Armenian-Chinese Business Forum To Be Held In Armenia

ARMENIAN-CHINESE BUSINESS FORUM TO BE HELD IN ARMENIA

ARKA
July 11

An Armenian-Chinese business forum is expected to be held in Armenia
this autumn.

Executive Director of the RA Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI)
Araik Vardanyan reported that a relevant arrangement was reached
during a visit paid to China by a CCI delegation last month.

According to him, a large delegation consisting of representatives
of all Chinese provinces will take part in the forum. The forum will
allow Armenian and Chinese businessmen to discuss specific issues
and establish cooperation.

Vardanyan pointed out that all the details related to the forum are
being discussed.

Armenian-Chinese trade turnover reached $115.8mln in January-May 2008.

Armenia’s trade balance with China reached $114.3. Armenia’s exports
to China totaled $747.3ths, and imports from China $115.1mln.

Calculations For Two?

CALCULATIONS FOR TWO?

Mikhail Rostovsky

WPS Agency
What the Papers Say
July 2, 2008 Wednesday

Why Russia should expand cooperation with Kazakhstan; Despite
Russia’s economic and emotional upswing during the Putin era,
Moscow’s capabilities in our erstwhile zone of exclusive influence
have been shrinking with every passing year. Kazakhstan is Russia’s
most promising partner within the CIS.

The direction of development in the former USSR has remained unchanged
since 1991. Despite Russia’s economic and emotional upswing during the
Putin era, Moscow’s capabilities in our erstwhile zone of exclusive
influence have been shrinking with every passing year.

In recent years, a new political elite has emerged in Georgia –
an elite with a very definite mindset. Take the current Cabinet in
Tbilisi. Of its 18 members, eleven – including the prime minister
– are under 40 years old. One lady minister – Economic Development
Minister Ekaterina Sharashidze, 34 – is able to boast dual US-Georgian
citizenship. Twelve of her colleagues have either studied or worked
in America or other Western nations.

A few years ago, Moscow still had a chance of attaching Georgia to
itself and giving NATO the finger. This would have required finding
some way of reuniting Georgia and Abkhazia, with Russia guaranteeing
that both sides would abide by agreements. But these days, according
to experts, there is no longer any way of stopping Georgia’s steady
drift toward NATO.

The most that Moscow can do now is take revenge on Tbilisi for its
pro-NATO policies by separating Abkhazia from Georgia forever. Even
this, however, is uncertain. Russian political analyst Ruslan
Saidov says: "Sooner or later, the Abkhazians and the Georgians will
reach agreement directly – and Moscow will be a third wheel. What
has Abkhazia achieved over the past 16 years? Freeing itself from
Georgia’s dominance? But is it really preferable to have Russians
and Armenians outnumbering ethnic Abkhazians in Abkhazia itself? For
Sukhumi, friendship with Moscow was a necessary tactical move. But
tactics have a habit of changing periodically."

Another sore point for us is Ukraine; things don’t look as hopeless
for Moscow there. Yet the best we can expect is that Ukraine will
end up neutral.

By 2017, barring any tectonic shifts in Ukrainian politics, Sevastopol
will be known as a former city of Russian naval glory. The Black Sea
Fleet is already falling apart due to disastrous funding shortages. But
the main problem is that Moscow simply has no arguments capable of
persuading Kiev to extend the treaty allowing our Fleet to remain in
the Crimea.

Our offer to raise the rent we pay for the Black Sea Fleet base as of
2017 is not a convincing argument. Kiev’s demand for the Russian Navy’s
withdrawal is based on high-level state ideology considerations; and
an ideological argument can only be defeated by another ideological
argument, not money. But what kind of ideological project can we
produce for Kiev? The "Slavic brotherhood" idea has only amusement
value these days.

Very similar dynamics are being observed in almost all other former
Soviet states.

A high-ranking official source says: "Of course, Russia’s national
interests require integration with other CIS countries – but our
country is now being run like a business corporation, and that system
of values lacks the concept of national interests. It only knows the
concept of profits. Russia Inc. doesn’t need integration. After all,
that would mean having to share the profits."

A source from the Cabinet staff is even less sentimental: "Integration
assumes specific benefits for the participants. But what would Russia
gain from integration, exactly? Our economy wouldn’t benefit – after
all, most of our import and export trade is outside the CIS. Thus,
it isn’t clear what the positive effect of integration would be –
aside from political dividends."

Most of Russia’s elite has reconciled itself to the idea that
everything will continue moving in the same direction as it’s moving
now. Many even see a positive side to that. If Russia’s current
direction of development remains unchanged, we won’t become "another
Britain" at all; we shall become something far less attractive.

The British economy owes its success to high-tech industry, developed
infrastructure, and small business. But in Russia, despite all the fuss
about nanotechnology, everything still comes down to raw materials.

After all, there are no oceans dividing Russia from the other former
Soviet states. They are still our neighbors.

Let’s assume that the European republics of the former USSR do not
present any security concerns. But then there is Central Asia –
which certainly won’t be admitted into the European Union.

Each of the Central Asian states is "unhappy" in its own way, but they
have this much in common: the long-term threat of a powerful crisis
and transformation into part of a Central Asian Islamic caliphate. If
something like that does happen, Russia certainly wouldn’t be able to
stand aside. Yes, we are separated from Central Asia by Kazakhstan –
but Nazarbayev’s state cannot act as a buffer all on its own.

In 2001, the threat of a large-scale regional crisis in Central Asia
was averted thanks to the American invasion of Afghanistan. But
although almost seven years have passed, the Yanks still haven’t
managed any radical changes for the better in Afghanistan. Thus, it
appears that Russia will mostly have to rely on itself. Then again,
there is another country – similar to Russia in terms of mindset
and political structure – which would also face mortal peril in the
event of a Central Asian crisis. That country is the abovementioned
Kazakhstan. It’s worth noting that Kazakhstan made its latest
integration proposal to Russia as recently as last month.

In May, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan proposed gradual
measures to integrate the economies of Kazakhstan and Russia. A senior
official source in Moscow comments as follows: "Kazakhstan has long
since chosen its model: maneuvering between three centers of power –
Russia, China, and the West. Therefore, I find it hard to believe that
Kazakhstan will now agree to pursue integration with Russia for real,
rather than just talking about it."

The skeptics may be right this time as well – but if integration
between Russia and Kazakhstan is possible at all, there has never
been a more favorable moment for it than now, and there probably
won’t be a more favorable time in the future. After all, the threat
of destabilization in Central Asia is not the only thing that unites
our two countries.

Both Russia and Kazakhstan have experienced rapid economic growth
due to oil prices reaching record highs. But neither country has any
chance of becoming the Eurasian equivalent of a country such as Qatar.

The Astana presidential administration has entrusted none other than
the Contemporary Development Institute in Moscow with working out
part of a long-term development plan for Kazakhstan. Note that the
Institute is known as President Dmitri Medvedev’s think-tank. Medvedev
himself chairs its board of trustees.

What kind of plan might the officials of Russia and Kazakhstan come up
with? Clearly, there is absolutely no question of surrendering national
sovereignty. But partial unification of pipeline systems and other
transport systems, along with attempts to cooperate in introducing
new technologies – such plans wouldn’t be entirely unfeasible. In
both areas, the chances of success are correlated with project
size. Besides, Moscow and Astana have already shown that they are
capable of reaching agreement on specific issues. Although it’s not
the done thing to mention it publicly, Russian-Kazakh "friendship"
in the nuclear sector is very close.

If Moscow and Astana can manage to create an economic integration
nucleus, that in itself would be a great step forward. After all, the
powerful European Union of today started out as the modest European
Coal and Steel Community, established with the aim of reconciling
France and Germany.

Of course, all potential consequences should be calculated thoroughly
before going ahead with any integration project such as the proposed
alliance with Kazakhstan. But it is also very important to avoid
missing the bus.

Dmitry Medvedev Held Talks With President Of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev

DMITRY MEDVEDEV HELD TALKS WITH PRESIDENT OF AZERBAIJAN ILHAM ALIEV

RIA Oreanda
July 3 2008
Russia

After private talks between the heads of state, the talks continued
with the participation of the delegations of the two countries.

Following their talks the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan signed
a Declaration on Friendship and Strategic Partnership between the
two countries.

In this document Russia and Azerbaijan confirm their position on
the unacceptability of forcible change of internationally recognised
borders, declare their readiness to strengthen cooperation in ensuring
security in the South Caucasus and the Caspian region, and stress
the importance of an accelerated settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.

The parties stressed that they consider priority tasks to be
strengthening the central role of the UN in international affairs and
increasing its effectiveness with respect to new threats and challenges
to international law. The parties also stated their intention to
strengthen cooperation within the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe and
other organisations and forums, both universal and regional ones.

Moscow and Baku also vowed to enhance the effectiveness of the
Commonwealth of Independent States in articulating timely solutions
to common problems and challenges.

Russia and Azerbaijan declared their intention to strengthen and expand
military and military-technical cooperation, the Declaration states.

In addition, Russia and Azerbaijan call on the Caspian states to
reach an accelerated settlement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea.

The following documents were signed in the presence of the heads of
state: an agreement between the foreign ministries on cooperation
in the field of archives and a memorandum between the ministries of
internal affairs on cooperation in protecting transit cargo.

Leaders of the Federal Customs Service of Russia and the State Customs
Committee of Azerbaijan signed an agreement on cooperation in combating
customs violations.

A memorandum between the Federal Agency for State Property
Management of Russia and the State Committee for Property Management
of Azerbaijan was concluded on cooperation in the field of state
property privatization and management.

After the talks the two presidents made statements to the press.

Baku:Samed Seidov: "Edward O’Hara’s Refusal To Visit The Region Is A

SAMED SEIDOV: "EDWARD O’HARA’S REFUSAL TO VISIT THE REGION IS ARMENIA’S FAULT"

Today.Az
07 July 2008
Azerbaijan

It is Armenia’s fault that PACE rapporteur for studying cultural
heritage of the South Caucasus countries Edward O’Hara refused to
visit the region, said head of Azerbaijani delegation in PACE Samed
Seidov, according to Interfax-Azerbaijan.

"Edward O’Hara’s refusal to visit the region is the fault of Armenian
side, as Karabakh separatists in its ward, do not agree to allow PACE
rapporteur to the occupied lands via the Armenian-Azerbaijani front",
said Seidov Monday.

He said Azerbaijan is interested in O’Hara’s visit.

"His visit should be held in the legal frameworks, in the framework
of norms, adopted by the Council of Europe".

It should be noted that O’Hara has sent a letter to the administration
of the PACE Committee for Culture, Education and Science, where
he noted that he refuses to visit the South Caucasus due to the
"situation established there". Yet the rapporteur did not explain
the reasons of their refusal.

He has previously told reporters that Azerbaijani side agrees on
his visit to the occupied lands only from its territories. However,
Armenian side reported that in this case it does not guarantee security
of O’Hara’s visit to Karabakh.

Prime minister in Nagorno Karabakh

Panorama.am

19:27 05/07/2008

PRIME MINISTER IN NAGORNO KARABAKH

The Prime Minister of Armenia Tigran Sargsyan left for Nagorno
karabakh for labor visit, reported the press service of the
Government. According to the source the delegation leaded by the Prime
Minister consists of the Ministers of Finance, Energy and Natural
Resources, Labor and Social Affairs, Education and Science, Culture,
Agriculture and the Mayor of Yerevan. Leaders of some banks leaded by
the President of Central Bank Arthur Javadyan have also left for NKR.

Today in the morning the Prime Minister had a personal meeting
discussion with his counterpart Arayik Harutyunyan. The Ministers of
Armenia had meetings with their counterparts. On July 5 Tigran
Sargsyan will have a meeting with the president of NKR Bako Sahakyan.

Source: Panorama.am

BAKU: "Alien Imperial Forces Entered Nagorno-Karabakh"-Polish Presid

Trend News Agency
2 July
Azerbaijan

"ALIEN IMPERIAL FORCES ENTERED NAGORNO-KARABAKH" -POLISH PRESIDENT

Poland supports the territorial integrity of Georgia and Azerbaijan. "I
mean Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are integral
part of Azerbaijan and Georgia," Lech KaczyÅ~Dski, Polish President,
said in the news-conference of the GUAM Batumi summit.

The Polish President stated that the Azerbaijani and Georgian nations
cannot agree with the strange forces occupied their lands. "Alien
imperial forces entered Nagorno-Karabakh violating international law
and it must be changed, this is my will," KaczyÅ~Dski said.

KaczyÅ~Dski expressed his negative attitude towards Russia’s actions
against the Georgian territories. "We always helped and will help
Georgia and Azerbaijan in future," the Polish President stated.

At the same time, KaczyÅ~Dski said that both Georgia and Ukraine
would become the NATO members soon.

–Boundary_(ID_1V7TilSMq1k+lLXn9gyiSg)–

Promotion Or Demotion?

PROMOTION OR DEMOTION?

A1+
02 July, 2008

According to some verified sources, Armenia’s Deputy Justice Minister
Gevorg Kostanian will soon replace RoA President’s Assistant Gevorg
Mherian in the European Court of Human Rights. Gevorg Mherian also
chairs the Anti-Corruption Strategy Monitoring Commission.

It is still difficult to say whether the replacement is determined by
Armenia’s "defeats or victories" at the European Court, or Kostanian’s
comments on the EC decision.

While Glossing Over Post-Soviet Conflicts

WHILE GLOSSING OVER POST-SOVIET CONFLICTS
Vladimir Socor

Eurasia Daily Monitor
DC
Wednesday, July 2, 2008

The unresolved conflicts, conducted or underwritten by Russia in
ex-Soviet territories, were glossed over in Khanty-Mansiisk. EU High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier
Solana had informally assured Georgian leaders ahead of the summit
that he would "forcefully" take issue with Russia’s forcible seizure
of Abkhazia. Such a step would have signified a major departure from
Solana’s indifferent track record on this and related issues.

By all accounts from Khanty-Mansiisk, however, Solana and the other
EU leaders shied away from any substantive discussion of Abkhazia
and the other post-Soviet conflicts. They also failed to raise the
issue of transforming Russia’s "peace-keeping" operation to conform
to international standards. Solana and several other top figures had
given those informal assurances to Georgia on the understanding that
Tbilisi would in turn refrain from declaring Russia’s "peace-keeping"
troops illegal. These EU leaders’ authority in that regard will not
be the same in Georgia after Khanty-Mansiisk.

According to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov,
one item on the summit agenda was the "five conflicts: Kosovo,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Karabakh, and Transnistria" [in that order]
(RIA-Novosti, June 27). If so, Moscow succeeded for the first time
to link the conflict in Kosovo with the four post-Soviet conflicts
at this summit. Initial post-summit briefings in Brussels seem to
confirm that the five conflicts were discussed as a package at
Khanty-Mansiisk. Linking conflict resolution in the post-Soviet
territories to that in Kosovo, so as to complicate all solutions
even further, became Russia’s policy during the final stages of
negotiations leading to Kosovo’s independence. It seems to have
re-emerged in Khanty-Mansiisk in a modified form.

According to Russia’s envoy to the EU, Valery Chizhov, on the eve
of the Khanty-Mansiisk summit (RIA-Novosti, June 23; Eurasia Home,
June 25), Moscow opposes the sending of an EU civil mission to Kosovo,
unless the mission is officially endorsed by Serbia and approved by
a resolution of the United Nations Security Council. This clearly
implies an offer to bargain with Russia. Lavrov, and presumably
President Dmitry Medvedev in the background, reiterated this position
in Khanty-Mansiisk (Itar-Tass, June 27). They seemed to suggest that
Russia did not need Georgian consent to the "peace-keeping" operation
in Abkhazia, as long as the EU and NATO feel that they did not need
Serbian consent to their ongoing or planned missions in Kosovo.

That logic fails on multiple counts, however. Georgia is the lawful and
recognized holder of sovereignty in Abkhazia, which Serbia is not in
Kosovo. The Russian seizure of Abkhazia is based on ethnic cleansing,
whereas the political resolution in Kosovo is based on reversing the
ethnic cleansing. The ongoing or planned Western missions in Kosovo
conform to international standards for such operations, whereas
Russia’s operation in Abkhazia violates the most basic accepted
standards. And no operation or country pursues annexation goals in
Kosovo, whereas Russia does so in Abkhazia. Such stark differences
between the two situations notwithstanding, Moscow again attempted
to equate them. Moscow seems to hint that it might not block an EU
mission in Kosovo, if the EU and other Western chancelleries continue
to tolerate Russia’s military "peace-keeping" and de facto annexation
of Abkhazia.

Summing up the discussion on the conflicts for the Russian media
after Khanty-Mansiisk, Lavrov declared that Russia would consider the
possibility of some EU participation in conflict-resolution processes
on post-Soviet territories. Any EU involvement should not, however,
change "the existing formats" for peace-keeping and negotiations,
he cautioned. Russia and the EU could cooperate in seeking solutions,
but "the main task is to promote direct contacts between the parties
to the conflicts" (Interfax, Itar-Tass, June 27).

Lavrov’s remarks express the familiar goal to maintain the formats
created in the early 1990s without significant changes in the future,
while accepting some minor EU involvement on economic reconstruction
issues. Ostensibly promoting direct contacts between the local parties
and placing the onus for political resolution on them is also a
familiar tactic. It obscures Moscow’s role as the main party to the
conflict, equates its secessionist protégés with the recognized
state on the opposite side, and seeks a step-by-step acceptance and de
facto recognition of Russia’s local clients. Moreover, Moscow insists
on vetting de facto authorities’ direct contacts with the legitimate
governments and has thus far been successful in controlling the agenda
of such contacts.

While Russia essentially stonewalled on these issues at
Khanty-Mansiisk, the EU and the United States are increasingly
promoting a new concept of direct contacts and confidence-building
measures, outside Russian control. Georgia supports and initiates such
steps as parts of a three-track diplomatic effort: internationally,
bilaterally with Russia, and locally with secessionist authorities
(see EDM, June 30). Success depends, however, on active EU and
U.S. involvement on all three levels, not just in the ancillary role
to which Russia would restrict them.

–Boundary_(ID_0qpN9/RMPgmez2nfnlWSHA)–

Armenians To Get Social Cards Instantly

ARMENIANS TO GET SOCIAL CARDS INSTANTLY

ARKA
June 28

>From now on, Armenians will be able to get their
social cards immediately after they submit an application. For this,
Armenian citizens need to apply to the Nork Information and Analytical
Centre of RA Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, produce their
passports and get their social cards in a few minutes.

The Press Service of the Nork Information Centre said soon people will
have an opportunity to instantly get their social cards in banks and
customs departments as well.

The new system substantially simplifies the process of issuing
social cards.

So far 2,76mln social cards have been issued in Armenia. The system
of individual social cards was introduced in Armenia on January 1,
2005, in accordance with RA Law "On Social Cards".

It says each citizen of Armenia, as well as refugees and people
without citizenship irrespective of their age must be issued social
cards bearing 10 symbols, with reference to sex, date of birth,
and passport number.

Russia EU don’t intend to change format of talks on frozen conflicts

PanARMENIAN.Net

Russia, EU don’t intend to change format of talks on frozen conflicts
28.06.2008 15:06 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Moscow supports EU’s wish to be more active in
settlement of frozen regional conflicts but doesn’t think it expedient
to change the format of talks, according to Russia’s Foreign Minister.

`It’s inexpedient to break the format of talks now,’ Sergei Lavrov
said during Russia-EU summit in Khanty-Mansiysk, RIA Novosti reports.

The summit focused on the Kosovo problem and frozen conflicts in the
CIS: the Georgian-Abkhazian, Georgian-South Ossetian, Nagorno Karabakh
and Transnistrian conflicts.