WHILE GLOSSING OVER POST-SOVIET CONFLICTS
Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor
DC
Wednesday, July 2, 2008
The unresolved conflicts, conducted or underwritten by Russia in
ex-Soviet territories, were glossed over in Khanty-Mansiisk. EU High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier
Solana had informally assured Georgian leaders ahead of the summit
that he would "forcefully" take issue with Russia’s forcible seizure
of Abkhazia. Such a step would have signified a major departure from
Solana’s indifferent track record on this and related issues.
By all accounts from Khanty-Mansiisk, however, Solana and the other
EU leaders shied away from any substantive discussion of Abkhazia
and the other post-Soviet conflicts. They also failed to raise the
issue of transforming Russia’s "peace-keeping" operation to conform
to international standards. Solana and several other top figures had
given those informal assurances to Georgia on the understanding that
Tbilisi would in turn refrain from declaring Russia’s "peace-keeping"
troops illegal. These EU leaders’ authority in that regard will not
be the same in Georgia after Khanty-Mansiisk.
According to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov,
one item on the summit agenda was the "five conflicts: Kosovo,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Karabakh, and Transnistria" [in that order]
(RIA-Novosti, June 27). If so, Moscow succeeded for the first time
to link the conflict in Kosovo with the four post-Soviet conflicts
at this summit. Initial post-summit briefings in Brussels seem to
confirm that the five conflicts were discussed as a package at
Khanty-Mansiisk. Linking conflict resolution in the post-Soviet
territories to that in Kosovo, so as to complicate all solutions
even further, became Russia’s policy during the final stages of
negotiations leading to Kosovo’s independence. It seems to have
re-emerged in Khanty-Mansiisk in a modified form.
According to Russia’s envoy to the EU, Valery Chizhov, on the eve
of the Khanty-Mansiisk summit (RIA-Novosti, June 23; Eurasia Home,
June 25), Moscow opposes the sending of an EU civil mission to Kosovo,
unless the mission is officially endorsed by Serbia and approved by
a resolution of the United Nations Security Council. This clearly
implies an offer to bargain with Russia. Lavrov, and presumably
President Dmitry Medvedev in the background, reiterated this position
in Khanty-Mansiisk (Itar-Tass, June 27). They seemed to suggest that
Russia did not need Georgian consent to the "peace-keeping" operation
in Abkhazia, as long as the EU and NATO feel that they did not need
Serbian consent to their ongoing or planned missions in Kosovo.
That logic fails on multiple counts, however. Georgia is the lawful and
recognized holder of sovereignty in Abkhazia, which Serbia is not in
Kosovo. The Russian seizure of Abkhazia is based on ethnic cleansing,
whereas the political resolution in Kosovo is based on reversing the
ethnic cleansing. The ongoing or planned Western missions in Kosovo
conform to international standards for such operations, whereas
Russia’s operation in Abkhazia violates the most basic accepted
standards. And no operation or country pursues annexation goals in
Kosovo, whereas Russia does so in Abkhazia. Such stark differences
between the two situations notwithstanding, Moscow again attempted
to equate them. Moscow seems to hint that it might not block an EU
mission in Kosovo, if the EU and other Western chancelleries continue
to tolerate Russia’s military "peace-keeping" and de facto annexation
of Abkhazia.
Summing up the discussion on the conflicts for the Russian media
after Khanty-Mansiisk, Lavrov declared that Russia would consider the
possibility of some EU participation in conflict-resolution processes
on post-Soviet territories. Any EU involvement should not, however,
change "the existing formats" for peace-keeping and negotiations,
he cautioned. Russia and the EU could cooperate in seeking solutions,
but "the main task is to promote direct contacts between the parties
to the conflicts" (Interfax, Itar-Tass, June 27).
Lavrov’s remarks express the familiar goal to maintain the formats
created in the early 1990s without significant changes in the future,
while accepting some minor EU involvement on economic reconstruction
issues. Ostensibly promoting direct contacts between the local parties
and placing the onus for political resolution on them is also a
familiar tactic. It obscures Moscow’s role as the main party to the
conflict, equates its secessionist protégés with the recognized
state on the opposite side, and seeks a step-by-step acceptance and de
facto recognition of Russia’s local clients. Moreover, Moscow insists
on vetting de facto authorities’ direct contacts with the legitimate
governments and has thus far been successful in controlling the agenda
of such contacts.
While Russia essentially stonewalled on these issues at
Khanty-Mansiisk, the EU and the United States are increasingly
promoting a new concept of direct contacts and confidence-building
measures, outside Russian control. Georgia supports and initiates such
steps as parts of a three-track diplomatic effort: internationally,
bilaterally with Russia, and locally with secessionist authorities
(see EDM, June 30). Success depends, however, on active EU and
U.S. involvement on all three levels, not just in the ancillary role
to which Russia would restrict them.
–Boundary_(ID_0qpN9/RMPgmez2nfnlWSHA)–