GEOPOLITICAL DIARY: RUSSIA’S SECRET CHECHEN WEAPON
Stratfor
Nov 13 2007
Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution David Bakradze on
Monday accused Russia of bringing "large" amounts of illegal military
equipment and personnel into its secessionist region of Abkhazia.
Included on Bakradze’s list of charges was that 200 new "peacekeepers"
had been moved into Ochamchire — most of them Chechen. The Chechens
have a long and bloody history in Georgia and Abkhazia, and using
them as official peacekeepers is like throwing matches — or even
road flares — at a powder keg.
Moscow and Tbilisi have been ratcheting up tensions through myriad
provocations over the past five months, among them a missile being
"mistakenly" dropped on a Georgian field and expelling each others’
diplomats. While the tit-for-tat has taken place, Georgia has
internally fractured with mass protests and riots, and now the call
for new elections. The Georgian government is weak, and now is the
time for Russia to exert its influence in the region.
Russia’s best bet in gaining access to and destabilizing Georgia
through the secessionist regions. Since late September there has been
a substantial increase in military tensions between Georgia and its
separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which have mirrored
and contributed to rising tensions between Tbilisi and Moscow.
At the start of November, Georgia accused Russian peacekeepers of
kidnapping Georgian soldiers in the Abkhaz region of Ganmukhuri. With
television crews in tow, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili flew
to the scene to demand the soldiers’ freedom; the situation ended in
a scuffle between the peacekeepers and Georgian government officials.
But what the cameras caught was an interesting twist in that quite
a few of the peacekeepers did not look Russian, but Caucasian.
It is difficult to tell from the footage whether the peacekeepers
are actually Chechen, but the possibility is one Georgian authorities
have latched on to, saying that hundreds of Chechens have just been
deployed to the region.
The Chechens have a long history in Abkhazia and Georgia, though
their presence in the region is less like Chinese water torture and
more like evisceration. Following a 1990-1992 stint fighting for the
Armenians in the Azerbaijani secessionist region of Nagorno-Karabakh,
the Chechens joined the Abkhazians during their "War of Independence"
from Georgia. The Chechens proved to be invaluable in that two-year
war, which was one of the bloodiest post-Soviet conflicts. The war
also showed that Georgia was far from able to fend off the Chechen
militants’ wood-chipper tactics.
But the Chechens also received essential guerrilla-style training and
practice, which they used in 1994 during the nasty first (post-Soviet)
Chechen war with Russia — a war that left a gaping wound for Moscow
throughout the following decade. While locked in conflict with Russia,
in 2001 the Chechens returned to Abkhazia but fought for the Georgians
in retribution for Abkhazia’s continued loyalty to Moscow.
But the situation between the Chechens and Russians has most definitely
changed in the past year; Russia has locked down control of Chechnya
for the first time since the Soviet period, declaring victory after
two humiliating wars. The main reason the Russians were victorious
this time is that Moscow switched tactics on how to smash the
Chechen militancy, using Chechens to fight Chechens. This allowed
Russia to create a large unofficial military force of Chechens that
has locked down — though brutally — its own region. Currently,
Russian authorities claim to have 15,000 people within their Chechen
militia, which is rumored to use tactics that would make even Russian
intelligence blanch — including the use of underground torture
chambers and taking out entire families.
It is entirely possible, though not certain, that Russia will now
be deploying its new pro-Moscow Chechen militia to other places,
such as Georgia. Currently Georgia is far too unstable to deal
with any serious Russian push, let alone the magnitude of fear and
instability that a hostile Chechen presence south of the border could
muster. But such a move would be dangerous for everyone involved,
because each time Chechens get involved in other regions’ disputes,
no side comes out well (except occasionally the Chechens).
Then again, Moscow knows that the Chechens are familiar with Abkhazia’s
terrain and the tactics of both the Abkhaz and the Georgians. Moscow
also knows that the Chechen militia’s scruples are less than that of
the Russian force’s — something that could be handy as tensions with
Tbilisi grow more dangerous.