Author: Emil Lazarian

Thousands of Artsakh residents turned out for a rally in Stepanakert on May 9

Thousands of Artsakh residents turned out on Tuesday for a rally dubbed “No to Ethnic Cleansing” in Stepanakert, where ceremonies were held earlier to mark “Victory Day,” the holiday commemorating the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. May 9 also marked the 31st anniversary of the liberation of Shushi.

The rally kicked off at Stepanakert’s Renaissance Square with a prayer and a moment of silence observed honoring those who gave their lives for Artsakh’s freedom, as well as during what is called the Great Patriotic War, ArtsakhPress reported.

Photos by David Ghahramanyan

The text of a petition addressed to the leaders of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing countries—the United States, Russia and France—and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was read to overwhelming applause as a sign of popular approval for the message.

“We demand that all international mechanism are applied to ensure the implementation of the terms of the November 9, 2020 agreement as well as the UN International Court of Justice ruling,” the petition said, referencing the February ruling by the United Nations court, which ordered Azerbaijan to immediately ensure “unimpeded movement” along the Lachin Corridor. Azerbaijan has refused to comply with the court’s order.

Photos by David Ghahramnyan

Among the speakers at the rally was Artsakh former state minister Ruben Vardanyan who signaled that the people of Artsakh are ready to take part in negotiations with Azerbaijan “but not with a gun to our head.”

“On April 23, Azerbaijan violated the red lines and installed a checkpoint. The violation of these red lines makes us struggle, as honorable people, because we have no other option. No one should restrict our free access and egress to and from Armenia,” Vardanyan said.

Artsakh’s former State Minister Ruben Vardanyan Artsakh President Arayik Harutyunyan and his predecessors Bako Sahakian and Arkady Ghukasian

“We have been under a blockade for 149 days already. We do not have gas and power, and you are aware of the situation in Sarsang reservoir,” Vardanyan added referring to the recently receding levels of the reservoir that is the main source of water for Artsakh residents.

“We have many problems, but we are not giving up. The situation is difficult, but one thing is certain, there can be no talk about any so-called reintegration,” emphasized Vardanyan in a direct retort to Baku’s demands that Artsakh resident accept Azerbaijani citizenship.

“We are defending our homes, our cities and villages, the graves of our ancestors, our right to live on our land. We do not want to attack anyone, we want a calm and happy life in our homeland. We are ready for negotiations, but these negotiations cannot take place with a gun to our head, but only in case of mutual respect,” Vardanyan said, calling on Armenians around the world to unite for Artsakh.

Also attending the rally was Artsakh President Arayik Harutyunyan, together with his predecessors Arkady Ghukasyan and Bako Sahakyan.

The Lachin Corridor has been blockaded by Azerbaijan since Dec. 12, 2022

BY GERARD KHATCHADOURIAN

In 1789, the ancien regime in France was toppled by mobs driven by the aspiration of establishing a more just and egalitarian society. The French Revolution promised universal liberty and equality, abolished royal titles and sought to radically transform society. But the fledgling republic soon found itself in an existential struggle against an alliance of Europe’s monarchies. These entrenched monarchies, fearful of the rapid spread of revolutionary ideology and apprehensive of similar uprisings among their own citizens, launched aggressive wars in a bid to suppress the ideas of the revolution.

Similar events can be observed in Russia in 1917. When a Bolshevik coup toppled the 300-year-old Romanov dynasty, Russia’s former allies landed troops to aid the White Russians loyal to the Tsar and stop the communist revolution. They were partially driven by fear of more “red revolutions” sweeping across the continent. This historic phenomenon can be observed time and time again. Revolutionary states are inherently destabilizing, and increase security concerns with rival states. The shake up of the status quo and balance of power leads to a higher propensity of open hostility with neighbors[1].

Indeed it is no coincidence that after Armenia experienced its own democratic revolution in 2018, Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s longtime autocratic ruler, launched a war of aggression in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Meanwhile, Russia, led by its own entrenched elites and Armenia’s nominal ally sat on the sidelines and watched Armenia’s revolution flounder. Like the regimes in Europe in 1789 and 1917, these autocratic states had a vested interest in seeing the ideas of a revolution fail.

There is some debate about whether the 2018 protest movement constitutes a revolution. While some argue it was a “coup from the streets,” or a simple change of power, the technical criteria does not change the fact that Armenia’s new leaders were perceived by Azerbaijan’s and Russia’s ruling elites as destabilizing revolutionaries and a threat to their own governments.

Both these regimes feared that the revolution directly challenged their forms of government. Vladimir Putin sees burgeoning democracies in Russia’s sphere of influence as a threat to his regime. Europe is replete with examples of Putin funding anti-democratic forces. Notably, after Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, Putin sought to undermine Mikheil Saakashvili’s government by invading Georgia in 2008. Similarly, Putin saw Ukraine’s Orange Revolution as a direct challenge to his power and Russian forces invaded Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 in an effort to install a Russia friendly government on its border[2]. While Putin did not intervene on behalf of Serzh Sargysan, Russia’s elites were suspicious of Nikol Pashinyan’s intentions and his rapprochement with the West[3].

 The revolution in Armenia also brought fears of democratic contagion to Azerbaijan’s ruling elite. Azerbaijan had similar concerns in 2011 when protests inspired by the Arab Spring erupted in Baku[4]. Hundreds were arrested amid a wider crackdown on civil society. With Georgia experiencing the Rose Revolution in 2003 and Armenia having its revolution in 2018, Azerbaijan’s elites feared they would be the last domino to fall in the Caucasus. Aliyev went as far as to ask Pashinyan directly from refraining from talking about the revolution in Armenia, out of fear of the revolution spreading to Azerbaijan[5].

The opposition in Azerbaijan frequently compared themselves to Armenia and were “jealous” of the outcome of the revolution, with a famous opposition journalist asking “Why is victory always on their side?”[6].  Aliyev feared that ordinary Azeris would want to emulate such an uprising to install a more democratic regime. Shortly after Sargsyan stepped down, Azerbaijan’s parliament took up a bill that would strengthen already-harsh penalties against illegal assemblies[7]. Aliyev feared that his own citizens would participate in uprisings and protests similar to those in 2011 and that would be fatal to his regime. From his perspective, it was essential that Pashinyan’s revolution be perceived as a failure.

Many revolutionary elites are poorly prepared for running a government[8].  They attempt to build a new regime by excluding experienced members of the existing government and replacing them with inexperienced members friendly with the revolution. They also take time to consolidate support amongst essential actors and fear a counterrevolution and the return of the old regime. In order to consolidate his revolution with average citizens, Pashinyan developed hawkish stances on Artsakh, publicly sparring with Aliyev on stage at the Munich Security Conference, and proclaiming, “Artsakh is Armenia” in Stepanakert. His public repudiation of the Madrid Principles, while popular at home, put further pressure on Aliyev to act. Pashinyan also chose a hawkish defense minister who proclaimed “new wars for new lands” as a direct threat to seize more territory from Azerbaijan[9]. These hawkish stances in effect took up one of the Sargysan administrations sources of legitimacy. Pashinyan essentially defanged the threat of counterrevolution in the name of protecting Artsakh by taking up the mantle of an Artsakh hawk. While this permanently damaged the negotiation process and increased chances of an armed conformation with Azerbaijan, it also helped Pashinyan consolidate support for his government by creating a “rally around the flag” effect.

Pashinyan also exaggerated the foreign threat to this revolution to further rally internal support. He took measures that further exacerbated the spiral of suspicion with Russia. He publicly challenged Russia by arresting the then head of the CSTO Yuri Khatchaturov and investigated Russian railroad companies. He also arrested Robert Kocharyan, a Putin ally, setting a dangerous example of a former head of state being arrested by a new regime, something unprecedented in the Russian sphere. Armenia also damaged relations by changing its United Nations votes to be a more critical of Russia[10]. Pashinyan also removed experienced members of the old regime from the bureaucracy, hurting the chances of Armenia and Russia understanding each other and seriously damaging relations. Experienced members of the old regime that stayed on such as President Armen Sargsyan had a strained relationship with Pashinyan.

Russia expressed its dissatisfaction with Pashinyan’s government multiple times. Putin did not visit Armenia until 2019 despite his frequent visits during the Sargysan administration,[11] and Putin made a point to wish his jailed ally Robert Kocharyan a happy birthday[12]. During the 2020 war, when Russia refused to provide the help Armenia needed, Pashinyan even offered to resign his government in exchange for more military aid, in essence acknowledging that his government’s rocky relationship with Russia may be the reason for the lack of support. 

Time was working both for and against the new Armenian government. Once power is consolidated, post-revolutionary states see a significant increase in defense capabilities[13]. They also tend to see a rapid rise in economic performance and an increase in prosperity for average citizens[14]. Aliyev knew that he had a short window to strike, before Pashinyan was able to consolidate his revolution and gain an advantage over Azerbaijan. Because of the disorder that followed the revolution internally in Armenia and with regard to relations with Russia, Azerbaijan decided that it was time to strike and strangle the revolution in the crib before it demonstrated success.

Armenian and Azeri soldiers engaged in a skirmish in July 2020[15]. Evidence suggests that Armenian troops took over abandoned Azeri positions and escalated the conflict by killing an Azeri general with a drone. As a response, a crowd of Azeris in Baku stormed the parliament building in protest, demanding that Aliyev take action against Armenia. This further heightened pressure on Aliyev to solve his Pashinyan problem. Aliyev who plays the role of a classic post-Soviet strongman also feared to be seen as the weaker party vis-a-vis Pashinyan.

Azerbaijan sought to delegitimize the Pashinyan government by launching a limited aims war that saw unexpected success. In September 2020, Azerbaijan attacked the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. The early days of the war saw a stalemate on the frontlines but Azeri troops were soon able to exploit a breakthrough in the south. During the war, Aliyev sought to personally embarrass Pashinyan and his government, claiming that the Armenian government “overestimated its global role.” In addresses to his country, Aliyev personally challenged Pashinyan, proclaiming “Ne odlu Pashinyan?” (what happened Pashinyan?) and calling Pashinyan “a stupid drunken clown.” Commentators noted that the attacks were of a personal nature, something notably absent during the Sargysan years.

Some argue that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had reached an inflection point. The decades long dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan was never resolved and some say war was inevitable. However, it is worth noting that the front was relatively quiet since the 1994 ceasefire with only smaller skirmishes taking place in April 2016 and full-blown war never breaking out. War erupted only 2 years into Pashinyan’s government. Perhaps due to inexperience, Pashinyan’s government badly miscalculated its own capabilities and the ability for Azerbaijan to gain territory[16].

The 2020 Karabakh War can be seen as a direct consequence of Armenia’s 2018 revolution. The revolution led to a change in government and a shift in Armenia’s political landscape, with the rise of inexperienced leaders to the helm. Azerbaijan’s autocratic ruler, Ilham Aliyev, and Russia’s entrenched elites were both wary of the democratic contagion that might spread to their own countries. They viewed Pashinyan’s government as a threat to their own forms of government, saw its weakness and isolation and sought to strangle it.

Gerard Khatchadourian is a political analyst in Washington, D.C.

[1] Walt, S. M. (n.d.). Revolution and War.

[2] Person, R., & McFaul, M. (2022, April). What Putin Fears Most. Journal of Democracy.

[3] Smith-Park, L. (2018, May 2). CNN.

[4] Klomegah, K. (2011, April 12). Arab Spring knocks at Azerbaijan’s door. Al-Jazeera.

[5] It was not me who turned to Aliyev, but he turned to me with a request. Pashinyan uncovers some details. First Channel News. (2020, September 28). st1yle=”font-size:16px;margin:0px 0px 1.25em;padding:0px;border:0px;line-height:inherit;,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline”>[6] Manukyan, S. (2018, May 8). Reactions to Pashinyan’s Premiership. The Armenian Weekly.

[7] Adilgizi, L. (2018, April 27). Azerbaijan watches Armenian rebellion with jealousy and hope. Eurasianet. Retrieved from st1yle=”font-size:16px;margin:0px 0px 1.25em;padding:0px;border:0px;line-height:inherit;,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline”>[8] Walt, S. M. (n.d.). Revolution and War.

[9] Cornell, S. (2020, November 14). How Did Armenia So Badly Miscalculate Its War with Azerbaijan? The National Interest.

[10] Mejlumyan, A. (2019a, June 5). In nod to Georgia, Armenia changes UN vote. Eurasianet. st1yle=”font-size:16px;margin:0px 0px 1.25em;padding:0px;border:0px;line-height:inherit;,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline”>[11] Mejlumyan, A. (2019, October 2). In Armenia, Eurasian Union meets Velvet Revolution. Eurasianet. Retrieved from st1yle=”font-size:16px;margin:0px 0px 1.25em;padding:0px;border:0px;line-height:inherit;,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline”>[12] Putin‌ ‌wishes‌ ‌friend,‌ ‌ex-president‌ ‌of‌ ‌Armenia‌ ‌Kocharyan‌ ‌happy‌ ‌birthday‌ . JAM News. (2020, January 9). Retrieved from st1yle=”font-size:16px;margin:0px 0px 1.25em;padding:0px;border:0px;line-height:inherit;,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline”>[13] Carter, J., Bernhard, M., & Palmer, G. (2012). Social Revolution, the State, and War: How Revolutions Affect War-Making Capacity and Interstate War Outcomes. The Journal of Conflict Resolution.

[14] Acemoglu, D. (2014, May 20). Does democracy boost economic growth? World Economic Forum. Retrieved from st1yle=”font-size:16px;margin:0px 0px 1.25em;padding:0px;border:0px;line-height:inherit;,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline”>[15] Stronski, P. (n.d.). Behind the Flare-Up Along Armenia-Azerbaijan Border. Carnigie Endowment for International Peace.

[16] Cornell, S. (2020, November 14). How Did Armenia So Badly Miscalculate Its War with Azerbaijan? The National Interest.