Author: Emil Lazarian

EurasiaReview
China’s Modern Middle East Strategy: Strengthening Partnerships With
Iran And Syria – Analysis
By Dr. Mohamad Zreik
Feb. 15, 2022
The Middle East strategy of China is gradually progressing. Recently,
an official agreement between the governments of Iran and China
brought the 25-year comprehensive cooperation treaty into effect,
while Syria signed an understanding to join the Belt and Road
Initiative. Massive trade and investment initiatives have helped China
establish itself as a significant player in the Middle East.
Iran and Syria want to strengthen commercial and trade ties as the
Syrian conflict fade. The end of the conflict in Syria represents the
beginning of a new era of business connections between the two
nations.
Syria and China signed a memorandum of understanding to join the Belt
and Road Initiative. The “Five Seas Proposal”, which Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad first mentioned in 2009, mirrored China’s current Silk
Road project.
The Five Seas initiative connects the Mediterranean, Red, Persian,
Caspian, and Black Seas, attempting to unify all nations in the area.
With the notion of “Shamgen” articulated by President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, who was the Prime Minister at the time, but in the movement
known as the Arab Spring, it was shelved.
The Belt and Road initiative, which includes Iran, is now being
proposed for Syria. This action has various implications. Since Barack
Obama, the USA has been working to finalize Middle Eastern agreements
with China. However, China wants to incorporate the Middle East with
Belt and Road initiative.
A branch of China’s Silk Road, Tehran, Baghdad continues down the
Euphrates River via Al Bukemal, Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Aleppo, and
Latakia. Thus, China may benefit from the land-accessible Latakia port
as a major logistical hub. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative
strengthens the bonds of communication and cooperation between China
and Iran, all the way to Syria. Damascus was a historic Silk Road
station. The old inns are still standing. These inns are said to have
utilized the first bills/checks.
The second branch from Tehran goes to Damascus, then Beirut. That’s
why China sought money for the Beirut port following the great
explosion. By negotiating with Lebanon for the Beirut port, China will
have two ports opening to the Mediterranean, giving it a huge
advantage.
As a consequence of the deal, Syria vowed that it would not make
concessions to the West. Even after certain Arab nations
re-established ties with Syria and France appointed ambassador, Syria
continues to offend the West.
Russia and Iran are also unconcerned about Syria-China collaboration.
Despite the potential of a favourable conclusion in the discussions
over its nuclear activities, Iran is now doing as “the field needs”
and establishing deals with China that will bind it for a quarter of a
century and beyond. So, Russia, Syria, and Iran all meet in one area.
Except for vetoes, China was quiet throughout the Syrian conflict.
However, its worldwide rivalry with the USA may intensify, and the
Syria move coincided with the “moment when counter-measures should be
implemented.”
Russia has returned to the Middle East, and China will soon follow.
After years of anticipation, Syria has finally joined the Chinese Belt
and Road Initiative. Syria joined the initiative following a
memorandum of understanding signed by the Syrian Planning and
International Cooperation Authority head, Fadi Al-Khalil, and China’s
ambassador in Damascus, Feng Biao, after official statements and
mutual visits on the Beijing-Damascus line in recent years indicated
Syria’s imminent accession to the BRI.
On the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad has said that Syria may participate via infrastructure
development. “China is a great nation that is attempting to enhance
its influence in the globe, but not in a bad sense, but influence in
the sense of depending on friends… as it depends on partnership and
similar interests, instead of the hegemonic strategy followed by the
West,” Al-Assad remarked at the time.
Assad went on “Syria is on the Silk Road, and China regards us as
equals, not as a large nation with a minor. There are similar
interests… a benefit for China, Syria, and other nations on this path…
in the end, it benefits all nations. This implies greater global
stability.”
The Syrian offer, which contained six Chinese projects aligned with
the Belt and Road model, appears to have been well received in
Beijing, which ultimately chose to include Damascus in its effort.
There are a number of projects that may be implemented as part of this
initiative. These include rail links between Tartous and the Iraqi
border, highways connecting the country’s south to its north,
electricity generation, oil and gas exploration; as well as Chinese
free zones in Syria.
Currently, the “leaning towards the east policy” is being followed;
Damascus has announced this policy in response to what it perceives as
the participation of the United States and Western countries in the
war against Syria.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad “leaning towards the east policy”
aligns with Chinese President Xi Jinping‘s Belt and Road Initiative.
Many compared the Chinese initiative to Syrian President’s “Five Seas”
project, referring to the Mediterranean, Caspian, Black, Arabian Gulf
and Red Seas.
China’s involvement in Syria has grown since 2018. In a statement
released by Xinhua News Agency, Chinese Ambassador Qi Qianjin
expressed his country’s desire to play a larger role in Syria’s
economic, political, and military affairs. During a hospital visit in
Damascus, the Chinese envoy remarked, “I believe it is time to focus
on Syria’s growth and rebuilding. I think China will further up its
support for the Syrian people and government.” Perhaps the recent $44
million in humanitarian aid to Syria bolster the Chinese ambassador’s
claims.
In an August 2019 letter, the Chinese ambassador emphasized the
development of Syrian railroads and ports; after promising $20 billion
to Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Jordan for rehabilitation and economic
growth.
The Belt and Road Initiative was announced by China in 2013 and
intends to link nations across the globe with a network of roads,
railroads, ports, oil pipelines, sea lanes, and telecommunications
networks.
The initiative has two parts: the Silk Road Economic Belt, which aims
to connect China with Europe through South Asia and Central Asia, and
the Maritime Silk Road, which aims to connect China with Europe via
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.
The Syrian president recently declared that it has reached a formal
deal with China to join the Belt and Road initiative. This initiative
was initiated by China in 2013. It is a massive infrastructure project
that intends to enhance China’s commercial linkages.
According to the deal inked between China and Syria, railways,
international roads, power plants, and the expansion of Syrian ports
would all be funded by China, with Syria paying a substantial portion
of the expenditures over time.
The Chinese president vowed to contribute $20 billion in Syria,
Jordan, and Lebanon to restore infrastructure, with Syria’s part
estimated at $9 billion.
However, China would not compete with Russia for the port of Tartus,
but will strive to develop the port of Latakia via the same
corporation that is already expanding the port of Tripoli in Lebanon.
Sino-Iranian agreement
“The comprehensive cooperation pact between Iran and China (25 years)
has started the implementation phase,” said Iranian Foreign Minister
Hossein Amir Abdollahian.
Abdullahian met with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Beijing, where
he is on a formal invitation, to discuss the current developments in
bilateral ties and economic cooperation.
In addition to supporting Iran’s nuclear rights and easing the
embargo, they discussed the current Vienna discussions on lifting the
embargo.
Although the contents of this strategic agreement, which is a plan for
long-term collaboration between the two nations, have not been
released, a consensus was obtained. This agreement will include
economic cooperation as a major component, which will need to be
signed and executed in the form of separate agreements between the two
nations.
In March 27, 2021, the two nations announced a “comprehensive
strategic partnership” in a joint statement. According to paragraph 6
of the statement, all parties are prepared to discuss and develop a
long-term cooperation pact. On April 27, Mohammad Javad Zarif and Wang
Yi, the Iranian and Chinese foreign ministers, signed this treaty.
In recent years, the two nations’ trade volume has been about $20
billion. Since 1995, Iran exported about $9 billion to China and
imported between $9 and $13 billion. China is a major provider of
electrical, audio-visual, chemical and industrial goods to Iran. Iran,
on the other hand, is one of China’s top oil suppliers, oil imports
before the sanctions amounted for around 6% of overall imports.
However, unofficial data shows that during the sanctions period, China
was the largest buyer of Iranian oil.
The Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road are two trade
routes proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. This
initiative links China, Central Asia, Russia, and the Middle East to
Europe. The Maritime Silk Road links China to Southeast Asia and
Africa through the sea, and reaches over 60 Asian, European, and
African nations.
The project will encompass 30% of global GDP and 35% of global
commerce and has three key goals. The primary purpose is to free China
from the naval blockade and depend entirely on the Straits of Malacca.
More than 150 ships each day, predominantly Chinese and Japanese
tankers, sail through the strait.
China will turn to be the world’s leading economic power by exporting
technological and engineering products and services to other nations.
Iran is a major supplier of energy, raw materials such as iron ore,
and petrochemical crude products to China, making it a major priority
in the Belt and Road Initiative.
The Minister of Economy declared that the 25-year deal between Iran
and China is nearing completion. China announced $400 billion in Iran,
with $280 billion going to the oil and gas sector and $120 billion to
transportation.
Currently, the government has about 100,000 unfinished economic and
development projects, which need a thousand billion tomans
(1,000,000,000,000,000,000 Tomans) of credit to complete. In addition
to continuing to purchase Iranian oil, the Chinese are helping to
build big oil and gas reserves and modernize Iran’s refineries.
Most notable oil and gas projects where Chinese involvement is
feasible are Phase 11 of South Pars, North Pars gas field development,
Azadegan and Yadavaran oil field development and repair of ancient
domestic refineries like as Abadan and Tehran refineries. The
country’s other energy initiatives include developing sustainable
energy and renovating aging power facilities. Promoting banking,
financial and insurance cooperation, creating Iranian bank branches,
and forming an Iran-China joint bank are feasible banking and
financial collaboration.
Construction of railways in various parts of the country,
electrification of railways such as the Tehran-Mashhad railway,
development of metro networks in major Iranian cities, participation
in the development of Makran beaches, development of Iranian ports
such as Chabahar port, and completion of domestic and international
highways and freeways in Iran are all part of the 25-year agreement.
In recent months, news of Chinese involvement in the form of
industrialization of housing building for the National Housing
Movement and the construction of four million housing units in four
years. Other probable 25-year areas of collaboration include
telecommunications, science-technology, education, health, and
tourism.
*
About author:
Dr. Mohamad Zreik has PhD of International Relations, he is
independent researcher, his area of research interest is related to
Chinese Foreign Policy, Belt and Road Initiative, Middle Eastern
Studies, China-Arab relations. Author has numerous studies published
in high ranked journals and international newspapers.
 

FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway
The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one's belief or religion
The right to join together and express one's belief
=================================================
Wednesday 16 February 2022
AZERBAIJAN: Imam's pre-trial imprisonment extended in treason case
A Baku court has extended pre-trial imprisonment for Shia imam Sardar
Babayev until April. The secret police arrested the former prisoner of
conscience in October 2021 and is investigating him on criminal charges of
treason. Six other arrested Shia preachers were freed and criminal cases
dropped. "It's a question of relations between Azerbaijan and Iran," a
commentator noted, but insists charges of treason are unfounded. "If
someone has sympathy for Iran, does it make them an Iranian agent?" A Baku
mosque police closed in October 2021 on alleged coronavirus grounds remains
closed. A spokesperson said police close mosques, "but we do so when we get
a request from the State Committee for Work with Religious Organisations".
AZERBAIJAN: Imam's pre-trial imprisonment extended in treason case
By Felix Corley, Forum 18
Nearly four months after his arrest, 47-year-old Shia imam Sardar Babayev
remains in pre-trial imprisonment as prosecutors investigate him on charges
of treason. In mid-February, a Baku court extended his pre-trial detention
for a further two months until April. A court initially ordered him held in
four-month detention after his October 2021 arrest.
This is Babayev's second jailing. He completed a three-year jail term in
January 2020 for leading prayers in a mosque after gaining his religious
education outside Azerbaijan (see below).
State Security Service (SSS) secret police arrested Babayev and five other
high-profile Shia clerics on 19 October 2021. Criminal cases were opened
against them. The secret police detained and questioned a seventh prominent
Shia on 25 October 2021 before releasing him. Babayev was the only one
ordered held in pre-trial detention, while the rest were freed by the end
of the month. It appears that only Babayev is now facing a criminal case
(see below).
"This is not a question of Babayev," one commentator told Forum 18 on 15
November 2021. "It's a question of relations between Azerbaijan and Iran."
But the commentator insists the charges of treason are unfounded. "If
someone has sympathy for Iran, does it make them an Iranian agent?"
The commentator noted that while those targeted mostly gained their
religious education in Iran and look to religious leaders there, this does
not mean they are uncritical of the way Islam is practised in Iran, or that
they want Azerbaijan to impose Islam in the way Iran does.
"No one believes Sardar Babayev is an Iranian spy," exiled human rights
defender Arif Yunus told Forum 18. "He is the last respected Shia
theologian qualified to issue fatwas [religious rulings] who was not
already in prison" (see below).
The arrests and criminal cases came as political relations between
Azerbaijan and Iran worsened from early October 2021. Around the time of
the 19 October 2021 arrests, a series of Shia Muslim websites deemed to
reflect an Iranian orientation disappeared. Forum 18 was unable to find out
if the state closed them down or pressured the sites' owners to close them
down (see below).
On 5 October 2021, police closed a Baku mosque which also housed the
representation in Azerbaijan of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The
mosque remains closed as of 16 February 2022 (see below).
The head of the Interior Ministry Press Department, Major Elshad Hajiyev,
told Forum 18 through an aide that the police themselves do not decide when
to close mosques. "We close them, but we do so when we get a request from
the State Committee for Work with Religious Organisations," the aide told
Forum 18. "Mosques can be closed because of coronavirus or for other
reasons. We close them on the basis of such a request." The aide declined
to say how often police close mosques at the request of the State
Committee. "We don't have such statistics," he claimed (see below).
No official at the State Committee in Baku would discuss mosque closures
with Forum 18 (see below).
On 15 February, the Milli Maclis (Parliament) approved in the second
reading amendments to the Religion Law which will hand responsibility for
naming prayer leaders in all mosques from the Caucasian Muslim Board to the
State Committee for Work with Religious Organisations. "The State Committee
is collecting all the power it can over the Muslim community," exiled human
rights defender Arif Yunus told Forum 18 (see below).
Meanwhile, a Baku court jailed a local Muslim for 15 days in November 2021
after he protested against the removal of prayer leaders at the mosque on
the territory of Sadarak shopping centre on the southern edge of the
capital. Security staff of the shopping centre beat the man before police
arrested him, but do not appear to have faced any charges (see below).
The United Nations Human Rights Committee made public two further rulings
in November and December 2021 finding that Azerbaijan had violated the
rights of Jehovah's Witnesses to freedom of religion or belief (see
forthcoming F18News article).
Worsening Azerbaijan-Iran relations led to Baku mosque closure
Political relations between Azerbaijan and its southern neighbour Iran
worsened on 1 October 2021, when Iran launched military exercises close to
the border. Iran's spiritual leader Ali Khamenei condemned what he saw as
the presence of Israeli agents in Azerbaijan.
On 5 October 2021, the Police "and other specialists" closed Huseyniyya
Mosque in Baku's Narimanov District. The Mosque was primarily a mourning
venue, particularly during the Muslim holy month of Muharram. It also
contained the office of Khamenei's representative in Azerbaijan Ali Akbar
Ojagh Nejad.
Police spokesperson Colonel Ehsan Zahidov said that the closure was because
of the prevalence of coronavirus at the mosque. "As a result, the activity
of the shrine was halted," he told the local media the same day. "At
present the epidemiological service is undertaking appropriate measures."
A Muslim close to Huseyniyya Mosque told Forum 18 on 16 February 2022 that
it remains closed.
Colonel Zahidov was unavailable each time Forum 18 called on 15 February.
The head of the Press Department, Major Elshad Hajiyev, told Forum 18 the
same day through an aide that the police themselves do not decide when to
close mosques.
"We're not involved in such issues," the aide told Forum 18 on behalf of
Major Hajiyev. "We close them, but we do so when we get a request from the
State Committee for Work with Religious Organisations. Mosques can be
closed because of coronavirus or for other reasons. We close them on the
basis of such a request." The aide declined to say how often police close
mosques at the request of the State Committee. "We don't have such
statistics," he claimed.
No official at the State Committee in Baku would discuss mosque closures
with Forum 18 on 15 February.
The Mosque community continues to post numerous messages from Ojagh Nejad
to its Facebook page. "Thus, in my opinion, the mosque became a virtual
one, using as the basis for that the official pretext of closure of the
Mosque because of pandemic reasons," Eldar Zeynalov of the Human Rights
Centre told Forum 18 from Baku on 16 February.
While the regime keeps all religious communities under control, it has been
particularly tightening its control over mosques in recent years. Almost
all the remaining Sunni mosques were closed
(
 ), including in Baku
and Ganca.
Raids, arrests, charges
On 19 October 2021, State Security Service (SSS) secret police officers
arrested Sardar Babayev of the Spiritual Leaders of Azerbaijan movement.
That day they also arrested four other supporters of the movement, Qadir
Mammadov, Jalal Shafiyev, Ali Musayev and Tamkin Jafarov. Officers seized
telephones and computers.
Officers questioned Mammadov, Shafiyev, Musayev and Jafarov before freeing
them on 26 October 2021. Criminal charges were not launched against them.
Jafarov's brother told Caucasian Knot news agency on the evening of 21
October 2021 that 48 hours after his brother's arrest, the family did not
know where he was.
All five also worked with or contributed to the website Maide.az, which
published news and Islamic writings.
Also on 19 October 2021, officers searched the Baku home of Ilgar
Ibrahimoglu Allahverdiyev. At the end of the raid they detained him and
took him to the police station, local news agencies noted. After
questioning for several hours as a witness, officers let him go. After his
release, Ibrahimoglu stated online that he would be withdrawing from social
media.
On 25 October 2021, the SSS secret police detained Shia Muslim Ahliman
Rustamov in Baku, Caucasian Knot noted on 29 October 2021. Officers
questioned and then released him. SSS officers seized about 15 religious
books, Rustamov's son Qasim told OC Media.
Rustamov is a theologian who was Imam of Haji Javad Mosque in Baku's
Yasamal District. In April 2017 a Presidential Decree ordered the Mosque's
demolition, causing protests. The Mosque was demolished in June 2017. A new
Mosque with the same name was built nearby and completed in April 2018.
Rustamov was Imam of the new Mosque for a short time before being removed
by the state-controlled Caucasian Muslim Board.
Websites disappear
Between 20 and 25 October 2021, a series of Shia Muslim websites deemed to
reflect an Iranian orientation disappeared. Among those that disappeared
was Maide.az, which described itself as an "Islamic enlightenment and news
website", set up in 2014 by Sardar Babayev and others.
Other sites that disappeared include Shia.az and Ehlibeyt.info (which
contained "articles, video and audio lessons on the bases of Islam, Sharia
rules and moral questions"), as well as Deyerler.org (a site associated
with Ilgar Ibrahimoglu). 
Forum 18 was unable to find out if the state closed them down or pressured
the sites' owners to close them down.
"The police don't close down websites," the aide to Police Press Office
head Major Hajiyev told Forum 18. "That's not within our competence." He
declined to say who might have done.
Treason prosecution, four months pre-trial detention already
Following his arrest on 19 October 2021, prosecutors are investigating Shia
Muslim Imam Sardar Akif oglu Babayev (born 12 March 1974) on charges of
treason under Criminal Code Article 274, his lawyer Javad Javadov noted at
the time. This carries a punishment of between 12 and 20 years'
imprisonment. Javadov was unable to reveal the substance of the
prosecutors' case as he had been ordered not to reveal details of the
investigation.
On 21 October 2021, at the prosecutor's request, Baku's Sabail District
Court ordered Babayev held in four months' pre-trial investigation prison.
Babayev appealed against his pre-trial detention, but on 27 October 2021
Baku Appeal Court rejected his appeal.
As the four-month detention period was about to expire in February 2022,
the prosecutor went to Court to extend it. A Judge accepted the
prosecutor's request and extended pre-trial detention until April.
Asked on 15 February about the criminal prosecution of Babayev, the aide to
Police Press Office head Major Hajiyev told Forum 18 that he had no
information about the case.
The man who answered the phone on 16 February at the SSS secret police
Public Relations Department refused to put Forum 18 through to its Head,
Colonel Arif Babayev, or his deputy Yashar Isakov. The man, who did not
give his name, refused to answer any questions about the criminal case
against Imam Sardar Babayev.
"No one believes Sardar Babayev is an Iranian spy," exiled human rights
defender Arif Yunus told Forum 18 on 7 February. "He is the last respected
Shia theologian qualified to issue fatwas [religious rulings] who was not
already in prison."
Imam Babayev's earlier jailing
Shia Muslim Imam Sardar Babayev is married with three children. He
completed theological studies at Al Mustafa University in the Iranian city
of Qom in 2000. He also studied Islam in Baku. At the invitation of the
state-backed Muslim Board, he led the namaz (Friday prayers) at Masalli's
Juma (Friday) Mosque from 2009.
Police arrested Imam Babayev in February 2017 and a court jailed him in
July 2017 for three years
(
 ) for leading prayers
in a mosque having gained his religious education outside Azerbaijan. He
was convicted under Criminal Code Article 168-1.3.1.
Article 168-1 punishes "violation of the procedure for religious propaganda
and religious ceremonies", including by conducting of Islamic rites by a
citizen who has received their education abroad. Article 168-1.3.1 punishes
those who commit such violations "repeatedly", with a prison term of
between two and five years.
Babayev was freed in February 2020
(
 ) at the end of his
sentence.
Babayev lodged a case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in
Strasbourg in 2017 (Application No. 34015/17). He initially brought the
case to challenge his pre-trial detention, but his lawyer updated the case
after his sentence 
(
 ).
The ECtHR asked the government questions
(
 ) about the case on 4 September
2018. Babayev is awaiting a decision in the case from the Strasbourg court.
Parliament approves Religion Law amendments in second reading
No election in Azerbaijan – including February 2020 Milli Majlis
(Parliament) elections - has ever been found to be free and fair
(
 ) by Organisation for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) election observers.
On 15 February, the Milli Majlis approved in the second reading amendments
to the Religion Law, the Milli Majlis website noted the same day. Deputies
had approved the amendments in the first reading
(
 ) on 1 February.
The amendments will hand responsibility for naming prayer leaders in all
mosques from the state-controlled Caucasian Muslim Board
(
 ) to the State
Committee for Work with Religious Organisations.
The amendments will also give the State Committee the leading role in
re-appointment of all imams every five years, with only the "involvement"
of the Caucasian Muslim Board. This is a reversal of the State Committee
and Muslim Board roles when the state mandated re-appointment of all imams
in June 2021 amendments to the Religion Law.
The amendments will re-designate the Caucasian Muslim Board – which has
been headed since 1980 by Sheikh-ul-Islam Allahshukur Pashazade - not as
the "organisational" centre but the "religious" centre for Azerbaijan's
mosques. The regime does not allow independent mosques to exist.
"The State Committee is collecting all the power it can over the Muslim
community," exiled human rights defender Arif Yunus told Forum 18
(
 ) from the Netherlands.
Another amendment will remove the possibility for non-Muslim communities to
have a "religious centre" or headquarter body. However, this term is poorly
defined in the current Religion Law and the implications of the change
remain unclear.
Beaten, 15-day jail for protesting against change of Imams
In November 2021, the authorities removed from office the three prayer
leaders (one of them named Akram) at the Mosque next to Sadarak shopping
centre in Baku's southern Qaradag District. Three new prayer leaders were
appointed to replace them.
One mosque attendee, 46-year-old Aydin Nagiyev, objected to the decision
and wrote to the head of the state-controlled Caucasian Muslim Board,
Sheikh-ul-Islam Allahshukur Pashazade.
On 12 November 2021, Nagiyev and other mosque attendees held a protest
against the removal of the prayer leaders. Officer Orkhan (last name
unknown) of Qaradag District's 10th Police Department phoned Nagiyev and
demanded that the protest stop, but Nagiyev refused. Security staff at the
shopping centre beat Nagiyev. A representative of the shopping centre later
told the media that Nagiyev bit his finger and then smeared blood on his
face.
Police then arrested Nagiyev and brought a case against him under
Administrative Code Article 535.1 ("Disobeying a police officer"), which
bears a punishment of a fine or up to one month's imprisonment. On 12
November 2021, Judge Rufan Mursalov at Qaradag District Court jailed
Nagiyev for 15 days, to start from 5:50 pm that day, according to the
decision seen by Forum 18.
Telephones at the 10th Police Department as well as at Qaradag District
Police went unanswered each time Forum 18 called on 18 November 2021.
Exiled historian and human rights defender Arif Yunus insists that the
jailing of Nagiyev was illegal. "The authorities' true goal was to bring
the mosque under control and impose prayer leaders that were under their
control," he told Forum 18 from the Netherlands on 9 February 2022.
The Mosque was built in a free-standing building on the territory of the
shopping centre in 2007. It does not have state registration, but this is
now being considered, the Turan news agency noted on 15 November 2021. To
gain registration it would have to submit to the Caucasian Muslim Board and
the State Committee, which will appoint the Imam. (END)
Full reports on freedom of thought, conscience and belief in Azerbaijan
(
 )
For more background, see Forum 18's Azerbaijan religious freedom survey
(
 )
Forum 18's compilation of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) freedom of religion or belief commitments
(
 )
Follow us on Twitter @Forum_18 
(
 )
Follow us on Facebook @Forum18NewsService
(
 )
All Forum 18 text may be referred to, quoted from, or republished in full,
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