There seems to be no end in sight for Azerbaijan’s blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, now in its seventh month.
The Lachin corridor, the only road that links the contested region to Armenia, has been blocked for more than 200 days, sparking a humanitarian emergency as food, energy and medical care becomes increasingly scarce.
The tens of thousands of ethnic Armenians living in the region are thus faced with a stark choice: either acquire Azerbaijani citizenship or leave the small enclave that has been at the heart of conflict between the neighbouring states for 35 years. Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognised as Azerbaijani territory, yet its Armenian population claims independence.
In mid-July, in the latest round of Western-mediated peace talks that have run for more than a year, Armenia and Azerbaijan showed some readiness to recognise each other’s territorial integrity. But differing views on Karabakh’s future persist. Azerbaijan continues to resist calls to lift the Lachin corridor blockade and accuses Armenians in Karabakh of escalating activity against Azerbaijan. Armenia says it will recognise Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan only if there are international mechanisms to protect the enclave’s ethnic Armenian population, which Azerbaijan rejects.
Unsurprisingly, for the European Union (EU), which mediated the latest talks, and regional power broker Russia, which has offered to host “a trilateral meeting” in Moscow very soon, their own interests – namely the conflict in Ukraine – take priority in the Karabakh confrontation.
Nagorno-Karabakh has been blockaded since 12 December 2022, when protesters claiming to be ‘eco-activists’ took to the streets. They alleged that illegal gold mining in Karabakh was causing environmental harm. Observers suggested the blockade was backed by Azerbaijan, which was denied by authorities in Baku, the capital.
The ‘eco-activists’ ended their protest in April, when Azerbaijani border guards established a checkpoint at the entrance to the Lachin corridor, justified with claims that Armenia was using the road to send troops, weapons and ammunition to Karabakh. Armenia denied this, while Azerbaijan released videos of military-looking trucks being escorted by Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. What the vehicles contained and whether or not Armenian soldiers were in them remains uncertain. Either way, the checkpoint’s installation violated the Russia-backed Trilateral Agreement that ended Azerbaijan’s six-week full-scale offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh in November 2020. The agreement guaranteed unimpeded traffic through the Lachin corridor.
On 15 June, the flow of goods and humanitarian aid along the Lachin corridor came to a complete halt following a shootout at the checkpoint. Authorities in Yerevan, the Armenian capital, said Azerbaijani border guards had attempted to plant their national flag in an area claimed by Armenia, while Russian peacekeepers looked on. Armenia opened fire and the exchange left one border guard wounded on each side.
Ever since, Azerbaijani border patrol units have blocked Russian peacekeepers and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from delivering humanitarian aid to the region, accusing the latter of “smuggling” goods. The ICRC is currently allowed to transport patients requiring urgent medical care to Armenia, but Azerbaijani medical personnel examine them at the border. The organisation says this practice is exacerbating Karabakh’s already dire situation.
As a result, Nagorno-Karabakh continues to experience severe shortages of food, baby food, fuel, medicine, hygiene and personal care items. The enclave previously relied on imports from Armenia, even for fresh fruit and vegetables, and the interrupted gas and electricity supply, which passes through Azerbaijan, is hindering local efforts to meet demands. Local media regularly shows empty supermarket shelves and long queues outside bakeries, with people waiting hours for just a couple of loaves of bread.
With rising unemployment and soaring prices of essential goods, the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh have introduced food stamps. Adding to the hardships faced by Karabakh’s people are dwindling fuel supplies, which mean uncertain goods deliveries, reduced private car usage and decreased public transport schedule. There has been a rise in miscarriages and premature births due to stress, poor nutrition and lack of essential medicines, according to Amnesty International, which cited doctors in Karabakh.
In one tragic episode in early July, two young children – Leo and Gita Narimanyan, aged three and six respectively – lost their lives while searching for their mother, who had left them unattended while she went to collect the family’s food allowance. The children, who had sought shelter in an unlocked car, ended up suffocating in what the Karabakh police suggested was vehicular heatstroke. (Another law-enforcement body has cautioned that this is just one of the theories being investigated.)
Azerbaijan denies imposing a blockade, using its state media to release videos that supposedly show Karabakh residents passing through passport control at a checkpoint. In January, Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev offered Karabakh Armenians a stark choice: accept Azerbaijani citizenship and the promise of security and equal rights, or leave altogether. “The road is not closed,” Aliyev said, “it is open.”
But Karabakh Armenians profoundly distrust Azerbaijan’s promises of security. They accuse the Azerbaijani military of repeatedly violating the ceasefire and shooting dead soldiers and civilians. War crimes reportedly committed against Armenian civilians and captured soldiers, as well as gross human rights violations in Azerbaijan, further erode trust. Indeed, Karabakh and the Armenian authorities have accused Baku of carrying out a programme of ethnic cleansing.
Azerbaijan is yet to present any plans to better integrate the Karabakh Armenian population and has done nothing to de-escalate hostility. In May, Aliyev demanded the de facto authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh surrender and promised them amnesty, but he threatened force if they did not comply.
International human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have strongly condemned the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh. Resolutions have been passed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the International Court of Justice. All have called on Azerbaijan to restore unhindered movement along the Lachin corridor, but these calls remain unheeded.
Baku’s intention may be to make life in Nagorno-Karabakh unbearable, forcing inhabitants to leave. This strategy would effectively achieve a ‘bloodless’ ethnic cleansing and sidestep the need to address Karabakh Armenians’ social and economic integration issues.
On 21 July, Aliyev appeared to take responsibility for armed escalations against Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia over the past three years. In referring to these incidents as “messages” to Armenia, Azerbaijan’s president basically admitted that Baku was using military pressure as its main negotiating tactic over Nagorno-Karabakh. Aliyev also declared that international law is ineffective as Armenian troops remain in Nagorno-Karabakh and force was the only guarantee of peace as signatures on agreements have little authority.
Even so, the Armenian leadership has generally adopted a more peaceable tone. On 25 July, prime minister Nikol Pashinyan said he was ready to sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, based on mutual recognition of territorial integrity. This, he said, was in line with the agreement reached during the talks held in Brussels this month, which were mediated by European Council president Charles Michel.
The Karabakh blockade continues but so do the peace talks, with each round accompanied by claims of progress. In reality, meaningful developments remain scarce.
Russia, the EU and the United States are the main mediators in these negotiations. The Kremlin has long played a significant role in the Karabakh conflict, leveraging it to bolster its regional influence. The 2022 tripartite agrement led to the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, with the Lachin corridor also falling under their purview. But they have yet to take steps to restore traffic through the corridor.
Russia is presumably content with the current situation, participating in negotiations only to prevent the West from becoming the sole mediator. Moscow views Nagorno-Karabakh as a way to exert pressure on both Azerbaijan and Armenia. But Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine means the Kremlin lacks the resources to maintain its declining influence in the South Caucasus. It appears unwilling to disrupt relations with Azerbaijan, a key transit route to Russia for goods that sanctions would otherwise make hard to get. Armenia is also used by Russia to bypass sanctions.
So far, the most productive negotiations have occurred in the West. The EU supports Pashinyan’s proposal to include a clause in any peace treaty that would guarantee the rights and security of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and provide an international mechanism to ensure those rights. Baku says the rights of Karabakh Armenians are an internal matter for Azerbaijan.
Baku’s intention seems twofold: to persuade the international community there is no blockade and create another humanitarian pressure mechanism to increase Karabakh’s reliance on Azerbaijan
Still, Brussels, preoccupied with the Ukraine war, views the Karabakh peace talks as a platform to counter the Kremlin’s influence. Signing a peace treaty could lead to Russia’s withdrawal from Karabakh, and potentially disrupt its relations with Armenia.
Indeed, there are questions about whether the EU can make Azerbaijan reopen the Lachin Corridor – or even wants to.
On 26 July, the day the EU again called on Azerbaijan to open the road, Azerbaijani military personnel refused an Armenian humanitarian convoy access to Nagorno-Karabakh, while officials in Baku claimed Brussels had approved the movement of humanitarian cargo to Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan. Previously, Michel of the European Council revealed that there had been joint discussions – although no approval – on sending humanitarian aid via the Azerbaijani town of Agdam, close to Karabakh.
Baku’s intention seems twofold: to persuade the international community there is no blockade and create another humanitarian pressure mechanism to increase Karabakh’s reliance on Azerbaijan.
Despite the escalating crisis and human rights violations, the lack of real Western pressure on Azerbaijan may also indicate the EU’s alignment with Baku’s conditions on the future of Nagorno-Karabakh. Perhaps the gas deal between Brussels and Aliyev plays a role. Concluded in the summer of 2022, it will increase the amount of fuel Azerbaijan supplies to the EU. The deal was done without any conditions set by Azerbaijan and observers say the proceeds of Baku’s energy sales to the EU may be going towards acquiring more weapons, sponsoring the blockade, armed escalations and human rights violations by the Aliyev regime.
This begs the question: with Karabakh, could the West be repeating the same mistake it made with Vladimir Putin in the 2010s, whereby the Kremlin profited from resource sales, prepared for war and disregarded all treaties before finally attacking Ukraine?
In a recent speech, Aliyev seemingly spoke the truth: international law operates selectively and signatures on treaties hold no value. Consider this statement in light of the EU’s behaviour. It says it is committed to human rights values but merely expresses bland concern about violations in Nagorno-Karabakh, calling on “both sides” to move towards a ceasefire.