Author: Emil Lazarian

HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE ARABS
By Robert Satloff
Newsweek (International Edition)
Nov 12 2006
Even for the most empathetic Arabs, the Holocaust is still a faraway
event-Europeans killing their own-for which they paid a price.
Nov. 20, 2006 issue – A moroccan cartoonist recently took top honors,
worth $12,000, in a contest lampooning the Holocaust, sponsored by
Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Instead of echoing the crass
anti-Semitism that nowadays issues from Tehran, Moroccans and other
Arabs might better have cited their rich history with Jews and the
Holocaust to put Ahmadinejad in his place.
In North Africa and the Middle East, discussion of the Holocaust has
tended to take one of three forms. One is outright denial, favored
by demagogues ranging from secular nationalists like Egypt’s Gamal
Abdul Nasser, who 40 years ago said that “no person takes seriously
the lie of the six million Jews that were murdered,” to religious
radicals like Hizbullah’s Hassan Nasrallah, who once proclaimed that
“Jews invented the legend of the Holocaust.” At the opposite end
of the spectrum are what I call Holocaust glorifiers. These Hitler
cheerleaders are best exemplified by the editorial writers at Egypt’s
state-owned al-Akhbar newspaper, who have praised the Final Solution
and only lamented the fact that the Nazis didn’t finish the job.
Most Arabs settle between these extremes in a sort of “Holocaust
relativism.” They admit that Jews suffered during World War II but
dispute both the numbers and the unique depravity of the Final
Solution. “In war, bad things happen,” they tend to say, citing
mass killings of Armenians, Kurds or Cambodians to suggest that the
Jewish experience was nothing special. Thus Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad told U.S. TV host Charlie Rose earlier this year that
he doesn’t have “any clue how [Jews] were killed or how many were
killed,” while moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas authored
a Soviet-era doctoral dissertation that questioned the number of Jews
killed. Even for the most empathetic Arabs, the Holocaust is still
a faraway event-Europeans killing their own-for which, they say,
the Palestinians have paid a price in the creation of Israel.
Five years ago, shortly after September 11, my family and I moved to
Rabat to begin a research project that I hoped would change the way
Arabs think about the Holocaust. My man-bites-dog idea was simple.
Not a single Arab is among the more than 20,000 non-Jews recognized by
Yad Vashem, Israel’s official memorial to the Holocaust, for rescuing
Jews from the threat of death. This didn’t make sense to me, given
that North Africa, with more than a half-million Jews, was such a
critical front of the war. If I could find even a single story of
an Arab who saved a Jew, I thought, perhaps it could serve as a tool
for transforming the Holocaust into a source of pride for the region,
rather than a target of denial.
I soon learned that the Holocaust, while overwhelmingly a European
story, was an Arab story, too. From June 1940 to May 1943, the Nazis
and their allies controlled North Africa and exported across the
Mediterranean many elements of the Final Solution, from slave labor
camps to the Yellow Star. Arabs responded remarkably like Europeans:
most were indifferent to the fate of the Jews, a sizable percentage
willingly collaborated in the persecution of Jews, and a small but
symbolically important group of Arabs helped and even saved Jews.
Perpetrators ranged from Arab guards who tortured Jews in Vichy
“punishment camps” in Algeria and Morocco to Arab interpreters in
Tunisia who went house to house with SS officers pointing out Jews.
These ordinary Arabs are best represented by a Tunisian named Hassen
Ferjani, convicted by a Free French tribunal in 1943 for a conspiracy
that led to the deportation to Germany-and subsequent execution-of
three Jewish men, a father and his two sons.
The heroes have names, too. They include men such as Si Ali Sakkat,
a former mayor of Tunis who opened his mountainside farm to 60 Jews
escaping from a labor camp, and the dashing Khaled Abdelwahhab, son
of a celebrated Tunisian author, who spirited several Jewish families
from their hostel in the middle of the night to protect one of them-a
beautiful blond, blue-eyed Jewish woman-from being raped by a German
officer. I also found tales of many Arabs whose names we don’t know:
the Arab wet nurse who took in Jewish children when milk was scarce;
the Arab baker who squirreled away extra bread for Jewish families when
Vichy rations penalized Jews most of all; the Arab shepherds who opened
their modest homes to Jewish families fleeing bombed-out villages.
These stories of villains and heroes constitute the real-life Arab
experience of the Holocaust. Arabs don’t have to take a lesson from
the president of Iran. In fact, they could teach him a few things.
Satloff, director of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is
the author of ‘Among the Righteous: Lost Stories From the Holocaust’s
Long Reach Into Arab Lands’
week/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

BLOOD ON THEIR HANDS
by Andrew Wallis
Reviewed By Rw Johnson
The Sunday Times, UK
Nov 12 2006
SILENT ACCOMPLICE: The Untold Story of France’s Role in the Rwandan Genocide
France has recently infuriated Turkey by making it illegal to deny
the Turkish massacre of the Armenians in 1915. But if Turkey is in
denial, so is France, which bears a central responsibility for the 1994
genocide of 937,000 Tutsis in Rwanda. On occasion, as he tells this
terrible story, Andrew Wallis’s indignation gets the better of him,
causing him to lapse into heavy-handed infelicities. These do not,
however, weaken the power of what he has to say.
For those unfamiliar with French policy in Africa, it may seem
almost incredible how far it is still driven by imperial rivalry with
Britain and a sort of bitter fury at the triumph of les Anglo-Saxons,
producing a defensive rallying of Francafrique, and roping into it
Rwanda and Zaire, abandoned by the Belgians. Such attitudes are by
no means confined to Gaullists – it was Francois Mitterrand who,
as minister of justice in 1957, explained French problems with its
West African colonies: “It is British agents who have made all our
difficulties.” So while Charles de Gaulle first welcomed Rwanda into
Franc-afrique, blithely ignoring the massacre of Tutsis carried out
by President Gregoire Kayibanda in 1963, so Mitterrand as president
adopted exactly the same attitude to President Juvenal Habyarimana,
who had deposed (and killed) Kayibanda in 1973. Habyarimana became his
personal friend, and Habyarimana’s wife, Agathe, a sort of African
Imelda Marcos, became a constant visitor to his household and close
friend of the first lady, Danielle. Agathe is the founder of the
extremist Hutu society, Akazu, whose network (le clan de madame)
is credited with much of the responsibility for the genocide. Its
power is still greatly feared today.
After the earlier massacres, many Tutsis had fled into Uganda where,
under Paul Kagame, they fought alongside Yoweri Museveni against
Idi Amin and Milton Obote. When Museveni won, Kagame led the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) back into Rwanda in 1990. It was immediately
clear that the RPF was fully a match for the Rwandan army (FAR),
and French troops were promptly dispatched to prop up Habyarimana –
for Kagame was Anglophone and American-educated. The French insisted
that Kagame was a CIA agent, that the RPF was really just the Ugandan
army, and that the plan was to evict France’s client and instal an
Anglophone regime instead. Their opposition to such an outcome was such
that they were willing to encourage their Hutu proteges to do anything,
including genocide, to stop it. Two Frenchmen in succession were put
in as the effective heads of FAR and, blithely ignoring EU directives
about “ethical” arms sales, they arranged huge supplies of arms for
the Hutu regime, much of it routed through Egypt with the help of
their ally in the Cairo foreign office, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. It
was an even greater coup when, in 1991, Mitterrand was able to push
in Boutros-Ghali as UN secretary-general.
By this time, the first massacres of Tutsis had begun, and a furious
Kagame flew to Paris where Paul Dijoud, African affairs director
at the Quai d’Orsay, seems to have threatened that, if he did not
withdraw the RPF, “you will not see your brothers and your family
again, because they will all have been massacred”. In fact, Wallis
produces plentiful evidence that some French officers were training the
Hutus how to capture and tie up prisoners, how to slit their bellies
so that their bodies wouldn’t float and in general preaching that
“if you let them (Tutsis) carry on producing children . . . you’ll
never be done with them”. And it seems there are many eyewitnesses of
French troops assisting at torture sessions and catching Tutsis and
handing them over to Hutus who hacked them to death before their eyes.
These early massacres were as nothing compared to the all-out
genocide launched upon Habyarimana’s death in April 1994. The new
government, with key genocidaires, was, it appears, formed by the
French ambassador at a meeting in the French embassy. The man the
French had put in charge, Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, apparently made
no secret of his plans: “I have come back to declare the apocalypse,”
he said. The French, well aware of what was about to happen,
then got out. The calculation was that any peace deal would mean a
power-sharing agreement with Kagame – which was anathema. Better let
the Hutus continue the genocide to completion if that allowed them
to stay in power, but in that case France, having armed, trained and
encouraged its proteges towards such an outcome, had to get clear of
the carnage. As the evidence of the holocaust thus unleashed became
overwhelming Bruno Delaye, the Elysee’s Africa boss, is reputed to
have said that “that’s the way Africans are”. When asked how he could
have entertained genocidaires in his office, he seems to have replied
that he’d had 400 assassins and 2,000 drug dealers through his doors:
“You can’t deal with Africa without getting your hands dirty.”
Mitterrand shrugged off the killings with “Dans ces pays-la, un
genocide ce n’est pas trop important” and cynically concocted the
notion of a “double genocide”, ie that the Tutsis were just as guilty,
which was rather like saying the Jews and the Nazis were as bad as one
another. When the surrounding states tried to hold an emergency meeting
on the situation in Tanzania, Paris angrily torpedoed it: “We can’t
let Anglophone countries decide on the future of a Francophone one.”
And so it continued to its dreadful end. Ultimately, Kagame and the
RPF won and the French sent troops in to get their Hutu proteges into
Zaire where they could reform and rearm for a fight that has thus far
cost 4m lives. Mitterrand angrily refused to invite Kagame’s Rwanda
to his last Francafrique summit and made sure the genocide was not
even discussed. Several genocidaires still live happily in France
where a parliamentary inquiry, headed by one of Mitterrand’s former
ministers, is accused of whitewashing the whole operation. Jacques
Chirac and Dominique de Villepin have wholly backed this all up,
for the French elite are as one in wishing to continue to celebrate
France as the home of democracy and human rights.
It is only in the past few years that French responsibility for
the deportation of 100,000 Jews in the second world war has been
acknowledged, and nobody yet admits that French eagerness to damage
Anglophone Nigeria by lending surreptitious support to Biafra cost
many hundreds of thousands of lives. But all this is dwarfed by the
enormity of what happened in Rwanda – an enormity so great that neither
Britain nor any of France’s partners seem keen to broach the matter.
This book (and the news that France is to declassify some documents
relating to the genocide) are at least a start. The leading
presidential contender, Nicolas Sarkozy, is fond of talking of the
need for a frank “rupture” with the past. There is no part of the
French past that needs honesty and a clean break more than this.
Read on…
websites: Human Rights Watch on Rwanda
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ARMENIAN DEFENSE MINISTER TO VISIT IRAQ AS ARMENIA TO EXTEND SMALL TROOP PRESENCE
The Associated Press
International Herald Tribune, France
Nov 13 2006
YEREVAN, Armenia: Armenia will extend the mission of its nearly
four-dozen troops serving in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq for another
year, Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisian said Monday as he left on a
visit to the country.
Sarkisian said that the government had asked parliament to approve
an extension of the deployment.
The mission has met with criticism from opposition parties in this
former Soviet republic, many Armenians and even the 30,000-strong
Armenian community in Iraq, which fears being targeted for attacks.
Sarkisian said he would hold talks with his Iraqi counterpart during
his trip and visit the 46-member Armenian contingent, which has been
deployed in Iraq since January 2005 and was due to end its mission
at the end of this year.
President Robert Kocharian and his government have sought to portray
the deployment as a way to boost ties with Europe. The contingent
serves under Polish command.
On Saturday, Armenian officials announced that an officer was wounded
while defusing land mines and had to have his foot amputated.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

FRESNO STATE REAL ESTATE CENTER ENDOWED
Central Valley Business Times, CA
Nov 13 2006
~U $1.5M gift establishes center
~U Research, ethical standards highlighted
California State University, Fresno announced Monday a gift to create
a $1.5 million endowment which will be used to establish the Arnold
and Dianne Gazarian Real Estate Center in the Craig School of Business.
Arnold Gazarian, a retired dentist, is a member of the California
State University, Fresno Foundation Board of Governors. Dianne Gazarian
serves as chair of the Berberian & Gazarian Family Foundation.
“We hope that this gift will assist the university in making it a
leader in educating real estate professionals, conducting real-world
research and promoting high ethical standards,” says Mr. Gazarian,
in written comments. “We also hope that the center will bring together
members of the real estate community to discuss issues of importance
to the industry.”
The money enables Fresno State to create a center that will support
the Craig School’s Real Estate and Urban Land Economics option and
major for students as well as the expansion of research by faculty
and graduate students. The center will assess trends in commercial
retail, office, residential and investment markets; analyze land
use planning; and conduct research in such areas as single- and
multi-family residential housing, commercial real estate and real
estate financial assets.
In addition, the Gazarian Center will sponsor conferences, seminars
and workshops in real estate and land use.
The Gazarians have made previous gifts to the university including
gifts to the President’s Fund, Smittcamp Alumni House, the Haig and
Isabel Berberian endowed chair in Armenian Studies, the Craig School
of Business and the Kremen School of Education and Human Development.
“This generous gift will position the Gazarian Real Estate Center as an
academic leader in real estate market analysis and research and will
help to further the university’s goal of helping the economy grow,”
says John Welty, president of Fresno State.
The Gazarian Real Estate Center will also provide students
opportunities to learn the business side of real estate and apply
their academic knowledge to real-world projects and experiences. The
real estate business community will gain a valuable informational
resource relating to the greater Fresno metropolitan area and Central
Valley region, as well as access to student interns and potential
future employees.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

280 ELECTORAL DISTRICTS PREPARED IN NKR
DeFacto Agency, Armenia
Nov 13 2006
36 millions drams have been allocated from the NKR state budget for
the preparation and conduct of a referendum on the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic Constitution, the NKR Central Electoral Commission head
Sergey Nasibian told journalists. According to Nasibian, 280 electoral
districts have been prepared in the Republic; one electoral district
will be opened at the NKR Permanent Representation in the RA.
The Constitution will be adopted in case not less than a third part
of the electors vote for it. Serge Nasibian also said the voters’
lists had already been made. The final draft of the Constitution will
be published in a couple of days. To remind, the referendum on the
NKR Draft Constitution will be held current December 10.
DE FACTO Information-Analytics Agency
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

NKR PRESIDENT: WE ARE READY FOR A SERIOUS DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION WITH ALL THE CONCERNED PARTIES
DeFacto Agency, Armenia
Nov 13 2006
The NKR people will not deny their independence, and we are ready for
a serious dialogue and cooperation with all the concerned parties in
the name of long-lasting peace, stability and economic development in
the region, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic President Arkady Ghoukassian
stated in the U. S. in an interview with New Russian Word and Inner
City Press newspapers and Ararat and AGBU monthlies.
According to the information DE FACTO received at the NKR President’s
administration, speaking of the current stage of the Karabakh
conflict settlement Arkady Ghoukassian mentioned the Azeri President’s
non-constructive stand, in part, his refusal to hold direct talks with
the Nagorno-Karabakh, which hampered the conflict’s final settlement.
As it has already been informed, the NKR President arrived in the U.
S. in connection with the TV marathon to be held November 23. Within
the measure’s preparation frames Arkady Ghoukassian met with the head
of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the Northern America Archbishop
Oshakan Choloyan. In conclusion of the meeting a reception was held in
the Eparchy head’s residence with the participation of the Armenian
Assistance Union leadership and members, Panarmenian Educational and
Cultural Union and other organizations’ representatives.
Arkady Ghoukassian also met with the Prior of the Eastern Eparchy
of the Northern America of the Armenian Apostolic Church Archbishop
Khajak Parsamian and the heads of a number of organizations actively
cooperating with the Eparchy.
In the course of the meetings the Eparchies’ leaders mentioned a
particular role of the Artsakh people’s struggle in the new Armenian
history and reaffirmed their readiness to promote the settlement of
the problems Artsakh faces.
In his turn the NKR President acquainted the meetings’ participants
with the process of state construction in Karabakh and the issues
referring to the Republic’s democratization. Arkady Ghoukassian highly
estimated the Armenian Diaspora’s participation in the restoration and
development of the Artsakh’s economy. Having stated the importance
of the infrastructures’ restoration the NKR President urged the
Diaspora’s representatives to actively participate in the restoration
and improvement of the Artsakh towns and villages.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

KOSOVO-KARABAKH – STRATEGIC FORK: VIKTOR YAKUBYAN
Regnum, Russia
Nov 13 2006
Continuing the discussion about the role of the “Kosovo precedent” in
the resolution of the conflicts in the territory of the former USSR,
REGNUM publishes the article of the expert on the South Caucasus
Viktor Yakubyan.
Time precedent
Vladimir Putin: “The decisions on Kosovo should be of universal
nature. This is an extremely important question for us – not
only because we advocate the observance of the principles of
the international law but also because we have purely practical
interests… Not all the post-Soviet conflicts are yet resolved. We
can’t use different principles every time.”
It seems that the most symptomatic peculiarity of the “Kosovo
precedent” is a kind of “casus tempi” – the case of the time it is
developing in. This casus can be compared with the English Future In
the Past, when the event has not yet taken place but its precedent
is already being actively discussed. Despite this peculiarity, the
“Kosovo precedent” is a product of the Russian politics, and so,
it can be compared with the interests of other conflicting parties
only in the context of the Russian interest.
A precedent that has not yet taken place is ambiguous. The side
offering it for a global political discussion must be sure that it will
not be the loser in whatever outcome this precedent may bring to. And,
vice versa, the sides who are involuntarily involved in this “casus”
have the right to choose between two or more scenarios of action. At
the same time, those sides must be ready for new pressures in case of
a negative outcome for ones and a positive outcome for the others. In
such a case – just as always – the primary task of each of them will
be the ability to assert their own positions irrespective of the
presence or absence of a precedent. To reiterate, the side offering
the “potential precedent” – in this particular case, Russia – must
ensure that this precedent works out in any case.
Obviously, there are four groups of players in the “Kosovo precedent”
game:
1. The author of the “casus” – Russia.
2. The authors of the Balkan repartition and the opponents of the
Russian initiative – the US and the EU.
3. De facto independent: Kosovo, Abkhasia, Transdniestria,
Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia.
4. De facto non-integral: Serbia, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan.
If for the third group the “Kosovo precedent” is acceptable only if
Kosovo is fully recognized, for the fourth group it is acceptable if
Kosovo is annexed to Serbia and subdued to Belgrade. If for the second
group it is absolutely unacceptable because it is the initiative of
Moscow, for the Russian side it is acceptable in any case as it is
a very strong lever for Russia to restore its political weight over
a vast geo-political area.
It should be noted that they in Moscow seem to perfectly realize
that none of the conditions allowing one or another group to smoothly
push its “precedent” through will be ensured – especially after the
referendum in Serbia, when the Serbs have put in their Constitution
a point saying that Kosovo is integral part of Serbia. The western
diplomacy cannot avoid the “potential precedent” as, initially, it
was exactly the West who undertook to resolve the Kosovo problem. And
this very resolution (whatever it is) will become a precedent – i.e.
they in the West will create the precedent themselves, like it or not.
It seems they like it, but, naturally, they want to turn it exclusively
into their own advantage. In the international law there have always
been problems with normative standards – for, as the fable says “the
stronger always blames the weaker,” and no law can change this. In the
last 15 years the international law has turned from “precedental” into
“situational” i.e. precedents are interpreted exclusively depending
on who the specific situation in the specific conflicting region
benefits. And there were plenty of such precedents throughout the
last Balkan crisis (by the way, it is not over yet).
In this particular case, the situation is not yet clear, and there
is still a certain uncertainty about the “frozen conflicts” in the
post-Soviet area. That’s probably why we can be sure that neither the
unrecognized republics of the third group nor the non-integral states
of the fourth group have special illusions about the “precedent.”
Thus, the “Kosovo precedent,” as it is, is especially important now
that it has not yet been played, i.e. until the situation is finalized.
Possible scenarios for Kosovo
The US and the EU planned 2006 to be decisive for the Kosovo status.
No need to prove that the interests of the Kosovan Albanians and
Serbs have been and are the least the Americans are interested in.
What they really want is to maximally correctly stop the bloody Balkan
epic by parceling Yugoslavia out into as few multi-cultural units
as possible. And exactly at the end of this project, when Kosovo was
had been brought very close to independence, Russia appeared with a
generally inconvenient argument. Before that, the process of Kosovo’s
self-determination had been artificially sped up from the formula
“first the standards then the status” to the formula “the standards
at the same time with the status.”
As of now there is no specific formula for Kosovo’s future status. In
his report the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy Kai Eide says:
“There will not be any good moment for addressing Kosovo’s future
status. It will continue to be a highly sensitive political issue.
Nevertheless, an overall assessment leads to the conclusion that
the time has come to commence this process.” Eide means that at the
initial stage Kosovo should be given “conditional independence,” which
will develop into full one in the course of the region’s integration
into the EU.
The Contact Group’s Nov 2005 Guiding Principles for a Settlement of
the Status of Kosovo say that Kosovo should not be partitioned or
annexed to any other country or part of a country and that the sides
should not return to the situation before Mar 1999. At the same time,
the principles do not rule out the existence of two Albanian states.
Serbia strongly objects to the prospect of Kosovo’s independence,
and the new Serbian Constitution clearly shows that. At the same time,
it is obvious that very few people in Belgrade believe that they will
be able to get Kosovo back.
The former employee of the US Department of State and Senate Jim
Jatras says that the talks between the Serbian and Kosovan leaders
will not lead to agreement as the Serbs refuse to accept Kosovo’s
independence, while the Albanians keep saying that independence is
the only acceptable way for them. When the talks come to a final
deadlock, the only possible way for the international community will
be to try to impose a ready-made settlement on Serbia, most probably,
a Contact Group recommendation, which will be finalized into a UN SC
resolution and will replace the existing resolution 1244, saying that
Kosovo is part of Serbia. Jatras notes that Russia has the right to
say a strong “no” to the new resolution and even to put a veto on it,
but he is inclined to believe that Russia will not break the West’s
agenda on Kosovo and will prefer to turn this situation into profit
in its neighboring regions. Here, too, Russia will try to avoid
unnecessary problems with the Bush administration.
Meanwhile, after the results of the referendum in Serbia, EU
spokeswoman Krisztina Nagy said that the future of Kosovo depends not
on the results of the constitutional referendum in Serbia but on the
results of the relevant UN-sponsored talks. She said that the status
of Kosovo has nothing to do with the referendum in Serbia. She noted
that the Albanians have not taken part in the voting and its results
are contrary to the Kosovo settlement talks.
Thus, this is a classic stalemate or status quo, and its breach
will result in the final exodus of Serbs from Kosovo and political
destabilization in Serbia, where quite weak authorities have shouldered
quite a heavy “constitutional” responsibility for a problem they don’t
even control. De jure independence of Kosovo will inevitably result in
a new wave of ethnic clashes, particularly, in Vojvodina, where there
are many Hungarians, and southern Serbia, with a big Albanian minority.
Reverting to the opinion that Russia can put an end to Kosovo’s
independence by saying that it will veto any resolution on this issue,
I would like to note that it will hardly benefit Moscow to show such
a stance at such a critical moment. Veto is the last argument Russia
ought to use, while the principle of “potential precedent” gives Moscow
a wide room for maneuver. It seems that, under such circumstances,
the West has nothing left but to freeze the Kosovo process for better
times for fear that it may become the author of de facto precedent.
No coincidence that the US State Department is painstakingly copying
the passages about Kosovo’s independence from the reports and
recommendations of the International Crisis Group and similar NGOs.
Jatras says that those organizations have played a decisive role in the
“colored” revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine (not mentioning Serbia)
and still hope to “democratize” Russia.
It should be noted that the US has got into quite an absurd
situation. On the one hand, they fear that an excessive delay in the
Kosovo process will lead to the loss of control over the situation –
when the Albanians will stop playing “democracy” and will continue
the process according to their own scenario. On the other hand, they
are witnessing a steadily growing radicalism in Serbia. For the US,
any “Kosovo precedent” is important in terms of its relations with
the Muslim world of the “Big Middle East.”
Kosovo parallels
Arkady Ghoukassyan: “If the world community is ready to recognize
the independence of Montenegro and Kosovo, I think it will be very
hard for them to explain why they don’t recognize Nagorno-Karabakh…”
There is a great deal of logic in what the president of the
unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic says. However, experience
shows that not every logic evolves into a relevant process. In fact,
even after the recognition of Kosovo, the world community may give no
explanation to Nagorno-Karabakh, but Russia has a good ground to demand
one. Moscow will get a chance to demand resolution of the conflicts
that are dangerous for its citizens and will do it according to the
generally applied scheme – by recognizing a de facto independent
state entity.
The foot-dragging of the Kosovo settlement until the resolution of
the post-Soviet conflicts is quite unpromising but most probable
scenario. In this case, the protracted status quo will lead to the
legislative consolidation of Kosovo’s de facto independence.
Particularly, the Kosovo government institutions, who are sanctioned
by the UN and OSCE and internationally recognized as an “interim”
administration, will be given the status of “permanent” authorities.
And it will become much harder to abolish those authorities than to
recognize them de jure.
The subordination of Kosovo to Serbia is an almost impracticable
scenario, which, if put into practice, will also become a precedent –
a precedent that will show that the western diplomacy has failed in
the Balkans, that the whole Balkan process was in vain and thousands
of innocent people have died for nothing.
No direct parallels are admissible between Kosovo and
Nagorno-Karabakh. In fact, there are no direct parallels as such. At
the same time, there are hundreds of tiny threads that sew these two
processes together. Kosovo is not a guiding star for Nagorno-Karabakh
as Nagorno-Karabakh’s de facto independence is not the result of NATO
carpet bombings but of a national-liberation war.
In fact, the “Kosovo precedent” is a classic “strategic fork” provoked
between the Balkans and the CIS and fraught with two scenarios.
The first scenario is the obvious precedent or de jure recognition
of Kosovo’s independence. This precedent will immediately bring the
post-Soviet conflicts to a new level. Grown from nothing by the
US and international organizations, the “Kosovan statehood” will
become an ace in the hands of self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria. The latter believe –
and not without reason – that their state-building achievements,
not mentioning their legal grounds, are much more substantial. The
formation of the unrecognized post-Soviet republics is the result of
the centrifugal processes following the USSR collapse. And so, this
process seems quite logical as, initially, there were absolutely no
guarantees that the Soviet empire would fall into exactly 15 pieces.
Likewise, there was no limit for the quantity of post-Yugoslav states.
The second scenario is the non-obvious precedent or delayed Kosovo
status, which, as we have already said, will be gradually crystallizing
into existing status quo. The long-term transitional status and broad
powers and legalized administrative institutions in Kosovo will, in the
long run, lead to the formation of Kosovan state, i.e. to the birth
of the selfsame obvious precedent. In this case, the unrecognized
post-Soviet states will witness the practical legalization of the
status quo that has been present in Kosovo since 1999, and this
practice will be automatically applied to even longer status quos
in Nagorno-Karabakh (1994), Abkhazia (1994), South Ossetia (1991)
and Transdniestria (1992).
The selfsame Nagorno-Karabakh will not hesitate to use both the
obvious “Kosovo precedent” – if Kosovo is proclaimed independent –
and the non-obvious “Kosovo precedent” – if the long-term status
quo is legalized. This has no connection with the quantity of oil
produced in Azerbaijan. In fact, this has connection with the global
experience of ethnic conflict resolution, when there is no precedent
of forcible subordination of de facto independent units of former
metropolises, while there are de jure recognized East Timor, Eritrea,
Montenegro, de facto recognized Kosovo and de facto independent
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria. The latter do need
beneficial precedents. However, the problem as such is not so much
about the events in the Balkans but about the survival of Armenians
in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ossetians in South Ossetia and Abkhazians in
Abkhazia.
NATO in the Balkans and the chronicle of the birth of a precedent: Note
The NATO military campaign against Yugoslavia lasted from Mar 24 to
June 10 1999 (79 days). On Mar 24 1999 NATO Secretary General Javier
Solana declared that NATO was starting an operation Allied Force in
order to protect the moral values of Europe of XXI. NATO’s proclaimed
goal was to prevent a humanitarian disaster following the genocidal
policy of the Yugoslavian authorities against ethnic Albanians.
19 NATO member-states from Europe and North America took part in the
operation. The core of the Allied Force was naval and air forces
of the US, the UK, France and Germany. Belgium, Hungary, Denmark,
Spain, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Turkey
provided their troops and territories. Neutral Albania, Bulgaria,
FYR Macedonia and Romania provided air spaces and territories.
The air forces consisted of almost 400 planes, the naval forces –
of US and NATO combat ships, deployed in the Adriatic Sea, and the
NATO permanent contingent in the Mediterranean. Some 14,000 bombs
(a total of 23,000 bombs and missiles) with a total weight of 27,000
tons were dropped during the 79 days of the operation. The US alone
dropped over 1,000 cluster bombs. A total of 2,300 bombing-missile
attacks were made on 995 facilities. Over 1,000 bombers took part in
the most intensive bombardment on May 20-21 night. On the last days,
the NATO air forces made as many as 1,000-1,200 sorties a day.
The death toll ranges from 1,200, according to the UN, to over 1,300
(400 children), according to the Yugoslav side. 6,000 people were
wounded. 250,000-300,000 Serbs fled from Kosovo together with over
700,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The purely military
effect was insignificant. Despite the NATO reports that they had
destroyed lots of military facilities, it later turned out that the
aggressors brewed up just a few tanks and infantry vehicles.
The economic damage caused to Yugoslavia by the NATO operation
made up $100bln. The NATO troops destroyed almost 90 historical and
cultural monuments, over 300 schools, universities and libraries,
over 20 hospitals, almost 40,000 apartment houses, some 80 bridges.
They damaged radio and TV, the oil refinery in Panchevo, an
agricultural aircraft plant, fertilizer factories, camps of refugees
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, almost 200 medical facilities. Over
2.5 million people were left without jobs. There are still plenty
of unexploded cluster bombs in Kosovo and the Adriatic Sea. WHO
reports that 150 Kosovans were blown up in the first month after
the operation. UN experts report real ecological disasters in some
regions of Yugoslavia.
On July 10 1999 the NATO Secretary General ordered to stop the
bombings and to start deploying NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo. The
UN SC resolution 1244 of June 10 1999 empowered the UN mission to
execute civil administration in Kosovo. The same resolution approved
the deployment of NATO KFOR peacekeeping force.
On Sept 3 1999 the UN Mission in Kosovo abolished the currency law of
Yugoslavia and established customs control with FYR Macedonia. On Sept
20 the Kosovo Liberal Army was reorganized into a Kosovo Protection
Corps comprising 5,000 people, of whom 200 had the right to carry
arms. Serbs withdrew from the Kosovo interim council. On Oct 19 the
UN Mission and the KFOR dismissed the proposals of the Kosovan Serbs
to form their own cantons and to have their own protection corps. An
Interim Administration Mission was formed in Kosovo on Dec 15. The
local Serbs refused to take part in it. On Jan 12 2000 the mission was
enlarged from 14 to 35 members. The first 167 of total 400 judges were
appointed on Jan 24 2000. This marked the beginning of the formation of
the Kosovan judiciary system in line with the Criminal Code of Serbia
of 1989. On Mar 9 2000 the UN Mission started issuing passports to
Kosovo citizens. On Apr 14 the OSCE Mission formed a central electoral
commission for ensuring the conduct and control of elections.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

EU AWAITS DETAILS OF BILL ON CHARITIES IN TURKEY
Athens News Agency, Greece
Nov 13 2006
Representatives of Turkey’s numerous charitable foundations, all
falling under the domain of the state-run General Directorate for
Religious Property (Vakuf), are still awaiting to see details of a
draft bill passed by the Turkish assembly, expected to be unveiled
later on Monday.
According to reports here, European diplomats and representatives
of the EU Commission in Ankara referred to a “wait and see” attitude
on whether numerous demands by Europe and private foundations in the
country will be fulfilled with the new law.
Similar statements were made by representatives of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate, as the latter is keenly following developments in
coordination with the representatives of Jewish and Armenian groups
in Turkey.
The bill deals with all faith-linked charitable foundations, including
the very large Muslim “vakufs” in the country.
The bill was ratified by a vote of 241 in favor to 31 against, with the
opposition in the Turkish assembly strenuously opposing the bill and
calling for the postponement of beneficial provisions for foundations
and charities until Turkey becomes a full EU member-state.
Later reports also speculated over whether the Turkish president will
veto the legislation.
One of the primary demands by the EU and local communities focused
on establishing a framework for foundations that passed into the
hands of the state due to a lack of recognised and functioning boards
of directors.
Members of recognised Vakufs also want the return of properties that
after 1974 passed into the hands of third parties.
On the plus side, the draft bill reportedly foresees the right of
permanent residents of Turkey, who are not Turkish citizens, however,
to serve on the boards of foundations.
Caption: A view of the courtyard at the headquarters of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate in Istanbul, better known as the Fanar.
ANA-MPA photo / STR
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

KARABAKH EXPECTS DEMOCRATS TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY IN NKR
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 13 2006
Will the victory of the Democrats in the United States affect the
settlement of the Karabakh issue in any way? This is not a question
for one day. Some analysts are optimistic and they think the United
States will give greater support to Armenia. Others remind that the
same Democrats were in power in the United States 12 years ago.
Meanwhile, the Armenian community in the United States is celebrating
the victory.
Karabakh is cautious towards this victory. The speaker of the NKR
National Assembly Ashot Ghulyan congratulated Nancy Pelosi November
10. His message emphasizes the considerable moral support and
humanitarian aid that the United States gives to Nagorno Karabakh to
overcome the destruction caused by the Azerbaijani aggression, and
the active engagement of the United States in the settlement of the
conflict mediated by in the OSCE Minsk Group. “We believe that the
U.S. Congress will continue to uphold freedom and democracy and we
expect further support to strengthen and develop Nagorno Karabakh,”
runs the message.
On these days NKR President Arkady Ghukasyan is visiting the United
States. It is not known yet if he will meet with the leaders of the
Democrats. Nevertheless, Karabakh expects that the Armenians of the
United States will donate a little more money to Karabakh.

WHAT DID THE ELECTIONS GIVE TO THE AMERICAN ARMENIANS?
Khazhak Mkrtchian “Hayrenik” (“Motherland”), USA
Yerkir, Armenia
Nov 13 2006
The US congressional elections held on November 7 were analyzed from
different perspectives. The American Armenians had their criteria
for such analysis based on the impact they would have on the issues
of interest for the Armenians.
The party affiliation of individual American Armenians, the nature
of their business, the state of residence and other factors of
course determine their individual views of the elections. However,
these factors have no impact on the collective assessment of the
American Armenians. The most important factor in this case is the
elected official’s position on issues of interest for the Armenians
irrespective of whether he is a republican or a democrat.
If we look at the elections from this perspective, the Armenians might
have lost in terms of the number of officials that have a pro-Armenian
position. However, the results of the elections can overall be assessed
as positive based on several facts. The first positive development in
this respect is the resignation of Denis Hastert and Nancy Pelosi’s
becoming the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
The former was known for his tendency of yielding to pressure from
the executive and excluding the issue of the Genocide recognition
from the agenda. It should be noted that the instructions Hastert
was receiving did not come exclusively from Republican sources. In
several cases the democratic executive was pressuring Hastert.
This cast some shadow on the Armenians’ optimism regarding Nancy
Pelosi. However, the Armenians’ optimism connected with Pelosi has
some ground. The latter has repeatedly taken pro-Armenian positions
and her pre-election promises inspire hope that she will stick to
her positions.
The election of New Jersey representative Bob Menendez is of special
importance for the American Armenians for two reasons. First,
Menendez took an important position during the discussion of the US
Ambassador’s candidacy. This issue is still open, therefore, Menendez’
presence is important in terms of continuing the efforts and achieving
a pro-Armenian outcome.
Second, the results of these elections further strengthened the
connection between the American Armenians and Menendez because when
the results of the exit polls questioned Menendez’ election, ARF’s
Hay Dat Committee of New Jersey took a principled position on the
issue and expressed its support to Menendez based on the latter’s
pro-Armenian position on issues of interest for the Armenians.
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned facts, we can state
that the results of the November 7 elections can be assessed as
positive for the American Armenians. However, in order to achieve
positive results from the elections it will be necessary to use this
historical opportunity properly, to double our joint efforts and
support the work of Hay Dat Committee that has taken up the mission
of pursuing the Armenian question.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress