DOUR DEMOCRATS
by Lincoln A. Mitchell
Transitions Online
March 26 2008
Czech Republic
Presidential races in Georgia, Armenia and Russia were not just bumps
on the road to democracy, and that’s a big problem for democracy
advocates.
Georgia, Russia and Armenia have all held presidential elections
this year, and in each case, the outcomes demonstrate that efforts to
strengthen democracy are either stagnant or, more worryingly, failing.
In Russia, we saw a well orchestrated and smoothly run undemocratic
election, and there was little democracy advocates or international
observers could have done to change that.
In Georgia, an election broadly assessed as essentially free and
fair occurred in a less than democratic political environment. It
gave rise to substantial demonstrations after results were released
and questions about the extent to which the result, a first-round
victory for incumbent Mikheil Saakashvili, reflected the actual voting.
The Armenian election was somewhere between Georgia and Russia with
regard to democracy, as the outcome was never really in doubt, but it
was considerably more competitive than the Russian race. Following
the Armenian election there were protests in the capital, a violent
crackdown and, as of this writing, no clear resolution.
These elections, and the political contexts in which they occurred,
were distinct from each other, but together they point toward the major
challenges facing the advance of democracy and policies to support
it. All three of elections demonstrate the importance of developing
democracy assistance strategies that can help liberalize illiberal
regimes or stop the slide of semi-democracies toward authoritarianism.
COMMON DEFICIENCIES
The election in Georgia was clearly the best-run of the three,
followed by Armenia and then Russia. However, we must not overlook
the similarities between the three cases. These elections shared
several important characteristics, which highlight broader trends in
the region.
First, they were not competitive. Dmitry Medvedev faced no real
opposition in Russia, while few in Armenia or Georgia thought that
victory for Serzh Sarkisian or Saakashvili was ever really in doubt.
Second, none of these elections saw a clear-cut choice between a
democratic and non-democratic candidate. Third, the most substantial
irregularities occurred in the pre-election period: various
combinations of media bias, intimidation of opposition candidates,
and liberal use of state resources on behalf of the eventual winner.
The election days themselves were relatively smooth and not marked
by rampant irregularities.
Another similarity is that in each election the role of international
observers was complex. In Russia, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe’s electoral monitoring agency, the ODIHR,
did not observe the process because of the government’s refusal to
cooperate in a way that would have made serious observation possible.
In Georgia, the snap election gave ODIHR and other election monitors
little time to put an observation mission in place. In both Georgia
and Armenia there were substantial discrepancies between the evaluation
done by ODIHR and the views of the political opposition.
Finally, in none of the cases did the election contribute to greater
democracy in the country. Moreover, the role of Western democracy
advocates was very limited. In Russia, they were virtually shut out
of the process. Many Western, particularly American, supporters of
Georgia sought unsuccessfully to explain away the crackdown and state
of emergency in November 2007 which led up to the election. The events
in Armenia are perhaps most striking because of the lack of attention
being paid by Western media and governments alike. Clearly, these
are no longer the days of oranges and roses in the former Soviet Union.
STAGNANT DEMOCRACY
Looking for reasons behind the stagnancy of democracy and of
democracy assistance in the Caucasus and Russia, we can see that
17 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with the first
phase of post-communism now in the past, there is a movement toward
illiberal democracies in the region. These states are characterized by
strong executives, limited freedoms, weak political oppositions and
elections which are, generally speaking, non-competitive. In Russia,
this transition away from democracy seems almost complete.
Unless Medvedev does something extremely surprising, Russia will
likely continue to move away from semi-democracy and consolidate its
authoritarian rule.
It is clearly unfair and inaccurate to suggest that Saakashvili’s
Georgia is as authoritarian as Vladimir Putin and Medvedev’s Russia.
Nonetheless, to a great extent the differences between the two
countries are of degree, not kind. The same is true of Armenia which,
once again, can be placed somewhere between Russia and Georgia on
this scale.
The rise of illiberal regimes should also be viewed through the prism
of seeking to balance democracy assistance with broader foreign policy
goals. More specifically, in Russia the West is now confronted with
a regime that is no longer weak and does not see itself as having
anything to gain from Western or U.S. expertise on issues like
democracy. However, Russia is an increasingly important player in
areas that include frozen conflicts in the Caucasus, energy security,
and Iran’s nuclear capability.
In Georgia, the close relationship between the Bush and Saakashvili
administrations has clouded U.S. efforts to help Georgia consolidate
the initial gains of the Rose Revolution and helped to mute criticism
of problems with Georgian democracy long before last November.
Armenia is probably the country of least strategic importance to the
United States, but recent events there make it clear that the U.S.
appetite and ability to facilitate democratic change in the region
is not what it once was.
In Armenia, Russia and Georgia the rise of illiberal regimes and the
effects of American foreign policy have contributed to situations
that were not only complex, but where both sides employed different
tactics in attempts to make it unclear who the democrats were or how
democracy might be strengthened in their respective countries. In
Russia, orderly elections, a clean election day and a smooth, if
not altogether sincere, transfer of power characterized what Putin’s
government might refer to as a Russian style of democracy.
In Georgia and Armenia, the situation was more complex. The elections
in Georgia occurred because of a somewhat unexpected decision by
Saakashvili to resign in the backlash against his government’s violent
crackdown on opposition protesters. Saakashvili and his supporters
presented his decision as evidence of his supreme commitment to
democracy, but this seems somewhat Pollyannaish. The issue in Georgia
was not Saakashvili’s legitimacy, or even his public support, both of
which were acknowledged by all but his most extreme critics. Rather,
the issue was Saakashvili’s tendency to govern unilaterally with
little regard for the niceties of consultation, legislative process
or constitutional stability.
Elections, particularly in the tense political climate of January 2008,
were not likely to have an impact on that problem.
HOW TO HELP DEMOCRATS
The context of the Armenian election raises a different set of
problems for democracy advocates because it was essentially typical
for that country. The outcome was never in doubt, the fix was in
early, the opposition was not really democratic, and there were few
strategic options for internal or foreign democrats. Moreover, by
making electoral reforms, the Armenian government was able to avoid
a negative election report or any significant negative consequences
for staging yet another flawed contest.
It is the ordinariness of the Armenian election that goes to the
crux of its importance. It is precisely in elections of that
nature where the United States and its allies must be able to
help democratic forces with assistance to maintain democracy’s
relevance and centrality. Elections of this type in the region’s
illiberal regimes cannot be reasonably expected to play pivotal
roles in democratization. Similarly, in illiberal regimes relatively
smooth election days, and technical election-related improvements
cannot be taken on their own as evidence of a government’s efforts
to democratize. U.S. policy must begin to reflect this by taking
longer-term approaches to democracy assistance which recognize the
breadth of the problems facing democracy in these regimes and the
limited immediate prospects of elections meaningfully addressing
these problems.
Elections were further complicated in Georgia and Armenia by the
initial refusal of the opposition to respect the results.
Demonstrators came to the streets of Tbilisi and Yerevan to protest
elections which Western observers and multilateral organizations
had assessed as largely free and fair. In Armenia, violence was used
to disperse the demonstrators, but the final card there has not yet
been played.
In Georgia, the demonstrations eventually gave way to the parliamentary
campaign, hunger strikes and on-and-off negotiations between the
government and the opposition. In both these countries opposition
demonstrators questioned both the veracity and the motives behind
international assessments of the elections.
While elections are only one of several pillars of both democracy
and democracy assistance, this is the institution that draws
the most media attention and is most salient to both domestic and
international audiences. It’s not hard to find explanations for why
the West was unable or unwilling to take a more critical approach
to any of these elections, particularly in Armenia and Georgia: the
opposition was weak and not really made up of democrats; these were
better elections than in the past; the outcome wasn’t really at stake;
these countries are either too powerful (Russia) or too important
(Georgia). All these are empirically accurate, but add up to a dead
end for democracy assistance.
The elections this year in Russia, Georgia and Armenia represent
a range of outcomes with which democracy advocates have become
increasingly familiar. The presidential election scheduled later this
year in another south Caucasus country, Azerbaijan, will probably
look a lot like these. There is little likelihood of a change in
leadership or an advance in democracy.
The question of what to do about an election where the outcome is not
in doubt, choice is limited, democratic institutions are not firmly
in place, and it is not so easy to determine who the democrats are,
will not go away. Those interested in seeing these countries become
more democratic must find a way to either de-emphasize elections in
favor of other aspects of democracy assistance such as civil society
development, hold governments accountable for bad elections even when
the fraud does not change the outcome, or determine a longer-term
strategy for supporting democratic development that will not get
sidetracked during every election season.
Lincoln A. Mitchell is the Arnold A. Saltzman assistant professor
in the Practice of International Politics at Columbia University’s
School of International and Public Affairs.