Author: Dabaghian Diana

Waterloo Record, Canada

Turkey’s ‘deep state’ is doomed

100 years after the Young Turk revolution, this country is at a crossroads

July 05, 2008
GWYNNE DYER

The Ottoman Empire had already been in retreat for over a century when
the Young Turk revolution broke out in July 1908. Some of the Young
Turks hoped to save the whole empire; others wanted to abandon the
empire and rescue an independent Turkey from the wreckage. The latter
group won the argument, in the end, and although the rest of the
empire fell under European imperial rule 10 years later, Turkey itself
was saved.

Now, exactly a 100 years after the Young Turks, the country is plunged
into another constitutional crisis.

In March, the public prosecutor brought a case to Turkey’s highest
judicial body, the constitutional court, demanding that the ruling AK
(Justice and Development) Party, re-elected only last year with an
increased majority, be shut down for trying to subvert the secular
state. He also wants Prime Minister Tayyib Recep Erdogan and 70 other
senior AK party members banned from politics for five years.

Last week the government struck back, arresting two retired generals
and 23 other people on the charge of "provoking armed rebellion
against the government." One, General Hursit Tolon, was the former
second-in-command of the army.

Police allege those arrested were members of a state-backed gang that
is suspected of a number of murders of prominent public figures with
the aim of destabilizing Turkish society and forcing military
intervention.

But wait a minute. "State-backed?" Isn’t the government itself the
embodiment of the state? In Turkey, not necessarily. The conspirators,
it is claimed, belong to what Turks call the "deep state," the
alliance of senior judicial and military figures who still see
themselves as the guardians of the secular Turkish republic that was
ultimate result of the Young Turk revolution.

What the rebellious Young Turk officers demanded in July 1908 was the
restoration of the constitution suspended 30 years before. It brought
a rough kind of democracy to the multinational empire, but the various
ethnic nationalisms, Bulgarian, Kurdish, Greek, Arab, Armenian — and,
above all, Turkish — were already too strong for a unified state to
survive.

The Ottoman Empire went under at the end of the First World War,
leaving a decimated Turkish population (only eight million in 1918) to
fight for its independence against British, French, Italian and Greek
invaders who sought to carve Turkey up between them. The man who led
that independence struggle, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founded the Turkish
Republic in 1923, and he made it one of the most rigorously secular
states in the world.

Ninety-nine percent of Turkey’s citizens are Muslims, but political
parties are banned from appealing to religion. Even religious symbols
are seen as dangerous: women wearing "Islamic" head scarves are not
allowed inside state institutions, including universities.

Initially, this militant secularism was a tactic for wrenching a
largely illiterate and deeply conservative peasantry out of its
medieval ways and catapulting the country into the 20th
century. Turkey must never be weak again, and to be strong it must be
"modern." But as the decades passed, the reformers turned into a
self-selecting "republican" elite who justified their privileges by
claiming that they had a mission to defend the secular state.

What they have ended up defending the state against, in fact, is
democracy, which challenges their arbitrary power. Faced with a
democratically elected party that has Islamic roots (although it has
been staunchly loyal to the secular constitution), they have begun
waging an open war against it in the courts.

They have also launched a secret and violent struggle against it in
the shadows, a struggle that has already cost lives. Some fear that it
could end in a military coup, but that time has passed.

A hundred years after the Young Turk revolution, the Turks are again
at a crossroads. It is quite possible that the court will decide to
ban the AK Party later this year, just as it rejected the new law
allowing women students to wear the head scarf at university last
month. Many senior judges are part of the "deep state." But it is not
1908: the outlook this time is a lot brighter.

The 75 million Turks of today have about the same per capita income as
Russians or Romanians, and about the same range of social attitudes,
too. Turkey is not going to turn into a theocratic dictatorship,
because very few of them want such a thing.

However, quite a few of them do want a state that does not despise or
penalize them for being publicly pious. Quite a few others who are not
at all devout support the AK Party anyway, because they know that in
the current crisis it represents democracy, tolerance and the rule of
law.

It will turn out all right because the self-nominated defenders of
secularism are transparently cynical in their attempts to manipulate
popular opinion. And it will be all right because the AK Party leaders
have clearly decided that it’s not worth having a bloody political
battle now, when it’s obvious that they have already won the war.

If the court bans AK, they will all resign from power peacefully, in
obedience to the law.

Then those who are not banned from politics entirely for five years
will reform the party under another name, and fight and win another
election. And bit by bit, the "deep state" will wither away.

Gwynne Dyer is a London-based independent journalist.

3500 YEARS OLDER !

Gibrahayer
July 1, 2008
Nicosia

Edinburgh – Tourists familiar with Scottish heritage would be
astonished to discover the possibility of famous Stonehenge been
originated in Armenia, claiming the fact that the Armenian land is
the real cradle of civilisation.

Famous professor and world’s known specialist on stone monuments
Gerald. S.

Hawkins had acknowledged that Karahunj is 7,500 years old, which
means that it is 3,500 years older than Scotland Stonehenge, older
than Karnak in France and Newgrenge in Ireland. It may prove what some
people already suspect that Armenia is the cradle of the civilisation.

The sight is beautiful and ancient, well worth the visit. Astronomers
from Europe and the US are showing increasing interest in the complex,
and several expeditions have already taken place. To compare Armenian
Karahunj with Scottish Stonehenge visit Welcomearmenia.com for its
unique images under Zorats Karer.

>From a conversation with a friend: The names Stonehedge and Karahunj
have the same meaning. Stone is kar in Armenian and hunj has become
henge in English.

GEORGIA’S ETHNIC MINORITIES LEFT IN THE DARK ON NATO MEMBERSHIP
Shorena Labadze

Messenger.ge
Thursday, July 3
Georgia

Ethnic minorities in Georgia are less likely to know about and support
the country’s NATO membership bid than other Georgian citizens,
a local organization which works with minorities said yesterday.

The group, Public Movement ‘Multinational Georgia,’ is launching a
campaign in ethnic minority-populated regions to educate residents
about the Western military alliance which, its leadership pledged
this spring, Georgia will one day join.

"We do not want to see two separate political directions emerging
in regards to NATO membership, with popular feeling among minorities
and the [state] center becoming alienated from each other," said Sian
Davies, a volunteer for the youth union of Multinational Georgia.

NATO integration has been a foreign policy ambition for two successive
Georgian governments, but in poorly-integrated ethnic minority areas,
citizens remain skeptical and uncertain of how they will fare with
Georgia as a member state.

The NGO ran focus groups last week in Samtskhe-Javakheti province’s
Akhalkalaki district, which is overwhelmingly ethnic Armenian.

"Although everyone involved had heard of NATO, most knew only about
its military activities, associated it with the coalition war in Iraq
and were unaware of specific benefits NATO membership could bring
for the Georgian armed forces," said Davies.

NGO secretary general Ilona Kochoi said that in Akhalkalaki schools,
teachers aren’t informed enough to answer questions about NATO,
"even though the children are often curious."

Residents of poverty-mired Akhalkalaki fear Georgian foreign policy
could ultimately cost them work. In a sense, it already has.

A Russian military base was once a major employer and economic motor
for the district. It closed last year, leaving the area bereft of
jobs and increasingly dependent on remittances from relatives working
abroad, particularly in Russia.

Interviewees were worried that NATO membership could make it more
difficult for them to travel to Russia for work, or could weaken
state ties with Armenia. Some also fear NATO integration would bring
Turkish soldiers and military bases to their region, dredging up old
memories of Turkish persecution.

Georgian military analyst Koba Liklikadze said ethnic minorities in
Georgia see NATO as a "hostile organization."

"They must understand that NATO guarantees not only military safety
but also defends their interests," he said.

NATO information centers in Georgia, which are tasked with promoting
the alliance domestically, say they are making efforts to reach ethnic
minority residents.

"We are aware about this problem and it really exists, especially
in the areas populated with ethnic minorities. From time to time, we
take NATO representatives and military experts there, hold seminars,
distribute booklets and other printed materials among the residents,"
a representative of a NATO information center in Tbilisi said.

The Saakashvili administration has made the bid to join NATO a
centerpiece in its foreign policy platform, saying membership in the
alliance will provide security against Russia and further integrate
Georgia into the West.

In the January presidential election this year, Georgians voted on
a plebiscite asking whether Tbilisi should continue pursuing NATO
membership.

63 percent of voters in Akhalkalaki voted for NATO membership,
according to the Central Election Commission, well below the national
average of 77 percent.

Public Movement ‘Multinational Georgia’ is also planning to talk
about NATO integration with ethnic Azeri residents in Kvemo Kartli.

THEATRICAL GYUMRY – 2008
Kima Yeghiazaryan

Hayots Ashkhar Daily
Published on July 01, 2008
Armenia

LTP’s Summer Tour

After the earthquake of 1988 LTP made his third "historical" visit
to Gyumry last Saturday.

If you remember his first visit to Gyumry was in 1990, which was aimed
at sending back the constructors who came from different countries
to restore the ruined city.

His second visit was this winter, in the framework of the pre-election
campaign.

And the third visit was last Saturday. As a well-informed person,
not fearing Turkish and Azerbaijani spies, he yet again breached the
regime of his "house arrest" and appeared in the Theatrical Square
in Gyumry in June 28.

There are two reasons for organizing a political tour in Gyumry.

First: the center of the movement headed by LTP wanted to show by
their visit that they are not indifferent towards the revolutionaries
in Gyumry.

And in the honor of the "political prisoners" originating from
Gyumry, Makeyan, Ashot Zakaryan, and Saghatelyans, he decided to
hold a demonstration. By the way the radicals have decided to hold
demonstrations in the native cities of all the other political
prisoners.

The revolutionaries can’t put up with the idea that four months after
the elections the provinces are not as enthusiastic as they used to be
and the inhabitants, sick and tired of the post-election developments
have become extremely passive and live their every day life.

What they need is to burn the fire of the demonstrations with the
thunderous speeches and to convince everyone that the struggle is
still on and they need the support of Gyumry people to have victory,
because the latter didn’t participate in June 20 demonstration near
Matenadaran. Of course the activists of the movement will state that
the reason was the closed roads, but in case of a big desire they
could have reached Yerevan.

What did LTP speak about in Gyumry’s Theatrical Square, for the
participants of the meeting that mostly came with him from Yerevan?

He was telling different kind of jokes, speaking about "the national
disasters" he pointed out the emigration problem and the people’s
life that is going from bad to worse.

Because he had mentioned during the pre-election campaign that in case
of being elected he would stay in office for 2-3 years, in Gyumry he
revealed the names of those whom he was going to shift power.

"I was planning to shift power to more energetic and young political
figures such as Stepan Demirchyan, Aram Sargsyan, Raffi Hovhannisyan,
Alexander Arzumanyan, Davit Shahnazaryan."

Can you imagine what danger we averted by not electing LTP? From the
before mentioned names, except Demirchyan all of them have already
failed in this or that post.

It was only one week before that during the Meeting near Matenadaran
in June 20 LTP blamed Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan for selling the
country’s gold by a very cheap price. But in Gyumry he announced that:
"there are some honest people in the government, such as Tigran
Sargsyan, Edward Nalbandyan and a couple of Ministers but I don’t
think these people can make practical steps to change this system."

What a kind attitude towards the Prime Minister and some
Ministers. What is really noteworthy is that during the pre-election
phase LTP and his companions-in-arm were trying to persuade us that
the government in power is going to dissolve but today they are trying
to touch the hearts of some high-ranking officials thus hoping to
split the ruling power.

PACE: WITHOUT RAFFI HOVHANNISYAN

Panorama.am
15:04 02/07/2008

David Harutyunyan the leader of Armenian Delegation to PACE said
that Armenian authorities themselves are interested in the active
participation of opposition and their role in the inner political life
of the country, as well as in such an important institution as PACE is.

"Without opposition Armenian Delegation has much to lose and if
R. Havhannisyan is not in the committee we’ll lack a man, politician
and speaker. I would like to use this chance and to ask Raffi
Hovhannisyan to come back and continue his activities in the frame
of Armenian Delegation to PACE for the sake of Republic of Armenia,"
said David Harutyunyan adding that he does not affirm the act of
Heritage leader.

Avet Adonts, member of Prosperous Armenia talked about the act of
Heritage leader and said that regarding team work Armenian Delegation
lacks a powerful, intellectual speaker.

GEVORIK’S CANDIDACY INSTEAD OF LEVON TER-PETROSYAN

Hayots Ashkhar Daily
Published on July 02, 2008
Armenia

Will Levon Ter-Petrosyan campaign for the 4th President of the Republic
of Armenia.

In response to the question of "Hayots Ashkharh" daily LTP firstly
clarified the number of the last President and only after that did
he answer our question, but we had to repeat the question.

He said: "Only in case of extra-ordinary elections. We demand
extraordinary elections. That is why we demand that. After 10 or even
5 years it is senseless to touch upon this topic. Why do we demand
extraordinary elections? Only for that reason. But most probably I
will nominate the candidacy of another person." Of course he didn’t
reveal the name of this person.

But judging from the announcement made by LTP recently he will
nominate Gevorik’s candidacy from Armenian Pan National Movement,
for the 4th presidential elections in Armenia.

INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE ACCUSED

Today’s Zaman
03.07.2008
Turkey

We have become accustomed to the shameless defense mechanism of being
"Kemalist and loving the republic," used in the face of any charge
against the elitist-secularists of Turkey.

Sinan Aygun, an alleged member of the Ergenekon terrorist organization,
was asked why he had been detained and he replied thus: "Because
I am a Kemalist [he used the term "Ataturkcu"] and because I love
the republic."

What does this mean?

This means Aygun is instrumentalizing Kemalism and the republic. He is
using them as a shield for whatever crime he may have committed or is
unjustly charged with. This is already a crime under the current legal
framework in Turkey. Ataturk, the republic and its founding principles
are preserved constitutionally in Turkey and their denigration is
a crime. Using Ataturk as an excuse for sins committed or as an
explanation for attacks by others is simply an act of denigration.

Aygun may indeed be innocent of the charges he will face, but he was
caught red-handed while instrumentalizing the higher values of the
Turkish Republic.

The irony is in the detail. While Aygun was using Ataturk as a shield,
Rıfat Hisarcıklıoglu of the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity
Exchanges (TOBB) and the usual suspects of the opposition parties used
him (and others accused of having links to the infamous Ergenekon)
as a sword. One usurps Ataturk to defend himself, the other to attack.

Being arrested is bad… Especially if you are guilty! One usually
does not want others to know one is in custody; that is, the moral
value of detention is negative.

Instrumentalism does not only stand for "turning a particular
person, event or thing into an instrument and use, utilize or usurp
it." Instrumentalism is an imposed Machiavellian redefinition of the
moral value of a concept based on its utility. A particular event may
be disastrous for the general public, but if it proves utilizable by
a certain group, it becomes morally desirable by their understanding.

I remember the Burdur earthquake of 2002. The prime minister of the
time visited the area a day after the destructive event, but was
booed by his opponents. The earthquake was instrumentalized and its
moral value was made positive!

I remember the funerals of the Turkish soldiers martyred on the
frontlines of the fight against terrorists. They were utilized by the
secularists as a stage on which to show off. I wouldn’t dare to say
they felt happy whenever they heard of a new martyrdom, but I have
heard this observation from several people. They had seen the tragic
"jeer-fullness" in the faces of those who, otherwise, should have been
"fear-full" of another funeral.

Now, the detention of 23 people by the Ä°stanbul public prosecutor
is not something to be happy with. Deniz Baykal, the leader of the
opposition, is angry. He claims the judiciary is politicized and has
been usurped by the government. Is he not doing the same by using a
legal case for his own means?

Instrumentalization brings about several side
effects. It may lead to a reverse-demonization of the thing
instrumentalized. Over-instrumentalization leads to deification and
dogmatization. Instrumentalization through laws produces insurmountable
roadblocks.

Once ultranationalists used Christian missionaries and their
activities in order to attack Muslims engaged in interfaith dialogue;
the missionaries were demonized and in the Malatya incident they
were even slaughtered. If the so-called secular elitists continue
to use secularism as their shield and sword, its fate, God forbid,
won’t be any different.

Armenians over-instrumentalizing the tragic events of 1915 are turning
them into dogma. The moral value of dogma is never as appealing as
the moral value of tragedy.

Certain Kemalists over-instrumentalizing Ataturk are deifying him. The
moral value of a manmade god is never as worthy of respect as a
founder of a republic.

The Constitution itself is instrumentalizing secularism through laws
and is turning it into a stumbling block. Secularism secured through
a legal framework is not as indispensable as secularism that secures
the legal framework of the country.

–Boundary_(ID_kMW8QELezLddPNQHW+n99w)–

WAS IT THE LACK OF COURAGE OR HONESTY?
Armen Tsatouryan

Hayots Ashkhar Daily
June 25, 2008
Armenia

The main peculiarity of L. Ter-Petrosyan’s speech delivered during the
June 20 demonstration was that he tried, on the one hand, to restrict
himself to the scope of the new post-electoral developments and on
the other hand, came into unsolvable conflicts with them.

Of course, as a master skilled enough to "extort maximum benefit" from
the electoral and post-electoral developments, the ex-President was
again in his elements on the 20th of June. As usual, he was unsparing
both in his criticism and the assessments and characterizations
deriving thereof.

However, L. Ter-Petrosyan could not have ignored the fact that there
are new authorities formed in Armenia after the elections, and they
have already undertaken certain steps towards relieving the internal
political tension and initiating reforms.

On June 20, Mr. Ter-Petrosyan was simply obliged to swallow the
political assessment of those steps. That’s why, he stated in the final
part of his speech that the opposition, be it in Armenia or any other
part of the world, has "two functions". The first function is to come
to power – something which requires much time, and the second function
is "to press the authorities to make positive steps for their people".

There was an impression that after confirming the above-mentioned
realities, the ex-President would have enough courage to
enumerate the positive steps made by the authorities within the
past 3 months; steps, which he believed, were the aftermath of the
opposition’s pressures. And no matter to what extent such allegation
would correspond to the reality, society might conclude that the
Ter-Petrosyan-led opposition was fulfilling its functions, i.e. it was
using pressure against the authorities, pushing them to positive steps.

And despite the statements saying, "If we do something good, who will
say that we are doing wrong things?", Ter-Petrosyan practically lacked
the courage and perhaps, honesty to be as good as his word.

Judge yourselves: the ex-President believes that the new authorities
of the country have been busy with the reshuffling of the human
resources; and nothing more. In particular, no steps were made towards
establishing tax control over the monopolists, appointing professional,
well-disciplined human resources to the important government posts
and solving other problems.

The following question comes up: if Ter-Petrosyan believes in this
kind of declarative statements, how does he account for the fact that
the custom fees entering the state budget, for instance, increased
twice during the month of May. And isn’t the above-mentioned enough to
insist that there is really a certain tax control over the monopolists?

With regard to the professional and well-disciplined human resources,
there’s the following question: can Mr. Ter-Petrosyan insist that the
new President has not appointed such kind of people as Ministers of
Foreign Affairs and Defense, positions that are of pivotal significance
for the country’s domestic and foreign policy?

Haven’t the electoral and post-electoral developments of the past
months, including the political pressure of the Ter-Petrosyan-led
opposition, produced a certain impact on the new authorities which
are engaged in introducing reforms in certain spheres and appointing
well-disciplined and professional human resources?

Why, apart from ignoring those steps, is Mr. Ter-Petrosyan
trying to cast a dark shadow even on his own investments in those
achievements? Doesn’t this testify to the fact that the ex-President
is persistently continuing to ignore the positive steps of the
authorities, without voicing his protest against them?

Moreover, Ter-Petrosyan not only ignores the positive steps, but also
tries to disseminate distrust towards the officials who are engaged
in initiating the reforms mentioned above. Otherwise he wouldn’t have
remembered about the sale of the gold reserves, a bargain concluded
in the period when Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan was the Chair of
the Central Bank. Does he really think that the CBA Chairman made
that step on his own? And if not, why does he make his accusations
in this particular direction?

The answer is obvious. The ex-President does not have the courage to
make an objective assessment on the economic initiatives undertaken
by T. Sargsyan after assuming the post of Prime Minister, because
these initiatives are much bolder in nature than the theoretical
assumptions of Hrant Bagratyan, the "greatest reformer" of the time.

We believe that instead of revealing the objective reality,
L. Ter-Petrosyan proved the extreme subjectivism of his assessments,
by ignoring the positive developments achieved by the new President
and Government during the past months.

Enumerating the material "functions" of the opposition, L.

Ter-Petrosyan forgets that by virtue of being its leader, he is now
obliged to practice what he preaches. And if he still continues to
pursue only one of the functions, i.e. the function of coming to power,
while forgetting about the other, no less important function of pushing
the authorities to positive steps by pressure and making an objective
assessment on their achievements, he is from now on displaying an
unconscientious attitude towards the obligations he enumerates.

ARMENIA: SUMMER OF DISCONTENT

ISN
June 25 2008
Switzerland

As tensions continue to simmer, Armenia’s opposition leader
Ter-Petrosian, hopes to take advantage of the government’s
unpopularity.

By Richard Giragosian in Yerevan for ISN Security Watch (24/06/08)

Just two months since the inauguration of Armenia’s third president,
simmering political tension continues to plague the new government
of President Serzh Sarkisian.

Although triggered by a disputed 19 February presidential contest,
the underlying causes of Armenia’s post-election crisis include
several unresolved problems, ranging from widening socio-economic
disparities to a pronounced political polarization.

Unlike past political crises, however, Armenia’s traditionally
fractured and marginalized opposition has been able to unite behind
the leadership of former president Levon Ter-Petrosian.

After spending a decade in political seclusion, Ter-Petrosian emerged
last year to pose a significant challenge to the country’s ruling
elite, putting himself forward as a presidential candidate.

The return of the country’s first post-Soviet president surprised
many observers and threatened to upset the long-planned transition
from outgoing President Robert Kocharian, constitutionally prevented
from seeking a third term, to his chosen successor, Prime Minister
Serzh Sarkisian.

Ironically, the Ter-Petrosian campaign represented a direct threat to
both Kocharian and Sarkisian, the very same leaders who forced him
to resign in 1998 amid an atmosphere of nationalist recriminations
over Ter-Petrosian’s alleged willingness to adopt an unacceptably
moderate approach to the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with
neighboring Azerbaijan.

Given the circumstances of his forced resignation, as well as
the authorities’ concerted attempts to link much of the country’s
problems to his administration, Ter-Petrosian faced an uphill battle
throughout the presidential campaign. His efforts were also hindered
by the overwhelming power of incumbency, which was exerted through
the use of "administrative resources" leveraging the influence of
state resources and offices.

As a result, Ter-Petrosian faced a pronounced disadvantage in
both articulating his platform and countering the authorities’
assertions. Yet the disparity between the rival Ter-Petrosian and
Sarkisian campaigns was most profound in terms of access to the
media, with the country’s broadcast media dominated by an overly
pro-government bias and alternative opposition and independent media
outlets under pressure and threat.

In a private meeting with ISN Security Watch, Ter-Petrosian noted
the difficulties but asserted that "the timing of my return to
politics was not based on any personal ambition but was driven by the
compelling need to correct the dangerous and irresponsible policies
of the Kocharian regime," which he argued "put the country on the
wrong path" by only "fueling corruption and an abuse of power."

Armenia, he claimed, was increasingly becoming a "banditocracy"
where "a criminal class emerged to pillage and plunder the country’s
strategic assets and whose leaders were leaving a legacy of moral
and political bankruptcy for the next generation of Armenians."

It was against this backdrop that the elections were won outright by
Sarkisian, avoiding a second-round ballot.

Although the election results were disputed and marred by reports of
serious voting irregularities, the more significant implication from
the pre-election period was that the opposition was denied a fair
contest, leaving the ordinary voter with little choice and even less
voice. This also fueled a post-election crisis, with the opposition
resorting to mass rallies and public demonstrations in the streets,
reflecting a sense that public demands and personal rights were
blatantly ignored or denied by the authorities.

It was at this point that Ter-Petrosian was able to reach far beyond
the core group of his supporters and opposition activists, bridging
the normally apathetic and politically uncommitted citizenry. For the
first time, he has managed to forge a broad-based consensus bolstered
by his pledge to spur true political change and not simply a personal
return to power – a claim for which the jury is still out.

Ter-Petrosian reiterated his willingness "to serve less than a full
[five-year] term as president," offering instead to "hold the office
[of president] for two or three years, as a period of sufficient time
to allow for the implementation of broad, lasting and meaningful
reforms, as well as a sincere effort to combat corruption in the
country."

Fanning the flames As tension mounted, opposition demonstrators
staged increasingly serious mass protests, overnight vigils and even
hunger strikes.

In turn, the authorities, acting on the orders of Kocharian in his last
days in office, over-reacted to the crisis, culminating in an open and
violent clash between opposition demonstrators and riot police on 1
March that left at least 10 dead, many injured and even more arrested.

The confrontation prompted the authorities to introduce a one-month
state of emergency, complete with sweeping restrictions on the
media and on the freedoms of assembly and speech. Yet the state of
the emergency only deferred, rather than defeated the confrontation
between the state and the opposition. By resorting to the imposition
of virtual martial law under the terms of a state of emergency as
an immediate reaction to the crisis, the authorities only fanned the
flames of political discord and discontent.

Interestingly, it also demonstrated an inverse relationship between
regime security and state stability, whereby each step to secure the
regime posed an equal and corresponding move toward destabilizing
the state.

In Ter-Petrosian’s opinion, the state of the emergency merely confirmed
the "desperation and fear of an illegitimate regime" and tended
to reveal that the Armenian authorities were concerned solely with
"maintaining power in order to reproduce the regime in another form."

Yet in the weeks after the end of the state of emergency and a
seemingly peaceful return to normalcy, the continued tension suggested
that the crisis was far from resolved and that the country was even
farther from reconciliation.

Hot summer Most recently, the opposition staged a mass rally on 20
June, with between 10-15,000 supporters demonstrating against the
Armenian government and demanding sweeping political change.

This demonstration was a key test for the opposition and its success
ensured that the momentum for political change could be sustained
through the hot summer months, a period known for relative political
inactivity.

The 20 June rally was also an important opportunity for Ter-Petrosian
to maintain pressure on the authorities, a necessity if the opposition
movement was to uphold the momentum of its political strategy.

In his public address to the demonstrators, Ter-Petrosian stressed
two priorities. First, to demonstrate the "firm resolve of the people
to the government and the international community" that despite the
election results, the "free and conscious people of Armenia reject"
and view the government as "illegitimate." Second, the release of all
opposition supporters ("political prisoners" in Ter-Petrosian’s words)
from police detention, followed by dialogue with the government.

Ter-Petrosian also reiterated his demand for "early presidential and
parliamentary elections" as a "solution" to the crisis.

Although the adherence to such a maximalist position may seem
unrealistic, as an initial bargaining chip it may actually be a
prudent position prior to entering into a political dialogue with
the authorities.

The issue of dialogue is also significant as a means of addressing
the polarization of politics in Armenia, especially as even prior to
Armenia’s recent post-election crisis, this political polarization
had been defined largely by a division based on affiliations to a
narrow set of political leaders and parties. For the past decade,
for example, such political polarization was manifested by a division
between supporters of the ruling elite and a largely fractured and
fragmented opposition.

In terms of national politics, neither camp demonstrated much more
than a desire to simply attain or maintain power, offering little in
terms of strategic vision or policy alternatives.

At the same time, there has been an equally profound economic divide,
driven by widening inequalities in wealth and income. But most
importantly, it is the combination of this political polarization
and economic division that has now resulted in deep fissures within
Armenian society as a whole.

Yet even in the face of these political challenges and a crisis
of confidence, the more serious threat to stability stems not from
political polarization, but from mounting economic pressure.

More specifically, with the new Armenian government weakened by
internal discord and a lack of legitimacy, the onset of a new economic
crisis represents one of the most significant threats to security
and stability in Armenia.

Opportunity knocking?

As for Ter-Petrosian, he believes that this time things could be
different and he is taking every advantage of the fact that, as he
sees it, "the Armenian people are clearly different this time, with
little fear and even less patience for the political status quo,"
and the new government is also different, beset by a "profound
unpopularity and an absence of trust."

But it will be from within the broader economic context that the new
Armenian government will face its next serious challenge.

Thus, it seems that even beyond the context of the current political
crisis, the new Armenian government faces an even more challenging
economic crisis against a backdrop of simmering tension and impatience.

But even as Ter-Petrosian has admitted, the "course of reform and
change needed to correct the path toward a law-based society is
difficult and far from certain in Armenia."

Richard Giragosian is an analyst specializing in international
relations, with a focus on economics, security and political
developments in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and the
Asia-Pacific region. He has served as a Professional Staff Member
of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress and is a regular
contributor to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). Giragosian
is also a contributing analyst for Jane’s Information Group.

POLITICAL SCIENTIST AMAYAK OVANNISYAN: "WEST ENCOURAGES AZERBAIJAN TO REPEAT GEORGIA’S ACTIONS TOWARDS NATO"

Today.Az
June 24 2008
Azerbaijan

"Russia wants Armenia to focus less on the unilateral ties with it for
Azerbaijan not to think that all its misfortunes come from Russia",
considers Amayak Ovannisyan, chairman of the Armenians Political
Scientists Union.

"West encourages Azerbaijan to repeat Georgia’s actions towards
NATO. In this situation Russia wants Armenia to accentuate less on
the unilateral ties with Russia for Azerbaijan not to think of Russia
as a main source of all its misfortunes", said Ovannisyan.

The political scientist also noted that if Azerbaijan joins NATO,
the issue of South Caucasus’ getting into the US influence orbit will
be settled. "Armenia needs to fully take into account the realities
of the game, launched in the region.

If Azerbaijan joins NATO, the three century presence of Russia in the
South Caucasus will come to an end", noted the political scientist
and added that Russia will also deepen cooperation with Azerbaijan
in order to avert its falling under the US influence.