevent any
U.S. financing of the approximately $800 million venture. Do you
intend to raise concerns about the railway? What steps will you take
to end Azerbaijan’s blockade of Armenia?
3. In the aftermath of September 11th, Congress granted the President
limited and conditional authority to waive Section 907 of the Freedom
Support Act, with the understanding that the administration would
ensure military parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, in
this year’s budget, the President requested over $1 million more in
military aid for Azerbaijan than for Armenia. On what basis has the
administration decided to depart from its previous commitment to
provide equal amounts of military assistance for Armenia and
Azerbaijan?
4. Do you believe that Azerbaijan deserved to be elected to the UN
Human Rights Council? How did the U.S. vote on Azerbaijan’s
candidacy? What steps will you take to improve respect for human
rights in Azerbaijan?
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly
Vol. 6, No. 10, 12 May 2006
A Weekly Review of News and Analysis of Russian Domestic Politics
**************************************** ********************
HEADLINES
* PLANE CRASH REVEALS CRACKS IN MOSCOW-YEREVAN TIES
* EU MAINTAINS CODEPENDENT ENERGY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA
* THE RECURRING FEAR OF RUSSIAN GAS DEPENDENCY
* INTERVIEW: WILL RUSSIA’S OIL WINDFALL GO TO MILITARY?
**************************************** ********************
PLANE CRASH REVEALS CRACKS IN MOSCOW-YEREVAN TIES. The fatal crash of
an Armenian airliner near the Russian resort town of Sochi on May 3
has revealed tensions in the usually warm relations between Yerevan
and Moscow.
Many in Armenia believe the crash — the worst in
Armenia’s history, with 113 deaths — was the result of poor
recommendations by Russian air-traffic controllers. But such claims
may only be the cover for deeper concerns about the impending advance
of the Russian gas giant Gazprom and growing racism in Russia
directed in part at natives of the Caucasus.
Hmayak Hovhanisian, the chairman of the Armenian Association
of Political Scientists, says it is too early to tell if the
controversy will have a lasting impact on relations between the two
countries.
“It depends on how the investigation proceeds,” he notes. “If
the black boxes aren’t recovered and the real causes of the
disaster aren’t explained in a way that is clear for everyone, it
will have a negative effect on Russian-Armenian relations.”
Recovery work is continuing following the May 3 crash of the
Armenian Airbus A320. So far divers have located fewer than half of
the 113 victims, the vast majority of whom were Armenians.
The concurrent investigation into the crash is ongoing as
well, under the joint supervision of Russian Transport Minister Igor
Levitin and Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisian.
But so far few clues have been revealed about the probable
cause of the crash. Without the black-box flight recorders,
investigators lack critical information about the flight crew’s
actions in the moments before the plane nose-dived into the Black Sea
off the Sochi coast.
The lack of information has angered Armenians, who believe
the pilot may have crashed after being told by Russian air-traffic
controllers to resume preparation for landing despite poor weather
conditions. Georgian air officials had earlier recommended the plane
turn back.
While observers like Hovhanisian note that the responsibility
for final decisions ultimately rests with the pilot, and not the
air-traffic controllers, many Armenians — including those in the
political opposition — are concerned by Russia’s role in the
crash. They have also expressed doubt that an investigation led in
part by Russia will be fully honest.
Russia and Armenia have long enjoyed strong strategic ties.
Russia maintains a military base on Armenian soil, and the two
countries are partner to a landmark treaty in which Moscow has
committed itself to defend Armenia militarily in the event it is
attacked from outside — an apparent reference to its historic enemy,
Turkey.
It has also helped to prevent further outbreaks of violence
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.
Armenia has also remained a loyal member of both the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the CIS Collective
Security Treaty. This is something that sets Armenia apart from its
disgruntled South Caucasus neighbor Georgia, which has tense
relations with Moscow and has threatened to withdraw from the CIS.
But many Armenians remain resentful of Russia. This is due in
part to what is viewed as mounting racism in Russia. Skinheads were
believed to be behind the killing in April of a 17-year-old Armenian
in Moscow.
Many Armenians also accuse Russia of seeking to monopolize
the country’s energy industry. Eduard Aghajanov, an independent
political analyst in Yerevan, says Russia is not treating Armenia
like an equal partner.
“Many already don’t believe that [Russia] is a ally,
because the way Russia deals with Armenia in its foreign policy is
not the way a strategic partner would behave,” Aghajanov says.
“It’s the way it would treat a vassal.”
Armenia recently agreed to hand over a portion of its state
energy assets to Russia’s state-run gas giant Gazprom, in order
to prevent a threat to double gas prices. Gazprom has raised
natural-gas prices for nearly all of its CIS clients this year, but
Armenia, due to its compliance, saw a hike of just 10 percent.
Gazprom is now set to assume control of a major Armenian
power plant, and may also obtain a controlling share of a planned
Armenian-Iranian gas pipeline. The deal is expected to give Moscow
near-total control over the Armenian energy sector.
Observers in Russia are more sanguine about the deal. Boris
Makarenko, deputy director of the Moscow-based Center for Political
Technologies, says Gazprom’s policy in Armenia is no different
than those in other countries.
Makarenko says anti-Russian sentiment has recently become
more “fashionable” in Yerevan. But on the whole, he adds, relations
between Moscow and Yerevan can be held up as an ideal in the CIS
neighborhood. “Speaking objectively, Russia has fewer problems in
relations with Armenia than with any other post-Soviet state,” he
says. (Valentinas Mite)
EU MAINTAINS CODEPENDENT ENERGY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA. The
European Union’s apparent dependence on Russian oil and gas
imports has been the source of much debate in recent months, as
Moscow has shown its willingness to wield its influence as an energy
supplier for political gain. But at a high-level conference on energy
security held in Brussels on May 10, senior European officials noted
that Russia will need massive injections of foreign capital to retain
its dominant position as a supplier to Europe’s energy market.
BRUSSELS, May 11, 2006 (RFE/RL) — It is clear that when it
comes to the energy trade, Russia and the EU are mutually dependent
on each other.
The EU looks to Russia for 30 percent of its oil imports and
about half of its imported gas. Russia’s economy, meanwhile, is
fueled to a great extent by the revenue it generates by exporting
energy to Europe’s massive energy market.
Likewise, while recent threats by Russia to look east for
future gas and oil exports have made EU legislators nervous, some
attending yesterday’s conference on energy security noted that
Russia will require foreign investment to keep up with rising EU
energy needs.
Among those in attendance was former Russian Prime Minister
Mikhail Kasyanov, who said Russia must take “urgent action” to avoid
a sharp decline in its output of natural gas. However, he said,
Russia’s recent efforts to establish greater central control over
“strategic” assets have damaged the country’s investment climate.
“That creates a big problem for [the] overall investment
process, [for] those investments which [are] badly needed in Russia
right now, so [as to] raise the production of energy to satisfy our
internal and general European demand,” Kasyanov said. “[The] lack of
different foreign investment is much more risky for Russia since it
badly needs capital to be invested in the national energy sector.”
Senior European Commission official Christian Cleutinx
estimated that by 2020, the EU’s energy needs will rise by 200
million metric tons of gas per year. But he says that according to
Russia’s most recent energy strategy, the country envisions
expanding its total level of gas exports by just 50 million metric
tons by that time.
Cleutinx says that amount would meet only a quarter of
Europe’s future needs, not taking into account Russia’s other
export markets.
“So, you see immediately the big difference there is between
the exports that Russia on the basis of the current plan can deliver
into the world markets — because we’re not talking about 50
[million] tonnes of oil equivalent [going only] to Europe, it’s
to the CIS, to Turkey, it be might the United States, and we need an
increase of 200 [million tonnes],” Cleutinx said.
Cleutinx estimates that Russia would need $200 billion to
meet its export targets. Overall, the European Commission says Russia
would need $735 billion to modernize its energy sector by 2020. (Ahto
Lobjakas)
THE RECURRING FEAR OF RUSSIAN GAS DEPENDENCY. U.S. Vice President
Dick Cheney’s recent criticism of Russia for using natural gas as
a political weapon is by no means new. Similar charges leveled 24
years ago during the Cold War resulted in an embargo on the sale of
gas-extracting equipment to the Soviet Union and to the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) purported destruction of a Soviet gas
pipeline.
In 1982, as the Soviet Union was beginning construction of a
$22 billion, 4,650-kilometer gas pipeline from Urengoi in northwest
Siberia to Uzhhorod in Ukraine with the intention of supplying
Western Europe, the CIA issued a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
titled “The Soviet Gas Pipeline in Perspective.”
The NIE, regarded as the definitive product of the U.S.
intelligence community, reached several conclusions, among them that
the Soviet Union “calculates that the increased future dependence of
the West Europeans on Soviet gas deliveries will make them more
vulnerable to Soviet coercion and will become a permanent factor in
their decision making on East-West issues.”
In addition, according to the NIE, the Soviets “have used the
pipeline issue to create and exploit divisions between Western Europe
and the United States. In the past, the Soviets have used West
European interest in expanding East-West commerce to undercut U.S.
sanctions, and they believe successful pipeline deals will reduce
European willingness to support future U.S. economic actions against
the USSR.”
The Urengoi gas field, located in northwest Siberia’s
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, was one of the largest Soviet gas
fields. The main customers for Urengoi gas were West Germany, France,
and Italy.
The initial volume of the pipeline was to be 40 billion cubic
meters per year, which would mean that Soviet gas could account for
30 percent of German and French gas imports, and 40 percent of
Italy’s. Such figures were approaching a dependency level too
great for the White House to accept.
Washington apparently dealt with these concerns in a direct
manner initially. In January 1982, U.S. President Ronald Reagan
purportedly approved a CIA plan to sabotage a second, unidentified
gas pipeline in Siberia by turning the Soviet Union’s desire for
Western technology against it. The operation was first disclosed in
the memoirs of Thomas C. Reed, a former Air Force secretary who was
serving in the National Security Council at the time. In “At the
Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War,” Reed wrote:
“In order to disrupt the Soviet gas supply, its hard-currency
earnings from the West, and the internal Russian economy, the
pipeline software that was to run the pumps, turbines, and valves was
programmed to go haywire, after a decent interval, to reset pump
speeds and valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those
acceptable to pipeline joints and welds.
“The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and
fire ever seen from space,” he recalled, adding that U.S. satellites
picked up the explosion. Reed said in an interview that the blast
occurred in the summer of 1982.
The sabotage operation, however, did not halt the
construction of the Urengoi pipeline. The CIA was forced to revise
its tactics.
Responding to the Soviet leadership’s support for the
1981 crackdown on Poland’s Solidarity movement, Reagan announced
a program of sanctions on companies selling gas-drilling equipment
and turbines for gas-compressor stations to the Soviet Union while
urging European states not to buy Soviet gas.
Officially it was declared that this was in retaliation for
Soviet support for martial law in Poland. But it is also plausible
that the strategy was meant to ease U.S. concerns about the
construction of the Urengoi-Uzhhorod gas pipeline.
The embargo, however, was easier to declare than to
implement.
Norwegian scholar Ole Gunnar Austvik wrote in an article
titled “The U.S. Embargo of Soviet Gas in 1982” that a delegation
under the auspices of the U.S. State Department sought to induce the
Western Europeans not to buy Soviet gas and to choose alternative
sources of energy.
“The arguments in favor of such diversion were close to our
notion of economic warfare, even though the whole range of arguments
was actually used. An economically strong Soviet Union is more
dangerous than a weak one,” Austvik wrote. “The U.S. compensation
package contained two main components; American coal and Norwegian
gas were presented as alternatives to Soviet gas.”
Neither alternative, however, existed. The United States did
not produce enough coal to meet Europe’s needs and even if it
did, the logistics of transporting it there were overwhelming.
Furthermore, at the time Norway’s gas production was not
sufficient to replace Soviet gas. By November 1982, after the United
States increased its grain sales to the USSR, the gas sanctions were
terminated.
Originally, the Urengoi pipeline was projected to go through
East Germany, but the West German government protested and it was
rerouted through Soviet Ukraine. The West Germans were concerned that
in the event of a crisis, the East Germans could turn off the valves
and stop supplies. Soviet Ukraine was seen as the more reliable
transit route.
The 1982 NIE states that the West Europeans’ prime energy
goal at the time was to “reduce their dependence on OPEC,” at the
time a significant Western concern arising from the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil boycott of 1973. The oil
crisis that ensued from that boycott may have fueled U.S. concerns
regarding Soviet gas, lest the Soviet Union someday copy OPEC’s
tactic.
In November 1983, the CIA issued another NIE, titled “Soviet
Energy Prospects Into the 1990s,” which, in many ways, foresaw the
current predicament.
“If Moscow lands contracts to supply even half of the West
European gas-demand gap now foreseen for the 1990s, an additional
pipeline…would be required…and dependence on Soviet gas could
approach 50 percent of gas consumption for major West European
countries, far in excess of the 30 percent share that we and some
West European governments regard as a critical threshold for
political risk” the NIE stated. (Roman Kupchinsky)
INTERVIEW: WILL RUSSIA’S OIL WINDFALL GO TO MILITARY? WASHINGTON
May 11, 2006 (RFE/RL) — While Russian President Vladimir Putin
focused on domestic political issues in his annual
state-of-the-nation address to the Federal Assembly on May 10, he did
mention making new purchases of nuclear submarines and boosting the
“procurement of modern aircraft, submarines, and strategic missiles
for the armed forces.”
RFE/RL correspondent Julie A. Corwin asked Brian D. Taylor,
an expert on the Russian military at Syracuse University’s
Maxwell School and author of “Politics and the Russian Army:
Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000,” to put Putin’s remarks in
context.
RFE/RL: In his annual address, Putin talked about
commissioning two strategic nuclear submarines among other military
expenditures. Is this how Russia is going to spend its new oil
wealth? Does this represent a real commitment to higher military
spending or is this a just bone thrown to the military?
Brian Taylor: He obviously [has been] flush with oil and gas
money over the last few years, and it has shown up in defense
expenditures really starting around 2002 or so. But at the same time
he himself notes in the annual address this year that they
shouldn’t expect to match the U.S. or even countries like France
and Britain in terms of how much they’re outlaying on defense.
There is some need for certain investments in strategic
nuclear forces given that there was very little investment in those
in the 1990s, but it doesn’t mean that we are looking at a new
nuclear arms race. You know, I think it’s probably real that they
are going to be spending more money in this area but it’s nothing
that from the U.S. perspective that should be seen as alarming or
worrying.
RFE/RL: So the procurement budget has already been going up?
Taylor: The procurement budget has been going up — that is
certainly true, but we shouldn’t overestimate the extent to which
things have really sort of taken off. And we also shouldn’t
overestimate what impact that will have on military performance,
because military performance depends on a lot of other things other
than weapons systems.
And he [Putin] didn’t have anything really to say — or
he didn’t have much to say in the speech about that. He talked a
bit about some of the changes in personnel policy in short term of
the draft and getting more NCOs [noncommissioned officers] and
sergeants and that sort of thing.
But that’s been something they have been talking about
for quite some time, too, and it doesn’t seem to have had a big
impact in terms of reducing certain dysfunctional elements of serving
in the Russian military, like hazing and death from suicide and death
from accidents and the fact that most people don’t want to send
their kids to serve in the military.
RFE/RL: Why not use some of the oil money to recruit soldiers
and make the army fully professional? Perhaps with the right
recruitment bonus, young men wouldn’t try so hard to avoid the
draft?
Taylor: I think people would come for certain amounts of
money. I mean there are people particularly in rural areas and
certain working-class families who see it as a viable option. So they
have increased the so-called professional component of their armed
forces over time and they’re reducing — in fact they’ve
eliminated in terms of the armed forces sending draftees to Chechnya.
And there is this sort of long-term trajectory towards creating more
professional forces.
But again, this is old rhetoric. I mean if you go back to
[former President Boris] Yeltsin and when he ran for president the
second time in 1996, he was going to end the draft and create a
professional military.
RFE/RL: So what’s the U.S. reaction to this speech likely
to be?
Taylor: I don’t really think the U.S. will respond in any
sort of serious way, rhetorical or otherwise, and I really don’t
think the U.S. should or needs to. If you just look at the trajectory
in terms of nuclear forces, which is the one area in which he made
some specific commitments today, the U.S. is well out ahead of Russia
in terms of developing new systems — in deploying new systems, and
the number of warheads available.
And really we’re in a situation in which the U.S.
probably has a much larger nuclear arsenal than it needs and the
trends are sort of down, over time, and somewhat consistent with
certain arms-control treaties, although those don’t have a lot of
teeth. And Russia is going to continue over time to let the size of
its nuclear force reduce, too, as older systems go offline.
RFE/RL: So in conclusion it sounds like you don’t think
the Russian military will be the recipient of the “oil dividend”?
Taylor: They’re going to be one of the beneficiaries of
an oil-and-gas dividend, but there are other things that Putin wants
to spend the money on, too, He’s got his whole national projects
in terms of education, agriculture, housing, and those sorts of
things. And in terms of delivering voters to his anointed successor
in 2008, if that’s the plan, spending the money on the national
projects seems like a better way to try and attract voters, assuming
that elections matter, than spending it on nuclear submarines.
************************************* ********************
Copyright (c) 2006. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.
The “RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly” is prepared
on the basis of a variety of sources. It is distributed every
Wednesday.
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress