Author: Emil Lazarian

Azerbaijan’s government is sounding more and more positive about the U.S.- and EU-brokered negotiations with Armenia and increasingly negative about Russia’s mediation efforts. 

Those talks are taking place on a separate track, not coordinated with the Western mediators. Russia maintains a 2,000-strong peacekeeping contingent in Azerbaijan’s Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh.

The latest meeting between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders on July 15 in Brussels, mediated by European Council President Charles Michel, didn’t seem to advance the process too much, but it did introduce one new idea. 

Michel welcomed Azerbaijan’s “willingness to provide humanitarian supplies” to the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, via the Azerbaijani city of Aghdam. 

The initiative was not received well by Armenians. Many interpreted it as a step toward normalizing and legitimizing Azerbaijan’s seven-month blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh. Some residents of Askeran, an Armenian town close to Aghdam, reportedly vowed to install barriers on the Askeran-Aghdam road “in order to counter the so-called humanitarian aid predetermined by the Azerbaijani authorities.”

(Michel also “emphasized the need to open the Lachin road” connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Toivo Klaar, the EU’s special envoy to the South Caucasus, told Armenian media that the Aghdam offer is “not an alternative but a complement to the Lachin road”.)

Azerbaijanis largely welcomed the Aghdam proposal, seeing it as an opportunity to advance the integration of the Karabakh Armenians into the Azerbaijani state. 

“In case humanitarian aid will be accepted by the Armenian community, it could create a precedent (not massive) for them accepting the Azerbaijani citizenship in the near future,” political analyst Fuad Shahbaz tweeted in English. 

Vasif Huseynov, of the state-run Analysis of International Relations Center, wrote for the Jamestown Foundation that Michel’s support for the Aghdam proposal was “another affirmation of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity by the EU and Armenia – to the dismay of some ultra-nationalist groups in Armenia and on the Russian side.”

Azerbaijan’s reaction to a statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry on the same day, July 15, similarly highlighted its growing preference for the European track of talks.

The Russian statement opened by saying that “by recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijani territory,” Yerevan had “cardinally changed the fundamental conditions” under which the Russian-brokered cease-fire that ended the 2020 Second Karabakh War was signed.

The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry soon released its own statement objecting to this line: “Russian MFA commenting on and setting conditions for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan in the context of the recognition of Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, a country that occupied the territories of Azerbaijan for nearly 30 years, is unacceptable.”  

(Both the Russian and Azerbaijani foreign ministries asserted that Armenia already recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan while in fact it has only stated its willingness to do so)

This sort of verbal sparring between Russia and Azerbaijan isn’t new since the 2020 Second Karabakh War. Azerbaijan has long accused Russia of failing to secure the withdrawal of what it calls “illegal armed Armenian groups” in Nagorno-Karabakh. (This refers to Karabakh’s armed force, the Artsakh Defense Army.)

In nearly every official utterance Azerbaijan is at pains to refer to the Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh as “temporarily stationed there.” The peacekeepers’ 5-year term of deployment expires in 2025.

Russia’s war against Ukraine provided Baku with yet another platform to reproach Russia. Though Azerbaijan has never officially condemned Russia’s invasion, nor voted for UN resolutions against Russia (in accordance with a strategic partnership agreement signed two days before Russia’s invasion), Azerbaijani state media has clearly been taking the Ukrainian side. And Azerbaijan has regularly been providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine since the start of the war. 

Baku has been taking advantage of Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine, seizing additional territories in Nagorno-Karabakh and placing the region under blockade. 

This is widely seen as an attempt to change the situation on the ground in such a way to ensure that the peacekeepers leave Karabakh when their mandate expires. 

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Azerbaijan’s strategic partner Turkey, recently threw his weight behind Azerbaijan’s demand for the Russian peacekeeper’s timely exit and expressed confidence that they would leave by 2025. 

The existing discourse and latest statements suggest that Azerbaijan is working to secure Russia’s exit from Karabakh, says Shujaat Ahmadzada, an analyst at the Topchubashov Center, a Baku-based think tank. He says Baku has two key levers it can use to make this happen. 

“First, there is a need for rapid integration into the non-Western economic space for Russia. In this direction, the intensification of trade contacts with India, the Middle East and other actors is more relevant than ever. The full realization of the North-South Corridor passing through Azerbaijan is more relevant than ever for Moscow. For Azerbaijan, the North-South Corridor is not only an economic project, but also a political lever.” Ahmadzada wrote on Facebook. 

“Second, it is important for Russia that states do not join the anti-Russian front. Azerbaijan supports Ukraine and provides humanitarian aid, but does not join the anti-Russian front. In this case, Azerbaijan’s ‘neutrality’ is more important than ever to Moscow.”

Both these things are more important to Russia than maintaining peacekeepers in Karabakh, Ahmadzada said.

Azerbaijan’s government is sounding more and more positive about the U.S.- and EU-brokered negotiations with Armenia and increasingly negative about Russia’s mediation efforts. 

Those talks are taking place on a separate track, not coordinated with the Western mediators. Russia maintains a 2,000-strong peacekeeping contingent in Azerbaijan’s Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh.

The latest meeting between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders on July 15 in Brussels, mediated by European Council President Charles Michel, didn’t seem to advance the process too much, but it did introduce one new idea. 

Michel welcomed Azerbaijan’s “willingness to provide humanitarian supplies” to the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, via the Azerbaijani city of Aghdam. 

The initiative was not received well by Armenians. Many interpreted it as a step toward normalizing and legitimizing Azerbaijan’s seven-month blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh. Some residents of Askeran, an Armenian town close to Aghdam, reportedly vowed to install barriers on the Askeran-Aghdam road “in order to counter the so-called humanitarian aid predetermined by the Azerbaijani authorities.”

(Michel also “emphasized the need to open the Lachin road” connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Toivo Klaar, the EU’s special envoy to the South Caucasus, told Armenian media that the Aghdam offer is “not an alternative but a complement to the Lachin road”.)

Azerbaijanis largely welcomed the Aghdam proposal, seeing it as an opportunity to advance the integration of the Karabakh Armenians into the Azerbaijani state. 

“In case humanitarian aid will be accepted by the Armenian community, it could create a precedent (not massive) for them accepting the Azerbaijani citizenship in the near future,” political analyst Fuad Shahbaz tweeted in English. 

Vasif Huseynov, of the state-run Analysis of International Relations Center, wrote for the Jamestown Foundation that Michel’s support for the Aghdam proposal was “another affirmation of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity by the EU and Armenia – to the dismay of some ultra-nationalist groups in Armenia and on the Russian side.”

Azerbaijan’s reaction to a statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry on the same day, July 15, similarly highlighted its growing preference for the European track of talks.

The Russian statement opened by saying that “by recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijani territory,” Yerevan had “cardinally changed the fundamental conditions” under which the Russian-brokered cease-fire that ended the 2020 Second Karabakh War was signed.

The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry soon released its own statement objecting to this line: “Russian MFA commenting on and setting conditions for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan in the context of the recognition of Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, a country that occupied the territories of Azerbaijan for nearly 30 years, is unacceptable.”  

(Both the Russian and Azerbaijani foreign ministries asserted that Armenia already recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan while in fact it has only stated its willingness to do so)

This sort of verbal sparring between Russia and Azerbaijan isn’t new since the 2020 Second Karabakh War. Azerbaijan has long accused Russia of failing to secure the withdrawal of what it calls “illegal armed Armenian groups” in Nagorno-Karabakh. (This refers to Karabakh’s armed force, the Artsakh Defense Army.)

In nearly every official utterance Azerbaijan is at pains to refer to the Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh as “temporarily stationed there.” The peacekeepers’ 5-year term of deployment expires in 2025.

Russia’s war against Ukraine provided Baku with yet another platform to reproach Russia. Though Azerbaijan has never officially condemned Russia’s invasion, nor voted for UN resolutions against Russia (in accordance with a strategic partnership agreement signed two days before Russia’s invasion), Azerbaijani state media has clearly been taking the Ukrainian side. And Azerbaijan has regularly been providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine since the start of the war. 

Baku has been taking advantage of Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine, seizing additional territories in Nagorno-Karabakh and placing the region under blockade. 

This is widely seen as an attempt to change the situation on the ground in such a way to ensure that the peacekeepers leave Karabakh when their mandate expires. 

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Azerbaijan’s strategic partner Turkey, recently threw his weight behind Azerbaijan’s demand for the Russian peacekeeper’s timely exit and expressed confidence that they would leave by 2025. 

The existing discourse and latest statements suggest that Azerbaijan is working to secure Russia’s exit from Karabakh, says Shujaat Ahmadzada, an analyst at the Topchubashov Center, a Baku-based think tank. He says Baku has two key levers it can use to make this happen. 

“First, there is a need for rapid integration into the non-Western economic space for Russia. In this direction, the intensification of trade contacts with India, the Middle East and other actors is more relevant than ever. The full realization of the North-South Corridor passing through Azerbaijan is more relevant than ever for Moscow. For Azerbaijan, the North-South Corridor is not only an economic project, but also a political lever.” Ahmadzada wrote on Facebook. 

“Second, it is important for Russia that states do not join the anti-Russian front. Azerbaijan supports Ukraine and provides humanitarian aid, but does not join the anti-Russian front. In this case, Azerbaijan’s ‘neutrality’ is more important than ever to Moscow.”

Both these things are more important to Russia than maintaining peacekeepers in Karabakh, Ahmadzada said.

By Heydar Isayev via Eurasianet.org 

https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/Azerbaijan-Armenia-Peace-Talks-Lean-West-As-Russias-Role-Declines.html

Western thinking of Turkish and Azerbaijani Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ilham Aliyev has been very wrong. Both countries are Ukraine’s strongest allies in the Greater Middle East, where Arab countries and Israel are sitting on the fence and trying to play both sides or hiding their heads in the sand. This is not the case with Turkiye and Azerbaijan.

Turkiye and Azerbaijan have a close military and political alliance drawn up after the 2020 Second Karabakh War. Both countries are critically disposed toward Russia and align with the pro-Western camp: Turkiye as a NATO member and Azerbaijan as a non-aligned country that has stayed away from Russian-led Eurasian integration projects.

Turkiye is home to millions of Crimean Tatars who moved to the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. Their Crimean homeland was occupied by the Russian Empire in 1783 which changed its ethnic balance. Crimean Tatars, who closely follow developments in Russian-occupied Crimea, where racism, Islamophobia, and political repression is endemic, are a powerful anti-Russian lobby in Turkiye.

Iran meanwhile has become Russia’s staunchest ally in the Kremlin’s fight against the US-dominated unipolar world and its replacement by an allegedly more ‘democratic’ multipolar world. Iran is constructing a facility to build Shaheed drones in Russia, while Turkiye is building a plant to build Bayraktar drones in Ukraine.

Western governments have wrongly portrayed President Erdogan as being in bed with Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, and were therefore wrong-footed by his recent steps. In the space of a week, Erdogan released Ukrainian POWs from the Spring 2022 battle for the port of Mariupol, infuriating the Kremlin because they had been released from Russian captivity on the basis that they would spend the entirety of the war in Turkiye.

But Erdogan went even further. On the eve of the recent NATO summit, Erdogan extended strong support to Ukraine becoming a member of NATO. Turkiye’s support infuriated the Kremlin who has expressed strong opposition to Ukraine joining NATO and the EU because this would definitively end any possibility of bringing the country into the Russian World.

In addition to 35 Bayraktar TB2 and 24 Mini-Bayraktar reconnaissance drones, Turkiye is sending other types of military equipment to Ukraine. Before the US announcement, Turkiye said it would supply Ukraine with cluster munitions. Turkiye sent up to 200 TRLG-230 Rokestan missiles to Ukraine that can be fired from multiple rocket launchers and have a range of 20 to 70 kilometers. Turkiye also sent 200 Kirpi mine-resistant armoured personnel carriers and 20 COBRA II 4×4 Tactical Wheeled Armoured Vehicles.

During the same week of NATO’s summit in Vilnius, Turkiye said it’s navy would escort Ukrainian grain ships through the Black Sea. Turkiye’s offer will be tested later this month after Russia refused to extend the UN-Turkish brokered grain deal beyond July 17. Turkiye’s battle of wills with Russia will impact the Kremlin’s arrogant view of the Black Sea constituting a ‘Russian lake.’

Azerbaijan’s strategic importance to Ukraine is six-fold. Firstly, Azerbaijan is the only south Caucasian state that has successfully resisted Russian control over its affairs. With three Russian military bases, Armenia is a long-time ally of Russia since the early 1990s and is a member of all Russian-led integration projects in Eurasia. Georgia has been captured by Georgian-Russian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili who has put former President Mikhail Saakashvili, a long-time opponent of Putin, in jail on trumped up charges.

Secondly, Azerbaijan is alone in the south Caucasus in not breaking Western sanctions against Russia. Armenia and Georgia are actively involved in sanctions busting both due to high-level corruption and because the Kremlin has influence over the ruling elites of both countries.

Thirdly, Armenia and Georgia, but not Azerbaijan, are disseminating the Kremlin’s talking points justifying Russia’s so-called ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine. Georgian leaders have parroted the Kremlin’s disinformation by blaming the West for the war in Ukraine. Speaking at the GLOBSEC Bratislava security forum in May, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili said ‘one of the main reasons’ behind the war in Ukraine ‘was NATO expansion … the desire of Ukraine to become a member of NATO.’ The Georgian Orthodox Church has taken the side of the Russian Orthodox Church over Ukraine receiving Orthodox autocephaly (independence). The Georgian Orthodox Church joined the Kremlin in protesting against Ukraine’s clamp down on subversion and Russian Orthodox clergy collaboration with Russian occupying forces.

Fourthly, Azerbaijan and Ukraine uphold the territorial integrity of states, which is not true of irridentist powers such as Russia and Armenia. Ukraine has given unqualified support to Karabakh constituting Azerbaijani sovereign territory. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has not supported Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory during votes on critical resolutions at the United Nations.

Fifthly, Azerbaijan’s supply of energy to the European Union, together with other countries such as the US and Norway, removes Russia’s stranglehold over energy supplies. Azerbaijan is one of the strategically important countries assisting Europe to become energy independent of revanchist Russia.

Finally, Azerbaijan provides free energy to Ukraine for humanitarian work. Since Russia’s invasion, the Azerbaijani state energy company SOCAR has been providing free gas and petrol to vehicles used for humanitarian missions, such as delivering aid to internally displaced people, ambulances and fire trucks. In June Azerbaijan supplied twenty tons of fuel to Ukraine free of charge as humanitarian aid, as well as water pipes, water pumps, and life jackets, in response to Russia’s terrorist destruction of the Kakhovka dam.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted how Turkiye and Azerbaijan are close allies of Ukraine over a wide range of areas. As the second biggest military power in NATO, Russia is forced to take Turkiye seriously when it supplies military equipment to Ukraine and protects grain convoys sailing through the Black Sea.

Turkiye, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine oppose Russian irridentism in Eurasia and Russian-led Eurasian integration projects; uphold the territorial integrity of states and Karabakh as Azerbaijani sovereign territory; and recognize the importance of European energy independence from Russia. Turkiye and Azerbaijan stand with Ukraine during votes at the UN condemning Russia’s invasion and occupation. Unlike Georgia and Armenia, Turkiye and Azerbaijan do not fan Russian disinformation about the causes of the Russian invasion.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His latest book is Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/erdogans-flip-how-turkiye-and-azerbaijan-became-ukraine-allies/ 

Azerbaijan on Thursday accused Armenia of intending to continue “illegal activities” on its territory over Yerevan’s rejection of a road into the disputed Karabakh region proposed by Azerbaijan.

“The fact that Armenia … rejects this road (Aghdam-Khankendi) by any means possible proves that the claim of a ‘tense humanitarian situation’ in the region is groundless and that Armenia intends to continue illegal activities on the territory of Azerbaijan,” a statement by the country’s Foreign Ministry said.

The statement came in response to comments made by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian during a government meeting earlier in the day.

It said Yerevan’s repeated claims on the Lachin road over the past eight months show the country’s intention to “use the issue for its political purposes and to obstruct the peace treaty negotiations that have been progressing recently.”

It further said Armenia’s claim that Azerbaijan is taking steps to carry out “ethnic cleansing” in the Karabakh region is “quite wrong and dangerous.”

The statement defined Pashinian’s conditions on the form of dialogue between Baku and Armenian residents in Karabakh as “unacceptable” and a direct challenge to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

It also said Armenia is clearly trying to make the process of border delimitation between the two countries fail, given that Yerevan “does not fulfill its obligation to withdraw the Armenian armed forces from the territory of Azerbaijan, continues to provide financial support to the territory, and emphasizes its territorial claims in various letters, statements and speeches.”

“Azerbaijan, as the initiator of the peace process with Armenia in the aforementioned areas, is interested in establishing peace, stability and security in the region and is an active party in the negotiation process. If Armenia is interested in peace, it should stop efforts that hinder the peace process,” it concluded.

Karabakh has been at the center of a decadeslong territorial dispute between the two countries.

Azerbaijan in April set up the border point at the entrance to the Lachin corridor, exacerbating allegations from Armenia of a Karabakh “blockade.” Tensions soaring over the move left another half a dozen people killed from both sides since December.

Baku fervently denied the claims, saying the checkpoint was created in response to security threats from Armenia and citing the transfer of weapons and ammunition to the Karabakh region.

Earlier this month, it temporarily halted the checkpoint pending an investigation into the Armenian branch of the Red Cross for alleged smuggling.

The latest developments followed a monthslong protest by Azerbaijani environmental activists, which Yerevan claims spurred a humanitarian crisis and food and fuel shortages.

Azerbaijan insisted at the time that civilian transport could go unimpeded through the Lachin corridor.

In February, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – the U.N.’s top judicial body – had ordered Azerbaijan to ensure free movement on the road.

The two former Soviet republics fought two wars to control the mountainous region of Karabakh in the 1990s and again in 2020.

Six weeks of fighting in autumn 2020 ended with a Russian-sponsored cease-fire that saw Armenia cede swathes of territories it had controlled for decades.

There have been frequent clashes at the two countries’ shared border despite the ongoing peace talks between Baku and Yerevan under mediation from the European Union and the United States.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, ethnic Armenian separatists in Karabakh broke away from Azerbaijan. The ensuing conflict claimed some 30,000 lives.

With major regional power Russia struggling to maintain its decisive influence because of the fallout from its war on Ukraine, the conflict has also drawn Western mediation efforts. Washington has been sponsoring peace talks, hosting ministers from both sides to hammer out an agreement twice this year alone, while the European Union has been mediating at the level of leaders between the former Soviet republics.

Baku and Yerevan say “tangible progress” was made at these talks but emphasize “more work” is needed.