Author: Dabaghian Diana

Armenian nativity scene (Flickr)

Christmas is the celebration of God’s revelation of Himself in and through Jesus Christ. God reveals Himself in many ways—in historical events, in nature, through the Bible, through persons and supremely through Jesus Christ.

God’s revelation through Jesus Christ is called Incarnation. Incarnation tells us the truth about God. It tells us about His intervention in human affairs. It tells us about His true nature, about His self-giving love. It tells us that God came into this sin-filled world out of love in order to save it.

Incarnation also tells us the truth about human nature. It tells us that mankind has violated God’s will and has alienated itself from Him. God, however, wants to reconcile humanity, to restore the broken relationship and bring His sinful children to Him.

Christmas is the celebration of God’s presence with us here and now. Centuries ago, God told the prophet Isaiah that a baby was going to be born whose name would be called Immanuel, which means “God with us” (Isaiah 7:4).

One of the central affirmations of Christmas is that in Jesus Christ we see the love of God for humankind made flesh. In the fullness of time—God’s most opportune time—He intercepted human history with the gift of a Savior to redeem a world that had lost touch with its Creator.

In Jesus Christ we have come to know who God is. He indeed is Immanuel—God with us. Not a remote God beyond space and time, but God within us, among us, a deity that binds us to Himself and to one another.

The greatest news that Christmas imparts is that the God who came to mankind in the babe of Bethlehem two thousand years ago can come to us today if we make room for Him in our lives.

In the nativity story of Jesus, Luke tells us why it was necessary for him to be born in a manger. It was because there was no room for the Holy Family in the inn (Luke 2:7). And the most obvious reason why there was no room for Jesus was because the inn was occupied to capacity. One wonders whether the innkeeper could have done some rearrangement in order to accommodate the Holy Family. Most probably he would, had he recognized the significance of the occasion.

An existential question that arises in one’s mind is: If there was no room for Christ two thousand years ago, is there any room for him today? It appears that some people are so preoccupied with so many worldly cares that there isn’t room for anything else, not even for Christ.

Having room for Christ involves some rearranging of life. His very presence requires some commitments and changes.

Those who have made room for Christ in their lives are those for whom Christ is Immanuel (“God with us”). They have experienced the true joy of Christmas.

The advent of Christ into the world is not limited by time. Mary and Joseph held him in their arms. We can hold him in our hearts. If and when we do that, then our Christmas celebration will truly be a joyous one.    

Christ is born and revealed
Tidings of joy unto you and unto us.

The gathering of AYF members at the ARF Aram Manougian Youth Center in Yerevan, Armenia for distribution of the first backpacks filled with school essentials

On Sunday, December 17, through the AYF-YOARF Eastern Region’s “Sponsor a Student” initiative, 54 Juniors from five different regions of Artsakh gathered at the ARF Aram Manougian Youth Center in Yerevan, Armenia to receive their backpacks.

The “Sponsor a Student” initiative was launched in response to the crisis in our homeland. The AYF-YOARF Eastern Region decided to raise funds to provide supplies to school-aged children who were displaced from their homes in Artsakh. Since the launch, the campaign has raised nearly $18,000. With these collected funds, the AYF-YOARF purchased backpacks, filled them with school supplies and distributed them to displaced children this past Sunday. 

The New Jersey “Arsen” Junior Chapter shares a special video Christmas message with the Artsakh AYF Juniors

The backpacks include all the essentials to help alleviate the students’ transition to starting school in Armenia. This includes notebooks, pens, pencils, pencil cases, rulers, protractors, erasers, sharpeners, drawing compasses, pins and water bottles. ARF Youth members of Armenia also participated in the program to help facilitate new introductions and ensure organization of the distribution. The morning began with announcements from the Artsakh AYF Central Executive and a special video from the New Jersey “Arsen” Junior Chapter wishing the Artsakh AYF Juniors a Merry Christmas and Happy New Year. This gathering was an opportunity for the youth from Artsakh to come together, and while for some it was a reunion, for others it was an opportunity to meet new friends. 

Artsakh AYF Juniors singing together

After the introductions, the Juniors were split into teams to play games, which was followed by singing songs and reciting poems. At first, only a few Juniors were willing to sing, but by the end of the second song, everyone was volunteering to sing and recite their favorite poems. The program concluded with distributing backpacks to the youth members. Everyone left feeling excited for the upcoming events and reunions that the Artsakh AYF Central Executive is planning alongside other regions. 

Throughout the event, the beautiful dialect of Artsakh echoed in the room, whether it was through the games, the whispers between reunited friends or the parents’ encouragement and guidance of their children. The Artsakh dialect was not the only way the room was filled with Artsakhtsi spirit—it was evident in every opportunity throughout the event. The team names selected by the Juniors were: “Artsakhtsiner,” “Artsakhi Oujer,” “Avo,” “Monteapert” and “Artsakh” (Artsakh people, Artsakh forces, Avo, Monteaberd, Artsakh). 

Artsakh AYF Juniors enjoy delicious traditional Artsakh food, including Jingalyov hats and gurgut

The trivia game included questions about Artsakh’s history, geography, architecture, heroes, culture and songs. The poems and even the delicious traditional Artsakh food, like Jingalyov hats and gurgut, served as reminders of Artsakh’s resilience and the undying hope of return to the homeland. 

A donation of $50 sponsors a backpack and supplies for one student. The Central Executive has set a Round 1 goal of $25,000 to sponsor 500 students. Upon reaching this goal, future rounds will be announced to continue providing additional support to those children who have not yet received supplies. Future donation rounds will be aimed at delivering backpacks to those Artsakhtsis living outside of Yerevan and throughout the entirety of Armenia. 

Artsakh AYF Juniors show off their new backpacks filled with essential school supplies thanks to the AYF “Sponsor a Student” program

As the youth organization of the ARF, the Central Executive finds it important and necessary to support our fellow youth of Artsakh and ensure that we maintain their access to education through these extremely difficult times in our nation’s history.

To fund successive rounds of backpack deliveries, we need your continued generosity and support. If you would like to make a donation, please visit givebutter.com/artsakhfund to support this extremely vital initiative.

Cabinet meeting on December 14, 2023 (Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia)

YEREVAN—In a recent Cabinet session, the Armenian government approved the procedure for organizing and conducting joint working meetings between bilateral commissions on state border delimitation and security with Azerbaijan.

Armenian Deputy Minister of Justice Ara Mkrtchyan, who introduced the draft of the procedure, emphasized that the adoption of this procedural framework will empower commission members to establish the groundwork for border delimitation and demarcation processes. This framework aims to cover legal and technical aspects, ultimately leading to the development and signing of a pertinent document demarcating the national border between the two nations.

According to Mkrtchyan, the time, date and venue of these sessions will be mutually agreed upon by the commission chairpersons. The sessions will occur alternately in Armenia and Azerbaijan’s territories, along their shared border, in third-country territories or through video conferencing. “If conducted in either country’s territory, the hosting side will ensure all necessary conditions, including participants’ safety,” highlighted Mkrtchyan during the December 14 cabinet meeting.

Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan underscored the document’s current role in regulating organizational matters and facilitating bilateral interaction between the two sides. Grigoryan said that the next step in the process will be to create another set of rules that would focus on defining specific methodologies. This would include detailed descriptions of crucial terms like the definition of a map and what exactly qualifies as a document with legal significance. Once consensus is reached on these methodologies, the plan is to move forward with concrete documents and engage in discussions specifically centered around topographic maps.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stressed the necessity for reciprocal approval from the Azerbaijani side, asserting: “The institutionalization of the border delimitation process marks a historic milestone. Its transparency is crucial. It’s not a confidential document. It will be open to the public.” Pashinyan urged an intensified collaborative effort to propel the ongoing work forward and achieve tangible progress.

Pashinyan also unveiled the “Crossroads of Peace” initiative during the Ministerial Meeting of Landlocked Developing Countries on December 14. The PM’s presentation emphasized the regime’s readiness to actively engage in re-establishing communication channels with Azerbaijan.

Addressing the potential for signing a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the near future, Pashinyan highlighted that if Baku upholds its agreements, the prospect of a peace treaty will “increase in probability.”

Expressing Armenia’s intent, Pashinyan stated, “The Republic of Armenia is committed to reinstating railway connections between Azerbaijan and Armenia, utilizing the pre-existing railway infrastructures.” The proposed routes include the northern track connecting Azerbaijan’s Kazakh district to Armenia’s Tavush province and the southern track linking various regions of Azerbaijan, including its exclave Nakhichevan.

Pashinyan also addressed the recent exchange of 32 Armenian POWs for two Azerbaijani soldiers on December 13, regarding it as a starting point for potential progress. He stated, “I consider the recent developments as a baseline from which we can strive to ensure that forthcoming updates signify an increased likelihood of signing a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, not the contrary.”

However, concerns persist, as dozens of Armenian prisoners and the military-political leaders of Artsakh are still detained in Baku.

Former Artsakh State Minister Artak Beglaryan highlighted the return of 32 Armenians from captivity in Baku as a positive step, yet drew attention to the unresolved plight of at least 23 confirmed prisoners who remain detained in Azerbaijan. Among them, 14 are civilians who were captured between 2020 and 2023, with approximately 20 originating from Artsakh. “It is imperative that all these individuals be released, and international pressure is needed to ensure their freedom,” Beglaryan said. 

Beglaryan’s remarks shed light on the continuing concerns regarding those who remain imprisoned in Azerbaijan, urging concerted efforts to secure the release of these detainees, particularly emphasizing the civilian status of a significant portion of the captives.

In the midst of negotiations, during a joint press conference in Baku, significant remarks were made following a meeting between Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Bayramov said that a recent package of draft proposals for a peace treaty from Armenia indicates “certain progress.”

However, contentious points on a peace treaty persisted, notably Baku’s dismissal of Yerevan’s proposition to withdraw troops from the border. As a consequence of Azerbaijan’s aggression against Armenia in May and November of 2021, and September 13, 2022, Azerbaijan has seized control of over 150 square kilometers of sovereign Armenian territory. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan had recently mentioned the withdrawal of troops as an important confidence-building measure that would prevent new escalations.

Bayramov dismissed the suggestion during a press conference with his Turkish counterpart, claiming that the Azerbaijani army remains within its territory. Bayramov denied that Azerbaijan occupies Armenian territory, highlighting the complexity of the undelimited Armenian-Azerbaijani border. 

Amid intensified diplomatic efforts, including Azerbaijan’s bid to involve Turkey in talks with Armenia, and evolving proposals, members of the international community have expressed their anticipation for forthcoming meetings. They pin hopes on these discussions to yield substantial advancements toward securing enduring peace and stability between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The European Union has taken a significant step by engaging with both Baku and Yerevan to organize a forthcoming meeting in Brussels. This development follows confirmation that Azerbaijan accepted a proposed meeting initiated by the United States. The meeting, scheduled for January, is set to bring together the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington. This follows Azerbaijan’s recent refusal to participate in high-level talks organized by the United States and the EU.

Head of the press service at the U.S. State Department Matthew Miller has extended a warm welcome to Turkey’s involvement in negotiations. He highlighted the shared stance between Washington and Ankara in backing direct talks between Yerevan and Baku and their mutual support for achieving lasting peace in the region.

In an interview with ABC Media, Turkish expert Tiran Lokmagyozyan underscored that such steps by Azerbaijan and the statements emerging from Turkey suggest the imminent signing of a peace agreement within a notably short span.

Lokmagyozyan cautioned that the primary objective of this agreement might not solely revolve around achieving peace. He suggested that the agreement may include provisions aligning with the interests of Azerbaijan and Turkey. He referenced EU Council President Charles Michel’s remarks about the importance of signing a peace treaty, which he argued signifies a synchronized effort between the Armenian government, the West and Azerbaijan.

Political scientist Artur Martirosyan has criticized the reliance on guarantees or agreements for lasting peace in Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations, highlighting the challenges of proposed mechanisms and the lack of an arbitrator to enforce international norms. He expressed doubts about the forthcoming meeting between the foreign ministers in Washington, arguing that Azerbaijan could manipulate it for political advantage in its upcoming snap presidential elections. Martirosyan also suggests that Armenian concessions may not lead to peace due to potential hindrances from Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Head of the EU Delegation Ambassador Vassilis Maragos (seated left) and Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia Paruyr Hovhannisyan (seated right) at the signing of the agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the EU on the Status of EUMA (SOMA), Nov. 20, 2023 (EUMA, X, formerly Twitter)

From November 27-29, 2023, a delegation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission visited Yerevan. The EU Delegation to Armenia said the purpose of the trip was to “explore possibilities to deepen and strengthen EU-Armenia relations.” Ideas were exchanged on “how to best leverage investments to address the immediate needs and enable integration of displaced Karabakh Armenians.” They agreed to “explore areas to strengthen cooperation between the EU’s Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and Armenia” and continue dialogue on matters of security and defense, such as the EU’s promise to explore non-lethal support to the Armenian military via the European Peace Facility. The EU representatives announced their support for the “normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan based on the principles of mutual recognition of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders based on the 1991 Almaty Declaration.”

Despite the outreach of the EU to Yerevan, it is still unclear whether the EU has a clear and unified strategy or vision for the future of the South Caucasus. Do the three states in the region have any future in the EU? Is the EU aiming to replace Russia in the region? Do the Europeans have an agenda when it comes to the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement? These are important questions that need to be addressed when assessing the EU’s political and economic role in the region. Despite Russia’s efforts to sideline the West following the November 10, 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement, Azerbaijani incursions in Armenia and Russia’s inability to address Armenia’s security needs pushed the latter to seek the help of new partners. It is within this context that the EU deployed a monitoring mission on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border after the September 2022 escalation, thus becoming a peace facilitator in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and a proactive player in the region. European think tanks started addressing some of these questions and proposing certain recommendations. In this article, I will highlight two important publications and summarize their recommendations related to Armenia and the region.

Objectives the EU should pursue in the South Caucasus

In March 2023, the Netherlands Institute for International Relations published a report titled, “The EU in the South Caucasus: Navigating a geopolitical labyrinth in turmoil.” The report argued that the EU should “develop and implement a more holistic strategic vision, both for the region and for its relations with the individual countries.” To fulfill this strategic vision, the report proposes that the EU adopt four parallel objectives that it should pursue in the South Caucasus: (1) exporting European values on good governance, democracy and human rights; (2) promoting regional stability and security; (3) expanding security, energy and trade interests; and (4) containing or even pushing back Russian influence. 

The report mentions that certain obstacles may arise in fulfilling these objectives. First, Moscow, although its “credibility as a security provider and its popularity in Armenia have shriveled,” tries to push the EU and the West out of any peace settlement process. Second, the issue of the establishment of a transport connection between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhichevan raises security concerns for Armenia, as Baku demands an extraterritorial corridor. A third obstacle is the demarcation and delimitation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from Armenia’s sovereign territory. Finally, there is the issue of the rights and the future of the Armenians of Artsakh, which is no longer a priority for Yerevan, Moscow and the West after Azerbaijan engaged in a military operation that forced the Artsakh leadership to capitulate and the population to flee to Armenia, fearing massacre.

On the geopolitical role of the EU, the report mentions several recommendations:

• The EU should have a clear focus on the security dimension as well as the (geo)political, economic and normative dimensions of the region and strengthen its presence in the three countries.
• The EU should continue to “invest in both the construction and security of transport and energy connection.” Within this context, the “Middle Corridor” is mentioned as an important transit route connecting the Caspian Sea via Azerbaijani and Georgia to Turkey and Europe, increasing trade between China, Central Asia and Europe. Certain concerns were raised that Russia would engage in sabotage activities against this route. 
• The EU should avoid “both-sideism,” deter Azerbaijani efforts to impose a peace treaty on Armenia under military pressure and demand the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from Armenian territory. 
• The EU should ensure that “Armenia duly implements the commitments it has undertaken regarding the transport connection from Azerbaijan proper to Nakhichevan.” The report mentions that the EU has an interest in its realization, not only because it unlocks the communication transport channels between Yerevan and Baku, but also because it would strengthen the Middle Corridor trade and lead to a normalization process between Ankara and Yerevan, thus opening their shared border.
• The EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) should be “endowed with sufficient resources and flexibility to fulfill its mandate.” The EU should make clear to Baku that the EUMA is an essential part of the peace process and encourage Baku to not only accept but also cooperate with the Mission, ideally “by allowing it to have access to the Azerbaijani side of the border.”
• When it comes to Artsakh, the paper recommended that the EU should press Baku to offer a credible and internationally monitored arrangement to the Armenians of the region, aiming to guarantee their rights and security within the context of “minority rights.” (The paper was published months before the September 2023 escalation and depopulation of the Armenians of Artsakh.)
• Finally, the report recommends that the EU should make a long-term investment in Armenia and engage in structural reforms to strengthen its democratic institutions and resilience. The report recognizes that in the short-term, Yerevan’s political and economic dependence will not decrease, and the EU must “manage Armenian expectations in this regard,” but it “can and should play a long game here (in the region).”

Three ways the EU can strengthen Armenia’s resilience

In November 2023, the European Council on Foreign Relations published “After Nagorno-Karabakh: How Europeans can strengthen Armenia’s resilience.” Marie Dumoulin and Gustav Gressel argue that even though Azerbaijan has captured Artsakh, security concerns in the South Caucasus are far from over, as Azerbaijan continues to push irredentist claims over Armenia. The authors say that the establishment of a land corridor through Armenia’s Syunik province, whether under the control of Russia or Azerbaijan, poses significant risks for Europe, as Ankara and Baku, with the support of Moscow, would control all the transit routes connecting Europe to Central Asia and China. To mitigate this threat, they suggest three ways that the EU can strengthen Armenia’s resilience. 

The first suggestion is that the EU should prevent further military escalations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. For this purpose, the EU should engage in high-level political engagement with Yerevan to show that it cares about Armenia. At the same time, it should engage with Ankara and Baku to minimize tensions and warn the Azerbaijani government that any possible attack would have consequences. To consolidate its active role in the region, the EUMA should extend its mandate and be equipped with the tools to better detect ceasefire violations. The authors welcomed the decision of the EU Foreign Affairs Council in November 2023 to increase the number of monitors.  

The second suggestion is to strengthen Armenia’s defense capabilities. The authors suggest that the EU should be open to using the European Peace Facility (an off-budget instrument to enhance the EU’s ability to prevent conflicts and build peace and security) to equip the Armenian army. It is important to engage with Georgia to facilitate the arms flow to Armenia. EU member states can also assist Yerevan in engaging in military reforms in the sectors of military logistics, training and education. Finally, engagement in strategic consultation with India and other partners is important to provide heavy arms to Armenia so that the latter can withstand future Azerbaijani attacks. 

Finally, the EU must support a peace settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The authors argue that since Artsakh is no longer a part of the negotiations, “mediation should aim for an agreement on the delimitation and opening of borders,” including the Armenia-Turkey border. Regarding a transit route connecting Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, the report concludes that as part of the future peace plan, the EU should offer investment opportunities and technical support to facilitate transit and connectivity. The authors say that the issue of Artsakh is “lost but suggest that the EU provide humanitarian aid to the Armenian refugees and help their “integration” into the Armenian society, to “ensure future domestic political stability in the medium and long term,” thus closing the issue of the right of return of Armenians of Artsakh. 

Importantly, the article says that the EU needs to convince the “Armenians not to have too many expectations, and Europe must refrain from making unachievable promises,” adding that the EU cannot “make Iran, Russia, Turkey and Azerbaijan go away—nor will it completely replace them.” Yet the EU can support Armenia to balance its interests without making painful compromises and prevent it from being fully dependent on a single regional power. 

To sum up, the recent publications and academic debates show that the EU is an active player in the South Caucasus. While the EU aims to minimize Russia’s influence in the region, the EU will not be able to replace Russia in the near future by exercising soft power (such as economic incentives or mediation), as long as it does not deploy leverage to push Baku to sign a peace treaty with Yerevan. For the EU, the issue of Artsakh, which was seen as one of the main obstacles to signing a peace treaty, is resolved. Following the loss of Artsakh, the EU is pressuring Baku to fulfill its obligations and accept the EU’s role in the region as a key mediating player. The question is to what extent the EU’s strategy will work, amid the exclusion of other key regional actors such as Turkey and Iran. The geography and cultures of the South Caucasus are unique compared to other conflicts in Europe’s neighborhood, such as in Eastern Europe. Policymakers must be aware that the South Caucasus is bordered by Iran, Turkey and Russia, and extra-regional actors such as China and India also have a share in this competition and in shaping the regional dynamics. Hence, for a stable and secure region, any peace process must be holistic, realistic and proportionally acceptable to the key actors.