Georgian sting seizes bomb grade uranium
By DESMOND BUTLER, Associated Press Writer
Associated Press
January 24, 2007
Republic of Georgia authorities, aided by the CIA, set up a sting
operation last summer that led to the arrest of Russian man who tried
to sell a small amount of nuclear-bomb grade uranium in a plastic
bag in his jacket pocket, U.S. and Georgian officials said.
The operation, which neither government has publicized, represents
one of the most serious cases of smuggling of nuclear material in
recent years, according to analysts and officials.
The arrest underscored concerns about the possibility of terrorists
acquiring nuclear bomb-making material on the black market,
although there was no suggestion that this particular case was
terrorist-related.
"Given the serious consequences of the detonation of an improvised
nuclear explosive device, even small numbers of incidents involving
HEU (highly enriched uranium) or plutonium are of very high concern,"
said Melissa Fleming of the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency.
Details of the investigation, which also involved the FBI and Energy
Department, were provided to The Associated Press by U.S. officials
and Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili.
Authorities say they do not know how the man acquired the nuclear
material or if his claims of access to much larger quantities were
true. He and three Georgian accomplices are in Georgian custody and
not cooperating with investigators.
Georgian attempts to trace the nuclear material since the arrest and
confirm whether the man indeed had access to larger quantities have
foundered from a lack of cooperation from Russia.
Merabishvili said that he was revealing the story out of frustration
with Russia’s response and the need to illustrate the dangers of a
breakdown in security cooperation in the region.
A message left with the press office of the Russian Embassy was
not returned. A duty officer at the Russian Foreign Ministry told
The Associated Press that there was no one authorized to comment on
Wednesday night.
Russia has tense relations with Georgia, a former Soviet
republic. Georgia has been troubled by Russia’s support for separatists
in two breakaway Georgian border regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The sting was set up after Georgian authorities uncovered extensive
smuggling networks while investigating criminal groups operating in
the breakaway republics, Merabishvili said.
"When we sent buyers, the channels through Abkhazia and South Ossetia
began to expand and we started seeing a huge flow of materials,"
he said.
"Sometimes it was low-grade enriched materials, but this was the
first instance of highly enriched material."
According to his account, during an investigation in South Ossetia,
a Georgian undercover agent posing as a rich foreign buyer made contact
with the Russian seller in North Ossetia, which is part of Russia.
After the Russian offered to sell the sample, the agent rebuffed
requests that the transaction occur in North Ossetia, insisting the
Russian come to Tbilisi, the Georgian capital.
At a meeting in Tbilisi, the man pulled out from his pocket a plastic
bag containing the material. Uranium has a low level of radioactive
emission and can be transported more safely than other radioactive
materials.
The man was arrested and sentenced to eight to 10 years in prison on
smuggling charges. His accomplices were sentenced on lesser charges.
Russian authorities took a sample of the material but failed to
offer any assistance despite requests for help from the Georgians,
Merabishvili said.
"We were ready to provide all the information, but unfortunately
no one arrived from Russia, not even to interview this person,"
Merabishvili said.
"It is surprising because it is in Russian interests to secure these
materials. There are terrorist organizations in Russia who would pay
huge amounts of money for this."
The Georgians asked for U.S. assistance. Agents from the FBI and
the Energy Department took the material back to the United States,
where it was tested by the Energy Department’s National Nuclear
Security Administration.
"The material was analyzed by agency nuclear experts and confirmed
to be highly enriched uranium," said Bryan Wilkes, a spokesman for
the the agency.
Fleming, of the IAEA, said that the agency was aware of the Tbilisi
seizure and was expecting formal notification from Georgia soon.
The CIA declined to comment on the case. FBI spokesman Richard Kolko
confirmed that the FBI was involved in the investigation and called
it a success, but he would not provide details.
Merabishvili, who was visiting Washington this week, said he did not
have some details of the investigation available, including the exact
date that the arrest was made or the full name of the suspect. Further
efforts to clarify with the Georgian Embassy were not successful.
None of the U.S. officials would confirm the exact weight of the
seizure or its quality, but Merabishvili said it was about 3.5 ounces
of uranium enriched by more than 90 percent.
Uranium enriched at 90 percent is weapons grade.
A nuclear bomb of a design similar to the one exploded over Hiroshima
in 1945 would require about 110 pounds of uranium enriched at over
90 percent, according to Matthew Bunn, a senior research associate
who focuses on nuclear theft and terrorism at Harvard University’s
Kennedy School of Government. Bunn said that a more sophisticated
implosion type nuclear bomb would require 33 to 40 pounds.
According to an IAEA database, there have been 16 previous confirmed
cases that either highly enriched uranium or plutonium have been
recovered by authorities since 1993.
In most cases the recoveries have involved smaller quantities than
the Tbilisi case. But in 1994, 6 pounds of highly enriched uranium
intended for sale were seized by police in the Czech Republic. In
2003, Georgian border guards using detection devices provided by the
U.S. caught an Armenian man with about 5 ounces of HEU, according to
the State Department.
Fleming said that examples of stolen or missing bomb-grade nuclear
material, including highly enriched uranium and plutonium, are rare
and troubling.
David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and head of the
Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security
said that lacking help from Russia, the CIA may be looking to other
allies to help identify who has access to lost nuclear material.
"Russian cooperation in answering these questions is critical but it
has not been forthcoming," he said. "One way to identify who is active
in trading these materials is to conduct sting operations," he said.
Associated Press writer Katherine Shrader contributed to this report.
_go_ca_st_pe/uranium_sting_5
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070125/ap_on