Asbarez: Lavrov, Minsk Group Co-Chairs Discuss Karabakh Settlement

November 19,  2020



OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs during a 2018 meeting in Yerevan

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov discussed with the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs the coordination of efforts to resolve the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Russian Foreign Ministry said on Wednesday.

The meeting was attended by Igor Popov of Russia, Stephane Visconti of France, Andrew Schofer of the U.S., as well as the personal representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office Andrzej Kasprzyk.

“During the consultations, they discussed the situation in and around Nagorno-Karabakh after the statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation on a complete ceasefire and stopping all hostilities on November 9. The coordination of further mediation efforts of the three countries were considered,” the ministry said, according to Sputnik.

There were no other or official press statement from this highly-anticipated meeting—the first time the Minsk Group co-chairs were meeting since the Karabakh War agreement was signed on November 10.

After Russia’s Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire, could Turkey step up next for a lasting peace?

Brookings Institute
Nov 18 2020
Kemal Kirişci and Behlül ÖzkanWednesday,
Editor’s Note:

While lasting peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia appears to be a tall order, an opening exists for Turkey to play the role of an honest broker in the conflict, write Kemal Kirişci and Behlül Özkan. This post originally appeared in Just Security.

Can the pain and destruction, the losses and gains from the recently reignited war over Nagorno-Karabakh be turned into peace?

While the world was fixated on the outcome of the U.S. elections and the ongoing drama of whether U.S. President Donald Trump would concede to President-elect Joe Biden, Russia appears to have achieved the near-impossible by arranging for a ceasefire between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Kremlin has satisfied Azerbaijani leaders in Baku and their backers in the Turkish capital Ankara, though at the expense of Armenian leaders in Yerevan. The pattern echoes the Treaty of Kars signed almost a century ago, when Soviet Russia in 1921 compelled Armenia to cede territory to Turkey in Eastern Anatolia; this time, Armenia was forced to do the same, to the benefit of Azerbaijan in Karabakh.

Previous ceasefires did not hold, but this one, backed by Russian peacekeepers, appears to stand a chance. Achieving long-term peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia is a tall order. However, the Nov. 9 deal may offer the kind of opportunity the region has not seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the conclusion of the initial war over Karabakh in 1994. The stars may be just adequately aligned for such an outcome, though this would require an acceptance that Russia is the dominant player. Nevertheless, a sustainable peace might help make that uncomfortable reality more palatable.

The stability and prosperity that would result from a settlement could help build the kind of mutual trust between the two nations to help them finally bury the hatchet and move on. To achieve this, both sides would have to abandon their maximalist demands driven by nationalism and opt for pragmatism. As unlikely as it may sound, Turkey could actually help.

The current round of hostilities erupted late in September when the Azerbaijan military went on the offensive with the stated objective of recapturing territories lost to Armenia in 1994, when a ceasefire ended two years of hostilities. At the time, Armenia occupied more than 4,200 square miles of Azerbaijan territory, an area a little smaller than Connecticut. Approximately one-third of this is the Karabakh region, where 150,000 Armenians live. The remaining two thirds of the territory is comprised of seven Azerbaijani regions around Karabakh, from which approximately half a million Azerbaijanis were displaced. Currently, Azerbaijan has one of the highest per capita concentrations of internally displaced people in the world, according to the United Nations Refugee Agency.

After the war, the Minsk group of countries led by France, Russia, and the United States was established to lead efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict. Long years of negotiations resulted in the adoption of the Madrid principles in 2009 that call for Armenia to return the territories surrounding Karabakh to Azerbaijan in exchange for Baku accepting a referendum on Karabakh’s final political status. Such a peace never materialized. The frustration stemming from the failure to arrive at a settlement has long simmered in Azerbaijan and threatened the credibility of President Ilham Aliyev’s leadership.

Against this backdrop, several additional factors motivated Azerbaijan to launch its offensive. Most important is the investment made in boosting the capabilities of the Azeri military, particularly with technologically advanced weapons, after it had been defeated so miserably in 1994, combined with the Armenian conviction in its invincibility, especially in a defensive war on mountainous terrain.

All the same, the launch of such an offensive by Azerbaijan would have been unthinkable without at least the acquiescence of Russia, which had established the Common Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 1992 to provide collective security for a group of post-Soviet states, including Armenia (Azerbaijan never joined). The Kremlin had made its displeasure known with the increasingly pro-Western leanings of the government of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan that came to power after pro-democracy protests in Yerevan in 2018. Russia’s tacit acceptance of Azerbaijan’s offensive became especially visible when President Vladimir Putin, in the middle of the Azeri military advances, announced that the CSTO would not apply unless Armenia proper were to be threatened.

After several failed attempts at a ceasefire brokered by various members of the Minsk Group, Russia negotiated this deal on the heels of the Azeri military liberating four of the seven regions under Armenian occupation and then pushing on into Karabakh and capturing the historically Azeri town of Shusha, 10 miles from Stepanakert, the administrative center of Armenian-controlled Karabakh. A definitive human toll of the six weeks of heavy fighting has been difficult to establish independently, though Putin said in the aftermath of the deal that more than 4,000 had died, including civilians, and more than 8,000 had been injured.

The deal calls for a corridor linking Karabakh to Armenia proper, the 10-mile-long Lachin corridor, in return for a 30-mile-long corridor through Armenia linking Azerbaijan to the Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan bordering Turkey. The corridors would be policed by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). The agreement, however, is silent on the future status of Karabakh and how a final settlement of the conflict would be reached.

The toll of three decades of conflict has been heavy for Armenia. Diplomatic relations with Turkey remain ruptured since 1993, and its borders with both Azerbaijan and Turkey are closed, leaving only narrow stretches of border with Georgia and Iran to access the rest of the world. The economic consequences have been devastating, further deepening its dependence on Russia and complicating its transition towards a more democratic regime. The human cost and civilian suffering on both sides have been tragic.

Indeed, the deal brokered by Russia has been called a “stunted” one. For sure it has serious weaknesses, and it remains far from clear whether Russia has a genuine interest in a real peace between the two countries. The future role of the Minsk Group is unclear as well. Despite these uncertainties, the gloomy picture on the ground, and the deep historical enmities, the ceasefire agreement signed by the conflicting parties is a ray of hope. But for a more promising future to be realized, several conditions would need to be satisfied first.

Armenian leaders should revive the legacy of Levon Ter-Petrosian, the country’s first president after independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union. He advocated pragmatism and recognized the need to compromise to achieve peace. He was also deeply conscious of the importance of Armenia having good relations with Turkey. To achieve this, he was even willing to see the return of occupied territories. He warned the public in 1997, “The international community will not for long tolerate the situation created around Karabakh because that is threatening regional cooperation and security as well as [the] West’s oil interests … Karabakh has won the battle, not the war.”

Ter-Petrosian faced massive resistance from hardliners and was even accused of treason. He was eventually deposed in 1998. His line of thinking in Armenia continues to face resistance and as late as 2016 was condemned as a harmful “virus.

Turkey could help manage this resistance and contribute to the creation of a climate that is more conducive to reconciliation. One possible immediate step would be to revive the ill-fated diplomatic accords that were negotiated with Armenia in 2009, especially with regard to the opening of the land border with Armenia. Since Azerbaijan has recovered a good part of its territories and assuming that Armenia does indeed withdraw from the remaining areas in keeping with the terms of the ceasefire, one of the major impediments to the implementation of the protocols will have been removed.

Numerous studies have shown how impactful the opening of the border would be in helping to improve the economic situation in Armenia and its access to the external world. It would also benefit Turkish provinces bordering Armenia where locals have long desired closer relations to boost their local economies. However, Turkey would have to proceed cautiously, recognizing that its unmitigated support of Azerbaijan reduces its credentials as an “honest broker.” To overcome this, Turkish leaders will need to adopt a narrative that is sensitive to how raw and intensely the physical and psychological wounds opened by the recent round of hostilities are felt among the Armenian public.

At first glance, expecting such an approach from the Turkish government may not seem realistic. Yet it was Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who as prime minister oversaw the negotiation of the 2009 diplomatic protocols. The protocols also broached the very difficult issue of how to address the events leading to deaths and deportations of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Erdoğan also was the leader who took an important step towards reconciliation on that issue in 2014, when he announced in an official statement, published also in Armenian, the Turkish nation’s condolences to the families of Armenians killed during the First World War. Clearly, this falls well short of Armenian demands and expectations, but in the Turkish context, it marked, as one of us co-wrote later, “a fundamental change in the nation’s approach to comprehending and addressing the events of 1915.”

Ter-Petrosian had recognized the challenge. He once noted that adopting “a tough position vis-a-vis Turkey and confront[ing] it with the issues of the recognition of the Genocide… would not bring any advantages to the solution of the Karabakh problem.”

Of course, Turkish politics and foreign policy have become much more nationalistic and confrontational compared with the days when Turkey was hailed as a model for democratization and soft power. Yet, Erdoğan also has a pragmatic streak and recognizes the need to adjust his politics in order to address Turkey’s economic woes and international isolation. He has already signaled his interest in improving relations with the United States under President Biden and recognizes the prestige and leverage that opening borders with Armenia would bring him internationally.

Finally, the performance of the Azerbaijan military and the unequivocal support Erdoğan gave to Aliyev would enable the Turkish leader to placate the more nationalist elements of his power base. That’s especially true of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), led by Devlet Bahçeli, that is particularly closely allied with Erdoğan. Bahçeli represents hardline Turkish nationalism, staunchly pro-Azerbaijan. Yet, the founder of MHP, Alparslan Türkeş, was an avid supporter of better relations with Armenia. The late Türkeş held the first high-level official contact with Armenia when he met Ter-Petrosian in Paris in 1993. At the time, he had even suggested the idea of erecting a statute on the Turkish-Armenian border carrying the words “we are sorry for the sufferings.” This legacy of Türkeş could facilitate Erdoğan’s hand in overcoming potential domestic resistance to opening the border.

Much more challenging to such a Turkish initiative would be the complicated geopolitics of the south Caucasus. Russia has played its hand skillfully and reasserted its role in the region in a decisive manner. How would Russia perceive such an initiative from Turkey? Would Putin be willing to let a Ter-Petrosian legacy supportive of reconciliation with Turkey openly surface in Armenia? How would the thousands of people protesting Prime Minister Pashinyan’s acceptance of the Russian deal be persuaded to give the Turkish initiative a chance? Where would the Armenian diaspora that traditionally has supported maximalist demands come down on responding to such an initiative favorably? Similarly, how would leading Western powers such as the United States and France, as members of the Minsk Group, react?

No matter the answers to these questions, Turkey should seize this opportunity to take a bold diplomatic step in the direction of opening the border. And why not be so bold as to announce it unilaterally?


Healthcare Minister says dedicated rehabilitation center needed for wounded troops

Save

Share

 17:05,

YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 18, ARMENPRESS. Healthcare Minister Arsen Torosyan says the country needs a new rehabilitation center for the treatment of wounded servicemen.

“There is a lot to be done here. We think that there are three main directions we should focus on. First, the maximally effective use of existing capacity, a part of which require modernization, second – our calculations show that we need new capacities, a 250-bed rehabilitation center, and third, the permanent support of these capacities in the form of buying services through state funds,” Torosyan said.

Continuous support of these capacities will cost from 2 to 2,5 billion drams according to preliminary calculations.

Torosyan said the Armenian organizations in the Diaspora could have major investments in creating the new center.

Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan

Charges pressed against Fatherland Party leader Artur Vanetsyan

Save

Share

 17:14,

YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 15, ARMENPRESS. Leader of the Fatherland Party, former director of the National Security Service of Armenia Artur Vanetsyan has been charged for illegal possession of firearms, plotting assassination of a state, political or public official and attempting to seize power, his lawyer Lusine Sahakyan told reporters today.

She said that Vanetsyan denies the wrongdoing.

Earlier, the National Security Service of Armenia has announced that it has prevented an assassination of a government official, attempts to seize power by a group of people with prior consent, as well as revealed cases of illegal acquisition and possession of weapons, ammunition and explosives by a group of persons for this purpose.

In particular, a resident of Syunik province Ashot Minasyan, by using the fact of the presence of weapons in Artsakh during the recent war unleashed by Azerbaijan, has illegally transported and stored large amount of weapons, ammunition, explosives in one of his buildings in the town of Sisian after a preliminary consent with a group of people. This person, during and after the military operations launched on September 27, has agreed with a number of opposition party leaders, former politicians and their supporters to seize power through these illegally acquired weapons, in particular to assassinate the Prime Minister, as well as to usurp power, and also they have even discussed issues relating to a possible candidate for the next prime minister.

As a result, the resident of Syunik province and a group of opposition party leaders, former officials and their supporters have acquired measures and tools for conducting a deliberate crime, as well as have deliberately created other conditions for preparing to commit the assassination of a government official and usurping power, however, all their plans were revealed and prevented by the National Security Service.

A group of people, including the leader of the Fatherland party Artur Vanetsyan, former Member of Parliament Vahram Baghdasaryan, as well as commander of the Sisian volunteers squad Ashot Minasyan have been arrested in suspicion of being involved in the conspiracy. Investigative operations are being carried out to find the remaining members of the group and prevent and neutralize their criminal activity.

Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan

8 aircrafts of Russian Air Force took off to transfer peacekeepers to Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone

Save

Share

 16:16, 13 November, 2020

YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 13, ARMENPRESS. On November 13, eight Il-76 aircrafts of the military transport aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces took off from the Ulyanovsk-Vostochny airfield to transfer units of the 15th peacekeeping brigade to participate in the peacekeeping operation in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone, the Russian Defense Ministry reported.

The aircrafts deliver more than 10 heavy-duty off-road vehicles and logistical support, as well as over 100 military personnel to the airfield in Armenia.

The coordination of actions for the implementation of peacekeeping tasks and monitoring of the situation in the NK conflict zone are carried out on a 24-hour basis by the National Center for State Defense Control of the Russian Federation.

The ministry also reported that in order to carry out peacekeeping tasks, prevent possible incidents and ensure the safety of Russian military personnel, continuous interaction with the general staffs of the armed forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia has been organized. Communication by direct channels has been established.

Heavy clashes continue near Shushi – Artsrun Hovhannisyan

Save

Share

 21:11, 7 November, 2020

YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 7, ARMENPRESS. Representative of the Defense Ministry of Armenia Artsrun Hovhannisyan wrote on his Facebook page that heavy clashes continue near Shushi.

‘’Heavy clashes continue just near Shushi’’, ARMENPRESS reports Hovhannisyan wrote.

Earlier, Hovhannisyan wrote that heavy clashes take place in the north, Martuni direction and south from Shushi.




Several MPs of Czech Parliament express support and solidarity with Armenian people

Save

Share

 16:14, 5 November, 2020

YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 5, ARMENPRESS. A number of deputies of the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic, expressed their support and solidarity with the Armenian people, condemning the aggressive artillery shelling and the use of prohibited weapons against the peaceful Armenian population and civilian objects in Stepanakert and other parts of Nagorno-Karabakh. The deputies condemned the involvement of members of terrorist organizations and Turkey in the conflict, and stressed their support for the provision of humanitarian aid to the peaceful population of Nagorno-Karabakh, Head of the Armenia-Czech Republic parliamentary friendship group Gayane Abrahamyan said on Facebook, posting the text of the statement.

“We, the undersigned deputies of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament, acknowledging that the Armenian people are the heirs of the first Christian kingdom that was often threatened by foreign enemies, recalling the 2017 resolution of the Chamber of Deputies on the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, express our support and solidarity.

In regard with the resumption of the armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh initiated by the Azerbaijani army in late September and the double violation of the ceasefire regime between the two warring parties we

-condemn the aggressive artillery and air strikes, including the use of prohibited weapons against the Armenian population and civilian facilities in Stepanakert and other parts of Nagorno-Karabakh;

-feel that the current situation is disastrous and could become one of the biggest humanitarian catastrophes in recent years;

-understand that the involvement of members of the “Islamic State” or other terrorist organizations will endanger the security of the whole world;

-do not agree with Turkey’s involvement in this conflict, as it could destabilize the situation in the entire Caucasus region; and we call upon the Turkish government to stop its military involvement in the conflict;

-call on all parties of the conflict to cease hostilities, to abide by ceasefire agreements, and to make dignified burial possible;

ask all actors to return to the ceasefire and peaceful negotiations, which will allow to find an effective, lasting solution to the mutual disputes;

-fully support the urgent need for humanitarian assistance to the civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh;

-ask the Czech Government to be guided by the spirit of the above principles in the European Union, the UN and other international organizations”.

 

Gayane Abrahamyan expressed her sincere and heartfelt gratitude to Mr. Marek Benda, Chairman of the Armenian-Czech Republic Friendship Group, and all the other Deputies for their support and solidarity.

BBC: Grey Wolves: Far-right group to be banned in France

BBC News, UK
Nov 2 2020
Grey Wolves: Far-right group to be banned in France

France is banning the far-right Turkish group Grey Wolves after a memorial to the Armenian genocide near Lyon was defaced with pro-Turkish slogans.

The Grey Wolves, an international organisation, is seen as allied to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The memorial was daubed with yellow graffiti over the weekend that included Mr Erdogan’s initials.

It comes amid growing tensions between France and Turkey over a territorial dispute in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan erupted over the mountainous territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in September. The region is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, but it is controlled by ethnic Armenians.

Turkey has backed Azerbaijan in the conflict.

  • What are Armenia and Azerbaijan fighting over?

The move to ban the Grey Wolves will be put to the French cabinet on Wednesday.

The ban will mean that any activities or meetings by the group could lead to fines or imprisonment, French Interior Minister Gerald Darmanin said.

As the group is an international organisation, the ban will only restrict its activities in France.

Images of the memorial just outside Lyon showed yellow graffiti featuring the Grey Wolves’ name alongside the letters “RTE” – for Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Last week, four people outside Lyon were wounded in fights between suspected Turkish nationalists and Armenians protesting against Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, according to AFP news agency.

Tensions between France and Turkey also intensified recently after French President Emmanuel Macron’s pledge to defend secular values and fight radical Islam.

Responding to Mr Macron’s comments, Mr Erdogan said the French president needed a mental health check.

It came after French teacher Samuel Paty was murdered after showing his students controversial images of the Prophet Muhammad.

Depictions of the Prophet Muhammad can cause serious offence to Muslims because Islamic tradition explicitly forbids images of Muhammad and Allah (God).

Last week, Turkey vowed to take “legal, diplomatic actions” over a cartoon of Mr Erdogan that appeared on the cover of French magazine Charlie Hebdo.

The cartoon depicted Turkey’s president lifting the dress of a veiled woman.


https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54787028

Azeri Opinion: How to End the Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

Law Fare
Nov 2 2020
By Anna Salvatore

Monday, November 2, 2020

This fall, one of the world’s most protracted conflicts reignited in Nagorno-Karabakh. Since 1988, Armenia and Azerbaijan have sparred over the future of the majority-Armenian enclave, which is landlocked within Azerbaijan and subject to competing historical claims by both countries. Armenia won a decisive victory in the early ‘90s, occupying Nagorno-Karabakh and seizing surrounding territory that was home to about one million Azerbaijanis—a move so devastating to Azerbaijan that its government has spent the past few decades stockpiling arms from allies like Turkey, Israel and Syria. After years of tension and sporadic violence, Armenia and Azerbaijan descended into war on Sep. 27. 

After fighting ended in the 1990s, Nagorno-Karabakh declared itself an independent republic and is now known as “The Republic of Artsakh” to its roughly 150,000 inhabitants. The republic is not recognized by neighboring countries, although Armenia has close ties to the government and represents it in formal negotiations. Since 1992, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—a group chaired by Russia, France and the United States—has overseen these negotiations. Azerbaijan, however, has questioned the legitimacy of the process, arguing that the U.S. and Russia are both biased against Azerbaijan: the U.S. has a vast Armenian diaspora population, and Russia sells arms to both Armenia and Azerbaijan and has military commitments to Armenia through the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

In a testament to the limitations of the OSCE Minsk Group, several promising ceasefires have collapsed over the past six weeks. Hundreds and perhaps thousands of soldiers and civilians have lost their lives amid shelling in Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ganja, the second-largest city in Azerbaijan. With the support of Turkey and Iran, Azerbaijan has also retaken much of the land seized by Armenia in the 1990s. Azerbaijan is now under scrutiny for bombing a strategically located city just south of Stepanakert known as Shusha or Shushi—and according to Arayik Harutyunyan, the separatist leader of Nagorno-Karabakh, “The one who controls Shushi controls Nagorno-Karabakh.”

I spoke to Arzu Geybulla, an Azerbaijani journalist based in Istanbul, about the state of the conflict and her proposals for peace. We also discussed an editorial she wrote for Osservatori earlier this month, where she excoriated Armenian and Azerbaijani leadership for exploiting the “neverending war” for political gains. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Q: According to an article by Thomas de Waal, the lands surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh are empty and decimated by conflict. Where are the Azerbaijani citizens who used to live in the “buffer zone,” and what are the prospects for their return?

A: True, the territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh that were under occupation have been left in poor, if not unlivable conditions. The government of Azerbaijan has vowed to rebuild all of the returned territories. The [internally displaced persons] and refugees ended up being disseminated across the country in refugee camps, train barracks, unfinished buildings. Some have received housing over the years, but the situation is dire and many are still waiting for housing.

I am not entirely sure how many of the displaced are willing to return—there are no studies that have documented the will and the interest. However, the current escalation has surely raised hopes for many of those who lost their homes and were forced to flee to return. There was a video that circulated online (one of many) of a soldier who found his home in one of the regained villages. Outside stood the sycamore tree that he remembered from his childhood. Another picture shared online was of a soldier who returned to his home after almost 30 years where the pomegranate tree still stood in the garden of what once was his home.

The sentiments are high, and so is the determination to return back what was Azerbaijan’s in the first place.

Q: If Karabakh is so closely tied with Armenia during formal negotiations, then why doesn’t Armenia recognize the territory as the “Republic of Artsakh”?

A: Because it would be the first country to recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. This action would also destroy the negotiations process, as well as likely result in worse military escalation than what we have seen in the last three weeks.

Q: The U.S. and France have abdicated much of their negotiating responsibility in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group. What role has Russia played in their absence?

A: Minsk Group does not only consist of Russia, France, and the U.S. Among its permanent members are Turkey, Sweden, Germany, Italy and Belarus. All members of the group have been calling for de-escalation since it became clear that neither of the sides to this conflict, namely Armenia and Azerbaijan, were going to stand down when the other was under attack in the years since the ceasefire was declared.

Surely, Russia’s geographical proximity to both countries, the history, the current relations, and the tradition of being the broker of the ceasefire in this conflict makes Russia the first co-chair to intervene and to mediate. It was also the co-chair that mediated a ceasefire in 2016 during the April war. Then, both sides agreed and came back to the negotiation table, this time, however, we are seeing that neither of the sides is interested in staying true to the articles agreed to in the ceasefire simply because the balance to this conflict has shifted.

The first ceasefire that was declared on Oct. 10 came after the Azerbaijan army made significant advances, recapturing villages and strategic heights. Surely it was not going to stop and watch as Armenian armed forces violated the ceasefire. But the truth is, it is hard to tell who violated the ceasefire the first time, because there are no independent observer groups on the ground, nor are there any independent peacekeeping forces.

At this point, no matter what Russia does, Azerbaijan demands are rather clear and have been voiced over and over by the president Ilham Aliyev who won’t back down until the demands made by Azerbaijan (in line with basic principles) are actually followed.

Russia also sells arms to both sides. I think what we should be asking here is why a country sitting at the negotiation table can be selling arms to both sides and still getting a say. And secondly, why other members did not step in over the years. We are partially seeing this now with Turkey strongly coming forward in support of Azerbaijan. But while Azerbaijan feels emboldened with this support, this is also not very constructive for the negotiations. As Turkey is not seen as a neutral actor here from the Armenian side.

Clearly there is a need for a bigger involvement of all member states, and perhaps other actors as well, whether through the presence of organizations like Human Rights Watch to document war crimes or others.

Q: You’ve written extensively about information control in Azerbaijan. To what extent has the Azerbaijani (and Armenian) government restricted information about the war online and created propaganda?

A: I think we should not be surprised by the existence of propaganda during the war. This is not unique to Azerbaijan or Armenia. We should, however, remember that much of popular, independent, and opposition media has been blocked in Azerbaijan since 2017. While they continue reporting, they still rely heavily on the information provided and shared by the government institutions/sources.

In addition to lack of access to independent information, what is important here is the blanket limitation imposed on Azerbaijani internet users by the government of Azerbaijan and how this limit serves to boost government-sponsored media platforms which only share information approved by the MoD, MFA and other government institutions.

They are also the ones who seem to have no issues accessing the internet and social media platforms. MoD has a telegram channel that updates on a regular basis and a Facebook page. Each of these platforms is accessible via VPN which the government strongly urges not to use as it can lead to stolen personal data.

In the absence of independent, verified information and in the absence of access to such information, the information war is natural and so is the likelihood of false information circulating online.

Q: You also wrote in June about President Aliyev’s heavy-handed and ineffective approach to the coronavirus. How has his policy towards COVID-19 changed since full-on war began?

There are new restrictions that came into effect last week. At this point, however, whatever President Aliyev was criticized for before the war is long forgotten given the fervor in support of the war and therefore in support of President Aliyev.

All other problems are secondary. This is why I don’t see there will be much criticism over the lack of measures taken now with rising numbers.

Q: In a stinging op-ed earlier this month, you accused government leadership of “[caring] too much about egos and seats rather than human lives” during the ongoing conflict. If you could advise [Armenian Prime Minister Nikol] Pashinyan and Aliyev about the way forward, what concrete suggestions would you give them?

I would advise them to bring civil society to the negotiation table. Although I’m not sure there are many peace advocates left on both sides, that being said, opening the negotiations to an independent civil society would be useful. Sharing with them the results of previous meetings, full transparency and demonstrated commitment to resolving this conflict once and for all.

To President Aliyev, I would ask to release all political prisoners, reinstate international funding mechanisms for NGOs and provide a safe environment for their work, on this conflict and outside.

To Prime Minister Pashinyan, I would say to tone it down—saying Karabakh is Armenia or threatening Azerbaijan to recognize Karabakh’s independence is not constructive. It may score him golden points at home, but it certainly does not help in reconciling long grievances between the two countries and its people.

To both, I would ask to take full responsibility for the recent weeks. Make concessions, and be prepared to convince the people in their respective countries that these concessions were needed in order to stop the human suffering and find a common ground.

For Aliyev, I would ask to take full responsibility for all that has happened under his reign, return what he has taken from the people and let this country rebuild itself not as an authoritarian state but as a thriving democracy.

Q: There are credible reports of civilians being killed in Ganja and Stepanakert, and you’ve shared an article on Twitter about the war becoming a “humanitarian crisis.” What role does the international community have, if any, in ensuring that the conflict only involves soldiers?

Every war brings with itself grave casualties and it is often civilians who suffer the most. It’s just that neither of the sides imagined how high these casualties were going to be. Any human life is valuable, whether it’s a civilian or an army officer. The loss of both is devastating as it is.

The most logical decision would be to stop fighting altogether. Stick to the ceasefire, exchange and collect bodies, exchange [prisoners of war], assess the situation and go back to the negotiation table. Without de-escalation, and an immediate stop of fighting, not one single actor could prevent the humanitarian crisis. War crimes must be independently investigated and the perpetrators on both sides must be brought to justice.

This is what the international community should try to achieve—all other attempts would be futile. That of course, in addition to safety guarantees, de-occupation and final solution to this conflict once and for all.

Q: De Waal also wrote in the 2019 Carnegie paper that, “Only very limited social groups, such as traders who do business in Georgia, or students who meet the other side in foreign capitals, encounter members of the other ethnic group and hear their point of view.” What role do cultural exchange programs have in creating popular support for a peaceful solution? 

I don’t think the leaders of the two countries were interested in finding a peaceful solution from the start. There were attempts earlier on, but they failed due to the liability of leaders to explain these solutions to the people.

One thought the status quo would continue, while the other was seeking revenge for all the losses. Lack of people-to-people diplomacy also drew both communities further apart, strengthening the respective government positions. No concessions could be made; not from the side of Azerbaijan anyway, considering the losses of the war.

I saw a post some two weeks ago on social media that was shared by someone from Ukraine who said “leaders would agree, wars would end but limbs won’t grow.” The quote was accompanied by a picture of two young Ukrainian boys who lost their legs during the fighting. Putting this into the context of the current situation, I can only say that making concessions is a skill. Surely not everyone will be happy, but at least people would still have their limbs, and people would still have the family members who are no longer with them. 

It’s like those sycamore and pomegranate trees that still stood. It takes years, and decades to grow trees, and it will take years and perhaps decades to rebuild trust—if, of course, an agreement is reached. Maybe at some point in time, perhaps not in my lifetime, there will be more sycamore and pomegranate trees raised from the debris of this war. I only hope that they will be surrounded by life and far from bloodshed.

How Russia is winning at its own game

ECFR, EU
Oct 29 2020

War and revolution are not inimical to Moscow if they follow paths Russian policymakers understand and even support.

Kadri Liik @KadriLiik on Twitter
Senior Policy Fellow

The current unrest in different parts of the former Soviet Union may make it tempting to conclude that Russia is losing control over its neighbourhood. And it is true that over some areas its hold has weakened – Russia’s loss of Ukraine is undeniable and serious. However, the current ructions do not mark a decline, but demonstrate rather the opposite: Russia is working on settlements for Nagorno-Karabakh and Belarus, and doing so according to its own principles. Meanwhile, the West lacks workable leverage over either issue.

Russia may appear on the back foot if one misunderstands its aims, by assuming that in Nagorno-Karabakh it stands unconditionally behind Armenia – its Collective Security Treaty Organisation ally whose control of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan relies on Russia’s military support. It is also wrong to assume that, in Belarus, Moscow stands fully behind Alyaksandr Lukashenka – the authoritarian leader who has long declared his friendship towards Russia, though not always lived up to it. In fact, Moscow is quite tired of Lukashenka’s two-faced behaviour, and would like to see a change in Minsk. It might also accept some change in Nagorno-Karabakh – as long as it happens on Moscow’s terms, or at least on terms understandable to Moscow.  

Russia’s true aim in these neighbourhood conflicts is not to back particular sides or personalities, but to defend the principles it values. It wants to delegitimise bottom-up revolutions as a means of transferring power; it also wants to signal that Western interventionism with its promotion of democracy and normative approach are unfruitful in general, and unwelcome around Russia in particular. What is playing out is essentially the same philosophy that guided Russia’s intervention in Syria – and if judged against these criteria, Moscow is doing well enough, at least at the moment.

Moscow wants to delegitimise bottom-up revolutions as a means to arrange transfers of power

In Belarus, for instance, Moscow might be backing Lukashenka for now, but in reality it is already working on his replacement. This process will take some time; Lukashenka will have some say over the terms of his exit. A recent meeting he held with opposition figures in jail was probably part of this process. Svitlana Tsikhanouskaya, though – the opposition leader now based in Lithuania and the likely real winner of the rigged election – has probably been prescribed the role of bystander by Moscow. And so has Europe. From the start, Moscow has shunned all European calls for due procedure, respect for human rights, and mediation by the OSCE. Vladimir Putin last week encapsulated his country’s position, though somewhat hypocritically, when he said: “Russia did not interfere in what was happening [in Belarus]. And we expect no one else to interfere either. No one should be stirring up this conflict to promote their own interests and impose any decisions on the Belarusian people.” 

Nagorno-Karabakh is a different type of conflict, of an ethnic-territorial kind, and the new onslaught of fighting – with an Azerbaijan emboldened by Turkish support – might suggest that Russia is facing a rival power in its neighbourhood. But for many in Moscow the advantage of having the West out still outweighs the nuisance of having Turkey in. Moscow knows Ankara and has learned to work with it. The two capitals are far from being allies: their goals in the Middle East often stand in direct opposition to each other. But both realise they need each other, as they cannot achieve their aims without some acquiescence from the other. And most importantly, the Turkish government is motivated by goals that in the Kremlin’s eyes are rational: strengthening its power at home, enhancing its leverage abroad, and pursuing economic and security interests. It lacks any Western-style rule-centric approach and instead subscribes to a worldview that Moscow understands.

Azerbaijan, too, has pursued its foreign policy without challenging Russia’s philosophical standpoint or historical narratives even though at times it has been at odds with Moscow. This is why Russia might be more relaxed than expected, even though its Armenian ally is in trouble: “Russia may have reasons to help its ally Armenia, but it has no reason at all to punish Azerbaijan, which has been an example of model behavior among the former Soviet states, as far as Russia is concerned”, notes Carnegie scholar Alexander Baunov. In Nagorno-Karabakh, it is again Moscow that has brought the warring sides together and arranged for a ceasefire, though an admittedly shaky one. The Western members of the contact group have largely been left on the sidelines.

Europeans have tried different ways to influence the situation in Belarus. Lithuania, for instance, has positioned itself on the moral high ground, arranged public shows of solidarity with the Belarusian opposition, and called for harsh sanctions against the regime. France has bet on dialogue with Putin, trying to get the latter to accept OSCE mediation. Collectively, EU leaders made great efforts in August to signal to Moscow their restraint and desire not to ‘geopoliticise’ the conflict – in the hope that Moscow would mirror the position, thus allowing for an ‘Armenian-style’ political transition with no geopolitical contest around it.

All to no avail. After adopting a wait-and-see position for around two weeks after the election, Moscow made up its mind and embarked on a strategy of transition – one that saves some face for Lukashenka; deepens Russia’s leverage in the country; brings to power a leader acceptable to Moscow; keeps both the West and the OSCE at arm’s length; and, most importantly, demonstrates that popular revolution is not an effective way to transfer power. One can imagine scenarios under which Moscow could reconsider its approach, change strategy, and even reach out to the Lithuania-based opposition. But all these would stem from developments inside Belarus itself – such as strikes that paralyse the country, or the regime splitting and crumbling – rather than something the West does or says. 

The lesson for the West is clear enough: to influence post-Soviet – or any – crises, one needs to have true leverage: either on the regional level, or on the global level that it can convert to regional influence. If one relies solely on good principles and the moral high ground, it is very easy to be outmanoeuvred in the face of a determined opponent.

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. This paper, like all publications of the European Council on Foreign Relations, represents only the views of its authors.