Asbarez: U.S. Fails to Condemn Azerbaijan for Ambush on Artsakh Police

An Artsakh police vehicle was ambushed by Azerbaijani forces on Mar. 5


Schiff Calls on State Department to Condemn Attack

Following an ambush by Azerbaijani forces on an Artsakh police vehicle on Sunday that killed three Artsakh officers, the State Department not only did not condemn Baku for its brazen actions, but continued to insist on Armenia-Azerbaijan dialogue.

Meanwhile, Congressman Adam Schiff said the “deliberate murder” of the Artsakh police officers warrants U.S. sanctions against Baku and urged the State Department and the Biden Administration to condemn the deadly violence.

“The attack by Azerbaijani forces that killed 3 Artsakh police officers is another act of deliberate murder and furthers the need for sanctions against Azerbaijan for their violations of human rights and the right to self-determination for the people of Artsakh,” Schiff said in a statement issued Monday.

“This latest violence comes during the ongoing humanitarian crisis caused by the blockade of the Lachin corridor, leaving 120,000 individuals in dire conditions. The U.S. must condemn Azerbaijan’s assaults on Artsakh and hold the Aliyev regime accountable. I urge the U.S. State Department and the Biden Administration to use all diplomatic channels available to address the increased instability in the region and ensure that the security and sovereignty of Artsakh is respected,” Schiff added.

The State Department reacted to Sunday’s deadly attack by saying that there can be no military solution to the conflict and that the use of force to resolve disputes is never acceptable.

“We’re following reports of a shooting incident on March 5th inside Nagorno-Karabakh which killed five individuals, we understand.  We offer our condolences to the families of those injured and killed.  There can be no military solution to conflict, and the use of force to resolve disputes is never acceptable,” State Department spokesperson Ned Price told a press briefing on Monday. 

“The only way to sustain peace is at the negotiating table and the use of force undermines negotiations.  Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations Lou Bono is in the region to stress the only way forward is through direct dialogue and diplomacy.  And as the Secretary has emphasized, the United States is committed to Armenia-Azerbaijan peace negotiations,” Price added.

Asked whether the ambush will have implications on the negotiation process, Price added: “The implication – the clearest implication for us is the imperative of continued direct dialogue and discussion between the parties’ themselves.  This is imperative on the part of the parties.”

“We have played the role of partner to both countries, facilitating on a trilateral basis engagement between the foreign ministers and at the leader level as well.  We are prepared – whether bilaterally, trilaterally, multilaterally – to continue to be a partner in furtherance of efforts to secure a lasting peace,” added Price.

The State Department spokesperson also added that the U.S. is not competing with Russia for a mediation role in the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement process. In fact, Price said, the U.S. is not a mediator, which calls into question its role as an OSCE Minsk Group Co-chair. Price did not elaborate on this during the press briefing on Monday.

“We are not going to put ourselves against any other offer of mediation, and in fact we’re not a mediator.  We are a partner to the two countries.  I think we have demonstrated both in word and in deed the nature of our relationship with the two countries, our ability to bring the two countries together, our willingness and readiness to help bring about additional progress in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan,” Price said when asked whether Western mediation is a better option given that Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently called on the parties to stick to Moscow’s efforts.

“We are not doing this as a means by which to compete with Moscow.  We are doing this in an effort to bring about the settlement and resolution of a longstanding dispute between these two countries, and unfortunately a dispute that has consistently taken lives, just as it did on March 5th,” Price said, referring to the Azerbaijani ambush of Artsakh police officers.

“Our interest here is in peace and security.  It’s in the interests of the people of Armenia and Azerbaijan as well,” Price added.

AW: Will the earthquake threaten Erdogan’s rule?

On February 6, 2023, two earthquakes with magnitudes 7.8 and 7.5the deadliest in Turkey’s historyhit the Syrian-Turkish border. At least 45,000 people died in Turkey. Another 6,000 lives were lost in Syria. The fallout of the catastrophic earthquake came as President Erdogan faces his toughest re-election campaign yet. Despite speculation that Erdogan may postpone the elections, he declared that presidential and parliamentary elections will be held on the agreed-upon date, May 14th of this year.

Turkey is a central power in the Middle East. After the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, its influence increased in the South Caucasus. Thus, any political shift will have an impact on the political landscape of the region. The Turkish President is known for exploiting crises; how he will be able to manage this current crisis and use it to his advantage is still questionable. This article will analyze the impact of the earthquake on Turkey’s domestic politics amid the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections as Turkey prepares to celebrate the centennial of its foundation as a republic in October 2023. 

From Natural to Political Earthquake

An earthquake in 1999 killed nearly 19,000 people in Turkey and exposed the limitations of the social contract between Turkey’s citizens and their paternalistic state. Soner Cagaptay, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the author of A Sultan in Autumn: Erdogan Faces Turkey’s Uncontainable Forces, writes, “The natural disaster, coupled with an ensuing economic crisis, stoked deep dissatisfaction and spurred the toppling of the secular and often illiberal regimes that had prevailed since the country emerged from the wreck of the Ottoman Empire, in 1922.” Out of the rubble of the earthquake, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist AKP took advantage of the failed crisis response of the government and scored victories in the municipal and parliamentary elections. Will the current earthquake have the same effect as that of 1999 and this time oust President Erdogan and his party?

The recent earthquake impacted a poor and conservative population with mixed Sunni, Alevi and Kurdish backgrounds, which may further reduce support for AKP. Thousands of buildings collapsed. The head of the local chamber of architects was even surprised and observed that the buildings were not reinforced with steel.

In 2022, the Turkish President, while commemorating the anniversary of the 1999 earthquake that destroyed parts of the country, hailed his government’s “urban transformation projects” that would shield his people from future earthquakes. “As humans, it is not in our hands to prevent disasters; yet, it is in our hands to take measures against their destructive impacts,” said Erdogan. The Turkish President is now contradicting his own words. Many Turks are complaining that the government was late in sending humanitarian aid to the damaged zones. The Financial Times reports that the AKP loosened tender rules by awarding lucrative public tenders to businessmen close to the party or relatives to senior AKP officials in exchange for media services or funds in social foundations linked to the President’s family. These activities encouraged illegal construction projects and careless building constructions. The public was also angry at the army for failing to mobilize and assist in the search and rescue operations. In response to these criticisms, the Turkish Defense Minister argued that most of the troops are deployed in Syria and Iraq, hence they cannot leave their posts.

Economically speaking, some experts argue that the total cost of the destruction caused by the earthquakes would even reach $84 billion (around 10 percent of the GDP). So far, the Turkish government has allocated a small portion for disaster relief. The government bets that more financial support may arrive from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The question is whether the opposition is able to organize its ranks and take advantage of Erdogan’s vulnerabilities.

The Road to Elections

In 2018, an opposition alliance formed with the goal to oust AKP. The “Nation Alliance” later expanded to include the participation of two AKP breakaway parties. However, its inability to find common ground with the Kurds boosted the “Peoples’ Alliance” formed between AKP and the far-right MHP in the previous elections. On February 28, 2022, Kemal Kilicdaroglu of the Kemalist Peoples’ Republican Party (CHP) and his long-standing ally Meral Aksener of the center-right Good (Iyi) Party were joined by former AKP and foreign minister Ali Babacan of the DEVA (Democracy and Progress) Party, Ahmet Davutoglu (former AKP Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Future Party) Gultekin Uysal of the Democrat Party and Temel Karamollaoglu of the Saadet Party to sign an interparty agreement. Despite clear ideological divides and differences on issues such as secularism, LGBT rights and the Kurdish issue, the “Table of Six” (as called later) coordinated steps against AKP’s rule and called for the restoration of parliamentary democracy. The country’s third-largest political party, the left-wing and pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democracy Party (HDP), due to Iyi’s opposition, was noticeably absent from the joint declaration.

There are key factors that will determine peoples’ voting behavior in Turkey. Citizens of Turkey have a notably different political culture than that of other Middle Eastern countries. For example, some who voted for an X candidate in the presidential elections may not necessarily vote for the same candidate’s party in the parliamentary or municipality elections. Based on the results of the municipality or parliamentary elections, one cannot predict if party candidates have received the same percentage of the votes.

One factor is the frustration of the middle class with Erdogan’s economic mismanagement. A growing number of disgruntled middle-class AKP voters, who were the backbone of the party for the last two decades, may cast their vote for other parties. This middle class originated from the cities Malatya, Ainteb and Marash, known as Anatolian Tigers. Impacted by the earthquakes, these cities have displayed impressive growth records since the 1980s. Their middle-class own a number of key small and medium-sized enterprises in the country.
While foreign policy may not be a crucial factor, the Syrian crisis and the Kurdish issue may determine the votes of the Alevis and the Kurds in the country. The CHP usually enjoys the support of the secular Alevis; its party leader happens to be an Alevi. The CHP started its electoral campaign by vowing to send young Syrian refugees in Turkey back to their homeland. The party also calls for the restoration of diplomatic relations with the government of Bashar al-Assad. While some Turks have concerns about Turkey’s foreign policy orientation and its alienation from the West, others do support the country’s central role in balancing between the West and Russia.

Finally, there’s the issue of nationalism and religion. According to some observers, Turkey is witnessing a significant rise in nationalism, and religion continues to play a crucial role in shaping the public sphere. Even though the younger generation is becoming more secular, the bulk of the country in central Anatolia still is conservative, which is why nationalist parties also adhere to cultural nationalism, thus giving space for religious conservatives to support their political agenda.

From a Fractured to a Unified Opposition

On March 3, cracks emerged in the Turkish opposition when the six opposition parties met to discuss their joint presidential candidate. All except Iyi endorsed Kemal Kilincdaroglu, the leader of the largest opposition party (CHP). However, Aksener the leader of the Iyi Party rejected the endorsement and said that she proposed the names of the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, but none received enough support from the remaining five parties. In a meeting with her party delegates, she argued, “The Table of Six has lost its ability to reflect the will of the nation and its decision.” She said that her party “will not bow to this… and not be a bystander of a scavenger of an outdated policy produced for personal profit.” She accused the head of the CHP of putting his personal ambitions over Turkey and later broke ranks with the opposition.

Kilincdaroglu condemned Aksener’s remarks and said that “there is no room on their table for such language similar to Erdogan’s.” He mentioned that the opposition is seeking to “enlarge” and include other parties, hinting at the possibility of extending a hand to HDP and other leftist parties. Kilincdaroglu and the other opposition parties are well aware that without the Kurdish and the votes of the liberals, they will not have a chance to withstand Erdogan in the presidential elections. A common language should be found with the Kurds and the Kemalists to provide certain concessions and bring HDP to the table without alienating the other opposition parties.

This would be a golden opportunity for President Erdogan. However, on the evening of March 6, the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara made a sudden visit to the Iyi Party’s leader and convinced her to come back. A few hours later, she attended the official ceremony of announcing the candidacy of the CHP leader. This was a positive development for those eager to put an end to Erdogan’s rule. 

Possible Scenarios as Outcome of Elections

Predicting the outcome of the elections is difficult, given the volatile political situation in Turkey, the political behavior of the people and the regional challenges that may shape or impact the opinion of a segment of the society.

AKP’s alliance with MHP will not guarantee Erdogan a win, given MHP’s weakness; hence, Erdogan may engage in flexibility to attract new votes. In this case, AKP has two choices: ally with Iyi or the HDP. Iyi has announced that it will support the opposition candidate. If AKP approaches the HDP, it will be risky as it will alienate the votes of the nationalists. In return, however, it will win over the votes of the Kurds. Of course, this can be a temporary electoral arrangement as any government in Turkey is not ready to provide concessions to the Kurdish demands. It is also unlikely to form a future coalition government with HDP, given the ideological and foreign policy orientation differences of both parties. However, politics can make the “impossible” possible. Last year, when two HDP MPs visited Beirut, one of the MPs confirmed that HDP is ready for dialogue with the government for purposes beyond elections, arguing that the opposition is also “nationalistic and authoritarian.”

Meanwhile, Kilicdaroglu, who has vowed to end corruption and authoritarianism, is eager to win over the swing votes of the Iyi Party, which is now crucial for both the parliamentary and presidential elections. If Kilicdaroglu and CHP create an electoral alliance with HDP, Kurds would become the king-makers. But how would other parties in the opposition react? How would hardline Kemalists in the CHP and Iyi nationalists react? Will Kilicdaroglu provide any political concessions to the Kurds? Or will this be just a tactical move for electoral purposes? There are also risks that President Erdogan will extend the state of emergency in earthquake-hit states. Under such conditions, elections would be neither fair nor free in these states, handing Erdogan a competitive advantage at the polls. Though some would argue that the HDP will cast its votes for the CHP leader over Erdogan, Kilicdarogu must engage in a balancing act so as not to marginalize the Kemalists and nationalists in his alliance.

 


Although Turkey’s parliamentary system is not a shining star for democracy, it nevertheless has established a system of checks and balances for years, which Erdogan’s presidential system dismantled. Today, the opposition has a chance to restore the parliamentary system. To do that, it must unify its ranks and show tolerance toward the minorities, mainly the Kurds. Leaders of AKP and CHP will make their moves, but the kingmakers will be the Iyi and HDP. Their swing votes may not only have an impact on the outcome of the elections, but may also shape the future government’s foreign policy orientation toward the West, Russia, South Caucasus and the Middle East.

Yeghia Tashjian is a regional analyst and researcher. He has graduated from the American University of Beirut in Public Policy and International Affairs. He pursued his BA at Haigazian University in political science in 2013. In 2010, he founded the New Eastern Politics forum/blog. He was a research assistant at the Armenian Diaspora Research Center at Haigazian University. Currently, he is the regional officer of Women in War, a gender-based think tank. He has participated in international conferences in Frankfurt, Vienna, Uppsala, New Delhi and Yerevan. He has presented various topics from minority rights to regional security issues. His thesis topic was on China’s geopolitical and energy security interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf. He is a contributor to various local and regional newspapers and a presenter of the “Turkey Today” program for Radio Voice of Van. Recently he has been appointed as associate fellow at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut and Middle East-South Caucasus expert in the European Geopolitical Forum.


Local composer’s ‘An Armenian Trilogy’ documentary to premiere on DPTV

March 8 2023
PUBLISHED: March 8, 2023 at 12:07 p.m. | UPDATED: March 8, 2023 at 12:08 p.m.

Dan Yessian released “The Freedom, The Fear and The Faith: An Armenian Trilogy” nearly eight years ago, and it’s remained a high point in a career that’s full of awards and achievements.

In 2014 the Farmington Hills-based composer was asked by his church priest to write a piece commemorating the centennial of the genocide in which 1.5 million Armenian families were murdered by the Turkish Ottomans. Yessian created an evocative three-movement, 22-minute duet between piano and violin, composed on one of the late Burt Bacharach’s old pianos. It was performed in 2017 by the Armenian Philharmonic and became the subject of a documentary by Yessian that will have its broadcast premiere at 7:30 p.m. Sunday, March 12, on Detroit Public Television (Channel 56).

“My objective was to musically interpret the feelings of my grandparents, whose stories reflected their escape from Turkey,” explains Yessian, 78, founder of Yessian Music, which also has offices and studios, run by his sons, in New York, Los Angeles and Hamburg, Germany. And while most of his composing work is shorter form for commercial clients, “An Armenian Trilogy” allowed him to stretch himself beyond that.

“This is the culmination of all my musical experience,” Yessian notes. “It was quite a feat for me in trying to make something interesting enough that would portray what (the genocide) was — which I never thought I’d be capable of doing. So this is something I could leave for my family, and for posterity, per se. It’s a passion.”

Yessian will appear during Sunday’s broadcast of the documentary, interviewed by DPTV’s Fred Nahat. The “Trilogy” itself is available via Amazon, iTunes and Spotify.

EU calls on Azerbaijan to ‘abide by’ UN International Court of Justice order regarding Lachin corridor

NEWS.am
Armenia – March 8 2023

The European Union (EU) remains concerned that the continuing disruption to freedom of movement through the Lachin corridor is affecting human rights in Nagorno-Karabakh, including rights to health, education, and food, the EU noted in a statement.

“The EU calls on the Azerbaijani authorities and all responsible to guarantee freedom and security of movement along the corridor, in line with the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020, and to abide by the order of the International Court of Justice of 22 February 2023. The EU urges Azerbaijan and Armenia to continue to engage in dialogue, including at the leaders’ level. We look forward to continuation of President of the European Council Michel facilitated peace process,” the statement adds, in particular.

UN International Court of Justice had partially granted Armenia’s claim against Azerbaijan and unanimously denied Azerbaijan’s claim against Armenia.

France MP calls for international investigation team to be sent to scene of Azerbaijan attack on Karabakh policemen

NEWS.am
Armenia – March 8 2023

Anne-Laurence Petel, member of the French National Assembly and head of the France-Armenia friendship group, commented on the attack by Azerbaijanis on the vehicle of the Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) policemen.

“I condemn the intolerable ambush which claimed the lives of 3 police officers in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan must respect the decision of the ICJ [(International Court of Justice)] and ensure free movement in the Lachin corridor. An international investigation team must be sent to the scene,” Petel wrote on Twitter. 

Earlier, Armenian News-NEWS.am reported that at around 10am on March 5, a sabotage group of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces targeted and opened fire on a staff shift vehicle of the Passport and Visa Department of the Artsakh Police. Three Artsakh policemen were killed and one was injured as a result.

Azerbaijani press: Initial discussions held on reintegration of Armenian residents of Karabakh region to Azerbaijan

Politics Materials 1 March 2023 12:58 (UTC +04:00)

BAKU, Azerbaijan, March 1. Initial discussions were held regarding the reintegration to the Republic of Azerbaijan of the Armenian residents living in the Karabakh region under the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan and its legislature, Trend reports.

Contacts with Armenian residents living in the Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan will continue. Additional information will be made available.

Ramin Mammadov, Member of Parliament, has been designated as a point person for the contacts with the Armenian residents of the Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

To that end, on 1 March 2023, in the city of Khojaly, at the headquarters of the Russian Federation’s peacekeeping contingent temporarily deployed in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ramin Mammadov held a meeting with the representatives of the Armenian residents living in the Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Also present at the meeting was Masim Mammadov, head of the monitoring group inspecting illicit exploitation of our natural resources comprised of experts with the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, State Service on Property Issues under the Ministry of the Economy and AzerGold Closed Joined-Stock Company.

Azerbaijani press: Next meeting between Azerbaijani reps and Armenian residents from Azerbaijan’s Karabakh may take place in Baku, Ganja or Aghdam

Politics Materials 1 March 2023 14:32 (UTC +04:00)

BAKU, Azerbaijan, March 1. The next meetings of representatives of official Baku with representatives of Armenian residents living in the Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan may take place in Baku, Ganja or Aghdam, Trend reports.

Meanwhile, the initial discussions were held regarding the reintegration to the Republic of Azerbaijan of the Armenian residents living in the Karabakh region under the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan and its legislature.

Ramin Mammadov, Member of Parliament, has been designated as a point person for the contacts with the Armenian residents of the Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

To that end, on 1 March 2023, in the city of Khojaly, at the headquarters of the Russian Federation’s peacekeeping contingent temporarily deployed in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ramin Mammadov held a meeting with the representatives of the Armenian residents living in the Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Also present at the meeting was Masim Mammadov, head of the monitoring group inspecting illicit exploitation of our natural resources comprised of experts with the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, State Service on Property Issues under the Ministry of the Economy and AzerGold Closed Joined-Stock Company.

Contacts with Armenian residents living in the Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan will continue. Additional information will be made available.

AW: Vasag’s Wish

Dikran Gamsaragan

Original text by Dikran Gamsaragan (1866-1941)
Translation by Kegham Balian and Nanar Nakashian

The prince of Syunik with his colossal frame, laid there in his dungeon, inertly adhered to the ground on a mere stretcher. Above his pillow, the candle light shimmered in the shadows, akin to a lantern casting its gaze upon a tomb. His cell resembled the entrance to a grave.

With a banal glance into the darkness of his prison chamber, a deathly Vasag seemed in search of his lost glory; plowing and foraging in thought for a glory that had sunk into the void of this very dungeon, this hole, which was the remaining estate of the lord of Syunik, whose immolated soul was once impassioned for a greater Armenia.

Kourken, the disavowed Armenian, the guard to his cell, who had since come to regret his emancipation, sorrowfully looked upon Vasag. Behold the prince, the grandest of Armenian princes, chained and curled up, abandoned to his death bed; perhaps the eventuality of his own fate as well. Kourken stood petrified, with a turmoiled mind. He eventually approached Vasag’s bedside, and with a crackled voice, spoke in his Armenian dialect.

-Your highness, my prince, allow me to be your hostage. Tell me what it is that you wish for; tell me what you yearn for. O which heart could bear distrusting your pain… 

Vasag, as if awakened from a deep slumber, with aching slowness, turned his head toward Kourken, casted a perplexed look upon him with a surprised invigoration that hinted at an inkling of life within him. Soon after, he murmured.

— Boy, are you Armenian?

Kourken bowed in agreement, that he was indeed Armenian, from Vartked Province in the state of Abar, son of Mushegh the camel herder. He continued in quick succession with an incongruous amalgamation of words, in order to explain how dark forces and the devil had conspired to seduce his soul, and on an even darker day, how he had succumbed, unbeknownst to him. Disgraced. Perhaps even more so than Vasag. 

Vasag’s head dropped to his chest, seemingly silently, entranced by sorrowful ruminations. He had just heard his own tale, albeit different, yet eerily and pitiably the same, a humanity recognized.

— Armenian! You, Armenian…

His eyes glinted with bliss as he made an effort to extend a brotherly hand toward Kourken, a clasping that sent reverberations throughout his nation.

From the depths of his heart, he, too, had missed the countryman, the builder, the Armenian Christian, whom he had never doubted having loved; the Armenian who recognizes himself?

— Armenian…

Alas, Kourken perched his head on Vasag and beseeched:

— Do it! Command me, Sir, my prince! Ask whatever it is that you wish! I will do the impossible! Speak my prince, speak!

A faint smile appeared on Vasag’s face, but he kept quiet.

— Are you in need of medication? Would you want me to secretly fetch the night warden’s cabalist? Please, Sir, do not refrain! Do not worry about me. I do not fear danger, for my life isn’t worth much anymore.

An emotional Vasag denied Kourken with a tilt of his head.

— If you wish it so, l will bring forth your child so you may embrace him one last time…

Kourken stopped, taken aback by the thoughtless word that had nearly escaped his lips.

Remembering his son, Vasag teared up. His heart palpitations grew stronger. Alas, he knew it was an impossible endeavor, the idea of seeing his son. He knew very well that Persian law decreed that any attempt to make contact with prisoners in solitary confinement would have resulted in the gouging of their eye [the person trying to contact the prisoner] and would have led to the decapitation of Kourken. To make matters more dreadful, he even doubted that his son would have wanted to see him. He had renounced his own father.

Vasag rejected the offer.

— O dear Prince, said Kourken, perhaps you’d like to send a letter back to the motherland. I would whisk away from this place, cross mountains and valleys and bestow your parchment personally. Perhaps with that I might find salvation. And if they wish to stone me to death, at least I shall perish on my soil in the bosom of my dear mother.

Vasag laid in astoundment. And when Kourken insisted with candor, Vasag gazed yearningly whence a wish materialized, fluttering from his visage, yet hesitant to divulge.

Kourken appeared uneasy, and in that moment, holding Vasag’s hands in his palms, tightly, declared with temerity in his voice.

— O dear Prince of Syunik, an offering for your soul. You guard a wish, fearing its release. I demand earnestly, O dear Prince, release it, may it enslave me. Release it, my dear Prince! Release it!

And then, in that moment, with elation bursting from his cadaverous face, Vasag murmured:

— Holy Communion.

VASAKIN GRID

TIGRAN KAMASARAK 

The Siuneat prince had his victory Hasak stretched out there, in his dungeon, and remained motionless and lying on the ground, on a stretcher. The light of a lamp above his snare flickers in the columns, as if it were a candelabrum hanging over a grave. That cell looked like the vestibule of a grave.

The glance is monotonous, but telephoto and focused, Vasak, near death, as if he insists on searching and pursuing his lost glory in idleness. He would have absorbed that glory here, in this dungeon, and this chamber was now the property of the lord from Siune, who had dreamed of crowning the “Armenian World” with the unbridled urge of his soul bursting with glory.

Gurken, the prison guard, who was a renegade Armenian and now regrets his apostasy, Vasak watched with terrible emotion. Here the Armenian prince, the great prince of the Armenians, was dying, tormented under chains, abandoned and helpless in his old age, as someone would have been. and Gurke was scared, he remained a thoughtful, intelligent man. then, getting even closer to Vasak’s snar, he said to him in a harsh, salty voice, in his native Armenian dialect.

“My lord, my prince, let me be your prisoner, tell me what you want.” Say, my lord of Cygnea, my darling. tell me what you want What kind of heart would you have, not to feel sorry for your suffering…?

Vasak, as if waking up from a deep dream, turned his head towards Gurken with painful slowness and directed a longing look at him, where the intensity of surprise was only a trace of life. after a while he muttered.

“Are you Armenian, boy?”

Gurke bowed his head to say that he was an Armenian, from the Vardget province of Apar province, the son of the camel driver Mushe, Gurke. And he told, in a few sharp, proverbial words, how the magician and the devil had conspired against him to lure Zing, and one dark day he had become a renegade – he didn’t even know how – and now he was very unhappy, perhaps as unhappy as himself…

Vasak bent his head on his chest and seemed to be deeply immersed in evil thoughts and thoughts. it was his story that he heard at that moment, his short novel, with so many actors different, but pitifully so similar and so human too.

“Armenian,” Vasak repeated, “you’re Armenian…”

And, with a faint hint of happiness in his eyes, he made an effort to shake Gurken’s hand with a brotherly gesture, from which his whole country was shaking at times. He would miss now, from the bottom of his heart, the man of the earth, even the Christian behind the construction, whom he never doubted that he loved so much. who knows himself?

– Armenian…

But Gurke, leaning his head on Vasak, said and begged.

– Oh, order, my lord, order whatever you want. I am ready to do the impossible for you. Oh, speak, my lord, speak.

Vasak had a sad smile. he always remained silent.

“Do you want medicine and medicine?” asked Gurke. Please, my lord, don’t hesitate, say. and don’t think about me, otherwise I wouldn’t be afraid of harm, and my life wouldn’t be worth much from now on.

Vasak, moved, nodded that he didn’t want medicine, no.

– If my love, – Gurken added, – I will go, bribing the men of the outfit, and bring your child in disguise for you to kiss him once, for the last time…

And Gurke didn’t finish, confused because of the ill-advised word that escaped from his mouth.

In memory of his child, Vasak’s eyes clouded with tears. the chest is beating faster now. Alas, he could not bear to see his child. The Persian law, he knew very well, ordered one eye to be gouged out for anyone who dared to meet secretly with a prisoner forbidden from communication. and Gurke was probably the head. He remained puzzled that his son would agree to come to see him. he even denied his father…

Vasak refused.

“But, lord prince,” Gurken got up, “perhaps you want to send a letter to the motherland.” I will leave, I will run away immediately, I will cross mountains and valleys and I will personally take your paper to its place, maybe I will find atonement. And if they want to stone me to death there, let me die on the soil of the earth, die in my mother’s arms…

Vasak was crushed and remained a yakchir. And when Gurken insisted again with jealousy and envious, so that he would know the will behind him, Vasak directed a pleading and longing glance to Gurken, a look where a warm and royal desire was beating, which he hesitated to express.

Gurge got upset and at the same time, squeezing Vasak’s hand in his palms, he said to him, putting all his heart in his voice.

– Oh, Lord of Siune, sacrifice of your soul, you have a desire that you did not want to reveal to me. I am desolate, Lord of Siune, reveal to me your desire, I desolate, to be your captive. Tell me, my lord, tell me…

And then, with an unearthly radiance of joy on his dead-like face, Vasak sighed.

“Holy communion…”

Kegham Balian is the production and marketing manager at Balian – Armenian Ceramics of Jerusalem, more than a century old family-business. He also writes for This Week in Palestine and additionally translates Armenian literature into English, hoping to extract and display pertinent lores that seek to highlight the depth of our 5000 year old culture.


Munich Conference Casts Optimistic Light on Azerbaijani-Armenian Peace Process

Jamestown Foundation
March 2 2023
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on the South Caucasus panel in Munich (Source: Eurasianet)

On February 19, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attended the discussion panel regarding the South Caucasus at the Munich Security Conference. Afterward, they held a face-to-face meeting on the sidelines of the conference with the mediation of United States Secretary of State Anthony Blinken (Asbarez, February 18). Ultimately, the parties focused on the points at the top of their respective agendas, and as a result, they failed to reach a significant agreement on many key issues, including the status of the Lachin road and future development of the Zangezur Corridor. Aliyev revealed in a later interview that he had proposed to the Armenian side the establishment of bilateral checkpoints at both ends of the Zangezur Corridor and along the Lachin road (Eurasianet, February 22). Since the end of the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Azerbaijan has long sought the establishment of this desired corridor through Armenia’s Syunik province to connect the country with its Nakhchivan exclave, albeit unsuccessfully. Thus, debates over the Zangezur project, among other issues, have led to a stalemate in peace negotiations, with regional actors, such as Iran, strictly standing against the project and supporting Armenia in its opposition (JAM-news, February 18).

The proposal to establish bilateral checkpoints in the border areas between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not a new phenomenon. Earlier, in October 2022, Yerevan expressed its willingness to set up additional border checkpoints with Baku, though in different locations (News.am, October 27, 2022). Of Azerbaijan’s greater concern, shortly after the Munich meeting, Armenia officially rejected the proposal of checkpoints along the Lachin Corridor, referring to the point in the Russian-brokered trilateral agreement signed on November 10, 2020, of “unimpeded movement via the corridor” (Apa.az, February 23).

Consequently, the continuing war of words between Baku and Yerevan coupled with the deadly clashes throughout 2022 have swiftly disillusioned both domestic audiences regarding the prospects for a comprehensive peace agreement. From the Azerbaijani perspective, one problematic issue had been the appearance of the Russian oligarch of Armenian descent, Ruben Vardanyan, in the Karabakh region in September 2022. Vardanyan assumed the role of the so-called “state minister” in the de facto separatist regime in Karabakh and was officially dubbed by Baku as a “project of Moscow” (JAM-news, January 24). Aliyev even went so far as to publicly state the Azerbaijani side would not negotiate with this “Russian emissary” (see EDM, February 13). Nevertheless, partially as a result of Azerbaijan’s continuous pressure and the ongoing civilian protests on the Lachin road, Vardanyan was sacked from his position on February 23 (OC Media, February 23). In a broader context, the core reason for Vardanyan’s removal from office was the lack of vocal support for his role from Moscow and Yerevan, as even Pashinyan had remained wary of the Russian oligarch due to his close links to Russian President Vladimir Putin (T.me/Bagramyan26, February 24).

Notwithstanding the internal dynamics in the breakaway region, the main topic of discussion during the Blinken-mediated meeting between the two leaders on the sidelines of the Munich conference was the renewed draft version of the peace treaty that Azerbaijan had recently handed over to the Armenian government (Apa.az, February 16). However, at that time and since then, no significant progress has been made in solidifying the key points of the new draft proposal.

While both sides failed to reach a serious consensus on this issue, the Munich meeting represented an attempt by the US to restore the collapsed Brussels negotiations format. Both Baku and Yerevan have not opposed a return to this format in light of mutual growing discontent with the destructive role of Russia—notably the mounting failures of the Russian peacekeeping mission deployed in Karabakh (see EDM, February 8). Moreover, Azerbaijan’s proposal of border checkpoints could be a signal to Moscow of Baku’s growing dissatisfaction with the Russian peacekeeping force in the Lachin Corridor (JAM-news, January 13).

As a result of these efforts, Ned Price, spokesperson for the US State Department, announced that the next Aliyev-Pashinyan meeting will soon be held in Brussels, without providing a specific timetable (Report.az, February 23). In this vein, Washington considers the Brussels format as the only reliable platform for peace talks between Baku and Yerevan, as it better suits US interests and prevents Moscow from fully weaponizing the endless process of negotiations, which de facto “freezes” the situation. Hence, the possible decline of Russian influence over the peace process in light of the newly deployed EU civilian mission has triggered a range of criticism from Moscow (Euractiv, January 27).

Indeed, the new EU mission has raised eyebrows in Moscow, as the Kremlin traditionally does not tolerate any challenges within its perceived geopolitical sphere of influence. For Armenia, the new civilian mission is more symbolic in nature, as it has limited capacity to prevent any possible escalation between Baku and Yerevan. Simply put, this mission seems to be a reactionary move against the Russian proposal for a Collective Security Treaty Organization mission to be sent to the region, which was largely ignored by Yerevan and soundly rejected by Azerbaijan (Carnegie Politika, February 16).

Consequently, Putin recently held separate phone conversation with Aliyev and Pashinyan, respectively, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov paid an official visit to Baku on February 27 (Kremlin.ru, February 23; Azernews, February 27). Lavrov’s visit came shortly after Vardanyan’s dismissal and the official deployment of the EU civilian mission. Nevertheless, Putin’s conversations and Lavrov’s visit have yet to yield any significant results regarding the peace process. As a result, it appears that the likelihood of Baku and Yerevan pivoting back to the EU-mediated process will keep growing steadily as both sides become increasingly disenchanted with Russian involvement.

Five killed in clash in Nagorno-Karabakh

March 6 2023
 6 March 2023

Three Nagorno-Karabakh police officers and two Azerbaijani soldiers have died in an armed clash in Nagorno-Karabakh. 

The incident took place on Sunday morning on a dirt road close to the Lachin Corridor, in an area not under Azerbaijan’s control. It centred around a small minibus.

Azerbaijani authorities said the bus was transporting weapons from Armenia to Stepanakert, while the authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh said it was on a regular police patrol.

One Nagorno-Karabakh police officer remains in hospital. 

Azerbaijan’s Defence Ministry issued a statement shortly after the incident, claiming that they had received information that military equipment, ammunition, and personnel were on board the minibus. Azerbaijan considers Nagorno-Karabakh to be territory of Azerbaijan temporarily under the control of Russian peacekeeping forces. 

‘An attempt was made to stop and check the vehicles carrying out illegal military transport’, reads the statement. ‘Shots were fired from the opposite side, and as a result of the shooting, there were casualties and injuries from both sides’.

Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry also alleged that the bus was travelling via a ‘dirt road’, bypassing the Lachin Corridor, which has been blocked since 12 December. 

Nagorno-Karabakh’s Foreign Ministry categorically denied the Azerbaijani allegations, alleging that a ‘sabotage group’ from Azerbaijan’s armed forces was responsible for the attack. 

It added that Azerbaijani forces had violated the ceasefire on 2 March and in the early hours of 3 March, and suggested that Azerbaijan was ‘seeking to initiate an escalation of tension’. 

‘It should be noted that these attacks were carried out immediately after the talks on unblocking the Lachin Corridor held between representatives of Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] and Azerbaijan on 1 March. Through its actions, Baku openly demonstrates its rejection of negotiations as a means of finding solutions to any issues’, stated the Nagorno-Karabakh Foreign Ministry. 

Both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh’s foreign ministries described the incident as part of an attempt by Azerbaijan to ‘ethnically cleanse’ Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Armenia’s Foreign Ministry additionally stated that the minibus carried only four police officers and a service pistol, describing Azerbaijan’s version of events as ‘absurd’. 

‘The actions of the Azerbaijani forces cannot be described as anything other than terrorism’, the statement said. ‘The facts prove that this provocation was pre-planned and instructed by the highest leadership of Azerbaijan.’

‘Under current circumstances, sending an international fact-finding mission to the Lachin Corridor and Nagorno-Karabakh becomes a vital necessity’, the statement concluded. 

The Azerbaijani authorities, however, laid the blame for the incident with Armenia’s government.

‘In order to prevent such military provocations, Azerbaijan demands the implementation of the Tripartite Declaration, an end to the transportation of illegal weapons and ammunition, personnel, and mines from Armenia, and the immediate withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from the territories of Azerbaijan’, the Foreign Ministry stated

On 22 February, the UN International Court of Justice rejected a request from Baku to order Armenia to stop planting landmines or sponsoring their planting in ‘areas to which Azerbaijani civilians will return in Azerbaijan’s territory’. 

Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry added that the incident ‘proved the necessity’ of introducing border control mechanisms between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In recent weeks, Azerbaijan has been demanding the establishment of Azerbaijani checkpoints on the Lachin corridor. 

On Monday, the European Union External Action Service published a statement, announcing that it ‘deplores’ the outbreak of violence. 

‘The circumstances surrounding this deadly incident need to be fully investigated’, the statement continued. ‘We urge all stakeholders to show restraint in order to prevent any further actions which could further undermine regional stability and threaten the peace process.’

For ease of reading, we choose not to use qualifiers such as ‘de facto’, ‘unrecognised’, or ‘partially recognised’ when discussing institutions or political positions within Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia. This does not imply a position on their status.