Author: Chakrian Hovsep

David Phillips dicusses his book `Unsilencing The Past’ on NJ Armenian
Radio:
`TARC broke the ice, it broke a serious taboo in Turkey’
On Sunday Feb.20, 2005 Vartan Abdo, director of the Armenian Radio
Hour of New Jersey had a live on-air phone interview with author David
Phillips about his new book `Unsilencing The Past – Track Two
Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation’.
David Phillips is a senior fellow and Deputy Director of the Center
for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. He chaired
the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission – TARC.
The following is a transcript of the interview:
What did you expect to achieve and actually did achieve through TARC?
Our goals were always to use the civil society contacts as a way of
building momentum towards opening the border between Turkey and
Armenia. That would be the first step in a process culminating in a
diplomatic relation between the two countries. It was also clear from
discussions that TARC had, as well as my extensive interaction with
Turks and Armenians, if you wanted to have discussions about the
Armenian genocide the only way to do that was to increase the level of
contacts between Turks and Armenians, where there will be more mutual
understanding and ultimately a recognition of historical facts.
Why were you tough on the Armenian Government in an op-ed that
appeared in the Wall Street Journal?
When I was in Yerevan meeting with different political figures as well
as with government officials, the day that I left was the day that the
security forces came and forcibly removed pro-democracy demonstrators
from the public square. That kind of heavy handed tactic in
suppressing dissent isn’t what the United States expects from its good
friends and allies around the world, nor is it in the interest of
Armenia. If the country is going to be a strong democracy and
collaborate effectively with its partners and friends aroundthe world
as well as its neighbors, it needs to abide by international
democratic and human rights norms. Clearly the behavior of forcibly
clearing the square, cracking down on dissent was an aberration from
what we expect from Armenia.
How could the governments of Turkey and Armenia have helped you in
your work with TARC?
If the goal is to open the border, the Turkish government first and
foremost needed to have the maturity and the foresight to recognize
that the economic interest of Turks and North East Anatolia would be
served by opening the border and increasing travel and trade; and its
interest in accelerating EC accession talks will also be well served,
consistent with European Parliament resolutions calling for
normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. If in fact this was the
goal -and my discussions with Armenian officials suggested it was the
intent of all parties to open the border; a clear and an unambiguous
statement from the Armenian Government that they were not seeking
Turkish territory would have created conditions for Ankara to move
forward with opening the border. I know from my own face-to-face
contacts with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, when I pressed him on
opening the border he said that mixed signals coming from Yerevan were
providing justification for not moving ahead. If it is in Armenia’s
interest to get that border open, as I think itis abundantly clear it
is, then the government is responsible for sending a clear message. It
failed to do so.
Georgia has open border with Turkey and Georgia’s economy hasn’t
benefited from open borders, why will open borders be in Armenia’s
interest?
We live in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world and the
notion of closed borders is really archaic and the thing of the
past. Right now Armenia suffers a terrible embargo on both its eastern
and western borders and as a result many young Armenian feel that they
do not have the opportunities in the country, and are leaving. That’s
not in the interest of a strong and thriving Armenia in the future.
Can we move forward without addressing the big issue of Genocide?
The only way you are going to address it is if you talk to Turks and
you have a chance to share information with them. One of the things
that shocked me in my visits to Turkey was the complete taboo on
Armenian issues and the absolute lack of understanding about events
surrounding the Armenian Genocide, in the early 20th century. Because
TARC announced its work it created a safe space for Turks and
Armenians to get together, it also served as a lightening rod
attracting a lot of criticism, but enabling other civil society
groupsto expand the broad portfolio of dialogue, contact and
cooperation. Those TRACK TWO contacts are going on today.
How would you expect Armenians to react to a comment made by a Turkish
member of TARC, `..the purpose of TARC is to block the international
recognition of the Armenian Genocide..’?
Angrily. And justifiably Armenians did respond angrily. The purpose of
TARC was not to bloc progress of international recognition. The
purpose was to promote mutual understanding through normal travel and
trade and ultimately normalized diplomatic relations. It was clear
that some members of TARC were operating with their own agendas or
instructions from their own government and weren’t entirely
constructive. That’s the difficulties of this kind of process. You
have a group assembled that represent different constituencies.
What’s important for the group is to achieve coherence and to work
constructively together. Have there been more support both from the
Armenian government and some elements of the Armenian community and
from Turkish national elementsand opposition party, I think TARC would
have been able to make more progress than it did. I was also
disappointed repeatedly by the Bush Administration. At critical
moments it failed to stand and support this reconciliation effort. We
always said that TRACK TWO is a substitute for official diplomacy but
clearly the events of September 11 and then the Iraq War affected the
context in which we were working.
At the time of the Iraq War, Ankara did not allow its bases to be used
by US military. At that same time, in a resolution passed in the US
Congress the Armenian Genocide was mentioned. How fair is it to use
this question of Genocide when it serves the national interests of a
country?
One thing about TRACK TWO is that it doesn’t occur in a vacuum. During
the negotiations leading to the Turkish government’s decision of the
transit of the 4th Infantry Division , it was extremely difficult for
US officials to raise Armenian issues in their discussions with their
Turkish counterparts. But then when the Turkish Grand National
Assembly voted against the transit ofthe 4th Infantry Division, US
officials were angered and Armenian issues suddenly resurfaced on the
list of talking points. A few months later when Turkey’s participation
in stabilizing Iraq, when the insurgency started to spread, became
more important, once again Armenian issues receded into the
background. That’s why it is important for TRACK TWO to maintain a
consistent approach and to fill the gaps when governments are unable
to do so. That was one of the successes of TARC. The milestone that we
thought to accomplish haven’t been achieved yet, but I am confident
they will be in the future.
Are Armenians ignorant of how sensitive Turks are to the Genocide
issue,` .acknowledging the genocide contradicts their
noble-self-image..’?
Well, mutual understanding is a two-way street. The Turks bring their
own baggage and their own history to the table and one of the things
we had to deal with TARC was to actually listen to each other and to
respond to each others concerns There was never any negotiation about
whether the Armenian Genocide did or did not occur. What TARC did do
is to listen to all the members. Each of them had their own views
about those events and the historical context in which they occurred
and the effect of those events on the present and the future. It’s a
difficult task to get people together and to forge acommon
vision. Because TARC announced its work and felt it is important to be
transparent about its intentions, it allowed itself to be turned into
a little bit of a punching bag. That probably also enabled other
groups to go forward andto be exempt of similar kind of treatment. But
the reality is that TARC broke the ice, it broke a serious taboo in
Turkey. Right now there is an industry of Turkish and Armenian
contacts and cooperation not only among civil society groups but also
at the business level, and all that speaks well of future prospects,
concerning both countries and of course the agenda of Armenianswhich
is to impress upon Turks facts concerning the Armenian Genocide so
that there can be an acknowledgement and move on.
How realistic is Van Krikorian’s position. `.TARC’s purpose was not
to explore the truth of the Armenian Genocide. That fact is beyond
question’?
You will note that the title of TARC doesn’t include truth in its
name. In fact when I was first introduced to Mr. Krikorian I
described to him the work that I had done with Greek-Turkish
rapprochement; one of the activities involved the shared history
between Greek and Turkish scholars on the `Fire of Izmir ‘ or `The
Burning of Smyrna’ depending on your perspective. Mr. Krikorian
listened patiently and appreciated the process but he made clear to me
then, and was clear throughout that from the Armenian perspective
there were no two versions of history. There was only one version and
that was the version that affirms veracity of the Armenian
Genocide. The question was how do we address that, how do we focus on
issues in the present tense. How do we build a brighter future for
Armenians in cooperation with Turkey and ultimately with Azerbaijan,
so the whole region can move forward.
The international Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) has qualified
the events of 1915 as genocide. Why was the wording of TARC to ICTJ so
strict?
The initiative to seek international legal advice came from Gunduz
Aktan, on the Turkish side. When he proposed this at one of our TARC
meetings, the term he used was the `applicability’ of the Genocide
Convention. The Armenians immediately understood that because he used
the term `applicability’ rather than `application’, legal analysts
could interpret that language broadly. The finding of ICTJ confirmed
that no treaty had been applied retroactively. Therefore, any effort
by any party to use the Genocide Convention to secure reparations or
territories would be null and void. Full stop! It also found in the
context of the applicability that based on the four criteria defining
genocide that at least some of the Ottoman rulers knew, when they
issued the deportations orders, that it would result in the mass
deaths of Armenians. So the prerequisite genocidal intent’ exists and
therefore journalists and historians and scholars would be justified
by using the term `genocide’. The Turks realized they had made a
mistake in the choice of words that were agreed to. The reason why we
surrounded the strategy for distributing the ICTJ findings with
ironclad language was because we didn’t want anybody to walk away from
the study once it was completed, or somehow try to disavow themselves
of the responsibility for conducting the study. It took us a
year-and-a-half to agree on the language, to request the study, to
negotiate the terms of reference, to move forward with the execution
of the study and then to release it. I think that the findings of ICTJ
will exist in history as an extremely important document concerning
Turkish Armenian relationship.
There are experts of international law who claim that there is no
statute of limitations on genocide and it could be applied
retroactively?
I am not aware of any qualified international legal experts who make
that claim. There has never been a treaty that was applied
retroactively. Any intent to do so in the context of the Genocide
Convention has no basis in International Law. I knew that all along
. The reason why I was pleased with the ICTJ finding is because I felt
it was a win-win outcome. It gave something to both sides and
ultimately rapprochement and reconciliation needs to make allowances
to both sides to move forward from a stalemate and undertake some
progress.
You mention that Armenians attack TARC in public but support it in
private?
One of the things that surprised me after my many trips to Armenia and
discussions with senior government officials and religious figures and
civil society leaders, was their strong support for reconciliation and
their endorsement of TARC’s efforts. As soon as the announcement about
TARC was made, Armenian nationalists jumped on it and started making
false accusations about TARC’s agenda and intent. Instead of standing
firm behind TARC which was the commitment that had been secured from
these persons all along they got wobbly under the pressure. Had the
government and others stood behind TARC it would have made TARC’s work
more successful and certainly much easier, but they withered under the
political pressure from coalition partners, and that was unfortunate.
What is your comment to your critics who say that TARC is all about
silencing the truth to accommodate the government of Turkey and TARC’s
funding and resources were not transparent?
Read the book! It describes in full detail the multiple sources of
funding, the extensive consultation, the constructive efforts that
TARC made. We are not holding any punches back here. It is completely
transparent accountingand it’s my belief that the Tashnag criticize
the efforts for one reason only – because they were not part of
that. Had they been included, I think they would have blown it up at
the beginning. But their criticism stems solely from the fact that
they had tried to own this issue and as a result there is little
progress made internationally and because of that scant progress work
of groups like TARC become all the more important.?
You say you have neglected to develop a strategy to neutralize
hard-line opponents? What strategy could you have applied?
Well there are hard-liners -opponents – on both sides and I feel asmy
role as a facilitator I had to work more closely with the communities
and shared more information earlier about TARC’s agenda., In
retrospect spending more time in Armenia, spending more time working
with different Armenian groups, so they felt better informed, probably
would have been to everyone’s interest. Hindsight is easy. But there
clearly were mistakes made. This was not a perfect endeavor. It fell
short of perfection, but it was still a pretty good try in moving this
agenda forward.
You say you underestimated the bitterness that exists between Turks
and Armenians. Where do we go from here?
The only way to decrease that level of bitterness is through contact.
If people have interaction with each other, no matter how bitterly
they may disagree, it will change the dynamics of their interaction in
the future. TARC was the first effort of its kind and I think that the
historical effect of TARC and of the ICTJ findings is yet to be fully
manifested over time – particularly as Turkey moves forward with its
EU talks and recognizes that it needs to make good on its pledge of
Turkey as a gateway to the Caucasus. There is going to be progress on
opening the border, on normalizing travel and trade, on diplomatic
relations. And the more contacts the Turks and Armenians have, the
more there is going to be understanding about the Armenian Genocide
and the tragic events in the beginning of the 20th century.
You were asked if YOU believe if there was Genocide. What is your
answer?
What I do or don’t believe is not important. What is important is that
all the participants in TRACK TWO endeavor have confidence in my
capacity, my commitment. My interest in this was inspired by my
affection for Armenians and Turks alike. This was hard work but it was
gratifying work and it was particularly gratifying because of the
honorable way which some of the TARC members conducted their
affairs. I hope the `Unsilencing the Past’ provides an important
historical record of their efforts and can be used as a road map for
similar kinds of TRACK TWO activities in the future.
Anything in closing?
It was an honor for me to be able to work with Turks and Armenians on
this TRACK TWO endeavor. It was a privilege to make TRACK TWO more
central part of the US government’s diplomatic toolbox. It takes time
before you realize tangible benefits, but I am very confident that we
will see in the near future measurable progress and the TARC’s efforts
will be seen in a different light, once those milestones are achieved

Phillip Morris to boost production in Russia
RosBusinessConsulting Database
February 18, 2005 Friday 2:54 am, EST
The Leningrad Oblast’s Phillip Morris plant wants to become the
largest tobacco factory in Russia by increasing production by 40
percent in 2005, up from the 50bn cigarettes output last year, the
St. Petersburg Times said citing the company’s report. The total
cost of expanding existing facilities, which is a necessary step to
boost production, is estimated at $240m, Guy Guffers, Phillip Morris’
production director, was quoted as saying. Initially the Phillip
Morris Izhora (PMI) factory was built in the Leningrad region with
an investment of $360m. The factory is a fully-owned subsidiary of
Phillip Morris and produces the Marlboro, Parliament, Virginia Slims,
L&M, Chesterfield and Bond Street brands.
Phillip Morris operates two factories in Russia and exports production
to Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Moldova and Kazakhastan.

POLITICAL TIES BETWEEN UK AND ARMENIA REMAIN TIGHT
PanArmenian News
Feb 18 2005
18.02.2005 15:28
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The political ties between Armenia and the UK
remain tight, UK Ambassador to Armenia Thorda Abbott-Watt stated
in her interview with IA Regnum. “We welcomed Armenia’s joining the
EU Neighborhood Policy last summer and we hope to witness progress
this year”, she noted. In her words, the UK will continue supporting
the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group for the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict settlement. The Ambassador expressed hope that UK’s Special
Representative for South Caucasus Sir Bryan Fall will arrive in Yerevan
in spring to discuss the development of the negotiation process with
the Armenian leadership. “We will also carry on programs for regional
development, in part in the Tavush and Gegharqunik marzes (regions)
of Armenia. Formally the start of these programs will be announced
by Armenian Minister of Territorial Development and Coordination of
Infrastructures Hovik Abrahamyan on February 21.

Armenian, Russian foreign minister discuss cooperation
Noyan Tapan news agency
17 Feb 05
Yerevan, 17 February: Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan on
17 February received Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov who is
paying an official visit to Armenia.
The meeting began with a private conversation and continued in an
expanded format.
Vardan Oskanyan welcomed the high-ranking guest, who is paying his
first official visit, and noted the importance of strategic cooperation
based on mutual interests.
Lavrov also expressed his satisfaction with the level of cooperation
and the positive dynamics of the development of interstate relations,
which will be reflected in the year of Russia in Armenia in 2005. The
beginning of this year, which includes various trade, economic,
cultural, scientific, educational, youth, sports and tourist events,
will be announced in mid-March.
Pointing out that the two countries’ opinions regarding international
and regional processes mainly coincide, the sides expressed their
readiness to make efforts directed at creating an atmosphere of
confidence and establishing cooperation in the South Caucasus. In this
connection, the sides discussed the current course of the settlement
of the Nagornyy Karabakh problem. Lavrov expressed the hope that
the Prague process will allow the conflicting sides to find common
ways to settle the conflict as soon as possible, confirming Russia’s
commitment to guarantee any agreement.
Then the sides spoke in detail about the current issues on the agenda
of Armenian-Russian relations, the press service of the Armenian
Foreign Ministry told Noyan Tapan news agency. Drawing special
attention to the economic sphere, the sides noted the effective
activities of the Armenian-Russian intergovernment commission and the
Armenian-Russian business association. It was also pointed out that
cooperation in this sphere could be promoted by direct links between
regions of Armenia and the Russian Federation, which have become even
more intensive of late.
Touching on the growth in the volume of trade and on the expanding
of Armenian-Russian relations, they pointed out the importance of the
South Caucasus countries and Russia conducting a single policy directed
at restoring communications in the region, which will also further the
settlement of the existing conflicts. The sides noted certain progress
in this sphere and a number of issues that still have to be resolved.
In connection with the year of Russia in Armenia, the sides also
touched on the humanitarian sphere, cultural exchanges and the
encouragement of teaching Russian and Armenian in both countries. From
this point of view, they noted the importance of long-standing
friendship between the peoples, which nourish Armenian-Russian ties.
The foreign ministers discussed problems of Armenian citizens living in
Russia, their status and working quotas in Armenian-populated areas,
as well as a number of specific issues related to the improvement of
the work of diplomatic and consular services in both countries.
Then the sides discussed issues of cooperation in international and
regional structures. They exchanged views on the process of reforms in
regional structures of the CIS and reached agreement on coordinating
opinions by the forthcoming CIS summit in August this year. The
talk was about a number of programmes and initiatives within the
framework of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization. The
foreign ministers also touched on issues of reforming the UN.
[Passage omitted: Lavrov is also planning to meet other Armenian
officials]

Armenian president, chief banker discuss monetary policy in 2005
Arminfo
15 Feb 05
Yerevan, 15 February: Armenian President Robert Kocharyan and Armenian
Central Bank Chairman Tigran Sarkisyan today discussed monetary policy
in 2005 and the Central Bank’s move to stabilize the currency market.
Sarkisyan filled in the president on the plans of the Central Bank
to minimize risks on the currency market caused by fluctuations in
the rate of the dram in connection with the expected considerable
currency flows this year, as well as private transfers, which can
exceed 1bn dollars in the current year.
Moreover, the president and the bank chairman touched on issues
concerning the law on currency regulation and control, which is to
come into force this year. In particular, they noted it was important
that the supervising bodies consistently oversee the fulfilment of the
provisions of this law. Sarkisyan noted that a ban should be imposed
on TV commercials which did not show the prices of advertised goods
and services in the national currency.
The head of the Central Bank pointed out that the commissions which can
carry out price policy in the republic should change their regulations
and demand that all companies show prices in drams.
[Passage omitted: minor details]
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENT GOING TO DISCUSS KARABAKH SETTLEMENT WITH VLADIMIR PUTIN
PanArmenian News
Feb 14 2005
14.02.2005 15:27
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ In the interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta Russian
newspaper Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated of his intention to
discuss the Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement with Vladimir Putin
during his visit to Moscow. In his words, similar discussions were
held in the course of the previous meetings and this summit will not
be an exception. “Moreover, during the Armenia-Azerbaijan meeting held
within the frames of the CIS summit last year Russian President joined
out talks thus proving Russia’s interest in the conflict settlement”,
he said.

Turkish Daily News
Feb 11 2005
Gül assures Azerbaijan on Armenia policy
Friday, February 11, 2005
‘Turkey’s policy on this matter is clear. The people of Azerbaijan do
not need to worry,’ says Gül relating to the closed Turkish-Armenian
border gate
ANKARA – Turkish Daily News
Turkey gave assurances to Caucasus ally Azerbaijan that its border
gate with Armenia would remain closed unless Armenia ends occupation
of the Azeri territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which has displaced
hundreds of thousands of Azeris.
“The border gate is closed at the moment. The continuing occupation
and the fact that almost a million Azeris are currently displaced
constitute a big obstacle for any change in Turkish policy,” Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gül told a joint news conference after talks with
visiting Azeri counterpart Elmar Mammedyarov.
Turkey closed its border gate with Armenia and severed diplomatic
ties with Yerevan in the last decade in protest of the Armenian
occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh. Ankara says normalization in ties is
related to Armenian troop withdrawal from the occupied territory, in
addition to Yerevan’s official acceptance of the current borders with
Turkey and stopping its support of Armenian lobby efforts to get
international recognition for an alleged Armenian genocide during the
late Ottoman Empire.
Yet, European Union aspirant Turkey has been facing pressure from
Europe to revise its Armenia policy and to open the closed gate with
landlocked Yerevan, something that has alarmed Azerbaijan.
“Turkey’s policy on this matter is clear. The people of Azerbaijan
do not need to worry,” Gül said, indicating that bilateral ties with
Armenia will return to normal when the occupation ends as a result of
peace talks on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.
Mammedyarov’s talks in Ankara come weeks before he meets Armenian
Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian in Prague on the dispute.
He and Gül also discussed bilateral economic ties. Turkey and
Azerbaijan are partners in a multi-billion dollar project, called the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, to transport Azeri crude oil to western
markets through Georgia and finally to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of
Ceyhan.
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is expected to become operational
soon, with the first delivery of oil scheduled for mid-2005. Gül said
he was confident that the project would be completed on time.
The energy cooperation is set to expand further when a natural gas
pipeline linking Azerbaijan’s Shahdeniz gas fields to Turkey’s
eastern province of Erzurum starts operating. Mammedyarov said the
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline could become operational in 2006 or
2007 and added that Turkey could import some of the natural gas from
this pipeline to European countries.
Seeking Azeri support to end KKTC isolation:
Gül also sought Baku’s backing for efforts to bring into force
international pledges to end the isolation of Turkish Cypriots.
Gül reportedly told Mammedyarov that Azerbaijan would become a
model that other countries could follow if it takes steps towards
ending the isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(KKTC).
Mammedyarov said in response that his government would work on the
issue and encourage Azeri companies to do business in Turkish Cyprus.
Mammedyarov was received by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer later in
the day.
–Boundary_(ID_6aDtGlUlJ5EnicMYumOvBA)–

Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
February 11, 2005, Friday
THE COVERED SKY
SOURCE: Vremya Novostei, February 9, 2005, p. 4
by Nikolai Poroskov
Heads of 10 countries of the Commonwealth: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Ukraine met on February 10, 1995, and signed Accord on the CIS
United Antiaircraft Defense System. The Accord does not have a
definite expiry date; it is open for new subscribers who accept
provisions of the CIS Air Space Defense Concept and Plan of
Co-operation of the United Antiaircraft Defense System. Georgia and
Turkmenistan have stayed away from programs within the framework of
the CIS United Antiaircraft Defense System since 1997.
These days, the CIS United Antiaircraft Defense System comprises 19
fighter regiments (11 of them Russian), 29 antiaircraft missile
regiments (11 Russian), 22 technical formations (9 Russian), 2 units
of radar and jammers (both Russian), 4 antiaircraft defense brigades
(all of them Kazakh). Antiaircraft missile regiments have Osa, Buk,
S-75, S-125, S-200, and S-300 complexes of different models. Fighter
aviation is represented by MIG-23s, MIG-29s, MIG-31s, and SU-27s.
Here is an interview with Lieutenant General Aitech Bizhev, Russian
Armed Forces Second-in-Command in charge of the CIS United
Antiaircraft Defense System.
Question: Many things changed in these last ten years. The CIS
Headquarters for Coordination of Military Co-operation is being
ousted by the analog from the Organization of the CIS Collective
Security Treaty. Does it have any effect on the CIS United
Antiaircraft Defense System?
Aitech Bizhev: The United System is working nowadays, performing the
functions for which it was established in the first place: protection
of air borders of the Commonwealth, joint control over the use of air
space, exchange of information on air situations, missile and air
raid warnings and dealing with them. We succeeded in restoration of
the system of mutual exchange of information ruined by the collapse
of the Soviet Union. We also set up the structure of forces on duty
and organized combat training. Exchange of information on situations
in the air is constant. In fact, it is automatic at least among
central command posts of the Air Forces and Antiaircraft Forces of
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
Question: But weapons and military hardware of the United System have
to be constantly repaired and upgraded every now and then. In the
meantime, Russia alone has the industrial facilities to build
antiaircraft complexes…
Aitech Bizhev: Spare parts needed to maintain antiaircraft military
hardware of CIS countries are provided in accordance with Decree 1953
of the president of the Russian Federation (December 1, 2000).
Whatever needs repairs is repaired in Russia. Every now and then,
teams of specialists themselves travel to the units with military
hardware in need of repair. Unfortunately, some standard acts of the
Russian Federation interfere with development of military-technical
co-operation, paradoxical as it is. However, changes in the acting
legislation initiated in the last 2-3 years only diminish
effectiveness of military-technical co-operation and attractiveness
of services enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex.
Coordinating Committee for Antiaircraft Forces drew some proposals it
forwarded to the Federal Service of Military-Technical Co-operation.
Their acceptance will ameliorate the situation.
Question: NATO organized air defense of the Baltic States as soon as
it expanded. How is combat duty within the framework of the United
System organized?
Aitech Bizhev: Antiaircraft defense forces of Russia and Belarus were
the first to organize joint combat duty. Following that, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Russia signed a trilateral Instruction on joint
actions of antiaircraft defense forces on duty. The forces went on
duty in March 2000. These days, we have joint combat duty with units
and formations of the Armenian, Belarussian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and
Uzbek armies. Needless to say, our work together allows for better
protection of the borders, lessens the stress of forces on duty, and
is generally less expensive. For example, it enabled us to cut down
the number of Russian units with radar turned on.
Question: How is the United System financed?
Aitech Bizhev: It is financed in accordance with the Provision on the
financial planning, establishment, restoration, and improvement of
the System. Money is provided as specified by the annual financial
plan endorsed by the CIS Council of the Heads of States. The plan
indicates how much is to be spent on establishment and modernization
of antiaircraft defense means, how much on joint functions, and how
much on joint modernization programs. All money is transacted from
budgets of participants to the bank account of the Coordinating
Committee. It is managed by Coordinating Committee chairman a.k.a.
Russian Air Force commander-in-chief. As for units of national armies
and modernization of national antiaircraft defense systems, every
country is on its own.
Question: What do you mean by “joint programs”?
Aitech Bizhev: The CIS Council of the Heads of States endorsed
Portfolio of the joint programs on June 20, 2000. Their fulfillment
maintains and modernizes national antiaircraft defense systems of all
countries in accordance with their needs. We hope eventually to form
regional antiaircraft defense systems in the East European, Central
Asian, and Caucasus areas. We already drew up a portfolio on
establishment of the united Russian-Belarussian antiaircraft defense
system. Joint programs are implemented in the form of joint combat
training. Command exercises and drills involving command structures
and forces on duty of the United System have been under way since
1995. More than 20 drills and exercises took place already. As a
rule, they involve tactical teams of Russian and CIS armies. They
drill co-operation between command structures and forces on duty in
dealing with trespassers, in assistance to craft in distress. Not
long ago, Russian, Belarussian, and Kazakh fighters executed a
maneuver-requiring landing on each other’s airfields. An AWACS-type
craft was involved in the exercise.
Exercises of the Combat Brotherhood series are organized on a regular
basis, on Russian testing sites for the time being. They always
include elements of shooting practice. Almost 70 batteries of
antiaircraft missiles, up to 60 crews of fighter, ground-strafer, and
bomber aviation, and dozens crews of radar operators participated in
the series. Servicemen will find tactical situations tricky indeed
this year. We have come up with some ideas on how to make life hard
for jammers and for whoever will have to deal with targets. Crews of
antiaircraft complexes will have to be put in the standby mode and
launch on the march. Armenia, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Belarus
(the latter hopes to test its automatic control system) will
participate in the exercise. Our crews will travel to Balkhash in
Kazakhstan to execute test with the S-400 complexes. A command
exercise on our central command post will take place in April.
Strategic aviation aircraft will play targets. This is going to be
the first such exercise, but not the last.
Question: Here is a situation that is not at all impossible: a border
of some member of the CIS United Antiaircraft Defense System is
violated. Will Russia come to this country’s help?
Aitech Bizhev: Yes, it will. Forces on duty of the invaded country
make a report to the central command post. Forces and means of the
United System are put on full alert. “All weapons free” decision are
made by commanders-in-chief of the Air Forces and Antiaircraft
Forces.
Translated by A. Ignatkin

Christian Science Monitor
Feb 10 2005
Calm before the Chechen storm?
Rebels urge Russia to peace talks before Feb. 22 cease-fire deadline.
By Fred Weir | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
MOSCOW – A surprise unilateral cease-fire ordered by two top Chechen
rebel commanders has Moscow abuzz with debate. Experts are asking, is
it a genuine chance for peace, a PR stunt, or an artificial lull
before a fresh storm of Beslan-style terrorist assaults?
Few see much hope of ending the Chechen war, now well into its sixth
year, unless there is a political breakthrough that sees the Kremlin,
the separatist rebels, and pro-Moscow Chechen forces sit down
together to seek a settlement.
President Vladimir Putin appears determined to stay his chosen
course, which involves signing a treaty with the Kremlin’s handpicked
Chechen leader Alu Alkhanov – perhaps as early as this May – that
will lock Chechnya into Russian permanently. But amid reports that
the rebels could have acquired a nuclear device or radiological
weapons, many experts see only an escalating cycle of violence in the
offing.
“The situation in Chechnya is currently at a dead end,” says
Alexander Iskanderyan, director of the independent Center for
Caucasian Studies, in Yerevan, Armenia. “The key to its solution is
in the Kremlin, but I see little hope of change there.”
Aslan Maskhadov, Chechnya’s rebel president-in-hiding, called
attention this week to the self-imposed cease-fire, which had been
announced last month on a rebel website but went largely unnoticed.
He portrayed the move as an olive branch to get peace negotiations
started, and urged Russian leaders to take up the offer to talk
before the cease-fire expires on Feb. 22.
“If our Kremlin opponents are reasonable, this war will end at the
negotiating table,” he told the Moscow daily Kommersant, in a rare
interview published Monday. “If not, blood will continue to be
spilled for a long time but we will reject any moral responsibility
for this continued madness.”
The cease-fire was endorsed by Shamil Basayev, the notorious Chechen
field commander who has claimed responsibility for many terror
strikes against Russia, including the 2002 seizure of 800 hostages in
a Moscow theater and last September’s school siege in Beslan that
left 331 people dead, half of them children. In an interview
broadcast by Britain’s Channel 4 News this month, Mr. Basayev
declared: “We are planning more Beslan-type operations in future
because we are forced to do so.”
That threat gained ominous traction this week when self-exiled
Russian tycoon Boris Berezovsky said a “Chechen businessman” had once
offered to sell him a miniature nuclear weapon stolen from former
Soviet stockpiles. “It is a portable nuclear bomb,” Mr. Berezovsky
said. “Some part of it is missing at the moment, but these are small
details.”
Russia’s Foreign Ministry quickly denied that, saying that all
Soviet-made “suitcase bombs” are accounted for. But independent
experts say Chechen militants may well have the means to produce a
“dirty bomb,” with deadly radioactive materials wrapped around
conventional explosives. “They probably don’t have a real nuclear
weapon, but we know they have had access to radioactive substances in
the past,” says Pavel Felgenhauer, a Moscow-based security expert.
“This threat is very real. A dirty bomb could make part of a Russian
city uninhabitable for 100 years. We may expect anything after the
cease-fire ends.”
Though the Kremlin has not responded to Mr. Maskhadov’s peace
overture, pro-Moscow Chechen leader Mr. Alkhanov said the only issue
he is willing to discuss with rebel leaders is their surrender.
“Negotiations with those who have engaged in bloody crimes against
society are absolutely out of the question,” he said. “The only real
salvation for such people is to give themselves up and confess their
crimes.”
There is doubt about whether the cease-fire, which was to take effect
Feb. 1, is holding. Russia’s official ITAR-Tass agency, which usually
reports peace and order prevailing in Chechnya, quoted Russian
commanders Thursday saying there have been up to 20 rebel attacks
each day this week.
Some experts say that Maskhadov, elected in Chechnya’s only
internationally recognized polls in 1997, no longer controls rebel
forces and is a fading force. “Maskhadov is just one of the leaders
of the Chechen resistance, and not even the strongest,” says Mr.
Iskanderyan. “[The cease-fire] may be just an attempt to show he’s
still relevant.”
But 17 prominent Russian human rights activists issued a statement
Wednesday warning that Chechnya was turning into an “eternal
conflict” and urging the Kremlin to take up the offer for
negotiations as “practically the only way of stopping Chechnya’s
transformation into yet another front in the confrontation between
radical Islam and Western civilization.”
The pro-Moscow Chechen government insists that reconstruction of the
war-torn republic has made great strides, though there is little
independent information. At a Moscow press conference this week,
Alkhanov said the treaty being drafted will settle the conflict by
granting Chechnya some economic autonomy “within the federal
constitution.”
But according to Malik Saidulayev, a Moscow-based businessman and
Chechen community leader, there is no security, order, or prospect
for peace in Chechnya.
The Kremlin’s “policy of Chechenization of the conflict has failed
and the situation in the republic has grown much worse,” he says.
“The war is not ending, it is spreading to the rest of the Caucasus
region.”
–Boundary_(ID_aMMM7rJDXeUy9/5gCkHrYw)–

Azeri MP sees Russian deputy speaker’s Karabakh remarks as “drivel”
Ekho, Baku
10 Feb 05
The statement by the deputy speaker of the Russian State Duma,
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, that the inclusion of Nagornyy Karabakh in
the Commonwealth of Independent States could facilitate a solution to
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is “drivel”, Azerbaijani MP Aydin
Mirzazada has said. “I don’t think he understands very well what
he says,” the MP told daily Ekho. The newspaper itself noted that
while Zhirinovskiy’s statement does not represent Moscow’s official
position on the problem, Russia has always backed Armenia as its
“historical ally” in contrast to Azerbaijan which is the “hireling
of the American imperialism”. The following is the text of Nurani’s
and R. Orucov’s report by Azerbaijani newspaper Ekho on 10 February
headlined “Zhirinovskiy suggests including Nagornyy Karabakh in the
CIS”; subheadings have been inserted editorially:
While the results of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit
to Azerbaijan are still being discussed in Baku and plans are being
drawn up ahead of the Year of Azerbaijan in Russia, rather alarming
statements are being made in Moscow. For instance, some media, in
particular Regnum news agency, have reported that the leader of the
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and the deputy speaker of
the Russian Duma, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, has outlined his own vision
of a solution to the Nagornyy Karabakh problem.
“Compromise solution”
In a news conference in Moscow, Zhirinovskiy said the Nagornyy Karabakh
conflict is as impossible to resolve as the dispute between Israel
and Palestine. However, he expressed his confidence that the conflict
could be resolved if Nagornyy Karabakh is admitted to the CIS.
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, as Regnum explains, thinks that neither Armenia
nor Azerbaijan will agree to the loss of Nagornyy Karabakh. “If Russia
insists that Nagornyy Karabakh be joined to Armenia, Azerbaijan will
take offence and vice versa,” he said. But he went on to say that
“Nagornyy Karabakh is a historical part of Armenia and is called
Artsakh”. And this leads to a simple conclusion – Nagornyy Karabakh’s
entry into the CIS, according to Zhirinovskiy, is a “compromise
solution”. Of course, the Russian audience was threatened with western
expansion again. The deputy speaker said the West is trying to apply
the so-called Dayton model [peace arrangement for Bosnia-Hercegovina]
to the Karabakh problem.
“Under such circumstances the Armenians will act as the Serbs, while
the Azerbaijanis are to be the Kosovan Albanians. The West wants to
suppress Armenia and create a 20m-strong Azerbaijan,” Zhirinovskiy
said. Obviously, Zhirinovskiy did not elaborate what the Dayton
arrangements had to do with the Kosovan Albanians.
However, it remains unclear whether at issue is the recognition of
Nagornyy Karabakh’s “independence” with its subsequent entry into
the CIS or its transfer into some sort of “direct administration”
of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
But frankly speaking, this can barely change the gist of the issue. If
Zhirinovskiy’s “compromise” envisages Karabakh’s entry into the
CIS as a fully-fledged member, then, let’s face it, this will
mean the fulfilment of the Karabakh separatists’ demands. Because
having received the status of “an independent state”, they will
have the opportunity to realize their “meatsum” [Armenian word for
unification] idea. But if Zhirinovskiy suggests introducing “direct
administration” of a part of Azerbaijani territory by the CIS, then we
are actually reviving the idea of putting Nagornyy Karabakh in “direct
administration” of Moscow, a suggestion first voiced in 1990. Then
Moscow set up a special committee headed by Arkadiy Volskiy. What
happened then is remembered only too well: Karabakh first seceded
from Azerbaijan “temporarily” and then this status became permanent
with all this entails.
Kremlin’s “official position”
It goes without saying that Zhirinovskiy has simply expressed his
own opinion and it would be “incorrect” to construe his statement as
the official position of the Russian authorities, not to mention
Zhirinovskiy’s ingrained habit of making super-extravagant
statements. But Zhirinovskiy’s shocking statements often
represent… [ellipsis as published] the Kremlin’s “official position”.
In other words, despite Azerbaijan’s latest advances to Moscow, which
have started to worry the West, they have failed to produce a tangible
shift in the “balance of Moscow’s sympathies and aversions”. It
still considers Armenia to be its “historical ally” and “brother”,
while Azerbaijanis are “hirelings of the American imperialism”
similar to the “Kosovan Albanians” (whether the West is prepared to
protect Azerbaijan as it did the Kosovan Albanians is the topic for
an altogether different discussion). And Moscow is even more unlikely
to relinquish the “confessional and historical priorities” which have
defined its policy in the South Caucasus for almost 300 years now –
starting from Peter the Great’s order to settle Armenians in the
Caspian region. And maybe Zhirinovskiy’s escapades suggest that we
need to think very carefully before making advances to Russia.
“Drivel”
When commenting on Zhirinovskiy’s statement, a representative of
the ruling New Azerbaijan Party in the Milli Maclis [parliament],
Aydin Mirzazada, described it as “drivel”.
“Although this man occupies the post of the deputy chairman of the
State Duma, I don’t think he understands very well what he says.” It
is known to all that Nagornyy Karabakh is a part of Azerbaijan,
the MP said.
“The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [PACE] recently
recognized Nagornyy Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory controlled by
the separatist regime. PACE documents say that Armenia controls a
considerable portion of Azerbaijani territory. And this is stated by
a body of which Zhirinovskiy himself is a member,” Mirzazada said.
Zhirinovskiy has already made a number of unrealistic and aggressive
statements and each time the Russian official circles disowned them.
“I think statements like that are put in Zhirinovskiy’s mouth by
certain nationalistic circles interested in friendship with Armenia
and some Azerbaijani territories. But the CIS is the Commonwealth of
Independent States, while Nagornyy Karabakh is a part of Azerbaijani
territory. Therefore, I think Zhirinovskiy’s statement can only be
seen as drivel.”